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Summary 
This thesis examines discussions within the British government held about 
immigration from the Commonwealth in the period between 1948 and 1964 and 
clarifies the role the government actors played. The introduction of the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 is an important event in British postwar 
history so that the political developments leading to the Act have been well 
researched. However, previous works on this topic have emphasised the role played 
by Parliament, political parties and politicians in the policy process, while they have 
neglected the role of non-political actors. Recognising this bias in research, this 
thesis clarifies the important and indispensable role played by civil servants in the 
policy process on Commonwealth immigration during this period. 
Through intensive archival research, in particular on British government 
documents deposited in the Public Record Office at Kew, this thesis chronologically 
analyses the policy process on Commonwealth immigration and the role major 
actors played there. Departmental files which have not been intensively studied so 
far are surveyed in depth to disclose the discussions among civil servants and their 
impact on policy development. 
In the policy process from 1948 to 1964 a small circle of policy experts was 
formed within the government, consisting of civil servants, in particular from the 
Home Office, the Colonial Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office and the 
Ministry of Labour. This policy community worked to exclude political pressure 
exercised from outside of the government on the one hand and to delineate the 
goverm-nent view of, and policy options for, Commonwealth immigration on the 
other hand. As a result, the social consequences of immigration were much 
emphasised and restrictive policy measures were consistently sought. 
This thesis shows that civil servants, whose positions within the government 
were assured by the existence of such a closed policy community, played a 
substantial part in the policy process on Commonwealth immigration. 
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Part I 
Framework of Analysis 
Chapter 1 British Government's Policy on Commonwealth 
Immigration 
1. Scope of the Thesis 
This thesis examines British governments' policy making on immigration from the 
Commonwealth from 1948 to 1964 and aims to disclose the role policy makers 
within the government played in this process, as well as the structure within the 
government in formulating immigration policy during this period. There are two 
questions to which this thesis tries to answer. The first question is: how and to what 
extent have civil servants exerted influence in the policy process ?A particular 
emphasis of the thesis is put on the civil service, not on individual politicians, 
political parties, or interest groups, which, although having been regarded as 
important actors in previous works, in fact are neither permanent members of policy 
making circles nor have regular links with them. As compared to the role of elective 
actors in policy making, i. e. Cabinet ministers and other politicians, that of non- 
elective actors have been relatively dismissed in the study of British politics. This is 
no exception in the case of immigration policy. Most works have devoted 
themselves to describing a history of events or analysing the role of particular 
politicians, political parties, or "political pressure". 
The second question is: how does one particular set of issues rather than 
another capture policy makers' attention in the course of discussion ? This research 
that pays particular attention to civil servants aims to complement these previous 
discoveries by focusing on the structure of policy formulation and regarding a 
policy as an outcome from such a stable structure. The structure that appears within 
the policy process binds relations between government policy makers. Composed of 
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inforinal networks between them and constitutional rules, it is to accumulate and 
institutionalise expert knowledge and skills in approaching a particular policy issue. 
The development of government policy is therefore viewed from its interactions 
with the development of the structure within the policy process. 
The period covered in this thesis is the one when the foundation of today's 
British immigration policy, including that for non-Commonwealth immigration, 
were established with respect to organisation, philosophy and policy measures. 
Historically British governments had allowed British subjects, including those from 
Commonwealth countries, the right of free entry to the UK. After the Second World 
War a remarkable increase in the influx from the West Indies occurred, which was 
followed, from the mid 1950s, by the influx from India and Pakistan. As a response, 
the British government introduced a law in 1962, which was to deprive the right of 
British subjects from the Commonwealth of free entry to the UK. The new Act, 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, obliged those Commonwealth people who 
intended to enter the UK to work to acquire an employment voucher in advance. 
With the continuing high pressure of immigration from India and Pakistan even 
after the Act went into force in July 1962, the number of the issue of vouchers was 
gradually reduced and finally in 1965 the categories of voucher for the unskilled 
were abolished. 
The Act was the first legislative measure by which the British government 
imposed control on the Commonwealth people intending to enter the UK. The 
British government's policy at this period was exceptional compared with those of 
other West European countries. It was trying to control a large influx of unskilled 
workers when other European countries were introducing comparatively cheap 
workers from outside during a period of economic expansion which was causing a 
severe shortage of labour. Until the economic depression triggered by the energy 
crisis of 1972-73, most West European countries actively recruited labour from 
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abroad to fill the domestic labour demand caused by the high economic growth. In 
this regard British legislation foreshadowed the present policy of maný countries, 
which shut their door to unskilled workers with the end of the economic boom. 
A large number of researchers have analysed British immigration policy 
during this period. ' Their main interests have been to find out the events and 
decisions at a particular place and time which appear more important than others. 
There is no doubt that these works, regarding each event as more or less accidental 
ones, have made great contributions to discovering the socially and economically 
significant events over this issue, or "politics" on immigration policy. 
Unfortunately, however, they have neglected the process in which policy was 
formulated and the role various policy makers played there. 
This tendency to focus on political actors could be justified if the policy 
making of a particular area has a strong politics-oriented nature. Donley T. Studlar 
claims that immigration policy is classified into the "emotive symbolism" policy 
area, which T. A. Smith proclaimed by refining Theodore Lowi's famous typology 
on policy areas. 2 The emotive symbolism policy has such characteristics as: the 
I Main among them published as books are: Paul Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics 
(Han-nondsworth, Penguin Books, 1965); Ira Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities: Race, Politics, 
and Migration in the United States, 1900-30, and Britain, 1948-68 (London, Oxford University 
Press, 1973); Zig Layton-Henry, The Politics of Race in Britain (London, George Allen and Unwin, Z=1 
1984); Colin Holmes, John Bull's Island- Immigration and British Society, 1871-1971 (London, 
Macmillan, 1988); Paul Rich, Race and Empire in British Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge Z! ) 
University Press, 2nd ed., 1990); Ann Durnmett and Andrew Nicol, Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and 
Others: Nationality and Immigration Law (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990); Zig Layton- 
Henry, Politics of Immigration: Immigration, 'Race' and 'Race' Relations in Post-war Britain 
(Oxford, Blackwell, 1992); Shamit Saggar, Race and Politics in Britain (London, Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1992); and John Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2nd 
ed., 1993). 
2 Donley T. Studlar, 'Elite responsiveness or elite autonomy: British immigration policy 
reconsidered', Ethnic and Racial Studies, 3,2 (1980), 207-23 ), T. Alexander Smith, The Comparative 
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effects of policy extend to many fields of everyday life as the policy basically relates 
to the people; and the contents of policy lack specialist nature. Consequently this 
policy area tends to arouse so much public interest that potential participants on the 
policy formulation are liable to be numerous. In a policy area of this kind, policy 
makers tend to be responsive to external pressures. Studlar argues in this respect 
that British immigration policy has been formulated in a way reactive to public 
opinion. 3 
However, even though the policy process of immigration policy had, as 
Studlar argues, the political nature, this can never be an excuse for dismissing the 
role of actors other than politicians or the public in the policy process. The whole 
picture of the policy formulation would not be disclosed without examining the 
structure in which a wide range of significant actors were embedded and the role 
such actors played there. This is particularly important in the analysis of the 
government in the postwar period, where specialist skills and knowledge on 
particular matters have gained its importance. The permanent staff within the 
government were to be illuminated in the light of such technical knowledge. This 
thesis examines the role of civil servants in the policy formulation within the 
government on the basis of this recognition. 
2. Contents and Contexts of Policy on Commonwealth Immigration 
The characteristics of the policy process in a particular area depend, to a 
Policy Process (Santa Barbara, CA, American Bibliographical Center/Clio Press, 1975); Theodore J. 
Lowi, 'American business, public policy, case-studies, and political theory', World Politics, 16,4 
(1964), 677-715. 
3 Studlar, 'Elite responsiveness or elite autonomy'. 
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considerable extent, on those of policy itself. It is thus useful to summarise at first. 
what political and social contexts British policy on Commonwealth immigration 
stands in. 
Tomas Hammar makes a working definition of "immigration policy" to 
compare relevant policies of a number of West European countrieS. 4 In his 
classification, "immigration policy" consists of two interrelated, but distinct, parts. 
These are: regulation of flows of immigration and control of aliens; and policies 
relating to the conditions provided to resident immigrants, which he called 
"immigrant policy". These two policies are distinct and even considerably different 
from each other so that reference to both policies in a single term, as is often seen in 
the everyday context, has little meaning. 
In this research "immigration policy" refers to the first part of Hammar's 
terminology, that is, immigration regulation and aliens control. It relates to the 
control of the admission and residence of, and the guarantee of "permanent status" 
for, foreign citizens, that is, both vulnerability and stability of their legal status. 5 
This use of the term corresponds approximately to the British government's 
terminology of policy on immigration. According to an official statement by the 
Home Office, 6 British government's current policy on immigration and nationality 
is to: 
" allow genuine visitors and students to enter the United Kingdom; 
" give effect to the "free movement" provisions of European Community Law; 
" continue to admit the spouses and minor dependent children of those already 
settled in the United Kingdom, provided that they satisfy the requirements of 
4 Tomas Hammar, 'Introduction' in Tomas Hanu-nar (ed. ), European Immigration Policy: A 
Comparative Study (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 1-13), pp. 7-10. 
5 Hammar, 'Introduction', p. 9. 
6 Home Office, Annual Report 1997: The Government's Expenditure Plans 1997-1998 to 1999- 
2000, Crn. 3608 (London, HMSO, 1997), March 1997, p. 87. 
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the Immigration Rules; 
9 meet the United Kingdom's obligations towards refugees under international 
law, while reducing the scope and incentive for misusing asylum procedures; 
* subject to the above, restrict severely the numbers coming to live 
permanently or to work in the United Kingdom; 
9 detect and remove those entering or remaining in the United Kingdom 
without authority; and 
9 maintain an effective and efficient system for dealing with applicants for 
citizenship. 
Of these seven points all but the last, which is concemed with nationality and 
naturalisation, are regarded as, and compose, British government's policy on 
immigration. 
Contexts of immigration policy 
In many national governments, immigration policy constitutes an independent 
policy area, but this comprises various elements each of which may be influenced 
by concerns in related areas. Immigration policy is a mixture of various policies of 
the national goverment. It concerns a wide range of policy areas such as external 
relations, the economy and domestic affairs. 
Patterns of postwar immigration, and therefore government's policy on 
immigration, differed considerably from country to country. In the case of Britain, 
immigration flow occurred more or less spontaneously from its colonies or former 
territories. In Germany and Switzerland, the organised introduction of migrant 
workers was attempted. France and the Netherlands experienced both types of 
migration. 
From these postwar experiences in European countries, at least three typical 
perspectives of the government about the policy, or policy contexts, of immigration 
7 
are identified. 7 
1. Immigration is perceived in terms of external policy. The Issue is seen 
from the view of relations with other governments, in particular the sending 
governments, which may be colonies or former territories. Policy is supervised by 
such ministries as Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Colonial Affairs. The main 
concern of these ministries is to maintain peaceful relations with these countries or 
territories, so that they usually show reluctance in drastic restrictions on 
immigration flows. Participants in the policy process are limited to a small number 
in the core of the government. 
2. Immigration is perceived in terms of economic policy, particularly 
responding to the demand in the domestic labour market. Usually immigrants are 
introduced as the organised labour force through bilateral governmental agreements. 
Immigration is controlled in relation to the situation of the domestic labour market. 
In addition to the government, business and industry such as employers and union 
leaders may exert some influence on policy. The crucial government ministries are 
Ministries of Labour and of Economic Affairs. Participants in the policy process are 
limited to a relatively small number of the core staff. 
3. Immigration is perceived in relation to other people in society, often with 
a growing recognition that immigrants are potential settlers. Patterns of perception 
reflect domestic social situations and the general conception on state-society 
relations. Therefore actual perceptions about immigrants may diverge, some 
regarding them from the perspective of integration while others may see them as a 
potential threat to public order. Usually, the Ministry of Justice or of Interior (or of 
Home Affairs) has a central seat in the policy process, as it supervises immigration 
7 Ann Dummett also raises four perspectives on immigration policy - legal, economic, moral and 
political. Her perspectives are, however, philosophical rather than empirical. See, Ann Dummett, A 
New Immigration Policy (London, A Runnymede Trust Publication, 1978). 
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control in most countries. In addition many domestic ministries are involved in the 
policy process. Policy makers may be limited to the ordinary staff, such as Cabinet 
ministers, senior civil servants and policy advisors. However, the boundary of 
policy makers can easily expand so as to include politicians, the media and the 
public. Participants may come from an unpredictably wide range of fields. A rapid 
increase of immigration may raise the salience of the issue and draw a wide range of 
groups and actors into the policy process. Elites may thus restrict a rapid rise in 
immigration in order to maintain control of the policy process. 
These three contexts may co-exist at a particular point of time, or they may 
arise one after another in the passage of time. However they are distinguishable in 
terms of both institutions, that is, participants in the policy process, and perceptions 
on issues. These perspectives drawn from empirical cases of European countries are 
also identified in British immigration policy. 
British conditions - 1. external relations 
British policy on Commonwealth immigration is explained in part by the process of 
decolonisation, in which the privileged status of residents in the former Empire was 
gradually withdrawn. 
After 1945 British withdrawal from the Empire became more certain. John 
Darwin argues that 'if by the "end of empire" we mean the final disintegration of an 
imperial system pivoted on British military and economic power, then it was in the 
postwar years that collapse began, and not until after 1960 that it was complete'. 8 In 
particular, the setback of the Suez crisis in 1956 was recorded in postwar British 
history not simply by the resignation of a Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, but by 
making the end of Empire and the decline of the British superpower status in the 
8 John Darwin, The End of the British Empire: The Historical Debate (Oxford, Blackwell, 199 1), 
p. 4. 
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world politics decisive. 9 
In the process of withdrawing from the Empire, Britain required, for both 
political and economic reasons, a new framework which would link herself with the 
former Empire. Her superpower status was believed by British politicians only to be 
secure if Britain remained the leader of the successor group to the Empire. The 
Commonwealth, which consisted of independent states but each continued to have 
strong links with Britain and accordingly to act together in the international political 
arena, could help to maintain Britain's prestige in the world. With a view to 
maintaining the ties between members of the Commonwealth, the British 
government made efforts to allow other Commonwealth governments preferential 
access in trade and easier mobility of capital and labour to the UK. 
This strategy to build the Commonwealth into a coherent political bloc was 
not much successful in general. However, the historical and imperial links became 
the background to migration from the Commonwealth to the UK on the one hand, 
and caused British policy makers to hesitate to restrict the rights of migrants on the 
other hand. It is true that postwar immigration from the Commonwealth occurred 
without positive involvement of the British government. However, people in the 
former Empire, whether the territory was independent or not, were supposed to have 
full civic rights in the UK as British subjects, so that they could vote, run for 
Parliament, and serve in the armed forces and public services. The right of access to 
the UK was one of such rights enjoyed by British subjects. 
In postwar legislation the British Nationality Act of 1948 confirmed these 
9 Peter Hennessy and Mark Laity, 'Suez: what the paper say', Contemporary Record, 1,1 (1987), 
2-8, p. 8. This "conventional" idea was supported by Brian Lapping, but refuted by Anthony Low in a 
later issue of Contemporary Record. Low claims the historical meaning of the Suez crisis is much 
exaggerated. See, Anthony Low and Brian Lapping, 'Did Suez hasten the end of EmpireT tý 
Contemporary Record, 1,2 (1987), 31 -3 ) 
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rights of being a British subject. 10 Introduced as a response to the policy of the 
Canadian government to set up her own citizenship independent of the UK one, it 
set up a new "Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC)" categorv 
within the "British subject" category, and thus excluded citizens of the 
Commonwealth countries with an independent citizenship of their own (e. g. 
Canada) from the CUKC. However the intention of the 1948 Act was to ensure that 
the citizens of independent Commonwealth countries and people in British Colonies 
all remained "British subjects". In this way it was hoped to maintain the unity of the 
Colonies and former Colonies and allegiance to the Crown through the "British 
subject" status. Citizens of the Commonwealth countries therefore continued to be 
guaranteed legal rights as "British subjects". II At this time the right of access to the 
UK had not been expected to be exercised. However this privilege began to be used 
on a large scale from the late 1940s. 12 
Apart from legal rights, migration hardly occurs without personal relations 
with destination countries. In the case of immigration to the UK, as Zig Layton- 
Henry explains, 'The imperial connection seems to have given West Indians in 
particular a high expectation of the wealth and benevolence of the Mother Country 
and feelings that they would be well received, treated as full and equal citizens, and 
achieve a high standard of living. Many had good memories or reports of the 
welcome and treatment that West Indians had received in Britain during the war'. 13 
Imperial connections mean, also in the cultural sense, that those coming from 
10 Vaughan Bevan, The Development of British immigration Law (London, Croom Helm, 1986), 
p. 112. 
11 Ian A. Macdonald, Immigration Law and Practice in the United Kingdom (London, 
Butterworths, 2nd ed., 1987), pp. 72-80. 
12 cf. Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics, p. 125. 
13 Zig Layton-Henry, 'Great Britain' in Hammar Tomas (ed. ), European Immigration Policy: .4 
Comparative Studjý (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 89-126, p. 95. I 
Colonies and Commonwealth could often speak English, sometimes even as their 
mother tongue. 
Meanwhile this special relationship with the former Empire also acted as a 
constraint when the British government tried to invent new policies. 14 At best, 
decolonisation needed to be a peaceful process in order to secure Britain's position 
in the world through leadership of a Commonwealth of independent states. At 
worst, the symbolic importance of the Commonwealth as the institutional successor 
of the Empire and the personal human relations with "old" Commonwealth 
countries in particular acted as a brake on decolonisation. British policy makers 
were likely to resist ideas that would halt free movement between Britain and the 
Commonwealth. 15 Moreover, political importance in the new world order of the 
Commonwealth increasingly composed of "Third World" countries needed to be 
fully considered when introducing immigration controls. 
British conditions -Z economy and demography 
A shortage of labour was a crucial problem for the postwar British economy. With 
the exception of a fuel crisis in the early months of 1947, which itself triggered by a 
labour shortage in the pits, unemployment kept at a low level until the mid 1950s. it 
has been pointed out that the shortage of labour was one reason for the relatively 
slow economic growth in postwar Britain. 16 In fact, other West European 
governments introduced labour from abroad to solve their domestic labour 
shortages. The French government in particular encouraged permanent settlement 
from neighbouring countries both in order to meet labour needs and to compensate 
14 Darwin, The End of the British Empire, p. 34. 
15 Nicholas Deakin, 'The politics of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill', Political Quarterly, 39, 
1 (1968), 24-45, p-34. 
16 For example, Charles P. Kindleberger, Europe's Postwar Growth: The Role of Labor Supply Z: p 
(Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1967). 
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for sluggish population growth derived from a low fertility rate. 17 However. the 
British governments were less proactive. 
This did not mean that Britain had a firm prospect for labour supply. On the 
contrary, the government repeated its concerns with the labour shortage in its annual 
Economic Survey and encouraged women and elderly people to enter the labour 
market. It was in these circumstances that an introduction of foreign labour was 
given a place in government's economic policy. The 1947 Economic Survey stated 
in a section of "the Objectives for 1947" that 'we shall require a larger labour force'. 
As one of the ways to increase the labour force, it suggested that 'Foreign labour can 
make a useful contribution to our needs'. 18 
From 1945 to 195 1, the goverm-nent permitted displaced persons in Eastern 
and Central Europe to settle in the UK mainly in expectation of their contribution to 
the British labour market. 19 115,000 Poles of the former Warsaw government, 
officials, demobilised soldiers and their families were permitted a permanent stay in 
Britain. 20 80,000 displaced East and Central Europeans were recruited to Britain 
under the European Voluntary Worker schemes. 21 They were introduced in such 
17 The French immigration policy in the postwar period is well analysed within the comparative 
framework by the following works: Gilles Verbunt, 'France' in Hammar Tomas (ed. ), European 
Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985), 127-64; 
and Gary Freeman, Immigrant Labour and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and 
British Experience 1945-1975 (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1979). 
18 Economic Survey, Cmd. 7046 (London, HMSO, 1947), February 1947, pp. 27-8. 
19 Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics, pp. 1 15-23. 
20 This resettlement of Polish people to the UK is dealt with by: J. Zubrzycki, Polish Immigrants 
to Britain (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1956); Keith Sword, 'The absorption of Poles into civilian 
employment in Britain, 1945-1950' in A. C. Bramwell (ed. ), Refugees in the Age of Total War 
(London, Unwin Hyman, 1988); Keith Sword, N. Davis and Jan Ciechanowski, The Formation of the 
Polish Community in Great Britain, 1939-50 (London, School of Slavonic and East European 
Studies, 1989). 
21 For the European Voluntary Workers schemes, see J. A. Tannahill, European Voluntary 
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industries as agriculture, textiles and health, where labour shortages were 
particularly serious. The 1949 Economic Survey gave a positive assessment to the 
introduction of these foreigners, writing that 'Foreign labour provided in 1948 a 
valuable addition to the total manpower in civil employment'. 22 
From the demographic perspective, Britain's ageing and stagnating 
population raised a concern of both governmental and non-governmental experts. 
The Political and Economic Planning (PEP), a non-governmental think tank in 
London, proposed in its report of April 1948 that the government should adopt 'a 
positive immigration' policy a part of population poliCy. 23 It supported immigration 
from European countries with a view to relieving shortages of manpower, replacing 
losses through emigration to the Commonwealth, and offsetting a decline in 
fertility. In the same manner the government's Royal Commission on Population 
showed its concern in its report in June 1949 that the trend of population would lead 
to a loss of flexibility in the economy, a rise in dependency ratio, decreasing 
emigration to Commonwealth countries (which was thought to be important for 
keeping ties with Britain), and a threat to national security. Like the PEP, the Royal 
Commission referred to the government scheme of European immigration. 
However, unlike the PEP, it clearly opposed the idea of placing immigration in 
population policy, saying that 'we should have to face serious problems of 
assimilation beyond those of training and housing'. 24 
Workers in Britain (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1958); and, Diana Kay and Robert 
Miles, Refugees or Migrant Workers? The Recruitment of Displaced Persons for British Industry 
1946-1951 (London, Routledge, 1992). 
22 Economic Survey, Cmd. 7647 (London, HMSO, 1949), March 1949, p. 33. 
23 Political and Economic Planning, Population Policy in Great Britain (London, Political and 
Economic Planning, 1948), pp. 108-16. 
24 Royal Commission on Population, Report, Cmd. 7695 (London, HMSO, 1949), June 1949, 
p. 124. 
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The labour shortages in Britain had been alleviated in part by Unorganised 
immigration from abroad. The largest influx was from Ireland. Even after her 
independence from the UK as the Irish Free State in 1922, and her subsequent 
withdrawal from the British Commonwealth in 1948, British governments allowed 
Irish citizens free entry and residence in the UK. There was constant large-scale 
immigration from Ireland to the UK for settlement and seasonal work, particularly 
in agriculture. Though few official statistics are available, the net annual influx 
from Ireland to the UK is estimated to be 35,000 to 55,000 between 1950 to 1960 
and 10,000 to 20,000 between 1961 to 1968.25 
Immigration from the former Empire can be similarly viewed from the 
labour force perspective. This source holding the right of free entry and unhindered 
by legislation on aliens must have been a "heaven-sent gift" for the government and 
the labour-hungry employers. 26 Moreover, compared to the official recruitment of 
European Voluntary Workers, this source should have been advantageous to the 
government as it did not hold automatic responsibility for finding accommodation 
and other forms of social assistance. In fact Ceri Peach's statistical survey from 
1956 to 1965, has shown that the main determinant of West Indian migration to the 
UK during this period was not government actions, but the demand for labour in the 
UK. Except for the extraordinary large influx in 1960 and 1961, when the 
introduction of legislative restrictions was rumoured, the fluctuation of West Indian 
migration roughly corresponded to the labour demand, namely the situation of the 
UK economy. Peach further claims that a decrease in arrivals soon after the new 
scheme was introduced in July 1962 was not as a result of government action, but 
that it can be explained as a decline in labour demand and a consequence of the high 
'15 F. X. Kirwan, 'Recent Anglo-Irish migration: the evidence of the British Labour Force Surveys', I 
Economic and Social Review, 13,3 (1982), 191-203, p. 195. 
26 Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics, p. 126. 
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number of arrivals before July 1962.27 
British conditions - 3. social impacts andpublic order 
The influx of more than ten thousand immigrants in a small number of large cities 
every year were concerned from their impact on social services in localities. It %ý'as 
claimed to be as if, particularly in inner-city districts, severe housing problems were 
created 'virtually overnight'. 28 The impact on local authority services were often 
exaggerated. However, this caused public anxiety which resulted in supporting the 
argument for the introduction of control of immigration. 29 
Tensions with neighbouring people were another major concern. Already 
before immigration from the Commonwealth increased at the turn of the decade to 
1950s, sporadic attacks by white youths on coloured people were not uncommon. 30 
Above all, a series of attacks on coloured people by white youths in the summer of 
1958 at Notting Hill and Nottingham are today considered by many researchers to 
be a major turning point of the government thinking in the policy on immigration 
towards restriction. 
By the time when legislation on immigration of aliens and that of British 
subjects were unified in a single law, the Immigration Act of 1971, the purpose of 
British immigration policy had come to be considered from a contribution to social 
harmony and integration. In 1971, Reginald Maudling, Home Secretary, articulated 
in the House of Commons as follows: 
27 Ceri Peach, West Indian Migration to Britain: A Social Geography (London, Oxford University 
Press, 1968); and Ceri Peach, 'British unemployment cycles and West Indian immigration - 1955- 
1974', New Community, 7,1 (1978), 40-4. 
28 Anthony M. Messina, Race and Party Competition in Britain (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989), 
p. 22. 
29 Deakin, 'The politics of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill', pp. 27-8. 
30 Layton-Henry, The Politics of Race in Britain, p. 3 5. 
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The main purpose of immigration policy ... 
is as a contribution to the great 
problem of ensuring that the varied communities which we have here can settle 
down progressively over the years to live together in peace and harmony. ... If 
we are to get progress in community relations, we must give assurance to the 
people who were already here before the large wave of immigration that this will 
be the end and that there will be no further large scale immigration. Unless we 
can give that assurance we cannot effectively set about the job ... of 
improving 
community relations. 31 
The tendency to link immigration with "law and order" has, rather than in the 1950s 
and 1960s, reinforced towards today. 32 
3. The Policy Process on Commonwealth Immigration 
Many researchers have touched on British immigration policy in this period. 
However, their main interest has been to focus on historically important events, 
which brought about major changes in policy, and to explain them by tracing 
discussions at a particular place and time. Their emphasis has been put on 
descriptions of history or the role of elective actors (e. g politicians) and their 
relations with the public. In contrast, analyses of the policy process and the role of 
non-elective actors (e. g civil servants) as an indispensable aspect of the policy 
31 House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 'Immigration Bill', House of Commons Official 
Report, Session 1970-71, Vol. 813 (London, HMSO, 1971), 8 March 1971, cols. 42-173), cols. 43-4. 
32 Messina, Race and Party Competition in Britain, p. 186; and, John Solomos, Black Youth, 
Racism and the State: The Politics of Ideology and Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1986), p. 43. 
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process, have been relatively dismissed (Figure 1.1). 
The focus of previous works concerned with the policy area of 
Commonwealth immigration has tended to concentrate on major changes in policV. 
As regards the policy from the late 1940s to the mid 1960s, the introduction of 
restrictive measures, particularly the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, has 
been taken as the most important event. As far as the role of particular actors are 
concerned, these works have resulted in raising two different types of theses about 
the role of the political elite. These could be described as elite responsiveness and 
elite autonomy. 33 
Elite responsiveness thesis 
Early works have put great emphasis on the influence of public and Parliamentary 
pressure on elite's decisions. These works represented by Foot, Deakin and 
Katznelson have all tried to answer the question as to why the policy change 
occurred. 34 Points of emphasis may vary, but they claim that domestic incidents in 
the late 1950s, in particular the urban disturbances of 1958 and the general election 
of 1959, became the turning points of this process. 
These works claim that the immigration issue was not a central theme of the 
British politics until some time in the late 1950s. Nicholas Deakin argues, 'until 
1958 the question of immigration from the Colonies and Commonwealth only 
touched the fringe of political debate, and that policy on this issue was determined 
more by events in the mainstream of politics than on the intrinsic merits of the 
subject'. 35 He maintains that the issue of immigration was kept out of mainstream 
33 This ten-ninology is borrowed from Studlar, 'Elite responsiveness or elite autonomy'. 
34 Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics; Deakin, 'The politics of the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Bill'; and Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities. 
35 Deakin, 'The politics of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill', p. 26. 
18 
the focussed area in previous works 
---------- - ----------------- ** ------------------------- 
civil cabinet Parliamentary 
servants ministers party 
interest political 
groups parties 
public/electorate 
Figure 1.1 The focus of the studies of policy making on Commonwealth immigration 
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political discussion as: 'Not until the late fifties did the immigration issue become 
one which could be evaluated in its own right, or in terms which were regarded as 
legitimate public political debate'. 36 
Until the late 1950s peaceful decolonisation was so important that some 
Conservative politicians, including ministers, who took close interest in the subject, 
had assimilated a conception of the Commonwealth, which led them to resist ariN, 
idea that free movement between Britain and the new Commonwealth should be 
ended. 37 Meanwhile those seeking restriction did not have coherent groups behind 
them which would translate their concern into action. 38 
Ira Katznelson similarly argues about a background of this marginalisation 
of the immigration issue that there was an implicit consensus among politicians. 
The essence of this 'pre-political consensus' was that 'colour would not be treated as 
a relevant political category' and that 'there were any problems of discrimination, 
prejudice, integration, and social deficiencies, was implicitly denied'. 39 This 
position out of the paternalistic view about the Empire and Commonwealth was 
held in common by both Conservative and Labour politicians, though they might 
differ over the future of Britain's colonial policy, and this shared view kept the issue 
from politicisation for a long time. 40 
This consensus within the political elite was claimed to collapse in the last 
few years of the 1950s. The violent clashes that erupted in London's Notting Hill 
and Nottingham in the summer of 1958 moved the issue from the periphery to the 
centre of political debate. Public and parliamentary anxiety increased and the issue 
became politicised. Successive opinion polls seemed to display a substantial 
36 Deakin, 'The politics of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill', pp. 27-8. 
37 Deakin, 'The politics of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill', p. 3 )4. 
38 Deakin, 'The politics of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill', pp. 27-8. 
39 Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities, p. 127. 
40 Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities, p. 125. 
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majority in favour of some control and substantial levels of racial prejudice. 41 The 
non-political consensus that had kept race out of politics was upset, and 'Colour was 
now relevant politically, and, respectable or not, it would be dealt with politically'. 42 
As 'By 1960-1, general public opinion had crystallised in favour of controlS1.43 the 
government in 1961, in response to pressures from vocal, anti-immigrant MPs, 
moved to restrict Commonwealth immigration. 44 
David Goldsworthy takes notice of the 1959 general election as the turning 
point of policy. In this election, the ruling Conservative Party saw a large 
generational change in composition as a result that many pro-Empire heavyweights 
retired and many young politicians, who had little personal connection with the 
Commonwealth and therefore had liberal ideas on colonial policy, returned to 
Parliament. Pro-Empire Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd was replaced by 
realistic modernist lain Macleod, and pro-Colonial heavyweights such as Oliver 
Lyttleton retired. 45 A decline in influence of pro-Empire groups was evident, which 
accelerated the move to decolonisation. The next year became the year of 
independence of many African territories, which accompanied Macmillan's famous 
"wind of change" speech. 46 
Deakin also points out the importance of the 1958 disturbances and the 1959 
41 Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities, p. 13 3; see also Layton-Henry, The Politics of Race in 
Britain, pp. 34-6 and 38. 
42 Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities, p. 129. 
43 Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities, p. 133. 
44 Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities, pp. 13 1-5. 
45 David Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics 1945-1961. - From 'Colonial 
Development'to 'Wind of Change'(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 35. 
46 Goldsworthy, unlike Deakin and Katznelson, argues that imperial interests were not well 
organised nor institutional ised in domestic politics. Commonwealth lobbies were able to exert no 
more influence than some politicians who themselves had personal relations with the 
Commonwealth. See, Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics 19,45-1961, p. 383. 
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general election. He claims that the disturbances 'reveal with some clarity for the 
first time the extent of the problem', and caused the issue of immigration to be 
pushed towards the centre of political debate. 47 The Parliamentary lobby was also 
strengthened since, and, under this new condition, the result of the 1959 general 
election made the introduction of controversial legislation politically feasible. 
According to Deakin, a steady increase in concern was observed among 
Conservative backbenchers as a result of new members from the industrial 
Midlands importing the element of direct constituency experience. 48 
This change in dynamics within the ruling Conservative Party was analysed 
by Paul Foot in detail. Foot argues that there were three major factions in the Party 
in the 1950s and 1960s. The first group "Tory Radicals" advocated open 
Commonwealth immigration policy mainly on economic grounds. From their 
perspective, Commonwealth immigrants made an important contribution to Britain's 
manufacturing and service industries which, if stopped, might precipitate labour 
shortages and jeopardise economic growth. Since Commonwealth workers were 
vital to Britain's economy, their emphasis was on integrating those already settled 
rather than on restricting the number of immigration, and some of them supported 
integration measures, including anti -discrimination legislation. 49 
The second faction "Traditional Right" was a pro-Empire group. 
Internationally oriented, this group included those who came from the aristocracy 
and were dedicated to the greatness and majesty of the British Empire. Many of 
them had served in Britain's former Colonies and had a special attachment to the 
Commonwealth ideal. 50 
47 Deakin, 'The politics of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill', p. 39. 
48 Deakin, 'The politics of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill', pp. 40-1. 
49 Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics, pp. 153-4. 
50 Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics, pp. 154-5. 
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The third faction "Goldwater Right" was the xenophobic and little England 
section of the party, whose political base was located in small business and 
constituencies, not in big business nor public schools. They were opposed to non- 
white immigration virtually from their inception and, through their efforts, a large 
number of anti- immigration resolutions were forwarded to the 1961 ConservatiN, e 
Party Conference. However, this group was poorly represented in Parliament and, 
until the early 1960s, not very influential. 51 
Until the late 1950s an informal alliance between the "Radicals" and the 
"Traditional Right" had blocked Parliamentary initiatives to restrict immigration. 
However, this delicate intra-party balance collapsed around 1959 for two reasons. ý` 
Firstly, after the 1958 disturbances, the third faction supported by local 
constituencies gained in influence within the Party. Public anxiety over 
Commonwealth immigration in the affected constituencies resulted in a number of 
illiberal Conservative Parliamentary candidates being returned in the 1959 general 
election, thereby strengthening the Party's anti-immigrant lobby. Secondly, a 
relatively poor economic performance in Britain illustrated the difference in views 
between the "Traditional Right" and "Radicals" over the role of the government in 
economic management, which resulted in government policy being left at a 
standstill. This led to the break up of their alliance and worked to make a room in 
the Party for anti -immi grati on voices. 53 
ý1 Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics, pp. 156-7. 
52 Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics, pp. 157-8. 
53 Originally, Foot's analysis emphasises the role of a determined anti- immigration lobbyist, Cyril 
Osborne, the Conservative MP for Louth. Foot's analysis of intra-party dynamics is presented as a 
background to explain how Osborne's campaign gained support. His campaign against immigration 
started in 1948, and turned specifically to Commonwealth Inu-nigration around 1952. He gradually 
gained support from other MPs such as Norman Pannell, the MP from Liverpool Kirkdale, Harold 
Gurden from Selly Oak, Martin Lindsay from Solihull. Foot claims that around 1958, probably after 
the urban disturbances, there appeared signs of the penetration of Osborne's thinking into the 
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Elite autonomy thesis 
These traditional views which see government policy as reactions to external 
pressure, however, have major weaknesses in their interpretation of the 
development of the issue after 1958. There was a significant time lag (more than 
two years) between the Notting Hill and Nottingham disturbances and the 
introduction of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill to Parliament. If Parliamentary 
pressure were to have a great impact in the course of policy, the Bill could have 
been introduced in the Parliamentary Session from the autumn of 1960, even 
considering the impact of the 1959 general election. Moreover it has even been 
pointed out that in the 1959 general election immigration did not become a major 
political issue. 54 It would not be a great mistake thus to claim that previous works 
have overemphasised public feeling and Parliamentary pressure on the policy 
process. 
Since the late 1980s there have appeared academic works which illustrate 
the internal dynamism of the "black box", or discussion and process within the 
government. Anthony Messina points out the active role of the government elite in 
the immigration policy process. " Stressing the role of party leaders, he claims that 
after the 1958 disturbances or even throughout the early 1960s party leaders retained 
initiative within the party and kept control of the issue. 56 
Party leaders kept the issue off the agenda of party competition. Both parties 
- Conservative and Labour - held internal divisions in their views about 
immigration. To refer to Foot's analysis, the increasing influence of the "Goldwater 
government view. See, Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics, pp. 129-38. 
54 Layton-Henry, The Politics of Race in Britain, pp. 37 and 43. 
55 Messina, Race and Party Competition in Britain. 
56 Messina, Race and Party Competition in Britain, ch. 2. 
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Right" made an outbreak of intra-party rivalry imminent. The similar situation was 
found also in the Labour Party. Facing a party split, the leaders of both parties chose 
to avoid raising the issue onto the overt party agenda. Messina writes that 'the sharp, 
intra-party divisions which the race issue engendered after 1958 and the persistence 
of strong illiberal public opinion on the subject motivated Conservative and Labour 
leaders to attempt to extricate race from British politiCS'. 57 The emerging delicate 
balance within both parties forced the political elite to depoliticise the issue. 
Messina likewise puts stress on the room of party leaders to determine policy on 
their own judgement. 
Since the late 1980s, another new body of research, which attempts to 
uncover inside stories, have been presented mainly by historians based on 
government archive research. 58 These works have given an historical re- 
examination of the events which had been raised in previous works, and, as far as 
immigration from Commonwealth was concerned, they have made clear that the 
ideas of restriction dates back to the early 1950s. However, these works have 
agendas of their own, such as proving the "racist" nature of the British "state"9 or 
57 Messina, Race and Party Competition in Britain, p. 2 1. 
ý8 For example, Bob Carter, Clive Harris and Shirley Joshi, The 1951-55 Conservative 
Government and the Racialisation of Black Immigration (Coventry, Centre for Research in Ethnic 
Relations, University of Warwick, 1987); D. W. Dean, 'Coping with colonial Immigration, the Cold 
War and colonial policy: the Labour Government and black communities in Great Britain 1945-5 F, 
Immigrants and Minorities, 6,3 (1987), 305-34; D. W. Dean, 'Conservative governments and the 
restriction of Commonwealth immigration in the 1950s: the problem of constraint', Historical 
Journal, 35,1 (1992), 171-94; Dennis Dean, 'The Conservative government and the 1961 
Commonwealth Immigration Act: the inside story', Race and Class, 35,2 (1993), 57-74; Richard 
Lamb, The Failure of the Eden Government (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, 1987); Richard Lamb, 
The Macmillan Years 1957-1963: The Emerging Truth (London, John Murray, 1995); Rich, Race 
and Empire in British Politics; and Dummett and Nicol, Subjects, CitLens, Aliens and Others. 
59 For example, Carter et al., Rich, and Durnmett and Nicol in note 58 above. 
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describing the immigration issue as an important issue in postwar political history'60 
so that they have not focussed directly on the policy process. Though pointing out 
most of the decisions taken by the Cabinet and the discussions leading to them, their 
research scope has been limited to the Cabinet level and their emphasis is on 
description rather than analysis based on particular theoretical frameworks. They are 
potentially liable to overemphasise the thinking and opinions of a small number of 
influential politicians. 
The role of non-elective actors in existing works 
The policy process on Commonwealth immigration has so far been given "political" 
answers. As the works reviewed above have shown, pressure from outside 
goverm-nent and the role of politicians have been paid much attention to. Actually 
the term "elite" used in the previous works in contrast to the public and Parliament, 
or "the mass", denotes, in most of the works, politicians. These particular 
dichotomous relations between the political elites and the mass, in other words, 
politics, may play a significant role in the policy process. However policy can be 
formulated also behind politics, and often without relations to it, both during the 
period of de- or pre-politicisation or of politicisation in the hands of non-elective 
actors. Emphasising the role of politics may thus risk picking up only one aspect of 
the whole process. These explanations have underrated a variety of factors within 
the government. 
Early writers cited above have pointed out the existence of inter- 
departmental discussions in the 1950s. From today's perspectives, however., the 
influence of these discussions were unjustly dismissed, and were not detailed until a 
few decades later when government documents became available. Relatively new 
60 For example, Dean and Lamb in note 58 above. 
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works identify departmental works before 1958,61 which were however treated as 
more or less episodic, and they lacked full accounts of the context in which 
departments were working over this issue. 
It is important to note that this traditional dismissal of non-elective actors 
does not originate in the inherent nature of the subject. As the next chapter shows, 
this has roots in normative views about the British political system, which is strong 
in the discipline of political science. The role of non-elective actors has been 
dismissed in this area as well as in the British policy process in general. 
4. Focuses of the Thesis 
This thesis will emphasise the role which civil servants played in the formulation of 
policy. In the analysis the structure in which policy makers formulated policy will 
be taken account of This will be made clear from three points. 
The first point is the factor which determines the stance of policy makers. 
Each policy maker has stance of his/her own towards the policy issue. Policy 
makers have different views and approaches from each other to a particular point 
and policy. It is therefore important to identify considerations which determine the 
stance of each policy maker in concrete cases and the mesh which binds together 
these considerations on different occasions by a particular actor. This thesis will 
show that the organisational responsibility of a policy maker determine his/her 
stance more than other factors. 
61 Layton-Henry, The Politics of Race in Britain; Layton-Henry, Politics of Immigration, Carter et 
al., The 1951-55 Conservative Government and the Racialisation of Black Immigration; Dean, 
'Coping with colonial Immigration, the Cold War and colonial policy'; Dean, 'Conservative 
governments and the restriction of Commonwealth immigration in the 1950s'; and, Dean, 'The 
Conservative government and the 1961 Commonwealth Immigration Act'. 
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The second point is the factor which determines the influence of policy 
makers in the policy process. In order to identify such factors. this thesis focuses on 
informal relationship which existed between policy makers. This is the point where 
the new "policy network" models have given their main emphasis. It will be 
exhibited in this thesis that the influence of a particular actor in the policy process is 
determined by his/her position in the policy network of the policy area. 
The last point is the set of rules which govern relations between policy 
makers. There are rules which bind them and govern their interactions. Interactions 
between major policy makers in the policy process are not made in a condition of 
anarchy. This point is particularly remarkable in relations between civil servants and 
ministers in which they are each other expected to play different roles in 
constitutional terms. Here it is claimed that this constitutional role expectations bind 
strongly the role of each actor in the policy process, and differentiate the role of 
ministers from that of civil servants. Often civil servants are criticised for breaching 
their remits. It is true that the role of civil servants in the policy process can never 
be dismissed, but this is not so as to infringe the role of ministers. The role 
distinction makes sense in significant ways in the policy process. 
This thesis proceeds to present, first, the position of this thesis in British 
political studies and the framework of analysis employed, then, the process analysis. 
Following this chapter which has shown the outline of the thesis, Chapter 2 reviews 
previous works on the British government and policy and shows that they have not 
much examined the role of civil servants in the policy process. Chapter 3 examines, 
and elaborates, models for policy process analysis in order to investigate the role of 
civil servants. 
Chapters 4 to 9 give a survey of the policy process in the area of British 
immigration policy. This process is examined in chronological order and the stages 
in the development of policy are shown. The whole period from 1948 to 1964 is 
28 
separated into six historical periods, each of which being dealt with in a single 
chapter: 
Problem recognition (1948 - 1950): the period when immigration from the 
West Indies began to be perceived as a problem to be tackled by the government 
and the Colonial Office was mainly in charge of the issue (Chapter 4); 
Institutional formation (1950 - 1954): the period when the Home Office 
gradually took over the responsibility from the Colonial Office on the issue, a 
change in recognition of the issue was brought about within the government, and 
accordingly the institutional framework for future government action was 
established (Chapter 5); 
Polic content formulation (1954 - 1956): the period when the views and y 
considerations of each policy maker on the issue were crystallised, as well as public 
and Parliamentary interests on the issue increased, so did ministerial pressure 
calling for restriction (Chapter 6); 
Politicisation (1957 - 1959): the period when the issue became politicised 
with the outbreak of the urban disturbances in 1958 (Chapter 7); 
Major decision making (1960 - 196 1): the period when a further increase in 
immigration brought a change in the Home Office's view, which led to the decision 
to legislation on immigration control (Chapter 8); and, 
Implementation (1962 - 1964): the period when the initial differences in 
views between actors in implementing the provisions of the 1962 Act converged 
into the Home Office's line of harsh application (Chapter 9). 
The findings from the process analysis in these chapters are surnmarised in 
the final chapter (Chapter 10), which highlights the role of civil servants and 
illuminates the structure within which the process of policy formulation took place. 
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Chapter 2 The British Government and Policy 
The marginality of non-elective actors in research is not unique to the analysis of 
immigration policy. The emphasis on the elected elite is one of the traditional 
characteristics in British political studies so that a huge number of scholars have 
devoted themselves to the power and role of Prime Ministers and other Cabinet 
ministers. On the contrary, non-elective actors have been analysed only in terms of 
their relations with those of the elected elite. This is especially the case at the macro 
level analysis of power relations, while at the meso level analysis of the policy 
process, few have touched on the role of non-elective actors, in particular that of 
civil servants. 
1. Actors in Government Policy Making 
Three main areas of governmentpolicy making 
Three main areas that have importance in the policy process within the British 
government are 1) the core executive, 2) political parties, and 3) government 
departments. The core executive such as the Prime Minister, senior members of the 
Cabinet and their advisers, senior governing party officers such as party chairman, 
whips, senior research officers, and senior civil servants, as well as the institutions 
where they act, are particularly important parts of the British government in terms of 
the policy process. 
The role ofpolitical parties in British politics 
The major debate about postwar British politics and policy is concerned with the 
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impact of political parties on government policy. For almost thirty years until the 
late 1970s, social democratic policies in the field of socio-economic areas were 
maintained by successive governments despite changes in party control and despite 
their adversary in rhetoric. These policies were based on a Keynesian approach to 
the economy, extensive state provision of welfare, a blend of private and public 
ownership in industry. The Atlantic Alliance and decolonisation in the field of 
external relations were also maintained throughout this period. This continuity of 
policy seemed to be particularly remarkable in the 1950s and 1960s, the period of 
"Butskellite consensus", where, it is claimed, there was broad "consensus" between 
the two major parties on fundamental issues. The long period of Conservative rule 
between 1951 and 1964, and then the period of Labour government between 1964 
and 1970, produced merely conflict over details. ' 
After 1979, with a clear commitment to the principles of economic 
liberalism, the Thatcher government tried to reduce the role of the state and give the 
citizens more direct control over their own affairs. The government set out to halt 
the rise in public expenditure, reduce direct taxation and cut the size of the civil 
service. Previous continuity in policy over the welfare state, the extent of public 
ownership and the government's economic management role was reversed. The 
reduction in the legal immunities and rights of trade unions, rejection of formal 
income policy, and the tripartite style of decision-making, according priority to the 
abatement of inflation, even with unemployment at over three million, privatisation 
of state industries and services, changes in the framework in which many public 
services are carried out, interventions in local government structure and imposition 
of far-reaching controls over its finance, changes in the welfare state, and open 
I See for example, Dennis Kavanagh and Peter Morris, Consensus Politics: From Attlee to Major 
(Oxford, Blackwell, 2nd ed., 1994); and, David Dutton, British Politics since 1945 (Oxford, 
Blackwell, 2nd ed., 1997). 
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hostility to the civil service and large parts of the public sector, all these constituted 
'significant discontinuities' with the previous era. 2 It is claimed that Thatcher's 
premiership has changed the terrain of British politics to such an extent that man ý, of 
the changes will prove irreversible. 3 Her government sought to be ideologically 
distinctive and to make a sharp break with the past. 
To what extent ideology contributed to these changes in policy remains to be 
seen. A partial reality is that these were brought in to cope with the change in 
external environments. The growing interdependence of the British economy with 
other economies has led to a situation where government economic policy is more 
at the mercy of external pressures. Policies of the governing party must recognise 
these pressures if they are to be effective. Many of the changes which were 
instituted were in harmony with many of the changes already taking place abroad by 
the end of the 1970s. These policy changes in Britain were made to cope with and 
ad ust the British situation to the changes which had arisen and were arising 
globally. 
The fact that the departure from social democratic policies occurred abruptly 
though the changes in external conditions were incremental shows how far the new 
government contributed to these changes in policy. The Thatcher administration 
expanded and accelerated the changes far more than her opponents would have 
dared or wished. The new policies were supported by an alteration in the climate of 
opinion and a sense that a change of direction was necessary. 4 The Thatcher era 
showed that a governing party can have a marked impact upon the nature of politics 
and society. 
2 Dennis Kavanagh, Thatcherism and British Politics: The End of Consensus ? (Oxford, 
Blackwell, 2nd ed., 1990), p. 317. 
3 Robert Garner and Richard Kelly, British Political Parties Today (Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 19933), p. 275. 
4 Kavanagh and Morris, Consensus Politics, p. 127. 
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In contrast, scholars' views on the impact of political parties in the period up 
to the late 1970s were divided. One position is that the room for independence 
enjoyed by political parties from other actors in domestic politics is small. Having 
examined party manifestos, legislation, and government financial performance. 
Richard Rose argues that parties did not make a difference in policy. This therefore 
accounts for the high level of consensus politics. 5 He argued that there were major 
constraints on a governing party which prevented from making a large difference 
from that of the policy of the previous government. These were: the existence of a 
high level of discipline within the party, electoral competition with other political 
parties, the permanent nature of the government machine and problems everý, 
government faces, and international politics and economic affairs. 6 
Above all, political parties are not free from the support of public in 
democratic society. Parties are primarily in the business of attaining power. which 
in a modern democracy involves reflecting the opinions of substantial portions of 
electors, and especially those 'floating' voters not firmly aligned to any one party. 
Fundamental differences between the major parties cause at least one of them to fail 
to reflect properly the concerns of the middle-ground voter, a condition that can lead 
to either ignominious defeat for the 'guilty' party or widespread disenchantment with 
the party system altogether if the failure is more general. 7According to this view 
parties cannot introduce radical policies which might lose middle-ground voters. 
What they can do is to differentiate themselves from other parties at the level of 
rhetoric only. Adversarial competition between two parties is not concerned with 
ideology or major policy but rhetoric or peripheral topics. 8 
ý Richard Rose, Do Parties Make a Difference? (London, Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1984). 
6 Rose, Do Parties Make a Difference? pp. 147-52. 
7 Garner and Kelly, British Political Parties Today, p. 261. 
8 Rose, Do Parties Make a Difference? p. 5 1. 
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A rather different view is that political parties are strong enough to introduce 
policies based on their own ideology. Even the poor performance of the postwar 
British economy is claimed to be the result of excessive party competition, which 
characterises adversary politics. S. E. Finer and his colleagues argue that Britain has 
suffered from excessive party competition, especially since the 1960s, with 
particularly damaging consequences for the continuity of stabilisation policy (which 
means, measures to ensure a high level of employment without inflation), regional 
policy, pension policy and incomes policy. 9 
Despite the difference in view as regards the pre-Thatcher period, the case of 
the Thatcher government seems to show that the governing party has enough 
independent power to implement policies without much reference to public opinion, 
at least, for a short period of time. 10 One unresolved point concerned with this is 
that the position that emphasises the role of the governing party does not often 
distinguish the view of party leaders and that of other members. Whether the 
changes in the Thatcher government were brought by party institutions or the Prime 
Minister as an individual is not necessarily clear. In this context studies of the Prime 
Minister and the core executive have developed. 
2. Studies of the Core Executive 
In the research of elites in British politics, the Cabinet and the Prime Minister have 
been the focus of most studies and have dominated the literature on govermnent 
9 S. E. Finer (ed. ), Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform (London, Anthony Wigram, 1974), 
especially, T. Wilson, 'The economic costs of adversary system', 99-116; and D. K. Stout, 'Incomes 
po I icy and the costs of the adversary system', 117-40. 
10 Garner and Kelly, British Political Parties Today, p. 299. 
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machinery. Above all, the power of Prime Ministers is a main theme in recent 
British political studies. 
Being senior party members and in most cases the heads of a government 
department, Cabinet ministers play a role in all three areas of the government policy 
making, namely, the core executive, political party and government departments. As 
has been pointed out above, the consensual/adversarial thesis of the British 
government has put emphasis on inter-party politics as far as the elites in British 
politics are concerned. This is applicable as a general thesis on the British 
goverrm-ient only if the condition is met that party politics is the dominant area of 
the British policy process, which is not however necessarily evident. The 
consensual/adversarial thesis fails to take account of the independence enjoyed by 
the core executive in the conduct of such areas as foreign policy. 
The Prime Minister and the Cabinet 
Under the concept of collective responsibility of the Cabinet, the idea that the 
Cabinet collectively decides policies has been traditionally, and normatively, 
accepted for a long time. However, as the strong leadership of the Prime Minister in 
the Thatcher Cabinet became apparent, an alternative idea has been gaining ground - 
the balance between the Prime Minister and other Cabinet members has been in 
favour of the former, not only in the Thatcher Cabinet but also in its predecessors. 
Many works on British governments have raised the position of Prime 
Minister as a power institution in its own right equal to or more powerful than the 
British cabinet system. Since the mid 1980s works on policy making have focused 
greatly on this role. II In this background of emphasis on the primacy of Prime 
Ministers lies, unsurprisingly, the advent of Mrs Thatcher in 1979 and her policy 
II For example, Anthony King (ed. ), The British Prime Minister (BasinIgstoke, Macmillan, 2nd 
ed., 1985); James Barber, The Prime Minister since 1945 (Oxford, Blackwell, 199 1). 
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style of strong leadership. 12 
The decreasing importance of the Cabinet is also emphasised, while it is still 
considered important in the legal or constitutional sense. Accordingly one scholar 
has even stated that 'The Cabinet has become a residual institution'. 13 The role of 
the Cabinet in policy making is now deemed to be small. Little, if any, policy 
originates in the Cabinet. Its role, it is claimed, is so small that it only arbitrates 
between conflicting departments, makes strategic decisions and approves major 
policy changes which might affect a number of departments. 
However, this shift in power is not necessarily a recent phenomenon. 
Richard Crossman asserted that the shift in power from the Cabinet to the Prime 
Minister began in the third quarter of the last century and was completed after 1945. 
He claims that this was facilitated by power concentration within major political 
parties and the growth of a centralised bureaucracy. 14 
Researchers have tried to find out the source of the power of the Prime 
Minister. 15 Firstly, the remit to appoint and dismiss about twenty Cabinet ministers 
and sixty junior ministers of sub-Cabinet rank is a part of his/her power base. 
Almost one third of the ruling party MPs, including three dozen MPs appointed to 
the Parliamentary private secretary position, acquire a post in the government. 16 
12 King (ed. ), The British Prime Minister, p. 4. 
13 Martin Burch, 'The demise of Cabinet governmeriff Teaching Politics, 14,3 (1985), 343-62, 
p. 359. 
14 Richard Crossman, 'Introduction' in Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution (London, 
Fontana, 1963), pp. 51-2. 
15 See, for example, A. Grant Jordan and J. J. Richardson, British Politics and the Policy Process: 
An Arena Approach (London, Allen and Unwin, 1987), pp. 134-5 1; Patrick Dunleavy and R. A. W. 
Rhodes, 'Core executive studies in Britain', Public Administration, 68,1 (1990), 3-28, pp. 8-9, and 
Barber, The Prime Minister since 1945, pp. 122-37. 
16 Richard Rose, 'British Government: the job at the top' in Richard Rose and Ezra N. Suleiman 
(eds), Presidents and Prime Ministers, Washington, D. C., American Enterprise Institute for Public 
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Recognition that, once in office, a govermuental post could be allotted, is no doubt 
one important Prime Minister's resource in maintaining party control. 17 
Secondly, the Prime Minister as the chairperson can decide the agenda of 
Cabinet meetings and summarise discussions at his/her will. Barbara Castle, a 
former Labour Cabinet minister, refers in her diary to this point as to how Cabinet 
meetings are recorded differently from participants' memories: 'One of the hazards 
of Cabinet government is that one is at the mercy of the Minutes, which often come 
out very differently from what one remembered'. 18 The Prime Minister also has the 
authority to appoint members of Cabinet committees, with which he/she can 
exclude likely opponents in the Cabinet from the decision making process 
efficiently. 
Corelcentral executive 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, a number of studies have appeared on the 
extension of the emphasis on the dominance of Prime Ministers. These studies, 
called core/central executive studies, have a meso level focus on decision making 
within the government, and, through it, they try to present a structural view of the 
Prime Minister's power base. 
They have confirmed the point that most government decisions are today 
made not in the Cabinet, but in the Cabinet Office, Cabinet committees, informal 
groups of powerful ministers, senior officials or the private staff of the Prime 
Minister. 19 Originally these institutions or groups were used to solve problems 
Policy Research, 1980), pp. 1-49, pp. 5-6. 
17 Burch, 'The demise of Cabinet govemment? 'p. 355. 
18 Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries 1974-76 (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980), p. 252. 
19 Michael Cockerell, Peter Hennessy and David Walker, Sources Close to the Prime Minister: 
Inside the Hidden World of the Neivs Manipulators (London, Macmillan, 1984), pp. 86-7. 
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resulting from a huge volume of ministerial work, by either taking decisions in 
place of the Cabinet, or shaping decisions so as to predetermine their outcomes 
when they reach the Cabinet. However, it is claimed that their development has 
gradually come to erode the Cabinet's domain, as they came to be used as a tool for 
power manipulation by the Prime Minister. 20 
These studies of networks within the Cabinet system originate in works by 
North American scholars in the early 1980s. One of the main characteristics of these 
works in approach are concerned with 'decision-makings within political executives 
in cabinet system'. 21 In Britain the survey on these intra-government networks are 
necessarily concerned with those at the centre of the executive around the Prime 
Minister, and academics have come to call these networks of British governments 
variously: "central executive territory", "core executive", or "central executive". 22 
These works claim that the concept of Prime Ministerial power is too 
simplistic. Instead, they try to illuminate the government structure supporting the 
primacy of the Prime Minister. Proposing a concept "central executive territory", 
Peter Madgwick claims that'within the Territory the basic activities of governing go 
on - making choices, taking decisions, developing policy, shaping programmes, 
20 Thomas T. Mackie and Brian W. Hogwood (eds), Unlocking the Cabinet: Cabinet Structures in 
Comparative Perspective (London, Sage, 1985), pp. 25 and 29; and, Burch, 'The demise of Cabinet 
govemment? 'p. 351. 
21 Mackie and Hogwood (eds), Unlocking the Cabinet, p. 1, italic as in original. These works in 
turn were influenced by early works of today's policy network approach, the details of which are 
discussed below. 
22 These concepts are used respectively by: Peter Madgwick; Patrick Dunleavy and Rhodes; and, 
Martin Burch and Ian Holliday. See, Peter Madgwick, British Government: The Central Executive 
Territory (Hemel Hempstead, Philip Allen, 1991); Dunleavy and Rhodes, 'Core executive studies in 
Britain'; R. A. W. Rhodes and Patrick Dunleavy (eds), Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive 
(London, Macmillan, 1995); and, Martin Burch and Ian Holliday, The British Cabinet System 
(Hemel Hempstead, Prentice Hall/ Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1996). 
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managing crises, building consent and securing approval'. 23 The Prime Minister 
makes use of the "central executive territory" as the power base in the way that, with 
'the support of the Cabinet Office and the Prime Minister's Office', 'The Prime 
Minister chairs the Cabinet, controls its agenda, manages the committee system, and 
has the major influence on how issues will be dealt with at the centre'. 24 Madgý\-Ick 
maintains that in the mid-nineteenth century the "central executive territory" was 
'little more than the Cabinet, the Prime Minister and one or two Private Secretaries'. 
However, by the 1990s it'had developed into the major arena of government'25 and 
is to include Prime Minister, Cabinet, Cabinet Committees, Cabinet Office, Prime 
Minister's Office, together with attendant ministers, advisers and officialS. 26 
However, so far many of the core executive studies weigh so heavily on 
describing institutions that their analysis is as yet impressionistic as far as actual 
policy making is concerned. In this respect R. A. W. Rhodes, proposing research 
agenda for further studies on the "core executive", shows a functional definition of 
the concept of the "core executive" as follows: 'all those organizations and 
procedures which coordinate central government policies, and act as final arbiters of 
conflicts between different parts of the government machine'. 27 Analyses of the 
structure and functions of intra-governmental networks from the view of 
core/central executive studies are still at the beginning. 
Cabinet committees within the Cabinet system 
23 Madgwick, British Government, p. 258. 
24 Madgwick, British Government, p. 237. 
25 MadgWick, British Government, p. 258. 
26 Madgwick, British Government, p. 5. 
27 R. A. W. Rhodes, 'From Prime Ministerial power to core executive' in R. A. W. Rhodes and 
Patrick Dunleavy (eds), Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive (London, Macmillan, 1995), 
pp. 11-3 7, p- 12. 
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As a preparation for the process analysis from Chapter 4, the institution of Cabinet 
committees and their functions within the Cabinet system are referred to here. The 
Cabinet committee is one of the institutionalised systems for coordination within 
the central government. A lot has been written about the organisation of Cabinet 
committees, 28 though existence of Cabinet committees had not been officially 
confirmed by the government for a long time. 29 
The history of the Cabinet committee system is alleged to be traced back to 
the mid nineteenth century. 30 Early committees were ad hoc, temporary, and 
usually dissolved once an issue was settled. The first standing committee was the 
Committee of Imperial Defence which was established in 1903. During the First and 
Second World Wars the committee system greatly expanded. A principle was 
established during the Second World War that, subject to a possible reference to the 
Cabinet, committee's conclusions were to have the same authority as that of the 
Cabinet. The reference of committee matters to the Cabinet was restrained and, 
from 1969 onwards, matters discussed in the committee can be sent to the Cabinet 
only with agreement by the committee chairperson. 31 
One of the most detailed description of the Cabinet committee system is 
found in Simon James's work. Examining power relations between ministers and 
28 For example, Brian W. Hogwood and Thomas T. Mackie, 'The United Kingdom: decision 
sifting in a secret garden' in Mackie and Hogwood (eds), Unlocking the Cabinet, pp. 36-60; Peter 
Hennessy, Cabinet (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986); and, Simon James, British Cabinet Government 
(London, Routledge, 1992). 
29 In 24 May 1979, in response to a Parliamentary question, Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister, 
officially announced for the first time the establishment of four main committees and their 
chairpersons. 
30 Burch, 'The demise of Cabinet goverru-nent? 'p. 348. 
31 Burch, 'The demise of Cabinet government? ' p. 349. The distinction between Cabinet 
committees and informal ministerial meetings are important in this respect, as Cabinet committee's 
decisions have the same authority with Cabinet decisions. 
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civil servants, and between the Prime Minister and other ministers, he argues that 
'Britain is not governed by the Cabinet but by a Cabinet system, an elaborate 
pyramid of which the Cabinet is only the pinnacle'. 32 The Cabinet has become 
severely overloaded and is unable to increase the number of meetings anymore. In 
response, according to James, a large network of committees has evolved. 33 Today 
the Cabinet discusses only a small proportion of government business: 'Most 
decisions are taken by committees, settled through bilateral discussion between 
ministers or agreed by correspondence'. 34 Cabinet committees relieve pressure 
which is exerted on the Cabinet by settling as much as possible at lower levels or by 
sieving through issues and clarifying the points of disagreement. 
Cabinet committees are classified in terms of duration and composition. 
Standing committees exist throughout a Prime Minister's term in office, while ad 
hoc committees usually have a shorter life and mainly deal with a single, but 
important, issue. Ministers, civil servants, and both compose ministerial 
committees, official committees, and mixed committees, respectively. 35 Though 
previous studies have pointed out two kinds of committees in terms of composition 
- ministers or civil servants, almost all descriptions are, in fact, about ministerial 
committees. Needless to say that only ministerial committees have the same 
authority with the Cabinet. 
In their relations with the Cabinet, Cabinet committees take decision in 
effect, with often the Cabinet merely endorsing or legitimating committee's 
decisions. 36 Therefore, in its relations with ministerial committees, Mackie and 
Hogwood summarise the role of the Cabinet as follows: 1) to set strategic guidelines 
32 James, British Cabinet Government, p. 4. 
33 James, British Cabinet Government, p. 11. 
3 34 James, British Cabinet Government, p. 4. 
35 Hennessy, Cabinet, pp.. 330-1. 
36 Mackie and Ho-wood (eds), Unlocking the Cabinet, p. 2. :M 
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within which Cabinet committees and individual ministers operate; 2) to give 
selective reviews of Cabinet committee decisions; 3) to resolve controversial issues 
that Cabinet committees have been unable to resolve, or which go straight to 
Cabinet; 4) to legitimise decisions of Cabinet committees. 37 
In their relations with the Prime Minister, Cabinet committees have offered 
him/her an arena where he/she can exercise his/her influence most effectively. 38 
This is due to Prime Minister's appointment of committee members, his/her 
chairpersonship as well as the secrecy of the committee. A recent study by Patrick 
Dunleavy based on the information about John Major's Cabinet of 1992 also 
suggests Prime Minister's dominance in the Cabinet committee system. 39 
Bias on the elective elite in British political studies 
British political studies have produced a large number of works on power structure 
and elective elites. In contrast, few works have been produced on the role of non- 
elective elites in the policy process. This imbalance in research has to do with some 
assumptions about British politics. There is a widely held belief in British politics 
that elected elites play crucial roles in political issues. British political culture 
provides a favourable condition for this belief to prevail. As Walter Bagehot 
described Britain as a "deferential nation", political culture in Britain tends to 
uphold the idea of strong political leadership, which the public is expected to 
folloW. 40 In fact, it is even pointed out, on most policy questions, the public is 
37 Mackie and Hogwood (eds), Unlocking the Cabinet, pp. 10-2. 
38 Burch, 'The demise of Cabinet governmentT p. 354; James, British Cabinet Government, pp. 63 
9. 
39 Patrick Dunleavy, 'Estimating the distribution of positional influence in cabinet committees 
under Major' in R. A. W. Rhodes and Patrick Dunleavy (eds), Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core 
Executive (London, Macmillan, 1995), pp. 298-32 1. 
40 Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution (London, Fontana, 1963[1867]), p. 247-51. For this 
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either generally disinterested or content to follow policies presented by elected 
leaders. 41 Moreover, this belief matches with a widely held liberal conviction that, 
in a democratic political system, power should reside in democratically elected 
representatives. The sympathy with the democratic normative view has helped the 
schema of strong ministers to dominate in society. Under these circumstances the 
general proposition, real or imagined, that elected elites have more power than 
others is easy to accept. 
This belief is difficult to refute, for the concept of power, the key concept 
underlining these assumptions, is often difficult to conceptualise and evaluate in 
empirical research. The concept of power is highly abstract so that, at a different 
level of analysis, different concepts of power are necessary. 42 The traditional 
interest of political science is the distribution of power in a polity. The location and 
source of, and measures of exercising, power have been the main focus. However, 
because of this conceptual ambiguity, the emphasis on power in British political 
aspect of British political culture, see also, Robert D. Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, 
Conflict and Democracy in Britain and Italy (London, Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 196-203; 
and, Richard Rose, Politics in England: Change and Persistence (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 5th ed., 
1989), pp. 143-8. 
41 For example, David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of 
Electoral Choice (London, Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1974), pp. 276-85. 
42 The difficulty of conceptualising power is particularly true when research focuses on the meso- 
level subjects such as the policy process of a particular issue. Take the minister-civil servant 
relationship, for example. Views of the civil servant are hidden from outside. Minister's decisions 
may be affected by the civil servant's view. Differences in views between the minister and the civil 
servant may be sought to be minimised as much as possible. Observers from outside find it difficult 
to judge whether a particular decision originates in a personal view of the minister or civil servants' 
opinions. When opinions of both are the same it does not mean the opinion necessarily comes from 
the minister. This view of power has much in common with the position taken by Bachrach and 
Baratz. See, Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, 'Two faces of power', American Political Science 
Review, 56,4 (1962), 947-52; and, Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, 'Decisions and 
nondecisions: An analytical framework', American Political Science Revieiv, 57,3 (1963), 632-42. 
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studies is liable to be a prey of dogmatism of normative and philosophical views. 
The influence of the non-elected personnel is often viewed with suspicion and 
caution. A view on where power should be easily intrudes into the question of 
where power is. 
The belief, or elitist view, that Britain is a society run by democraticallý' 
elected elites helped to delineate the scope of studies of politiCS. 43 Research 
undertaken on the central government has put emphasis, even excessively, on ke), 
actors and institutions - in particular the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the core 
executive. Worse still, these works on the political elite have produced results 
which have worked, in turn, to re-strengthen this elitist belief. These tendencies 
have particularly been exacerbated by the emphasis on the role played by Mrs 
Thatcher. 
It is on this recognition that this thesis deals with the policy process in the 
executive-departmental side of the British government, highlighting the role of civil 
servants in the policy process. In the following sections of this chapter the existing 
views on these areas are examined. 
3. Studies of Civil Servants 
In contrast to the abundance of literature about the executive and political parties, 
examinations of actors outside of this area in the policy process have been limited. 
One of the actors little surveyed in the policy process is the civil servant. The term 
43 The number of works apparently tried to counter this elitist view in British politics is small. 
Christopher Hewitt's work is one of the oldest, but still most important, among them. See, 
Christopher Hewitt, 'Policy-making in postwar Britain: a national level test of elitist and pluralist 
hypotheses', British Journal of Political Science, 4,2 (1974), 187-216. 
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"civil service" or "civil servants" is used here to designate (unless otherwise 
indicated) administrative class (so-called higher civil servants), which have a title of 
Principal or higher, who work for the central government departments 
("Whitehall"). 44 This administrative elite, whose number is about 4000, engage in 
departmental management and involved in national policy making. 
There are many accounts by the former ministers of the civil servant's role in 
policy formulation. For example, Richard Crossman, a former Labour Cabinet 
minister, refers to the civil servant's involvement in inter-departmental coordination 
and claims that principles of government departments are predetermined through 
advance inter-departmental coordination: 'Whitehall likes to reach an official 
compromise at an official level first so that Ministers are all briefed the same way'. 45 
Barbara Castle, another former Labour Cabinet minister, remarks that: 'The 
department did the horse-trading and having struck their bargains at official level 
they then briefed their Ministers on it, and so at cabinet meetings I suddenly found I 
wasn't in a political caucus at all. I was faced by departmental enemies'. 46 
Philip Norton, a British political scientist, depicts the "unelective 
dictatorship" of civil servants as follows: 
Officials ... 
have the opportunity, should they choose to exercise it, to skew 
advice in favor of a particular course of action. They can swamp a minister with 
an excess of paperwork to obscure the importance of a particular document. They 
can submit important documents at the last minute to prevent time for reflection 
44 Difficulty of unanimously defining civil servants in Britain is explained by Gavin Drewry and 
Tony Butcher. See, Gavin Drewry and Tony Butcher, The Civil Service Today (Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell, 2nd ed, 199 1), pp. 8-30. 
4ý Richard Crossman, Inside View: Three Lectures on Prime Ministerial Government (London, 
Jonathan Cape, 1972), p. 73. 
46 Barbara Castle, 'Mandarin Power', Sunday Times, June 10,1973, pp. 17 and 19, p. 17. 
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and outside advice. They can schedule so many meetings that the minister has 
little time to devote to particular issues. And, if these techniques fail to work, 
they can brief their counterparts in other departments, engage in some degree of 
misinterpretation of the minister's wishes, or simply stall until a new minister 
takes over. 47 
Generally speaking, however, studies of civil servants have been given, 
more or less, marginal status in the analyses of the policy process. Previous studies 
of British governments have not paid much attention to this aspect. As shown 
below, when British political studies surveyed the role of civil servants, the focus 
has been confined to macro analyses of power relations, in particular those between 
ministers and civil servants and related subjects. 
Minister-civil servant relations 
Constitutionally the roles of ministers and civil servants are supposed to be clearly 
differentiated: the role of ministers is to take decisions on policy issues and to 
defend them in Cabinet or other ministerial meetings, while the role of higher civil 
servants is to assist ministers on what they should do, including presenting options. 
The civil servant is an adviser of ministers and implementator of ministerial 
decisions. Brian Hayes, the then Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
confirmed this division of labour, in a radio programme in 1981 as follows: 
Civil Servants ought not to have power because we're not elected. Power stems 
from the people and flows through Parliament to the minister responsible to 
Parliament. The civil servant has no power of his own. He is there to help a 
minister and to be the minister's agent ... I think the job of the civil servant is to 
47 Philip Norton, The British Polity (London, Longman, 3rd ed., 1994), p. 203. 
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make sure that his minister is informed; that he has all the facts; that he's made 
aware of all the options that he is shown all the considerations bearing on those 
options. 48 
However, it may be fair to say that Hayes's idea about relations between ministers 
and civil servants is a normative image based on legal or constitutional views, rather 
than reality. 
This view of "division of labour" is countered by the claim that the influence 
of ministers in policy making is decreasing, while that of civil servants is 
increasing. Tony Benn told in the same radio programme that: 
The deal that the civil service offers a minister is this: if you do what we want 
you to do, we will help you publicly to pretend that you're implementing the 
manifesto on which you were elected ... they are always trying to steer 
incoming 
governments back to the policy of the outgoing government, minus the mistakes 
that the civil service thought the outgoing government made. 49 
The difficulty ministers have in exercising control over civil servants has 
been raised mainly by Marxist writers or socialist activists. 50 It is "suspected" that 
there are plots to exclude radical ministers from policy making by using Cabinet 
48 Quoted from Hugo Young and Ann Sloman, No, Minister (London, British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 1982), pp. 20-1. 
49 Quoted ftom Young and Ann Sloman, No, Minister, pp. 19-20. 
50 For example, Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London, Quartet Books.. 
197-')[1969]); Brian Sedgemore, The Secret Constitution: An Analysis of the Political Establishment z! ) 
(London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1980); Tony Berin, Argumentsfor Democracy (London, Jonathan 
Cape, 1981); and Peter Kellner and Lord Crowther-Hunt, The Civil Servants: An Inquiry into 
Britain's Ruling Class (London, MacDonald Futura Publishers, 1980). 
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committees and to manipulate information. Sedgemore asserts that there is an elite 
coalition of the civil service, business and the industry (he calls this "corporatism") 
so as to exclude ministers from their policy making circle. 51 
One simple and evident reason that makes it difficult for ministers to 
manage their civil servants is the overload of ministers. The range and amount of 
jobs ministers are expected to do exceed the capacity of an individual to do them. 
Moreover the number of civil servants is too great for a minister to control. A 
survey shows that the number of the personnel with Principal or higher ranks in 
Whitehall is about 4000, while the number of ministers is 100 - the ratio is as much 
as 40 to I in the civil servants favour. 52 Moreover the jobs of the minister extend to 
non- departmental matters, such as Cabinet, Parliament, constituency and the media. 
Bruce Headey's interviews conducted in 1969 with fifty ministers in the postwar era, 
showed that weekly working hours of ministers were 60 hours or more, of which 
only twenty hours were available for departmental matters. 53 A Chief Secretary to 
the Treasury in the Wilson Cabinet recalls his life in office as follows: 'not only 
would I be working seven days but also much of the evenings and nights too ... 
Even with that amount of time spent working, it was often extremely difficult to 
read the papers adequately to brief myself for the host of meetings I had to attend'. 54 
In postwar governments the constitutional division of labour in minister- 
ýI Sedgemore, The Secret Constitution, pp. 35-43. 
52 Bill Coxall and Lynton Robins, Contemporary British Politics: An Introduction (Basingstoke, 
Macmillan, 1992 ed., 1992), p. 146. Richard Rose shows that the ratio of Cabinet ministers to higher 
civil servants rose from about I to 15 to I to 35, during the period between 1967 and 1980, the year 
when Thatcher started a cutback in the size of the civil service. See, Richard Rose, 'The political 
status of higher civil servants in Britain' in Ezra N. Suleiman (ed. ), Bureaucrats and Policly Making: 
A Comparative Overview, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1984), pp. 13 6-73, p. 163. 
53 Bruce Headey, British Cabinet Ministers: The Role of Politicians in Executive Office (London, 
George Allen and Unwin, 1974), pp. 35-6 and 297-8. 
54 Joel Barnett, Inside the Treasury (London, Andre Deutsch, 1982), pp. 16-7. 
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civil service relations - the civil servant assist the minister to take decisions - is. it 
seems, hard to maintain. Most decisions are made by civil servants, while ministers 
are involved only in important matters. The balance shifts, to a considerable extent, 
in favour of civil servants, whose influence on policy formulation has become large, 
even on important issues. 
This much suspected deviance from the constitutional ideal has provided an 
impetus for other studies concerning civil servants. As well as ministerial overload, 
these studies have been looking for structural reasons inherent in the government 
machinery as to ministers' weakness in management. Martin Burch argues that 
minister's inability to handle civil servants is fundamental in that 'a system of 
control by ministers designed to operate in nineteenth century conditions of limited 
administration is incapable to meet a large scale and highly specialised government 
these days'. 55 
Since the 1970s, surveys on the British civil service have two main focuses 
related to this point - the social background of civil servants and the organisation 
and management of government departments. 
Social background of civil servants 
Minister-civil service relations have been further explored by the method of elite 
survey. Focussing on social attributes, these works are to find out the power base of 
civil servants. 56 They have a root in the sociological approach of leadership which 
tried to prove the existence of a ruling class or the power elite in the social 
55 Burch, 'The demise of Cabinet govemment? 'p. 359. 
56 For example, Colin Campbell, Governments under Stress: Political Executives and Key 
Bureaucrats in Washington, London and Ottmi, a (London, University of Tronto Press, 1983); Rose, 
'The political status of higher civil servants in Britain'; and Geoffrey J. Gammon, 'The British higher 
civil service: recruitment and training', Public Policy and Administration, 4,1 (1989), 28-40. 1 
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structure. 57 
These politico- soc i ological studies of the civil servant have an additional 
aim, not only to show the difference in background or career between ministers and 
civil servants, but also to discover convincing links between the civil servant's way 
of thinking and his/her social background. Therefore at first it is often emphasised 
that senior positions of the civil service are dominated by male, Oxbridge -graduate, 
generalists. At the level of Principal or above, less than I in 10 are women. Among 
newly recruited future senior civil servants in 1985,2 in 3 were Oxbridge graduates. 
More than half hold an arts degree rather than one in science or social science. ý8 
Also stressed are the specialist characters of civil servants compared to 
ministers. Almost all higher civil servants start their official careers at the Assistant 
Principal grade or its equivalent, and they are promoted, in most cases, solely within 
the Whitehall "community". 59 As a consequence, firstly, they are usually engaged 
in similar jobs for longer terms than ministers, even if not, they are not amateurs in 
the field. In contrast, the average length of a ministerial office after 1945 is two 
years. 60 The depth of specialist knowledge of civil servants is not at all comparable 
with that of ministers. Secondly, even though an individual civil servant may be 
57 C. Wright Mills suggests the existence of the "power elite" in American society which 
controlled the US political system, dominating the major positions in the government, large business 
and military. Based on sociological studies of the top personnel of the national institutions, the 
relative cohesiveness of the power elite is claimed to be derived from the overlap and close relations 
of leaders in these institutions. This was reinforced by shared social background and educational 
experience. Paul Sweezy interprets such elite from class concepts ("ruling class"). See, C. Wright 
Mills, The Power Elite (New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1956); and, Paul Sweezy, 'Power 
elite or ruling class', Monthly Review, 8 (1956), 138-50. 
58 Drewry and Butcher, The Civil Service Today, pp. 64-72; see also Richard A. Chapman, 'Civil 
service recruitment: fairness or preferential advantages', Public Policy and Administration, 8 (1993), 
68-73; and, Sedgemore, The Secret Constitution, pp. 148-53. 
59 Rose, 'The political status of higher civil servants in Britain', p. 142. zn 
60 Coxall and Lynton Robins, Contemporary British Politics, p. 147. 
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new to a post, "institutional" memories about the work have been accumulated in 
departmental files, which help him/her to execute the job along the predetermined 
path. 61 Anyone who comes from outside Whitehall - ministers, policy advisors or 
whomsoever - are absorbed in the accumulated knowledge of Whitehall and to 
adjust their views along Whitehall lines. 62 
The ministerial character of the short term in office and the relative lack of 
knowledge about departmental matters are the main reasons for the penetration of 
senior civil servants in policy making. Not all ministers who have taken office have 
knowledge of what his/her department covers. Therefore, as Coxall and Robins cite 
as the comment of a former Permanent Secretary of the Treasury, ministers accept 
three quarter of the opinions civil servants present to them. 63 
Organisadon and management of the department 
The organisation and management of the government department is another subject 
relatively well surveyed. Describing metaphorically the Whitehall as a "village", 
Heclo and Wildavsky have pointed out the culture of bureaucracy, which is based 
on unique rules, custom and ideas, and exceeds departmental boundaries but 
significantly independent from other social groups. 64 In the "village" the minister is 
recognised as the leader of the department. A "strong" minister who is able to assert 
the interests of his/her department in negotiations of a minister level gains the 
support of the department, while a "weak" minister who is unable to do so becomes 
subject to contempt from the department. 
In Whitehall culture protecting organisational interests is a prime value. 
61 Rose, 'The political status of higher civil servants in Britain', p. 155. 
62 Rose, 'The political status of higher civil servants in Britain', pp. 161-2. 
63 Coxall and Lynton Robins, Contemporary British Politics, p. 147. 
64 Hugh Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky, The Private Government of Public Money: Community and 
Polici, inside British Politics (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1974). 1 
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Therefore, for example, one visitor to the "village", Joe Haines, Harold Wilson's 
Press Secretary, was amazed and stated later in 1977 that 'I believe the cP"ll service 
today is at the peak of its power' and that 'The danger we face is that the civil 
service has achieved too much power'. 65 He criticised the waste in Whitehall: 
despite the strong objections of Michael Foot, when he was Employment Secretary, 
senior civil servants achieved high pay rises in 1974; the Ministry of Defence was 
running 200 cars for senior servants; the same Ministry had 164 Press Officers in 
1976, when the Home Office managed to get by on fewer than thirty and the 
Foreign Office had just 11.66 Defense for its own organisation is raised as the main 
mode of operation of civil servants. Dunleavy and Rhodes, taking the failure of 
reduction in government spending under Heath and Thatcher governments as 
examples, assume that the emphasis of civil servants is on maximising departmental 
budgets and maintaining his/her own welfare. 67 
The organisation of government departments and their change is another 
major subject of study. 68 From earlier periods, the development of the central 
government, the size of the civil service, the number of departments have been 
surveyed. 69 Organisational reforms are also a popular subject. 70 Examining 
65 Joe Haines, The Politics ofPower (London, Jonathan Cape, 1977), p. 25. 
66 Haines, The Politics of Power, pp. 18-24). Similar examples are shown in a work by Leslie 
Chapman, a former civil servant in the Department of the Environment. See, Leslie Chapman, Your 
Disobedient Servant (London, Chatto and Windus, 1978), pp. 40-55. 
67 Dun leavy and Rhodes, 'Core executive studies in Britain', p. 16. 
68 cf Martin J. Smith, David Marsh and David Richards, 'Central government departments and 
policy process', Public Administration, 71,4 (1993), 567-94, pp. 575-7. 
69 For example, D. N. Chester and F. M. G. Wilson, The Organization of British Central 
Government, 1914-1956 (London, George Allen and Unwin, 2nd ed., 1968); and, Brian Smith and 
Jeffrey Stanyer, Administering Britain (London, Martin Robertson, 1976). 
70 For example, Richard Clark, 'The machinery of goverm-nent' in William Thornhill (ed. ), The 
Modernization of British Government (London, Pitnam, 1975), pp. 63-95; Brian W. Hogwood, 
Trends in British Public Policy: Do Governments Allake Any Difference " (Buckingham, Open 
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changes in organisation of the governments between 1914 and 1974, Richard Clark 
claims that the changes came about as a result of gradual realisation that 'it was 
practicable to reduce the number of major departments radically' and that a 
consensus gradually came into being that 'a structure with a few very large 
departments is more effective than one with many smaller departments'. 71 He 
identifies, as the 'underlying forces at work' of these changes, considerations on 
increasing ministerial places, improving coordination and increasing the size of 
departments. Meanwhile, Brian Hogwood argues that, since 1974, there has been 
some shift away from larger departments. He argues that there appeared moves 
towards rationalisation and consolidation of functions as government departments 
more closely correspond to major public expenditure functions. 72 
Since the 1980s, the structure of the main departments and their budgets and 
management have been added in the list of research subjects. Reforms of 
organisations and management since Thatcher's premiership (e. g. Financial 
Management Initiative (FMI) and the "Next Steps") in particular have produced 
substantial academic studies. 73 
University Press, 1992); and, Colin Pollitt, Manipulating the Machine. - Changing the Pattern of the 
Ministerial Departments, 1960-1983 (London, Allen and Unwin, 1984). 
71 Clark, 'The machinery of government', p. 93. 
72 Hogwood, Trends in British Public Policy, p. 175. 
73 For example, Andrew Flyn, Andrew Gray and William 1. Jenkins, 'Taking the Next Steps: the 
changing management of government', Parliamentary Affairs, 43,2 (1990), 159-78; Leo Metcalfe 
and Sue Richards, Improving Public Management (London, Sage, 1990); Patricia Greer, 
Transforming Central Government: The Next Steps Initiative (Buckingham, Open University Press, 
1994); Geofftey K. Fry, Policy and Management in the British Civil Service (London, Prentice HalU 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1995); and, Colin Campbell and Graham K. Wilson, The End of 14'hitehall. - 
Death of a Paradigm 9 (Oxford, Blackwell, 1995). 
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4. Studies of Civil Servants from Policy Perspectives 
In contrast to the works derived from the interest in minister-civil servant relations, 
studies of the executive-departmental line, or more specifically, the role of civil 
servants in terms of government policy making, are not popular. Major models 
among them are Jordan and Richardson's bureaucratic accommodation model and a 
variety of Whitehall models. 
Bureaucratic accommodation model 
Government departments are emphasised by Grant Jordan and Jeremy Richardson 
when they discuss consensual style of policy making in Britain. They found 
consensual nature of British politics in the government department - interest groups 
relations. In Britain preferred operational procedures of 'handling problems' are to 
avoid electoral politics and public conflict in order to reach consensus or 
'accommodation' in the labyrinth of consultative machinery. 74 Such a system in 
which the prominent actors are groups and government departments and the mode is 
bargaining rather than imposition is termed "bureaucratic accommodation". This is, 
they believe, the most common style of policy-making in Britain, and is designed to 
produce consensus and agreement among important actors. 
The relationship between the bureaucracy and interest groups is claimed to 
be often symbiotic. The existence of separate policy sectors reflecting departmental 
boundaries leads to clientalistic relationships between departments and groups, in 
which the essential nature of the relationship is consultative and negotiative. These 
dominant policy style is caused by two factors: a cultural bias which emphasises the 
74 Grant Jordan and Jeremy Richardson, 'The British policy style or the logic of negotiation T in 
Jeremy Richardson (ed. ), Policy Styles in Western Europe (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1982); 
and, Jordan and Richardson, British Politics and the Policy Process. 
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need to legitimate decisions through consultation; and a functional necessity for 
governments to consult the 'affected interests'. 75 
In the bureaucratic accommodation thesis, policy making and 
implementation takes place via networks of relationships, where civil servants sit at 
the centre of the network. In a world of specialisation and increasing complexity. 
with its deep interdependency of organisations, groups and individuals, it is 
inevitable that bureaucracies should be extremely powerful. 76 In formulating 
policies, civil servants are the more likely, compared with politicians, to have some 
notion of feasibility. It may be closely related to their perceptions of what will be 
resisted at the implementation stage. The bureaucratic preoccupation tends to be the 
minimisation of disturbance, the securing of a stable environment or negotiated 
order, rather than significant policy change. 77As one of the conditions of successful 
implementation the affected groups are closely involved in the formulation of the 
policies. They have technical expertise which civil servants lack, 78 thus consultation 
and negotiation tend to arise. 
The Whitehall models 
The bureaucratic side of the government is modelled and labelled metaphorically as 
the "Whitehall model" in contrast to the "Westminster model", which deal with the 
legislative side of the government whose main component is Parliament. For 
example, Anthony Birch points out the independence from Parliament of the 
executive -department branch composed of ministers and civil servants. 79Many 
75 Jordan and Richardson, British Politics and the Policy Process, p. 171. 
76 Jordan and Richardson, British Politics and the Policy Process, pp. 178-9. 
77 Jordan and Richardson, 'The British policy style', p. 92. 
78 Jordan and Richardson, British Politics and the Policy Process, p. 171. 
79 Anthony H. Birch, The British System of Government (London, George Allen and Unwin, 3rd 
ed., 1973), pp-33-8- 
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initiatives were claimed to be taken from within the bureaucracy rather than from 
politicians in Parliament. The British bureaucracy conducts its affairs in substantial 
independence of Parliament, not only in respect of defence and foreign relations but 
also in respect of domestic matters. It is Whitehall rather than Parliament that is 
depicted as the centre of government. 
This is a view mainly focussed on the policy side of the British government. 
In contrast to the "Westminster model" that focuses on the democratic 
accountability side of the government based on the values of the democratic 
theorist, the Whitehall view is based upon the values of the administrator, who sees 
governinent as a way of providing public services and promoting the public interest, 
and tends to regard party conflict as a distraction which may be necessary but which 
is somewhat irrelevant to the main business in hand. 80 
The perspectives raised in the previous section take the position that the 
working principle of civil servants functions to oppose the division of labour 
between ministers and civil servants. Although Birch did not specifically present the 
division of labour in his Whitehall model by himself, there is a claim by others that, 
until managerial reforms that began in the 1970s and ftirther promoted under the 
Thatcher administration changed the traditional relations between ministers and 
civil servants radically, the division of labour was working considerably in the 
British governments up to the 1964 - 1970 Wilson government. Such division of 
labour that conforms with normative ideas was possible not because ministers and 
civil servants are in adversarial relations but because they are in interdependence 
and in need of each other. 
For example, Colin Campbell and Graham Wilson explain their own 
Whitehall model with regard to minister-civil servant relations in the pre-Thatcher 
period, which was also exported to other countries having close links with Britain. 
80 Bh-ch, The British System of Government, p. 38. 
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Raised as a 'marriage of democratic politics and intellectual brilliance', their 
interdependence takes the form that democratically elected politicians make policy 
as a result of collective negotiation but this was assisted in developing and 
implementing policies by civil servants selected on merit. 81 
Four elements are emphasised in this model. 82Civil servants are at first to be 
neutrally competent in that they serve loyally on behalf of the government 
established according to due procedures; secondly, higher civil servants are to exist 
as a profession without fear that their careers might be harmed by political 
pressures; thirdly, civil servants are to be accorded a near monopoly on providing 
policy analysis and advise to ministers; and fourthly, both ministers and civil 
servants are to endorse the right and responsibility of democratically elected 
ministers as the final decision-takers. 
Civil servants in the policy process 
As has been argued, British political studies have produced a large number of works 
on power structure and elective elites. In contrast, few works have been produced on 
the role of non-elective elites in the policy process. What is important here is that 
the imbalance of academic research, by no means, implies that non-elective elites 
are minor actors in the policy process. The role of civil servants might be 
underrated. Rather as Martin J. Smith and his colleagues claim, 'There are reasons 
to believe that even during the Thatcher government the central unit of policy 
making was the department'. 83 Bar issues of particular interest to the Prime 
Minister, or those of central strategic policy, or those with a high potential for 
controversy, the majority of policy issues is processed at the level of civil servants. 
81 Campbell and Wilson, The End of Whitehall, p. 289 and p. 303. 
82 Campbell and Graham K. Wilson, The End of Whitehall, pp. 32-3 and pp. 61-9. 
83 Smith et al., 'Central government departments and policy process', p. 569. 
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This is a fact that has been acknowledged in much of the public administration 
literature. Keith Dowding argues: 
Whosoever makes decisions, decisions about policy are made within 
departments. Whilst cabinet committees co-ordinate policy and agreements oN'Cr 
interdepartmental policy may emerge there, most of the major decisions about 
government policy are made within departments. Only on the grand issues such 
as important aspects of foreign relations and the economy does the prime 
minister have a continual role, and rarely, even under Thatcher, does the prime 
minister intervene directly in policy-making. 84 
Many scholars have insisted, at least, on the importance of civil servants in the 
policy process. 
The importance of civil servants in the policy process is thus recognised; 
however they have received relatively little attention even in the meso level analyses 
of the policy process. This is the meaning that the belief in society has delineated 
the scope of British political studies. Holding a strong elitist bias, British political 
studies have paid small attention to civil servants in policy making. With the great 
emphasis on the top executives in the macro level analyses, they are believed to play 
a large role also in the policy process. 
HoNvever, the macro-level statement whether non-elective actors have a 
power or not, and the meso-level argument what role non-elective actors play in the 
policy process are questions of different kinds. The difference of the level of 
analysis need to be fully recognised. In the policy process the "powerful" does not 
necessarily play a larger part than the "powerless". 
84 Keith Dowding, The Civil Service (London, Routledge, 1995), p. 113. 
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Chapter 3 Framework and Methodology of Analysis 
1. Role of Civil Servants in the Policy Process 
Two-layer policy process 
As discussed in the previous chapter, a large volume of literature has suggested that 
there exists an "unelective dictatorship" of civil servants within the government. 
These views assume that civil servants can manipulate information so that they can 
keep ministers from receiving information unfavourable to the views of civil 
servants. Nevertheless, this kind of literature does not go so far as to deny the 
existence of any divisions of labour between ministers and civil servants as the 
constitutional view holds. It is expected that ministers and civil servants play 
different roles in the policy process. This means that, however strong the civil 
servant's role in the policy process may be, they cannot take the formal 
responsibility constitutionally assigned to ministers. The constitutional view is still 
effective, to some degree, in analysing the role of civil servants in the policy 
process. 
Recognition of this role difference is important and not dismissible. In 
constitutional terms, civil servants are subordinate to ministers; in reality, they 
collaborate in producing organisational output, i. e. policy. They are independent 
from each other and their approach in the policy process are different and 
complementary. Accordingly the policy making arena within British governments 
has two layers, each corresponding to ministers and civil servants. 
Autonomy of civil servants: Casesfrom official committees 
This can be shown by the distinct existence of inter-departmental discussion at the 
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civil servant level, which is separate from that at ministerial level. The importance 
of official committees composed of senior civil servants of departments concerned 
should not be underestimated. 
Most ministerial committees have corresponding official committees as 
"shadow" committees. ' They have a, more or less, informal character. Some of 
them are serviced and chaired by the Cabinet Office staff so that they formally 
constitute a part of the Cabinet system; 2 however more of them are not within the 
formal Cabinet Office network. What are published so far, as the lists of Cabinet 
committeeS, 3 are, in reality, lists of ministerial committees. 
In contrast to ministerial committees, little is known about the details of 
official committees mostly due to their informal character. Simon James identifies 
three levels of "seniority" in official committees: committees of permanent 
secretaries, which 'meet rarely'; committees of deputy- or under- secretaries, which 
are 'more numerous and [meet] more often', and committees of assistant secretaries, 
which 'deal with a less exalted level of problems' and are 'the most common type'. 4 
There are more descriptions of official committees in writings by politicians 
than by academics. Crossman refers in his Diaries to the function of official 
committees as follows: 
I According to Crossman, expansion of "shadow" committees became apparent from the mid- 
1950s. See, Richard Crossman, Inside View: Three Lectures on Prime Ministerial Government 
(London, Jonathan Cape, 1972), p. 73. 
2 Brian W. Hogwood and Thomas T. Mackie, 'The United Kingdom: decision sifting in a secret 
garden' in Thomas T. Mackie and Brian W. Hogwood (eds), Unlocking the Cabinet: Cabinet 
Structures in Comparative Perspective (London, Sage, 1985), pp. 36-60, p. 43. 
3 For example, Peter Hennessy, Cabinet (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986); and, Patrick Dunleavy, 
'Estimating the distribution of positional influence in cabinet committees under Major' in R. A. W. 
Rhodes and Patrick Dunleavy (eds), Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive (London, 
Macmillan, 1995), pp. 298-32 1. 
4 Simon James, British Cabinet Government (London, Routledge, 1992), pp. 55-6. 
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The really big thing ... was that ... there is a full network of official 
committees; and the work of the Ministers is therefore strictly and completely 
paralleled at the official level. This means that very often the whole job is pre- 
cooked in the official committee to a point from which it is extremely difficult 
to reach any other conclusion than that already determined by the officials in 
advance .... 
5 
Brian Sedgemore also contends: 
The effectiveness of inter-departmental committees had grown enormously. In 
particular, the inter- departmental civil service committees which now parallel 
each cabinet sub-committee were exercising great power. Often these official 
committees were being used to foreclose options for ministers rather than 
open them Up. 6 
Haines regards official committees as one of the three 'Cabinets' which the British 
political system embraces, along with the 'real one' of 10 Downing Street and the 
'shadow' cabinet of the opposition party. 7 He observes official committees in the 
Wilson government as follows: 
This committee of heads of departments [the Permanent Secretaries] 
meets each week to discuss the business which will come before Cabinet and 
ý Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Volume One, Minister of Housing 1964- 
66 (London, Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, 1975), p. 198. 
6 Brian Sedgemore, The Secret Constitution: An Analysis of the Political Establishment (London, 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1980), p. 27. 
7 Joe Haines, The Politics of Power (London, Jonathan Cape, 1977), p. 16. 
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whether - and if so, how - Ministers will be advised on that business. If the 
Whitehall machine has a collective 'line' on policy, and it often does, it is at 
these meetings that it will emerge. 8 
The tone of Barnett criticising the officials' "Cabinet" is much harsher: 
Plotting is too strong a word but there is no doubt that officials at these 
meetings plan how to 'steer' Cabinet and Cabinet Committees along paths 
Ministers may not have originally intended. 9 
The existence of the separate discussions in official committees from that at the 
ministerial level is as such widely known. However, its function in the policy 
process, and its relations with ministerial committees are little surveyed. 
From description to analysis 
These descriptions by politicians of official committees appear to show the 
obtrusive nature of civil servant's discussions. However, relations between ministers 
and civil servants cannot be described in such ways that ministers are mere 
representatives of civil servants in the ministerial arena, or that they are conflicting 
opponents, or that they are the absolute lord and the unfree servants. Rather they are 
co-operative partners within a framework in which the minister, having 
constitutional supremacy, allows civil servants considerable autonomy as far as they 
act within the principles ministers set, in order to make the management of the 
government more smooth and efficient. 
In order to examine the role of civil servants in the policy process, it is 
8 Haines, The Politics of Power, p. 16. 
Joel Barnett, Inside the Treasury (London, Andre Deutsch, 1982), p. 188. 
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essential, therefore, to include as a focus of analysis both autonomy and constraints 
of civil servants, and to pay attention to both the resource of autonomy and the 
condition of constraints. On the whole, however, the distinct role of civil servants in 
the policy process is as yet not analysed. Attention to the two-layer structure of the 
policy process within the British government is descriptive and, in many cases, 
impressionistic. It is not theoretically well refined. The following section will 
observe the existing models of the role of civil servants in the policy process - 
bureaucratic politics model and policy network models - so that these are employed 
for analysis of the role of civil servants in the policy process. 
2. Perspectives for Policy Process Analysis 
Bureaucratic politics model 
Few explanations would be necessary as regards Allison's bureaucratic politics 
model. As is well known, the model was proposed along with the organisational 
process model as an alternative view to the traditional analysis of external policy 
making. 10 The external policy of a country had been analysed on the assumption of 
the state as a rational actor. 
Allison shows the inadequacy of treating the government as a rational 
unitary actor in policy making. In a study of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, he 
presented three different models each aiming to explain the policy process from 
different angles. At first, the difficulty of linking actions with goals persuasively by, 
what he termed, the rational actor model. He criticised model's proposition that 
policy is a product of the state acting as a rational actor. He claimed this was an 
10 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decisions: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, MA, 
Little Brown, 1971). 
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oversimplification of reality. It was claimed that policy is not the output from a 
unitary state organisation as there is no single actor which determines policy alone. 
The bureaucratic politics model was presented, along with the organisatlonal 
process model, to replace the rational actor model in analysing policy making within 
the government. The model focuses on bargaining among individuals participating 
in policy making. Such an individual, each representing a different government 
institution, propose or oppose policy in the interests of his/her own department or 
himself/herself. The government is composed of a number of such competitive 
individuals and groups, each pursuing their own interests and protecting its own 
domain. Negotiations are conducted based on constitutional and administrative 
rules, conventions and culture. A government policy is realised either as the option 
preferred by a single group or a coalition of groups which happen to be dominant in 
the government at a particular point of time or at a particular issue area, or as a 
result of compromise among various proposals. 
Meanwhile, the organisational process model views policy as an output from 
an organisation. Each organisation holds its own independent procedures, set of 
values, and managerial measures, which combine to constitute its "standard 
operating procedures". The standard operating procedures pre-exist the problem 
itself and are assumed to provide the mode of operation to deal with the problem. II 
The model assumes that the government is composed of a number of organisations. 
Allison's models brought new perspectives for an analysis of the policy 
II Allison, Essence of Decisions, p. 89. The standard operating procedures may even alter or 
neutralise external pressure, or, more concretely, even directions from political leaders (cf. Steve 
Smith, 'Perspectives on the foreign policy system: bureaucratic politics approach' in Michael Clark 
and Brian White (eds), Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach 
(Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1989), p. 115). The model further assumes differences in ideological 
attitudes among organisations, and thus emphasises the variety of policy making patterns. z! ) It) 
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process. His work received both praise and criticism. 12 Partly because of the 
criticism about potential compatibility of these two models, the organisational 
process model was later amalgamated into the bureaucratic politics model. 13 It was 
recognised that 'organizations can be included as players in the game of bureaucratic 
politics, treating the factors emphasized by an organizational process approach as 
constraints, developing the notion of shared attitudes, and introducing a distinction 
between "decision games" [in the bureaucratic politics model] and "action games" 
[in the organisational Process model]'. 14 There is, in fact, little difficulty in merging 
these two models, as the major difference between them is concerned with the level 
of analysis. The emphases of the models were put respectively on the policy 
process within organisations or groups and that between them. 
The essence of the bureaucratic politics model is that policy is an outcome 
of bargaining between conflicting groups. In the real world, however, the bargaining 
within the government is not made at random. Usually there are a set of rules as 
regards who should participate in bargaining, their resources, and how the 
negotiations should be conducted. In this respect bargaining is exercised in an 
orderly manner. Allison tells little about this point. Therefore a major criticism of 
his bureaucratic politics model is about its neglect of the special status of particular 
actors in the circle of policy makers, in his example of the Cuban missile crisis, the 
role of the US President. 15 The bureaucratic politics model emphasises that the 
12 Criticisms of Allison's work are most concisely summarised by Steve Smith, and Jonathan 
Bendor and Thomas Hammond. See, Smith, 'Perspectives on the foreign policy system'; and, 
Jonathan Bendor and Thomas H. Hanuriond, 'Rethinking Allison's models', American Political 
Science Review, 86,2 (1992), 301-22. 
13 Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, 'Bureaucratic politics: a paradigm and some policy 
implications' in Raymond Tanter and Richard M. Ullman (eds), Theory and Policy in International 
Relations (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 40-79. 
14 Allison and Morton Halperin, 'Bureaucratic politics', p. 40, footnote. 
15 It is worth emphasising that the organisational process model treats separately the role of 
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government is not a unitary actor; however it lacks propositions on the internal 
structure of the arena where policy makers have discussions. 
Policy network models 
One of the recent developments in the analysis of the policy process is the 
introduction of the idea of "policy network" within the government. The policy 
network approach has the aim to identify informal networks between actors in 
policy making. Rhodes argues that power within the central government is based on 
interdependence of policy makers rather than a zero-sum game conception. 16 
Organisations are dependent upon each other for, and exchange, resources to 
achieve their goals. 17 In other words, a policy network is a network of power 
sharing. 
The policy network approach has its origin in pluralist theories, in which it 
is assumed that policy is formulated in interactions between the state and social 
groups. A number of different policy systems, or networks of policy makers, coexist 
and function in parallel within one country at a time. Recognition that patterns of 
policy processes are largely different and that the policy process is therefore 
sectorised on the basis of issues so that each sector has its own participants and 
pattern of policy making, emerged in the 1960s from the studies of US politics. An 
initial hint of recognising the variety in policy areas was put forward by Theodore 
political leaders in policy making from that of organisations. Political leaders were supposed to act at 
a higher level than others so that they coordinate outcomes from, and the working of, independent 
organisations. See, Allison, Essence of Decisions, p. 87. 
16 R. A. W. Rhodes, 'From Prime Ministerial power to core executive' in R. A. W. Rhodes and 
Patrick Dunleavy (eds), Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive (London, Macmillan, 1995), 
pp. ] 1-3 7, p. 26- 
17 Rhodes, 'From Prime Ministerial power to core executive', p. 29. 
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Lowi. 18 He claimed that the genre of policy is concerned with the pattern of the 
policy process. As the result of a survey of the bills submitted to the US Congress, 
he argued that the content of proposed policy determines the pattern of political 
conflicts. Policies were classified, in accordance with the function of the 
government, into three groups: distribution, regulation and redistribution. Then he 
asserted that, corresponding to this classification, three patterns, or 'arenas', were 
found with respect to the pattern of conflicts, actors, characteristics of the elite. 
Lowi's view was extended by empirical surveys, which later resulted in 
discovering the national pattern in the policy process. In US politics, the close link 
between administrative agencies, congress subcommittees and pressure groups was 
claimed to be discovered. Although such sectorised policy subsystems were named 
variously - "whirlpool", "iron triangle", "subgovernment" - their implications are not 
so different as the names. Heclo meanwhile argued that there are more open systems 
of the policy process in US politics. He suggested that policy systems in the US 
became more open than before and claimed that American policy making is 
fragmented by an unpredictably large number of participants. 19 He, therefore, 
insisted that concepts like "iron triangles" should be replaced by "issue networks" as 
policy subsystem, in which no consensus exists as to the goal of poliCy. 20 
In Britain, Richardson and Jordan pointed out that the characteristic of 
policy making in Britain is high sectorisation. 21 Each area has its own pattern of 
18 Theodore J. Lowi, 'American business, public policy, case-studies, and political theory', World 
Politics, 16,4 (1964), 677-715. 
19 Hugh Heclo, 'Issue networks and the executive establishment' in Anthony King (ed. ), The New 
American Political System (Washington, D. C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, 1978), pp. 87-124, p. 88. 
20 Heclo, 'Issue networks and the executive establishment', p. 102. 
21 J. J. Richardson and A. G. Jordan, Governing Under Pressure: The Policy Process in a Post- 
Parliamentary DemocracY (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1979); and, Grant Jordan and Jeremy 
Richardson, 'The British policy style or the logic of negotiationT in Jeremy Richardson (ed. ), PolicY 
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policy process and, in general, is sectorised relatively rigidly. The British policy 
process is therefore not much open to outside influences. and most of the policies 
on non-conflictual issues tends to be formulated by a limited number of participants. 
In such a policy area, there is, they claimed, a relatively closed "policy 
community". 22 
Empirical findings about various patterns of policy process have led to the 
construction of a unified, but more abstract, framework for accommodating policy 
subsystems. Ranging according to openness, Rhodes proposes the concept of 
"policy network" as a comprehensive typology of policy subsystems, whose ends of 
spectrum are Richardson and Jordan's "Policy community" and Heclo's "issue 
network" respectively. 23 
Basically the policy network models assume that actors in the network are 
interdependent and they are therefore supposed to cooperate with each other. 
However, actors in a policy network may cooperate on one issue, but may be in 
dispute on another. Therefore the possibility of internal conflicts in the policy 
network should not be dismissed. In this respect, Paul Sabatier, an American 
political scientist, has put forward an advocacy coalition model, where the 
possibility of internal bargaining by a number of coalitions in a single subsystem is 
taken into account. Policy brokers not belonging to the coalitions are supposed to 
decide which options should be adopted or how different options should be 
compromised. 24 
Styles in Western Europe (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 80-1 10. 
22 Richardson and Jordan, Governing Under Pressure, pp. 73-4. 
23 R. A. W. Rhodes, Beyond Westminster and Whitehall: The Sub-central Governments of Britain 
(London, Routledge, 1988), pp. 48-77; see also, Martin J. Smith, Pressure, Power and Polic : State t:. y 
Autonomy and Policy Networks in Britain and the United States (London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
1993), p. 57. 
24 Paul A. Sabatier, 'An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy- 
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One of the most recent attempts about the policy network approach is its 
application to the analysis of the core executive so that the approach contributes to 
discovering the internal network of the government. As mentioned above, the policy 
network approach has tended to focus its attention on government-interest group 
relations. However, empirical surveys, conscious of the policy network or not, have 
suggested the importance of paying attention to non-elective actors. Application of 
the policy network approach to the internal mechanism of the core executive has 
already contributed to the depiction of different patterns of policy process in 
different policy issues. 25 These studies have suggested that the network of domestic 
policies is relatively extended while that of foreign policy is closed. 26 
Policy network models have potential to disclose the internal structure of 
government policy making. In so doing, these models are capable of explaining the 
flexibility of policy subsystems. They would show who participates in the real 
policy process and how participants differ in different policy areas. To the contrary, 
they have a risk to underestimate the importance of formal or constitutional 
arrangements. These impose limitations on policy makers about their actions and, 
therefore, affect patterns of policy process. It is thus necessary to recognise the 
extent of constitutional influence on the structure of the policy network. 
Application of the existing models 
oriented learning therein', Policy Sciences, 21,2/3 (1988), 129-68. 
25 James, British Cabinet Government; and, Martin Burch and Ian Holliday, The British Cabinet 
System (Hemel Hempstead, Prentice Hall/ Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1996). 
26 Meanwhile in the studies of civil servants, recent works have introduced concepts such as 
"policy network" or "policy community". However, such works use the concept only to expose 
fon-nal institutions within the government rather than to use it as a framework of analysis for flexible 
networks in the policy process. See, for example, Keith Dowding, The Civil Service (London, 
Routledge, 1995), pp. 112-22; and, Robert Pyper, The British Civil Service (Hemel Hempstead, 
Prentice Hall/ Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1995), ch. 4. 
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Some of the main assumptions in these two types of models - bureaucratic politics 
model and policy network models - will be applied in the analysis here of the 
British policy process within the government. Three points are particularly 
important. 
Firstly, a focus of the bureaucratic politics model is the relationship between 
policy makers' bureaucratic positions and their policy preferences. The major 
determinants of the stance of an actor is his/her position in the goverm-nent 
machinery: 'Where you stand depends on where you sit' so that 'the stance of a 
particular player can be predicted with high reliability from information about his 
seat'. 27 This factor is assumed to be more important than the actor's personality, 
ideology, or social background. This means that, in the case of a civil servant, 
maintaining the influence of his/her organisation, fulfilling the mission of the 
organisation, and securing its necessary capability are important, while he/she is 
relatively unconcerned with political implications of policy, which are a major 
concern for politicianS. 28 
Secondly, a major proposition of the policy network models is that the 
influence of an actor in the policy community depends on his/her position in the 
policy community. This could be described, in a similar manner to Allison's 
aphorism, 'how you stand depends on where you sit'. The actors assured of a central 
place in policy discussions within the government find it easier to have their views 
listened to policy circles, while those with marginal status or who are not assured of 
institutional places find it difficult or impossible to make their voice heard. The 
policy network models focus on the structure of policy making within the 
government. The position of each actor in the policy community is the major 
determinant of his/her influence in policy making of the area. 
27 Allison, Essence of Decisions, p. 176. 
28 Allison, Essence of Decisions, p. 167. 
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Thirdly, both bureaucratic politics and policy network models have 
weaknesses, however, in their little attention to the formal rules of negotiation 
within the government, or the formal structure of policy making arenas. In this 
respect, not only the customs and rules of convenience, but also constitutional 
expectations about the role of different actors should not be underrated. Every 
government actor has his/her own role assigned in terms of constitutional 
procedures. They do not have equal standings when they participate in the policy 
process. These roles, among others, could explain a lot about the division of labour 
in the policy process. It is also important to note that these role expectations reflect 
the polity of each country so that they produce identical patterns of policy process 
distinct from other countries. 
These three points among others will be focussed and examined in the 
process analysis from the next Chapter of the policy process in the British 
governments from 1948 to 1964 on Commonwealth immigration. 
3. Research Method 
Process approach 
As was pointed out previously, power is a concept hard to handle in any process 
analyses of policy: it is important to recognise that power relations are only a part of 
the policy process. Though British political studies have put a heavy emphasis on 
politics, i. e. power relations among actors, politics and policy are not in any sense 
synonymous. 
Hideo Otake, a Japanese political scientist, argues that "political process" 
can be analysed as "policy process" - the development process of a particular policy 
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- on the one hand, and "power process" among particular actors on the other. 29 In 
empirical studies of the policy process, it might be attractive to describe a particular 
individual or group of people as key decision-makers. However, such stances may 
hide the policy process behind them. As a result of paying excessive attention to the 
power of individual actors, many of the extant studies have so far failed to deal with 
basic questions such as: how the policy process is organised; and what type of 
networks exist within and between government departments. The power-based 
approach has narrowed the scope of studies of actors such as civil servants. In the 
analysis of the policy process, identifying the location of power has only a limited 
meaning. 
It is important to distinguish politics and policy. In the policy process both 
political and non-political aspects are important. The emphasis which political 
studies has put on power distribution has so far worked to limit the scope of 
empirical research. They have failed to pay proper attention to the non-political 
aspects of the policy process so that the role of civil servants in the policy process 
has attracted little academic interest. It is thus essential to examine the role of civil 
servants in the policy process on the recognition that non-political aspects are 
important in the policy process. 
The most effective way of identifying the role of different actors in the 
policy process is to regard the process as one which extends over time and to deal 
with policy formulation as a process of negotiation over time. This thesis thus 
examines chronologically the role civil servants played in policy formulation on 
immigration from the Commonwealth in the period from 1948 to 1964.30 
29 Hideo Otake, Seisaku-Katei (The Policy Process), (Tokyo, University of Tokyo Press, 1990). A 
similar but somewhat different conception of the "policy process" is shown by Christopher Ham and 
Michael Hill. See, Christopher Ham and Michael Hill, The PolicY Process in the Modern Capitalist 
State (London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 2nd ed., 1993), esp. ch. 1. 
30 The reason for focussing on this period is partly as many of the critical decisions determining 
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Examination of government documents 
In order to discover the role of civil servants in the policy process, this research 
owes its primary sources to government documents. The analysis of the policN 
process within the government has so far relied on two main methods - interviews 
and documentary survey. Works about civil servants such as those by Hugh Heclo 
and Aaron Wildavsky, and Colin Campbell were based mainly on interviews. 31 
Interviews are useful for discovering the subjective ideas of actors involved in the 
policy process. 32 The data produced from this method, however, is a partial picture 
through intentional or unintentional screening by interviewees from today's 
perspective; thus the importance of a particular event of the past may be over- 
emphasised, while others may be neglected. Moreover this method has a fatal 
weakness in falsifiability. Information obtained from interviews by a researcher 
cannot easily be replicated by another. This hinders the application of the interview 
method for a theoretical analysis from being fully justified, except where few 
written records are available for the topic or the interviews are used as a 
supplementary source. 
In the field of documentary analysis, such materials as diaries, memoirs and 
autobiographies are invaluable since they exhibit ideas while the person subject to 
research was in office. However, these materials are not free from intentional 
British postwar immigration policy were made in this period but also because of the availablities of 
the critical primary documentary materials. 
31 Hugh Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky, The Private Government of Public Money: Community and 
Policy inside British Politics (London, Macmillan, 1974); and, Colin Campbell, Governments under 
Stress: Political Executives and Key Bureaucrats in Washington, London and Ottawa (London, 
University of Tronto Press, 1983). 
32 Fiona Devine, 'Qualitative analysis' in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds), Theory and 
Methods in Political Science (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1995), pp. 137-53 ), pp. 140- 1. 
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screening, either. Moreover the number of people who left these documents are, in 
general, limited to a small number of senior figures. Therefore these are not 
sufficient to uncover the whole process of policy formulation. It can therefore be 
concluded that suitability of inter-views, diaries, memoirs and autobiographies as 
research materials lies in complimenting public documents by filling the gaps 
where, for some reasons, such documents are not available. 
As far as public documents are concerned, the abundance of sources for 
recent political events tends to result in researchers underrating the value of these 
documents. However, not only in the case of history, but also of contemporary 
events, there is little doubt that studies of the policy process within the government 
cannot be separated from studies of the public record which the events created. 
Organisations, either public or private, produce a large amount of documents every 
day in every aspect of their work. Modern organisations do not work without 
documents. Public documents are by-product of policy and administration, and, as a 
result, they best reflect the internal organisation and interests of the public 
agencies. 33 Public documents are not just a record of the policy process but they are 
important components of the policy process itself. 
In general, however, or because of this nature, access to public documents 
involves difficulties for researchers. Except for such documents as the record of 
Parliamentary debates, which is swiftly published, documents related to the policy 
process within the government are kept unpublished for a certain period of time. 
This constitutes a limitation for research on precise description of modern political 
events, as access to the departmental documents is controlled by the thirty-year rule 
under the 1967 Public Record Act. Public records normally become open to public 
33 John Scott, A Matter of Record: Documentary Sources in Social Research (Cambridge, Polity 
Press, 1990), p-58; and, Michael Roper, 'Public records and the policy process in the twentieth 
century', Public Administration, 55,3 (1977), 253-69, p. 254. 
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inspection after thirty years from the date of creation: this means, for example, in 
1997 only documents filed in 1966 or before are publicly accessible. This is based 
on the date of the latest papers contained in the file: for example, documents of 
more than thirty years old which are filed together with one of 1967, are not 
published until 1998.34 Moreover, files created on a three-year cycle basis are 
closed until thirty years from the completion of the cycle. 35 
Some documents are barred from publication for longer periods (50,75 or 
100 years). Government departments can, with the Lord Chancellor's permission, 
retain documents of more than thirty years old. According to Anne Thurston, such 
files closed for more than thirty years usually contain documents falling into one or 
more of the following categories: personal information which would cause distress 
to or endanger living persons or their immediate descendants; information obtained 
under a pledge of confidence; confidential commercial correspondence; and 
exceptionally sensitive papers the disclosure of which would be contrary to public 
interest whether on security or other grounds. 36 
Furthermore, not all documents in a single file are published. Documents 
that become available to researchers in open archives are a selection of the 
documents originally produced. 37 Documents which are not deemed to be too 
sensitive to disclose in the above standards would be available. However, they have 
generally been weeded before being deposited in the archives. The most obvious 
reason for this is the bulk of documents: it is physically impossible to store all the 
paper produced. However, it is almost impossible to know which items of 
34 Roper, 'Public records and the policy process in the twentieth century', p. 258. 
35 Anne Thurston, Records of the Colonial Office, Dominion Office, Commonwealth Relations 
Office and Commonwealth Office, Sources for Colonial Studies in the Public Record Office Vol. I 
(London, HNISO, 1995), p. 64. 
36 Thurston, Records, p. 64. 
37 Scott, 4 Matter of Record, p. 62. 
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documents will attract the attention of future researchers. As a result, researchers 
often find the criteria of selection employed for weeding unclear. 38 
This methodological problem constitutes another reason, in addition to the 
normative view on policy making as seen in the previous chapter, which has 
restricted studies on the role of non-elective actors in the policy process. Studies on 
the policy process of Commonwealth immigration have so far relied on the record 
of Parliamentary debates and of Cabinet meetings. Minutes of Parliamentary 
debates are published within a few weeks after the debates. Minutes of the Cabinet 
meetings are subject to thirty-year rule, but, after that period, access to them is 
relatively easy at the Pubic Record Office in Kew, thanks to its exceptional open 
shelving system employed for those documents. Documents of ministerial 
committees are, though not on open shelves, filed independently from other 
documents so that examination of these documents are easier than that of other 
documents once the appropriate files are identified. 
However, examination of other documents usually accompanies much 
difficulty. Documents of official committees are in most cases filed with other 
related documents in a number of files so that it is hard to identify the file 
containing the document in mind and it needs much more time and patience. This 
has undoubtedly hindered research on the role of civil servants. 
Consequently, for the analysis of the policy process on Commonwealth 
immigration, previous works have relied heavily on Parliamentary debates and 
published documents of political parties. Some recent works are based on 
government documents but these are documents of Cabinet meetings or, at most, 
ministerial committee meetings. 39 Their focus of research generally falls into the 
38 Colin Holmes, 'Government files and privileged access', Social History, 6,3 (1981), 33-33-50, 
p. 3 )4 1; and, Scott, A Matter of Record, p. 63. 
39 For example, D. W. Dean, 'Coping with colonial Immigration, the Cold War and colonial 
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decision actually taken rather than the process leading to the decision. 
Public Record Officefiles 
Departmental documents are published in the Public Record Office (PRO) in Kew 
and research for this thesis mainly focuses on investigation of the documents 
published there. The number of files deposited in the PRO is numerous. It is 
therefore essential for researchers of public documents there, and also important for 
readers examining the merit of works produced from such research, to understand 
the classification of the files deposited in the PRO. Departmental files in the PRO 
have two classification numbers - registration number and reference number. A 
registration number is allotted to the file by the ministerial department when it is 
registered within the department. In 1951 the departmental filing code system was 
introduced for this registration numbering; thereby, the registration number was 
systematised according to the objective of the file. 40 However, the contents of files 
before 1951 are in general difficult to identify from the registration number. 
More familiar reference numbers (e. g. CAB128/44, C01032/302) consist of 
lettercode (CAB, CO), class number (128,1032), and file, or piece, number (44, 
302). The lettercode usually refers to the ministerial department originally in charge 
of the file. Lettercodes concerned with this research are CAB (Cabinet Office), CO 
(Colonial Office), DO (Commonwealth Relations Office, as it had been the 
policy: the Labour Government and black corm-nunities in Great Britain 1945-51', Immigrants and 
Minorities, 6,3 (1987), 305-34; D. W. Dean, 'Conservative govermnents and the restriction of 
Commonwealth immigration in the 1950s: the problem of constraint', Historical Journal, 35,1 
(1992), 171-94; Dennis Dean, 'The Conservative government and the 1961 Commonwealth 
Immigration Act: the inside story', Race and Class, 35,2 (1993), 57-74; Richard Lamb, The Failure 
of the Eden Government (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, 1987); and, Richard Lamb, The Macmillan 
Years 1957-1963. - The Emerging Truth (London, John Murray, 1995). 
40 Thurston, Records, pp. 45-7 and 59. 
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"Dominion Office"), HO (Home Office), LAB (Ministry of Labour and National 
Service), MH (Ministry of Health), and PREM (Prime Minister's Office). The class 
defined by the class number is often called "series". 
The registration and reference numbers are independent of each other and 
relations between them are in general irregular. For example in the case of Colonial 
Office files after 195 1, one class generally consists of the files of one department 
supervised usually by an Assistant Secretary so that there are correspondence 
between the registration and reference numbers, while in the case of 
Commonwealth Relations Office files in the same period, one class based on the 
reference number contained the files of several assistant-secretaiy departments. 41 
Series of particular importance for this research are: 
Cabinet Office 
CAB 128 (Cabinet meetings minutes) 
CAB 129 (Cabinet meetings papers) 
CAB130 (ad hoc ministerial committees) 
CAB134 (standing ministerial committees) 
Colonial Office 
C0323 and C01032 (General Department) 
C0859 (Social Service Department) 
C0876andCO1028 (Welfare and Student Department) 
CO 1031 (West Indian Department) 
Commonwealth Relations Office 
D035 
41 Thurston, Records, p. 415. 
(general correspondence, 
including files of the Constitutional 
Department) 
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D0175 (Migration Department) 
Home Office 
H0213 (Alien Department) 
Ministry of Labour 
ML8 (Employment Department) 
ML26 (Welfare Department). 
All disclosed minutes and papers of the Cabinet and ministerial committee 
meetings, and many of the minutes and papers of official committees and related 
documents are found in the files under these series. 42 
These files were produced by civil servants actually in charge of the job so 
that documents were not necessarily filed on the same criteria. Logically, minutes 
and papers for inter- departmental meetings should be found in files of more than 
one ministerial departments. As mentioned above, today the minutes and papers of 
the Cabinet and ministerial committee meetings have been concentrated in Cabinet 
Office files and weeded from other files. In contrast, same copies of minutes and 
papers of an official committee are found in more than one file, while not all 
documents of an official committee may not be discovered. This is because civil 
servants at the time do not file some documents for certain reasons, or the relevant 
file is not disclosed in any departments, or had been destroyed. 43 
42 For search of PRO files, there is a guide produced by the PRO, Public Record Office Current 
Guides (Kew, PRO, periodically revised). However this guide is based on the information of formal 
departmental responsibilities and helpful only as rough guidelines at the class level of the reference 
number. A single class number sometimes contain thousands of files so that this guide is useless to 
find out the file which contains particular documents in mind. Researchers have to look for or "dig 
out" relevant files, with reference to previous works in the relevant field as well as the index of the 
file titles arranged by the reference number, which is produced also by the PRO. 1 
43 Roper, 'Public records and the policy process in the twentieth century', p. 260. 
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Many of the official committee papers concerned with this research are 
available in the files of the Colonial Office (CO series), the Commonwealth 
Relations Office (DO series) and the Ministry of Labour (ML series). Examination 
of the files of these departments has made clear the policy process within the 
government in the field of this thesis. 
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Part 11 
Process Analysis 
Chapter 4 Recognition of the Issue 
Before 1950, immigration from the Commonwealth as a policy matter was confined 
to the departmental level and it was not discussed much at ministerial leývets. 
Already in these early days, there were discussions which went beyond the 
boundaries of departments. These inter- departmental discussions among civil 
servants were in many cases organised around the Colonial Office. These meetings 
were in general ad hoc and were not appointed to serve or report to the higher 
meetings of the government machinery such as ministerial committees or the 
Cabinet unlike later inter-departmental committees of civil servants. 
The Colonial Office initially hoped to recruit West Indian workers to fill the 
gap in the UK labour market with the support of West Indian governments, many of 
whom were worried at high levels of unemployment in their islands. However, the 
growth of spontaneous arrivals from the West Indies came to cause anxiety among 
civil servants in the UK so that this immigration came to be gradually perceived as a 
problem which needed to be tackled by the government. 
1. Emergence of the Viewpoint for Immigration from the West Indies 
Colonial Office inter-departmental official committee 
In July 1949, an inter-departmental official committee which, for the last nine 
months, had been investigating the possibility of recruiting workers from the 
Colonies completed its report for the Colonial Secretary and the Minister of Labour. 
The report recommended that no recruitment of workers from the Colonies should 
be carried out. 
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The initial hint of establishing this official committee dated back to March 
1948. At that time, the British government was recruiting workers from Europe 
under the European Voluntary Workers schemes. The government situated these 
schemes as a part of its economic policy. The Treasury's Economic Survey had 
written in February 1947 that: 
Foreign labour can make a useful contribution to our needs. The old arguments 
against foreign labour are no longer valid. There is no danger for years to come 
that foreign labour will rob British workers of their jobs. I 
Meanwhile, the Colonial Office was concerned about unemployment in the 
Colonies, particularly in the West Indies. Against this economic background, the 
Department made enquiries to the Ministry of Labour about the possibility of 
importing Colonial workers to the UK. In March 1948, the Colonial Office asked 
the Ministry of Labour to raise the issue at the Cabinet's Labour Committee, of 
which the Colonial Office itself was not a member. 2 However, the Ministry of 
Labour was reluctant to propose the issue directly to the Ministerial Committee: this 
was thought too important to be done, and moreover, from the beginning, the 
Ministry had considerable doubts about introducing Colonial labour to the UK. The 
Ministry, instead, proposed to set up an inter-departmental working party at the civil 
servant level, i. e. official committee, in order to give deeper consideration to the 
issue. 3 
1 Economic Survey, Cmd. 7046 (London, HMSO, 1947), February 1947, p. 28. 
2 Thomas Lloyd, Permanent Under- S ec retary, CO, to Geoffi7ey H. Ince, Permanent Secretary, 
ML, 5 Mar 48, LAB 13/42 (Kew , PRO; 
hereafter this information of PRO documents is omitted, as 
the file number shows that the document is in the PRO file). 
3 Geoffrey H. Ince, Permanent Secretary, ML, to Thomas Lloyd, Permanent Under- Secretary, 
HO, 6 May 48, LAB 1-3 )/42. 
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Preparations for the official committee were jointly made by two 
Departments; however, the Colonial Office was to take responsibility on the whole 
matter. 4 The committee, "Working Party on the Employment in the United 
Kingdom of Surplus Colonial Labour" (code CLWP), was chaired by an Assistant 
Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office (J. M. Martin) and was represented by nine 
departments, namely: Colonial Office, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Ministry of Fuel and Power, Ministry of National Insurance, Ministry of Health, 
Home Office, Treasury and Foreign Office. 
Despite the expectations of the Colonial Office, however, it became clear 
from the first meeting that 'any mass immigration scheme was out of the question'. -5 
There were large differences in thinking between the Colonial Office and other 
Departments, above all the Ministry of Labour. Discussion of the CLWP proceeded 
at the pace of the Ministry of Labour. It cast doubts on Colonial immigration and 
argued that: 'Colonials were British subjects and [unlike the European Voluntary 
Workers, who were aliens] could not ... be sent to their respective Colonies' even if 
they quitted their agreed employment; 'the social problems associated with an influx 
of colonial labour must also be examined'; and that trade unions attitudes should be 
examined as to whether they could be persuaded to accept colonial workerS. 6 In a 
later meeting the Ministry was to raise concern also about the availability of 
4 Note of a meeting held in the Ministry of Labour on 9 Aug 48, LAB 13/42; cf Thomas Lloyd, 
Permanent U nder- Secretary, CO, to Pen-nanent (Under-) Secretaries of the Ministry of Fuel and 
Power, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, Ministry of National Insurance, Treasury and 
Foreign Office, 9 Sep 48, LAB13/42. The tenns of reference of the official committee were as 
follows: 'To enquire into the possibilities of employing in the United Kingdom surplus manpower of 
certain Colonial territories in order to assist the manpower situation in this country and to relieve 
unemployment in those Colonial territories' (CLWP(49)12,13 Jul 49, LAB26/226, para. 1). 
5 CLWP(48) I st meeting, 6 Oct 48, C01006/1, LAB26/226, para. 12. 
6 CLWP(48) I st meeting, 6 Oct 48, CO 1006/ 1, LAB26/226, paras. 4-7. 
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accommodation. 7 As these views suggested, the position of the Ministry was clear. 
It was: 'there was at present no overall shortage of man-power in the United 
Kingdom' and, moreover, 'labour available in the Colonies would not be of the type 
required in the U. K. 1.8 
The Ministry of Labour thus claimed, on the one hand, that the CLWP 
should 'look on its problem not as one of relieving a man-power shortage in the 
United Kingdom but rather as one of formulating a scheme whereby the Colonies 
might be helped', 9 and, on the other, that 'what the Colonial Office really needed 
was to find an explanation of this fact which would be acceptable in the Colonies'. 10 
Meanwhile, in particular points, the Ministry of Labour admitted that it would be 
more useful 'to consider where and in what occupation any workers who were 
brought over could usefully be employed', II and these were agriculture, mining, the 
textile industries, hospitals, and as domestic servants. 12 
Among other departments in the Committee, the Home Office, which was 
invited from the second meeting in order to examine 'the social problems associated 
with an influx of colonial labour, showed'a considerable interest in the matter from 
the law and order aspect'. The Department argued that the Committee should 
include in its scope of discussions 'the social aspect as well as the law and order 
problem'. 13 
The CLWP had four meetings altogether. In its report submitted to the 
Colonial Secretary and the Minister of Labour in July 1949, the Committee 
7 CLWP(48) 2nd meeting, 27 Oct 48, CO1006/1, H0213/868, LAB26/226, item3, para. 2. 
8 CLWP(48) I st meeting, 6 Oct 48, CO 1006/ 1, LAB26/226, paras. 4-7. 
9 CLWP(48) I st meeting, 6 Oct 48, CO1006/1, LAB26/226, para. 7. 
10 CLWP(48) I st meeting, 6 Oct 48, CO 1006/ 1, LAB26/226, para. 11. 
II CLWP(48) I st meeting, 6 Oct 48, CO1006/1, LAB26/226, para. 5. 
12 CLWP(48) I st meeting, 6 Oct 48, CO1006/1, LAB26/226, para. 13. 
13 CLWP(49) 3rd meeting, 3 Mar 49, H0213/868, LAB26/226, item 3, para. 12. 1 
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concluded as follows: 
Our investigations have shown that the shortage of manpower in the United 
Kingdom no longer presents a formidable problem and, while there are still 
deficiencies in individual industries, in general these do not, for various reasons, 
provide opportunities for absorbing Colonial workers on any substantial scale. 
The only important exception appeared to be found in certain sections of the 
textile industry, but consultations with both sides of the industry indicate that on 
account of recent importation of foreign workers any proposal for introducing 
additional 'outside' labour would be unacceptable at the present time. There may 
however be limited opportunities for the employment of Colonial workers in 
small numbers in certain occupations. For example, we have ascertained that 
suitable vacancies exist for female hospital domestics and a small scheme for 
bringing women from Barbados to this employment is under active 
consideration. 
14 
The report therefore recommended that: 
No organised large scale immigration of male Colonial workers should be 
contemplated; arrangements be made for the immigration of a limited number of 
female Colonial workers for employment as hospital domestics. 15 
Royal Commission Report 
Almost at the same time with the CLWP report, another government enquiry 
showed a negative view on large-scale immigration to the UK. The Royal 
14 CLWP(49)12,13 Jul 49, LAB26/226, p. 8, para. 26. 
15 CLWP(49)12,13 Jul 49, LAB26/226, p. 8, para. 27. 
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Commission on Population, which consisted of independent non-governmental 
members, and serviced by the Home Office, had been appointed in March 1944 in 
order 'to examine the facts relating to the present population trends in Great Britain, 
to investigate the causes of these trends and to consider their probable 
consequences; to consider what measures, if any, should be taken in the national 
interest to influence the future trend of population; and to make 
recommendations'. 16 In June 1949 the Commission completed its report, one month 
earlier than the CLWP. The report showed concern for the stagnating population of 
Britain, which might harm the national interest become a threat to national security 
with respect to the inflexibility of economy, a rising dependency ratio, and 
decreasing emigration to the Commonwealth. 
These conclusions were not very different from those in a report on 
population produced by the Political and Economic Planning (PEP), a private think 
tank, the previous year (April 1948). The PEP report had recommended the 
government to introduce immigration from European countries in order to solve 
these problems. 17 The remit of the Royal Commission was policy on population. 
However, probably in order to refute the PEP's recommendation, the Royal 
Commission in its report included a single section on "problems of immigration" 
and stated that: 
Immigration on a large scale into a fully established society like ours could only 
be welcomed without reserve if the migrants were of good human stock and were 
not prevented by their religion or race from intermarrying with the host 
population and becoming merged with it.... There is little or no prospect that 
16 Royal Commission on Population, Report, Cmd. 7695 (London, HMSO, 1949), June 1949, p. I. 
17 Political and Economic Planning, Population Policy in Great Britain (London, Political and 
Economic Planning, 1948), pp. 108-16. 
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we should be able to apply these conditions to large scale immigration in future 
18 
The Royal Commission thus concluded that 'continuous large scale immigration 
would probably be impracticable and would certainly be undesirable'. 19 
Two government reports in the late 1940s from different organisations 
shared a cautious view on large scale immigration. This was to become a motif of 
later government discussion about policy on Commonwealth immigration. However 
it is worthy of note that, among the government departments, the Treasury, which 
was in charge of economic policy management, gave a positive evaluation on the 
government sponsored "foreign labour" schemes. It had written as late as in March 
1949 in the annual Economic Survey that 'Foreign labour provided in 1948 a 
valuable addition to the total manpower in civil employment'. 20 This difference in 
views between the Treasury and other Departments on East and Central European 
migrants was to revive twelve years later in the debates on Commonwealth 
immigration. 
2. Emergence of Policy on Commonwealth Immigration 
The Empire Windrush 
In June 1948, during the preparation for the Colonial Office official committee 
CLWP discussed above, 492 Jamaicans on the Empire Windrush landed at Tilbury. 
They had left Jamaica despite previous warnings by the UK and Jamaican 
18 Royal Commission on Population, Report, p. 124. 
19 Royal Commission on Population, Report, p. 125. 
20 Economic Survey, Cmd. 7647 (London, HMSO, 1949), March 1949, p. 33. 
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governments 'of the difficulties which they were likely to meet in finding work and 
accommodation in the United Kingdom'. 21 In September 1948 another 108 
Jamaicans landed at Liverpool on the Orbita. The arrival of these unaided 
immigrants caused another line of discussions among civil servants of the 
departments concerned. This immigration was viewed as a problem as it was 
spontaneous and uncontrolled, but perfectly legal. The question was quickly 
emerged as to whether unaided immigration should be made subject to control. An 
inter-departmental meeting for this purpose was to be held at the Home Office in 
February 1949. 
The Empire Windrush set sail from Kingston, Jamaica, with more than 400 
people on board seeking work in their'Mother Country'. 22 On 15 June 1948, a few 
days before the arrival of the Empire Windrush at Tilbury, concern about the 
incident was expressed in the Cabinet's Economic Policy Committee 
(EPC(48)23rd). 23 Warning by the UK and Jamaican governments before their 
departure had been ignored, and ministers at the Committee thought that'the arrival 
of the Jamaicans in this country [UK] would create serious embarrassment'. 
Accordingly they decided that Colonial Secretary should 'do everything possible to 
21 CLWP(49)12,13 Jul 49, LAB26/226, p. 3, para. 10. 
22 Paul Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1965), 
p. 123. 
23 cf D. W. Dean, 'Coping with colonial Immigration, the Cold War and colonial policy: the 
Labour Government and black communities in Great Britain 1945-5 V, Immigrants and Minorities, 6, 
3 (1987), 305-34, p. 317. The Committee meeting was presented by the Prime Minister (C. R. Attlee), 
Lord President (H. Morrison), Foreign Secretary (E. Bevan), Chancellor of the Exchequer (S. 
Cripps), Minister of Defence (A. V. Alexander), Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (H. Dalton), 
Lord Privy Seal (Lord Addison), Minister of Health (A. Bevan), Commonwealth Secretary (P. J. 
Noel-Baker) and President of the Board of Trade (J. H. Wilson) (EPC(48) 23rd meeting, 15 Jun 48, 
CAB 134/216). 
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prevent the occurrence of any further incidents of this kind'. 24 
Upon this decision, three days later, the Colonial Secretary reported to the 
Cabinet in a memorandum about the situation and the measures taken so far and to 
be taken thereafter. He claimed in the memorandum that 'every possible step' had 
'been taken by the Colonial Office and by the Jamaica Government [sic] to 
discourage these influxes'. 25 However the most important point was that these 
Jamaicans were all British subjects so that 'The Goverm-nent of Jamaica has no legal 
power to prevent their departure from Jamaica and the Governinent of the United 
Kingdom had no legal power to prevent their landing. 26 This made evident the 
difficulties for the UK goverm-nent to control immigration from the 
Commonwealth. 
Meanwhile, in order to cope with these people arrived on the Empire 
Windrush, a series of ad hoc inter-departmental meetings of civil servants had been 
held since May mainly on the initiative of the Welfare Department of the Colonial 
Office. Accommodation and employment, above all, were the major concern. These 
discussions were held in particular with the Ministry of Labour and the Home 
Office. 27 
24 EPC(48) 23rd meeting, 15 Jun 48, CAB 134/216, item 3. 
25 CP(48)154,18 Jun 48, CAB129/28, p. 1, para. 2. The memorandum reads: 'There was ample 
publicity in the Jamaica press of the difficulties which men might meet if they came to England' and 
'before this party of 417 [sic] left Jamaica they were warned by the Jamaica Government about the 
difficulties which would beset them on their arrival in this country, but they decided, as they are free 
to decide, to take the risk' (CP(48)154,18 Jun 48, CAB 129/28, p. 1, para. 2). 
26 CP(48)154,18 Jun 48, CAB 129/28, p. 1, para. 2. 
27 Minute of a meeting in the Welfare Department of the Colonial Office on 26 May 48, 
C0876/88. Other Ministries concerned were: the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Ministry of Transport, National Assistance Board, Treasury, Air Ministry, and War Office (Empire 
Windrush: arrival of West Indians: scheme for reception and dispersal, I st draft by the CO, n. d. [ 18 
Jun 48], C0876/88). 
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The Colonial Office hoped to use hostel accommodation in London for these 
people. 28 However, the Ministry of Labour, the department in charge of tllcse 
hostels, rejected this idea. 29 Accommodation capacity was limited. Moreover the 
Ministry thought that this was concerned with 'a matter of very serious principle' 
because 'it would mean treating these men much more favourably than our own 
people in this country and furthermore it would undoubtedly encourage a further 
influx'. 30 The opinion of the Ministry of Labour was that the people arrived in the 
Empire Windrush should be treated under the auspices of the Poor Law so that 
responsibility should be taken by the Ministry of Health and the local councils. As a 
result of further negotiations, the Jamaicans were to be temporarily accommodated 
in the war-time Deep Shelter at Clapham South Tube Station. 31 
Speedy dispersion of these people in small groups were also sought. Among 
all, the Ministry of Labour strongly pushed this course. The Ministry was thinking 
that 'If they are all dispersed there would be no general problem to which public 
attention could be drawn'. 32 Partly due to this policy, within three weeks from their 
arrival, work had been found for all these people in foundries, agriculture, railways 
and as welders, carpenters, bricklayers, painters and tailors. 33 
28 The Earl of Listowel, Minister of State for the Colonies, to Ness Edwards, Parliamentary 
Secretary, ML, 5 Jun 48, C0876/88. 
29 Ness Edwards, Parliamentary Secretary, ML, to the Earl of Listowel, Minister of State for the 
Colonies, 9 Jun 48, C0876/88; Ness Edwards, Parliamentary Secretary, ML, to the Earl of Listowel, 
Minister of State for the Colonies, 15 Jun 48, C0876/88. 
30 Ness Edwards, Parliamentary Secretary, ML, to the Earl of Listowel, Minister of State for the 
Colonies, 15 Jun 48, C0876/88; cf. Dean, 'Coping with colonial Immigration, the Cold War and 
colonial policy', p. 318. 
31 CLWP(49)12,13 Jul 49, LAB26/226, p. 3, para. 10. 
32 W. Hardman, Assistant Secretary, Employment Policy Department, ML, n. d. [Jun 48], 
LA1326/218; cf. Dean, 'Coping with colonial Immigration, the Cold War and colonial policy', pp. 317- 
8. 
33 The government later assessed the situation as follows: 'As most of these men were either 
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Identification of the problem and emergence ofgovernment Is policy 
Though the scope of these inter-departmental meetings were specific to the 
accommodation and employment of those arrived, immigration from the 
Commonwealth had gradually become a concern within a small circle of civil 
servants. On the arrival of the Empire Windrush, the Colonial Office doubtless sakv 
that a similar mass movement would not take place again as transportation was 
unlikely to be available. 34 However, it was only three months later, in September 
1948, that further 108 Jamaicans landed at Liverpool on the Orbita. 3' 
Views of the civil servants of the departments concerned changed rapidly. 
The Colonial Office, in particular, its Welfare Department, felt a need for further 
actions to deter immigration. There was a sign that domestic race relations in 
Britain were beginning to deteriorate in urban areas. Anti - immigration riots had 
occurred from 31 July to 2 August in Liverpool, where the Orbita was to arrive one 
month later. 36 Therefore, on 3 September 1948, a senior civil servant of the 
Colonial Office (J. E. Keith, Assistant Secretary, Welfare Department) sent a letter 
to the Home Office and asked it to organise an inter-departmental meeting in order 
'to consider the influx of colonial people into the UK'. 37 However, the Home 
skilled or semi-skilled that finding of work for them was not too difficult' (CLWP(49)12,13 Jul 49, 
LAB26/226, p. 3, para. 10). 
34 CP(48)154,18 Jun 48, CAB 129/28, p. 1, para. 2. 
35 The CLWP report in July 1949 read as follows: 'Altogether since December 1947 about 800 
West Indians (mostly Jamaicans) have reached the United Kingdom in addition to the usual influx of 
stowaways, which during 1948 amounted to 212 from the West Indies'. However, 'as many of these 
had made their own arrangements there was not so much difficulty as with the "Empire Windrush... 
(CLWP(49)12,13 Jul 49, LAB26/226, p. 3, para. 10). 
36 Zig Layton-Henry, Politics of Immigration. - Immigration, 'Race'and 'Race'Relations in Post- 
war Britain (Oxford, Blackwell, 1992), p. 37. 
37 J. E. Keith, Assistant Secretary, CO, to U rider- Secretary, HO, 3 Sep 48, H0213/869. 
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Office, allegedly holding potential concerns on 'coloured colonial peoples' from the 
law and order perspective, was itself reluctant to take initiatives in this issue. 38 
For another five months, the proposed inter-departmental meeting was not 
convened. At last in February 1949, it was held at the Home Office chaired by the 
Deputy Under-Secretary of the Home Office (William S. Murrie). 39 The meeting 
was attended by civil servants from nine departments (Home Office, Treasury, 
Colonial Office, Commonwealth Relations Office, National Assistance Board, 
Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Labour and National Service, Ministry of Civil 
Aviation, and Ministry of Health). This meeting was to mark the important first step 
on the long government discussions on immigration from the Commonwealth. This 
meeting turned out to be a very important step in the development of government's 
policy on Commonwealth immigration. The nature of "problems" regarding 
Commonwealth immigration was identified for the first time. Their solutions were 
also for the first time to be sought, which resulted in the basic framework of 
government's policy thereafter. 
As far as the nature of "problems" was concerned, the meeting reached 
'agreement on what classes of persons were causing concern to the authorities'. Two 
points were confirmed: firstly, 'Of the persons under consideration a few came as 
paying passengers fully documented as to nationality' but 'a fairly large number ... 
arrived as stowaways' ; 40 and 'the problem arose mainly on coloured British and 
British Protected persons from Africa and the West Indies'. 41 
Measures to solve the "problem" were discussed from three perspectives: 
38 Dean, 'Coping with colonial Immigration, the Cold War and colonial policy', p. 319; W. S. Z=I :n 
Murrie, Deputy Under- Secretary, HO, to Cecil Syers, Deputy Under- Secretary, CRO, 12 Feb 49, 
H0213/869. 
39 Note of a meeting at the Home Office, 18 Feb 49, H0213/869, LAB26/226. 
40 Note of a meeting at the Home Office, 18 Feb 49, H0213/869, LAB26/226, p. 1, para. 
1. 
It) 
41 Note of a meeting at the Home Office, 18 Feb 49, H0213/869, LAB26/226, p. 1, para. 
2. 
1_.. - 
means of checking the traffic both at its source and at landing in the United 
Kingdom; employment and accommodation of those remaining in the United 
Kingdom; measures for repatriating those who were quite unsuited to conditions in 
the United Kingdom. 42 Firstly, in the field of controlling traffic, a possibility of 
amending immigration legislation was suggested. However, as the Chairman from 
the Home Office pointed out, there was a recognition that 'the right of free access to 
the United Kingdom had long been the traditional right of British subjects from any 
part of the Commonwealth'. It was claimed that 'there was nothing sufficiently 
compelling in the problems under review ... to justify a change in the United 
Kingdom law which might have an incalculable effect on Commonwealth 
Relations'. 43 The Colonial Office held the similar view, which was that 'any 
entrenchment on the principle that all British subjects should be allowed to enter the 
United Kingdom would be a most serious step'. 44 The idea of amending 
immigration legislation was thus hardly accepted by civil servants. Instead, the idea 
of reinforcing administrative measures to discourage immigration and to deter 
illegal entry was adopted. Their main points were: to request Colonial governments 
to take measures to discourage departure of migrants to the UK by public 
announcements and by restricting the issue of passports; and to request carrier 
operators to crack down on undocumented passengers. 
Secondly, in the field of employment and accommodation, civil servants 
shared the view that 'London and Liverpool were the worst areas of unemployment' 
45 
and that 'accommodation was the main difficulty about moving the men'. It was 
even considered that 'if some means could be found to overcome the 
42 Note of a meeting at the Home Office, 18 Feb 49, H0213/869, LAB26/226, p. 2, para. 3. 
43 Note of a meeting at the Home Office, 18 Feb 49, H0213/869, LAB26/226, p. 2, para. 4. 
44 Note of a meeting at the Home Office, 18 Feb 49, H0213/869, LAB26/226, p. 2, para. 4. 
4ý Note of a meeting at the Home Office, 18 Feb 49, H0213/869, LAB26/226, p. 4, para. 10. 
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accommodation difficulty and break down the larger aggregations, particularly at 
London and Liverpool, the difficulty presented to all the Government Departments 
concerned and to the Police would be greatly reduced'. 46 The Colonial Office, for 
this purpose, proposed to set up a small inter-departmental committee of civil 
servants. The committee was agreed 'to consider urgently the question of 
employment and accommodation for coloured people' and to be composed of 
representatives from the Colonial Office, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Health, 
and National Assistance Board. 47 
After this Home Office meeting, administrative measures to crack down on 
immigration, especially those coming as stowaways, were implemented by each 
department. The Home Office empowered immigration officers to refuse leave to 
land to those without satisfactory evidence that they were British subjects or British 
Protected persons. 48 The Colonial Office for its part asked the Colonial Governors 
by a despatch to the Colonial Governors dated 26 January 1950 to prevent 
stowaways from embarking by tightening up port controls as well as to take 
measures to hinder the issue of passports and travel documents to those who were 
46 Note of a meeting at the Home Office, 18 Feb 49, H0213/869, LAB26/226, p. 4, para. 10. 
47 Note of a meeting at the Home Office, 18 Feb 49, H0213/869, LAB26/226, p. 4, para. 11. 
48 CPUK(49) 3rd meeting, 20 Aug 49, C0859/207/7, LAB26/259, para. 4; CP(50)113,18 May 50, 
CAB 129/40, p. 3, para. 12. The measure was introduced by revising the Instructions to Immigration 
Officers (issued on 19 September 1949) so as to revert to the earlier practice as it had been until 
1942. Up to 1942 the practice of Immigration Officers was to refuse leave to land to seamen who 
claimed to be British subjects or British Protected persons unless they could produce documentary 
evidence supporting their claims. Stowaways were also refused leave to land unless they 
had 
satisfactory documents. In 1942, in response to demands from the Colonial Office, the practice was 
revised so that persons arriving in the UK whether as passengers or stowaways who claimed to 
be 
British subjects or British Protected persons were given leave to land even if they had no documents, 
if they could satisfy the Immigration Officer that they were in fact British subjects or British 
Protected persons (Note of a meeting at the Home Office on 18 Feb 49, H0213/869, LAB26/226, 
p. 3, para. 9). 
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known not to follow regular employment and whose financial position was not 
sound. 49 
Meanwhile, in May 1949, the proposed official committee, "Inter- 
departmental Committee on Colonial People in the United Kingdom" (code CPUK). 
was launched in order to consider questions about accommodation, employment, 
repatriation and welfare of Colonial people in the United Kingdom. Chaired by an 
Assistant Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office (J. B. Williams, in charge of the 
Welfare Department), the Committee was attended by civil servants from the 
Colonial Office, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Health, National Assistance Board, 
Ministry of Transport and Treasury. 50 
The position of this official committee, however, within the entire 
framework of policy on Commonwealth immigration was more or less sensitive. 
Measures for controlling immigration was rigidly exempted from the scope of the 
CPUK, except for the information on this subject being arranged to be reported. In 
its first meeting on 26 May 1949, the Committee confirmed that 'it should confine 
its enquiries to questions concerning accommodation, employment, repatriation and 
49 CPUK(50)3,28 Jan 50, C0859/207/7, LAB26/259; cf. CPUK(50) Ist meeting, 22 Feb 50, 
C0859/207/7, LAB26/259, pp. 1-2, para. 3; CPUK(50) 2nd meeting, C0859/207/7, LAB26/259, 
para. 5; CWP(53)8,16 Apr 53, C01028/22, p. 2, para. 9. Restriction on the issue of passport was 
accepted by the Governments of Sierra Leone, Gambia, the Gold Coast, and Trinidad, while the 
Governments of Jamaica and Trinidad showed negative views on the proposal (CWP(53)8,16 Apr 
53, CO 1028/22, p. 2, paras. II and 13). Meanwhile the Nigerian Government for its part proposed to 
introduce a measure, with the endorsement of the UK government, that a Nigerian applying 
for a 
passport in order to go to the UK for employment should be required to deposit a sum sufficient to 
cover the cost of repatriation (February 1950) (CWP(53)8,16 Apr 53, C01028/22, p. 
2, para. 8). 
Later, on II October 195 1, the Colonial Office asked the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and 
Gambian 
Governments to consider the similar measures. However, only the Gambian Government followed 
Nigeria (CWP(53)8,16 Apr 53, C01028/22, p. 2, para. 8). 
50 This inter-departmental committee continued to exist at least until October 19533. 
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welfare of colonial people in the United Kingdom'. 51 Even in the field of 
accommodation, employment and welfare, the CPUK acted only as a monitor of the 
situation, or a place to exchange information between departments, rather than 
making inter- departmental decisions or arranging co-ordination. Only the situation 
concerned with immigration and the measures each department had taken or would 
take were reported to the Committee. 
It was important to note that, despite all these restrictions in terms of the 
scope of discussions, the Home Office was still reluctant to be a regular member of 
the Committee and actually did not attend its first two meetings. This was partly 
because the Home Office regarded the social aspects of Colonial immigrants were 
outside its departmental remits and also because it did not want other departments 
to have much interest in immigration controls which only the Home Office was 
overseeing. 52 
*** 
British government's policy on Commonwealth immigration emerged and was 
established in the period between 1948 and 1949 in the discussion led by the 
Colonial Office. Increasing immigration from the West Indies at this time was 
recognised by civil servants as a problem because they feared potential social 
tensions which would have to be tackled by the government. In these circumstances, 
civil servants agreed at the Home Office meeting held in February 1949 that the 
problem should be approached from two directions, i. e. control of immigration to 
51 CPUK(49) Ist meeting, 26 May 49, C0859/207/7, LAB26/259, p. 1, para. 1. 
52 J. E. Keith, Assistant Secretary, CO, to W. S. Murrie, Deputy Under- Secretary, HO, 5 May 49, 
H021 3/869; W. S. Murrie, Deputy Under-Secretary, HO, to J. E. Keith, Assistant Secretary, CO, II 
May 49, H0213/869. 
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the UK, and accommodation, employment and welfare of those already settled in 
the UK. These two directions, as well as repatriation from the UK which would be 
added later, was to be a proto-type for British government policy on Commonwealth 
immigration. 
Meanwhile, administrative control of immigration resulted in reduction the 
number of stowaways to a certain extent. However, doubts gradually increased 
about the effectiveness of such administrative measures. A change in position of the 
Colonial Office was swift. It was true that the Department was opposed to amending 
legislation on entry at the Home Office meeting of February 1949, but its position 
changed by the summer. In a CPUK meeting of August 1949 a Colonial Office 
official (L G. Cummings, Temporary Administrative Principal) indicated a change 
in the departmental position. He argued that 'the stowaway problem could [not] be 
effectively dealt with administratively' and suggested that 'the solution would lie in 
fresh legislation in this country to enable stowaways to be refused leave to land'. 3 
Thus as early as the summer of 1949, support to control immigration by 
legislation was appearing within the circle of civil servants. Government discussion 
about immigration controls was thereafter to develop around possible legislation on 
entry to the UK. What is so extraordinary about these developments is that the 
problem the government should deal with, as well as the directions of the 
government policy on Commonwealth immigration, were identified among civil 
servants long before public debates on Commonwealth immigration started, and 
also long before senior politicians of the Conservative and Labour Parties started to 
regard it as a major policy issue. 
53 CPUK(49) -3)rd meeting, 
6 Jul 49, C0859/207/7, LAB26/259, para. 4, 
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Chapter 5 Formation of the Policy Community 
At the general election held on 6 March 1950 the Labour Party had a serious setback 
and lost many seats which were reduced from 393 to 315. It gained a narroxNý 
majority of only five. Clement Attlee continued to lead the government-, however, 
another general election was considered to be imminent. ' Nevertheless, Labour's 
short, seventeen months in office after this election was to provide new 
developments in the British government's position towards immigration from the 
Commonwealth. In this short period, attention on the issue rose to ministerial level 
and, more importantly, the Home Office was placed by a Cabinet decision in the 
centre of the government discussion on Commonwealth immigration. The position 
of the Home Office was reinforced during 1950 to 1952, despite the change in 
government. 
1. Shfft in Responsibility to the Home Office 
Thefirst ministerial discussion 
After the general election of March 1950, new developments were emerging in the 
UK government's position towards Commonwealth immigration. On 20 March, 
only two weeks after the establishment of the new administration, the Cabinet 
discussed, for the first time since the War, the issue of 'Coloured People from 
British Colonial TerritorieS'. 2 
There was a hint that this issue would be raised in the Cabinet. The Cabinet 
David Childs, Britain since 1945: A Political History (London, Routledge, 3rd ed., 1992), p-65. 
2 CM(50) 13th conclusions, minute 7, CAB 128/17. 
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had discussed eight months previously, on 27 July 1949 (CM(49)49th'). the 
possibility of amending legislation to enable deportation of British subjects from the 
UK. This was raised in association with the London Dock Strikes where Canadian 
communists were suspected of agitating the disputes. The Cabinet then considered 
whether they should change the laws regarding deportation. However, the Home 
Secretary (J. Chuter Ede) was opposed to 'depart[ing] from ... traditional policy of 
giving all British subjects the right to enter the United Kingdom and to enjoy the 
same rights and privileges as are given to United Kingdom nationals' (Home 
Secretary). The Commonwealth Relations Office shared the view with the Home 
Secretary. The Cabinet therefore deferred a decision. 3 
At this time, questions had been raised, though out of context, about 
immigration from the Colonies. The questions focussed on concerns that: 'Might not 
our higher standards of living begin to attract immigrants from other parts of the 
Commonwealth, especially the Colonies ? There had already been signs of such a 
movement from the West Indies. Might it not become necessary for us to regulate 
such movements? '4 
The Cabinet discussion in March 1950 was triggered by press reports. 
Reports had been made about, according to the Cabinet minutes, 'racial 
discrimination against coloured people in the United Kingdom' and 'the difficulties 
of finding suitable employment for the coloured people who had come to this 
country in recent years from the West Indies'. 5 This issue was raised in the Cabinet 
meeting on 20 March (CM(50)13th). Concerns were expressed that 'serious 
difficulties would arise if this immigration of coloured people from British Colonial 
3 CP(49)164,25Jul49, CABI29/36/pt. l. 
4 CM(49) 49th conclusions, minute 5,27 Jul 49, CAB] 28/16. 
5 CM(50) I Rh conclusions, minute 7,20 Mar 50, CAB 128/17. 
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possessions were to continue or increase'. 6 In conclusion, the Colonial Secretary 
(James Griffiths) was instructed, in order to consider the problem further, to submit 
a memorandum with 'problems arising from the immigration into this country of 
coloured people ... from the West Indies and other British Colonial TerritorieS'. 7 
Accordingly the detailed discussions began at the civil servant level. Two 
days later, on 22 March, civil servants of the departments concerned held a meeting 
in the Cabinet Office to determine the general lines on which the Colonial 
Secretary's memorandum should be prepared. The meeting was chaired by the 
Cabinet Secretary (Norman Brook) and the Deputy Under-Secretary rank of the 
Home Office, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Health, Colonial Office, and 
Commonwealth Relations Office were present. 
The civil servants confirmed that the Colonial Secretary's memorandum 
should deal, not with 'the general question of Government action directed towards 
overcoming colour prejudice', but it should deal with 'the subject of immigration of 
coloured people from British Colonial territories into the United Kingdom in search 
of employment'. 8 It was emphasised, however, that'the problem was not one which 
called for desperate remedies'. Civil servants thus agreed that the memorandum 
should indicate 'the size of the problem, which was not great, the steps which were 
being taken to keep it within bounds ... and suggest any 
further measures which 
might be taken'. 9 
The Cabinet considered in June the memorandum dated 18 May 
6 CM(50) 13th conclusions, minute 7,20 Mar 50, CAB 128/17. 
7 CM(50) 13th conclusions, minute 7,20 Mar 50, CAB 128/17. 
8 Note of a meeting at the Cabinet Office on 22 Mar 50, CAB21/1734, pp. 1-2. On colour 
prejudice, it was claimed that'Much thought have been given ... 
in the past and there was no reason 
to believe that either legislative or administrative action could profitably be undertaken for this 
purpose' (Note of a meeting at the Cabinet Office on 22 Mar 50, CAB21/1734, pp. 1-2). 
9 Note of a meeting at the Cabinet Office on 22 Mar 50, CAB21/1734, p. 2. 
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(CP(50)113) prepared by the Colonial Office on the agreed line. The Colonial 
Secretary (James Griffiths) expressed in the Cabinet meeting on 19 June 
(CM(50)37th) a fear that 'social problems were more likely to arise if coloured 
immigrants into this country formed themselves into residential colonies'. 10 The 
position of the Colonial Office was that it 'sought to disperse these people over as 
wide an area as possible'. II 
The Cabinet discussion turned on the means of preventing further increase in 
the 'coloured population' of the UK. 12 A number of people were confirmed to be 
found their way into the UK as stowaways. There was a doubt 'whether the existing 
methods of administration ... were sufficient to keep within reasonable bounds the 
numbers who contrived to enter this country as stowaways'. 13 In con unction, the i 
possibility of legislation was again raised, which should both deal with stowaways 
and restrict the right of any British subject to enter the UK. 
In the end, it was decided that the Prime Minister (Clement Attlee) would 
arrange for 'a review to be made of the further means which might be adopted to 
check the immigration into this country of coloured people from British Colonial 
territories, if legislation were passed limiting the right of British subjects, or of any 
class of British subjects, to enter and reside in the United Kingdom, and/or the 
issues of policy involved in making such a change in the existing law'. 14 
Ministerial Committee GEN325 
After this Cabinet meeting, the Cabinet Secretary (Norman Brook) recommended 
the Prime Minister to set up an ad hoc ministerial committee chaired by the Home 
10 CM(50) 37th conclusions, minute 2,19 Jun 50, CAB128/17. 
II CM(50) 37th conclusions, minute 2,19 Jun 50, CAB 128/17. 
12 CM(50) 37th conclusions, minute 2,19 Jun 50, CAB 128/17. 
13 CM(50) 37th conclusions, minute 2,19 Jun 50, CAB 128/17. 
14 CM(50) 37th conclusions, minute 2,19 Jun 50, CAB 128/17. 
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Secretary to consider the issue. 15 Accepting his advice, the Prime Minister called 
for an ad hoc Ministerial Committee on "Immigration of British subjects into the 
United Kingdom" (code GEN325). The Committee was to be composed of Home 
Secretary (J. Chuter Ede) as chairman, Minister of Labour (G. A. Issacs), Minister 
of Health (Aneurin Bevan), Colonial Secretary (James Griffiths), Scottish Secretary 
(Hector McNeil), Commonwealth Secretary (P. C. Gordon Walker) and Attorney- 
General (Hartley Shawcross). 16 
As seen in the last chapter, the Home Office was reluctant to take initiatives 
in the government discussions about Commonwealth immigration. However the 
arrangements for this Ministerial Committee with the Home Secretary in the chair 
forced the Home Office to play the leading role on the issue concerned with 
immigration from the Commonwealth. In preparation for the Ministerial Committee 
meetings, the Home Office proposed an inter-departmental meeting of civil servants 
from the Colonial Office, Ministry of Labour, Commonwealth Relations Office and 
Cabinet Office. This was to be the first inter- departmental meeting initiated by the 
Home Office as regards Commonwealth immigration, except for the inter- 
departmental meeting of 18 February 1949, which was held in the Home Office but 
was initiated by the Colonial Office. Equally important was that these inter- 
departmental meetings of civil servants was also to be the first one in which the four 
major departments - Home Office, Colonial Office, Commonwealth Relations 
Office, and Ministry of Labour - in this policy area for the next decade and a half 
were identified institutionally. 
15 N. Brook, Cabinet Secretary, to C. R. Attlee, Prime Minister, 19 Jun 50, CAB21/1734. 
16 However, Gordon Walker and H. Shawcross were absent from both two meetings of this 
Ministerial Committee. Lord Ogmore, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, 
and Frank Soskice, Solicitor-General, represented them. In addition several senior civil servants of 
the Departments concerned (Home Office, Colonial Office, and Commonwealth Relations Office) 
were also present at the meetings. 
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At this time the Home Office felt a need to discuss deportation, as well as 
legislation on entry. This is partly because deportation had been raised in the 
aforementioned Cabinet discussion of the previous year (CM(49)49th, 27 July 
1949). 17 However, there was another reason. The Home Office felt it was difficult 
to legislate on entry in the light of possible reactions from the public and Parliament 
which might be against dismantling the traditional rights of British subjects. The 
Department therefore preferred administrative measures. However, if legislation 
were unavoidable, the Home Office was thinking, it should legislate only on 
deportation. 18 
Meanwhile, the Colonial Office had changed its position in favour of 
legislation. The Department, much concerned about social tensions, shared the view 
with the Home Office on the point that more immigration should be restricted. 19 
However, unlike the Home Office, the Colonial Office held a firm conviction that 
legislation would be a clear cut measure for restriction and thus a less bad option 
than'devious' administrative measures. 20 This is confirmed in a minute by a senior 
Colonial Office official (J. B. Williams, Assistant Under- Secretary) which read: 'it 
would be far better to have an openly avowed policy of restricted immigration than 
17 W. S. Murrie, Deputy Under- Secretary, HO, to Charles Jeffries, Deputy Under-Secretary, CO, 
26 Jun 50, C0537/5219. 
18 J. B. Williams, Assistant Under-Secretary, CO, to Charles Jeffries, Deputy Under- Secretary, 
CO, 28 Jun 50, C0537/5219. 
19 Minute by J. B. Williams, Assistant Under- Secretary, CO, 27 Jun 50, C0537/5219. A senior 
civil servant of the Department (J. B. Williams, Assistant Under-Secretary) minuted in the 
departmental file that'the flow of immigrants from the Colonies to this country is now very much in 
excess of what it was before the recent war' and'This flow is leaving agglomerations of unassimilated 
coloured Colonial people in such centres as Liverpool and East London and this we all feel 
is 
potentially a very dangerous situation since it is undoubtedly leading to an increase in colour 
feelings' 
(J. B. Williams, Assistant Under- Secretary, CO, to Charles Jeffries, Deputy Under-Secretary, CO, 28 
Jun 50, C0537/5219). 
20 Minute by J. B. Williams, Assistant Under- Secretary, CO, 27 Jun 50, C0537/5219. 
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fall back on rather devious little devices whereby would-be immigrants are turned 
back because they cannot provide documentary proof that they are British subjects 
when in fact all concerned, including the Immigration Officer. know perfectly well 
that they almost certainly are British subjects'. 21 Therefore he further suggested as 
follows: 'I well hope that we in the Colonial Office will do what we can to prevent 
other departments from resorting to these shifts which seem to me quite un, %ý,, orthy 
of this country'. 22 In this respect the view of the Colonial Office was 'very strongly 
in favour of legislation'. 23 
In the inter-departmental negotiations of civil servants, three areas of 
probable legislation were identified namely: entry, deportation and stowaways. 
However, despite the Colonial Office's wish for legislation, the other departments 
found it difficult to support legislation. This was, at first, because the public and 
Parliament might resent restrictions on British subjects of the same kind as on 
aliens. Secondly, even if legislation was adopted, legislative restriction on Colonial 
British subjects would not be justified without the same control being introduced on 
the citizens of independent Commonwealth countries and Irish citizens. However, 
the Commonwealth Relations Office for its part was strongly opposed to any 
restriction to Commonwealth citizens. Moreover it was felt that control of Irish 
citizens would need substantial amount of additional administration. Therefore the 
general view of civil servants was, unlike that of the Colonial Office, that 
introduction of immigration controls would be unrealistic and that legislation would 
need to be confined to deportation or preventing stowaways. 24 
With these views having been formed at the civil servant level, the 
21 Minute by J. B. Williams, Assistant Under-Secretary, CO, 27 Jun 50, C0537/5219. 
22 Minute by J. B. Williams, Assistant Under- Secretary, CO, 27 Jun 50, C0537/5219. 
23 J. B. Williams, Assistant Under- Secretary, CO, to Charles Jeffries, Deputy Under-Secretary, 
CO, 28 Jun 50, C0537/5219. 
24 GEN325/2,17 Jul 50, CAB 130/61, paras. 6 and 9. 
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Ministerial Committee GEN 325 was to hold two meetings (24 July 1950 and 10 
January 1951). In the July meeting (GEN325 Ist), an estimation was given as 
regards the number of immigrants. It was that: 'about 30,000 persons of West 
African and West Indian extraction, and Moslems (mainly from Aden and 
Somaliland) were at present resident in various parts of the United Kingdom and 
that since 1945 the number of these persons had increased by at least 5,000 (mostly 
West Africans and West Indians)'. 25 Also it was emphasised that 'The most 
troublesome elements were stowaways and "one-trip seamen" who had signed on in 
various ports for discharge in the United Kingdom'. 26 
Ministers were more cautious about the need for legislation than civil 
servants and much concerned about public and Parliamentary reactions. Three areas 
had been concretely suggested by civil servants as possible areas of legislation: 
entry, deportation and stowaways. 27 Nevertheless, Committee members easily 
found reasons to rule out the possibility of legislation. These were: that 'a proposal 
to restrict the freedom of the British subjects to enter and remain in the United 
Kingdom' would run counter to 'a special status as the mother country' of the United 
Kingdom; that 'it would be contrary to the scheme embodied in the [1948 British 
Nationality] Act to treat persons belonging to the Colonies differently from persons 
belonging to the United Kingdom'; and that this might also involve 'a concealed 
coloured test' as 'the powers taken would almost certainly be applied most often to 
coloured persons'. 28 
Therefore the general view of ministers was that 'any legislation on this 
subject would be controversial'. 29 They thus concluded that, if there were to be 
25 GEN325 Ist meeting, 24 Jul 50, CABI'30/61, p. l. 
26 GEN325 I st meeting, 24 Jul 50, CAB 130/6 1, p. 1. 
27 GEN325 I st meeting, 24 Jul 50, CAB 130/6 1, p. 1. 
28 GEN-3325 I st meeting, 24 Jul 50, CAB 130/6 1, p. 2. 
29 GEN325 I st meeting, 24 Jul 50, CAB 130/61, p. 2. 
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legislation, it should be confined to dealing NA-ith stowawaý's, but, considering 
possible controversies in Parliament, 'it seemed desirable to consider wliether the 
stowaway problem could not be solved by more vigourous administrative action'. 30 
Reconfirmation ofpolicy 
Accordingly, civil servants reopened their deliberations about the main contents of 
legislative and administrative measures for reducing the influx of stoxý, aways and 
"one-trip" seamen. 
There was evidence that a number of people had arrived in the UK on forged 
documents. In particular the British Travel Certificate issued by the British 
authorities in West African territories, which was intended only for travel use within 
these territories, had been used as an identity document on landing the UK. 31 The 
Colonial Office had sent a series of circulars to Colonial Governors warning them 
about the misuse of the document and proposed in April 1950 the introduction of a 
standard document of nationality and identity for colonial seamen, in place of the 
existing certificates issued separately by individual colonieS. 32 The West African 
Council was also asked in July 1950 to introduce a new form of British Travel 
Certificates, which would make no reference to national status. 33 The new standard 
certificates for seamen was brought into use on I March 1952 and the new British 
Travel Certificates of West African territories came into effect in all areas by I 
30 GEN325 I st meeting, 24 Jul 50, CAB 130/6 1, p. 2. 
31 CPUK(50) 2nd meeting, 19 Jul 50, C0859/207/7, LAB26/259, para. 5; CP(50)1 1'), 18 May 50, 
CAB 129/40, p. 3), para. 12. 
32 Colonial Secretary, to Colonial Governors, 3 Apr 50, in CPUK(50)12,14 Apr 50, 
C0859/207/7, LAB26/259. 
33 Colonial Secretary, to Chief Secretary, West African Council, II Jul 50, in CPUK(50)19,25 
Jul 50, C0859/207 7, LAB26/259. 
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January 1952.34 
As seen in the last Chapter, the general lines of administrative measures to 
restrict stowaways, as well as to deter other types of immigration, had been agreed 
at the Home Office meeting of February 1949. All the above measures were 
introduced in accordance with the agreed lines. The civil servants thus felt that all 
the possible measures other than legislation had already been taken, while 
legislation may be politically difficult. In this dilemma, civil servants were to report 
to the ministerial committee GEN325 in January 1951 only about the details of 
administrative measures to control stowaways currently in operation. 35 
Meanwhile ministers were more concerned about public and Parliamentary 
feelings than civil servants. Mainly for this reason, the Ministerial Committee in the 
second meeting on 10 January 1951 (GEN325 2nd) resulted in reconfirming the 
view shown at its first meeting on July. This was that 'the problems arising from the 
immigration into the United Kingdom of coloured persons of colonial origin were 
not at present of sufficient extent to justify recommending to the Cabinet legislation 
to control such immigration'. 36 Ministers acknowledged that the best approach was 
to make the existing administrative measures 'as effective as possible'. 37 This 
34 CPUK(52) I st meeting, II Mar 52, CO876/233, para. 5. In addition to stowaways the arrival of 
fare-paying migrants was showing an increase. In response to an increase in the number of migrant 
workers by air from Jamaica, the Colonial Office asked in October 1950 the Governor of Jamaica to 
strengthen the publication of 'the difficulties experienced by migrants in the United Kingdom' in the 
field of employment and accommodation (Colonial Secretary to Governor of Jamaica, 20 Oct 50, in 
CPUK(50)-')O, 31 Oct 50, C0859/207/7, LAB26/259). The similar action was taken with the 
Governments of other Caribbean and West African territories (CWP(53)8,16 Apr 53, C01028/22, 
p. 1, para. 4). 
35 GEN325/3,2Jan5l, CABI30/61. 
36 GEN325 2nd meeting, 10 Jan 5 1, CAB 130/6 1, p. 2. 
37 GEN325 2nd meeting, 10 Jan 51, CAB130/61, p. 3). In discussion a future possibility of large 
scale migration from South Asia was pointed out. It was felt that, in the long term 'The social services I 
of this country ... 
inevitably acted as a considerable attraction' and 'there would be attempts at mass 
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conclusion was further approved in the Cabinet meeting on 22 February 
(CM(51)15th). 38 
At the civil servant level, there was a shared feeling that administrative 
measures to restrict entry had already reached their limit. However, the introduction 
of legislation carried with it the risk of politicising the issue. It might harm relations 
with independent Commonwealth countries and also it might raise domestic 
opposition to restricting the traditional rights of British subjects. These dilemmas 
caused ministers to decide that the existing administrative measures should be 
maintained for the time being. 
2. Institutionalisation of the Position of the Home Office 
Increase infare-paying immigrants 
In October 1951 another general election was held. The Conservative Party returned 
to power with a modest but sufficient majority of seventeen seats. This was the 
beginning of its thirteen-year period of consecutive rule until 1964. Winston 
Churchill returned to office and was appointed Prime Minister on 26 October. In the 
new Cabinet, ministers with the main institutional interest in Colonial immigration 
were David Maxwell-Fyfe (Home Secretary), Oliver Lyttelton (Colonial Secretary), 
Lord Ismay (Commonwealth Secretary) and Walter Monckton (Minister of Labour). 
Norman Brook stayed Cabinet Secretary. 
In the new administration, Colonial immigration was not a matter of 
migration from, for example, India' (GEN325 2nd meeting, 10 Jan 5 1, CAB 130/6 1, p. 1). So it was 
argued to be necessary to reconsider the question 'if there were signs that such immigration was 
starting on a considerable scale' (GEN325 2nd meeting, 10 Jan 5 1, CAB 130/6 1, p. 1). 
38 CM(51) 15th conclusions, minute 4,22 Feb 5 1, CAB 128/19. 
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ministerial discussion for almost one year until November 1952. During this period. 
the Colonial Office inter-departmental committee CPUK kept monitorinto- the 
situation of immigration from the Colonies. At its meeting on II March 1952, civil 
servants confirmed that, according to a senior civil servant of the Colonial Office (J. 
B. Williams, Assistant Under- Secretary), 'the views of the present Government were 
the same' as those of the previous Labour government, whose ministers had taken 
the view that 'legislation to restrict immigration to the United Kingdom would not 
be practicable'. 39 
However, the situation of immigration was beginning to change. By the time 
when the Conservative government started in October 195 1, civil servants had 
recognised a change in the type of the people arriving in the UK. Fare-paying 
migrants were replacing stowaways as a concern of civil servants. 40 Civil servants 
reconfirmed in the same CPUK meeting on II March that 'all that could be done by 
administrative measures to exclude stowaways' had been done; however, they also 
confirmed the view that 'the number of stowaways was now insignificant as 
compared with the fare-paying passengers, who constituted the real problem'. 41 The 
39 CPUK(52) I st meeting, II Mar 52, C0876/23 3, para. 1. 
40 The decrease of stowaways was reported in a CPUK meeting on 20 September 1951 
(CPUK(51) 2nd meeting, 20 Sep 5 1, C0876/233, p. 1, para. 2). Later in 1953, a Home Office paper 
stated that: 'the additional port controls have proved effective, particularly in West African territories' 
(CWP(53)8,16 Apr 53, C01028/22, p. 2, para. 10). Meanwhile as far as fare-paying migrants were 
concerned, it was reported in September 1951 that 'approximately 80 coloured people from the West 
Indies' had arrived at Plymouth a few days before and that 152 migrants workers from Jamaica were 
due to arrive at Liverpool on or about 28 September (CPUK(51) 2nd meeting, 20 Sep 51, 
C0876/233, p. 2, para. 3). Due to a shortage of acconu-nodation in Liverpool and London, the 
National Assistance Board suggested that these people would be discouraged to go into these cities 
and diverted to other parts of the country. 
41 CPUK(52) Ist meeting, 11 Mar 52, C0876/233, para. l. According to the Ministry of 
Transport, 'During the whole of 1951 the number of stowaways allowed to land at United Kingdom 
ports was less than 200, and in the same period it was estimated that there were more than 2,000 
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Home Office even suspected that some of the 'Colonials' might be involved in the 
drug trafficking. 42 
Meanwhile, in Parliament a question was raised in the Commons, though 
not specifically, about Commonwealth immigrants. In May 1952 Thomas Reid, the 
Labour Party MP for Swindon, submitted a Question to the Prime Minister which 
was supposed to be answered on 19 June. His questions were: 'how many aliens 
have settled down permanently in the United Kingdom since 1919; how many 
immigrants from British Dependencies have taken up permanent residence here 
since 1919; and what expenditure has been incurred by the Government on the 
maintenance of indigent immigrants or on their repatriation' ? 43 In fact, this was a 
question which followed another of one month previously about alien residents and 
the financial support by the British govermnent. 44 Nevertheless this question 
showed that there were some interests within Parliament in the matters concerned 
with Commonwealth immigration, which would be an issue for the government to 
tackle seriously. 45 
migrants who paid their own passages' (CPUK(52) 2nd meeting, 29 Apr 52, C0876/233). 
42 CPUK(52) I st meeting, II Mar 52, C0876/23 ) 3, para. 1. 
43 House of Cormnons, Parliamentary Debates, 'Aliens (U. K. residence)', House of Commons 
Official Report, Session 1951-52, Vol. 502 (London, HMSO, 1952), 19 June 1952, col. 127w. 
44 In 29 May 1952, William S. Shepherd, the Conservative Party MP for Cheadle, had asked in 
the Commons the Home Secretary about the number of aliens who had become resident in the UK 
since 19' )8 and whether the Home Secretary could 'give an assurance that, in granting further permits 
to people who reside in this country, he is mindful of the size of our own population and the 
difficulty we shall have in supporting it in the years to come' (House of Commons, Parliamentary 
Debates, 'Aliens', House of Commons Official Report, Session 1951-52, Vol. 501 (London, HMSO, 
1952), 29 May 1952, col. 163 8). 
4ý The Home Office asked other departments to give information on this subject, however there 
turned out to be little statistics of this kind (R. L. Jones, Principal, HO, to J. L. Keith, Assistant 
Secretary, CO, 24 May 52, C0876/233; J. L. Keith, Assistant Secretary, CO, to R. L. Jones, 
Principal, HO, 29 May 52, C0876/233). The Prime Minister's answer sent to T. Reid on 14 July was 
III 
Set up of a Home Office official committee 
Ministerial discussion on Commonwealth immigration was rekindled by the 
personal interest of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister (Winston Churchill) 
had an extraordinary concern with the existence of people from Colonies. 46 His 
interest was intensified by a newspaper article in late October 1952 about the 
situation in Brixton. 47 The Prime Minister was quite inquisitive about the situation 
depicted on the article so that he ordered his Private Secretary (A. Montague 
Brown) to pose successive questions such as 'the figures of coloured people' in the 
UK and the number of 'coloured students' and their subjects of study. 48 
On 25 November, the Prime Minister raised a question in the Cabinet 
meeting (CC(52)100th) about the 'employment of Coloured workers' at the Post 
Office. 49 He was suspicious that 'coloured workers' deprived domestic workers of 
employment. He asked 'whether the Post Office were employing large numbers of 
coloured workers' and claimed that, 'If so, there was some risk that difficult social 
problems would be created'. 50 
The Postmaster General (Earl De La Warr) responded to the Prime 
Minister's question in the Cabinet meeting on 18 December (CC(52)106th) and 
given accordingly (Winston Churchill, Prime Minister, to Thomas Reid, MP, 14 Jul 52, CO 1028/24). 
46 D. W. Dean, 'Conservative governments and the restriction of Commonwealth immigration in 
the 1950s: the problem of constraint', Historical Journal, 3 5,1 (1992), 171-94, p. 183. 
47 Minute by Winston Churchill, Prime Minister, addressed to A. Montague Brown, a joint Private 
Secretary to Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, 12 Nov 52, PREM 11/824. 
48 A. Montague Browne, a joint Private Secretary to Prime Minister and First Lord of the 
Treasury, to B. G. Smallman, Assistant Private Secretary, CO, U Nov 1952, PREM 11/824; B. G. 
Smallman to A. Montague Browne, 21 Nov 52, PREM 11/824; A. Montague Browne to B. G. 
Smallman, 23 Nov 52, PREM 11/824. 
49 CC(52) 100th conclusions, minute 8,25 Nov 52, CAB 128/25. 
50 CC(52) I 00th conclusions, minute 8,25 Nov 52, CAB 128/25. 
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stated that 'the problem of coloured workers was not confined to the Post Office' but 
'they were also found in other Departments'. 51 He expressed his position that 'If 
Government policy on this matter should be modified, his Department would fall 
into line; but it could hardly be expected to introduce discrimination on grounds of 
colour in its recruitment of staff as a matter of Departmental poliCy'. 52 
However, the Home Secretary (David Maxwell-Fyfe) for his part proposed a 
civil servant enquiry in order 'to establish the facts of the situation'. '3 The Colonial 
Secretary (Oliver Lyttleton) basically agreed to the proposal, although showing 
reservation that it would not be taken as the government being considering about 
discrimination. He told that 'there would be grave objection to any suggestion of 
discrimination between coloured and other subjects of Her Majesty in the matter of 
entry to the United Kingdom'. 54 The Cabinet therefore gave approval to the Home 
Secretary on an enquiry of civil servants 'to examine the possibilities of preventing 
any further increase in the number of coloured people seeking employment in this 
55 country'. 
The official committee, "Working Party on Coloured People Seeking 
Employment in the United Kingdom" (code CWP), was arranged shortly by the 
Home Office, according to its terms of reference, in order 'to examine the 
possibilities of preventing any further increase in the number of coloured people 
seeking employment in the United Kingdom'. 56 The committee was composed of 
CC(52) 106th conclusions, minute 7,18 Dec 52, CAB 128/25. 
52 CC(52) 106th conclusions, minute 7,18 Dec 52, CAB 128/25. 
53 CC(52) 106th conclusions, minute 7,18 Dec 52, CAB 128/25. 
54 CC(52) 106th conclusions, minute 7,18 Dec 52, CAB 128/25. 
55 CC(52) 106th conclusions, minute 7,18 Dec 52, CAB 128/25. 
56 Frank Newsam, Permanent Under- Secretary, HO, to Percival Liesching, Permanent Under- 
Secretary, CRO, 30 Dec 52, D035/5216; Frank Newsam, Permanent Under- Secretary, HO, to 
Thomas Lloyd, Permanent Under- Secretary, CO, 30 Dec 52, C01028/22; CWP(53)1,24 Jan 533, 
C01028/22 
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the Assistant Under-Secretary or Assistant Secretary rank of the Home Office, 
Colonial Office, Commonwealth Relations Office, Ministry of Labour, Scottish 
Home Department, and Ministry of Transport. The Home Office Assistant Under- 
Secretary in charge of the Aliens and Nationality Divisions (W. H. Cornish) took 
the chair. This official committee was to mark an important institutional beginning 
in the government's discussions on Commonwealth immigration. Firstly, for the 
first time the inter- departmental discussions of civil servants obtained an 
institutional basis centred by the Home Office. Secondly, this official committee 
was to provide the initial framework for the succeeding inter-departmental 
discussions, which resulted in the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act. 57 
In the light of the policy having been maintained since the previous Labour 
government, namely, adopting administrative measures while rejecting legislation to 
avoid the risk of politicisation, this official committee examined whether 
'preventing an increase in the number of coloured people obtaining employment in 
the United Kingdom' would be possible 'without placing any control on their 
actually entering the country. 58 
The key point was the feasibility of internal control. The Ministry of Labour 
had an idea, on the one hand, that it would be practicable for Employment 
Exchanges to refuse to submit coloured people for vacancieS. 59 This measure was 
felt also to have the effect of reducing immigration because 'Knowledge of the 
existence of a practice of excluding coloured people from employment might deter 
coloured people from setting out for the United Kingdom'. 60 However, at the same 
57 Equally important from another perspective was that David Maxwell-Fyfe, Home Secretary, 
who was to play an important role as the Chairman of the later ministerial committees, started to 
involve in the process. 
58 CWP(53)2,26 Jan 53, C01028/22, para. 4. 
59 CWP(53) I st meeting, 30 Jan 53, CO 1028/22, para. 5. 
60 CWP(53)) I st meeting, 30 Jan 5' ), CO 1028/22, para. 7. 
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time, the Ministry had a strong counter argument to these ideas, which was that 'the 
possible benefit which would result would be outweighed by the dislocation caused 
in the United Kingdom'. 61 Civil servants therefore established at the early stage of 
their discussion the view that 'it would have no purpose to prevent people obtaining 
employment without at the same time applying immigration controlS1.62 
Civil servants reached a different conclusion from what had been achieved 
in 1950. As shown above, there had been a common recognition among civil 
servants that administrative measures were not effective to deter immigration. As 
the Home Office observed in the meeting, they thought that 'all possible measures 
had been tried. 63 In these circumstances, legislation on entry was felt to be the 
major condition for the government adopting any measures as regards 
Commonwealth immigration. Civil servants had realised that the real question was 
how to persuade the public and Parliament to accept legislation and also that 
politicians were responsible for this political task. 
Having legislation in mind, therefore, civil servants continued their 
discussions about the details of legislation. A labour permit system similar to that 
applied to aliens was proposed by the Home Office as the measure to control both 
immigration and employment. 64 The Ministry of Labour raised administrative 
difficulties in operating the permit system and worrying about criticism as 
'exercising colour discrimination', but it did not oppose the Home Office's 
proposal. 65 The Colonial Office also supported the Home Office's proposal on the 
condition that it 'applied equally to all British subjects, whether white or coloured, 
61 CWP(53) Ist meeting, 30 Jan 53, C01028/22, para. 7. 
62 C WP(5 3) 1 st meeting, 30 Jan 5 3, CO 102 8/22, para. 14. 
63 CWP(53) 2nd meeting, 21 Jul 53, CO 1028/22, para. 13. 
64 CWP(53)2,26 Jan 53, C01028/22, para. 4. 
65 CWP(53) 3rd meeting, 12 Nov 53, C01028/22, para. 7. 
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who did not belong to the United Kingdom'. 66 However, the Commonwealth 
Relations Office showed an intention to oppose the plan if immigration control was 
applied to all British subjects as the Colonial Office claimed. A major concern of 
the Commonwealth Relations Office was 'to avoid any weakening of ... 
sentimental ties with dominions such as Canada and Australia so many of whose 
inhabitants looked on the United Kingdom as "home" '. 67 There was a difference in 
views between the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office with 
regards to the subject of control. 
Meanwhile, as far as deportation was concerned, all departments in the CWP 
endorsed legislation for deporting 'undesirable British subjects' not belonging to the 
United Kingdom. These would be those 'who had committed a serious criminal 
offence, or who were unemployable or had been dependant on public assistance for 
a long period'. Both the Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices, which held 
concern about the impact of immigration control to relations with the 
Commonwealth, thought that legislation on deportation would 'not cause any strong 
objection from the Colonies or the self governing Commonwealth countries, many 
of which had similar legislation'. 68 
The CWP had three meetings in the period of almost one year. The report 
submitted to the Home Secretary in December 1953 clearly stated, on the one hand, 
that 'No effective action to reduce the number of coloured British subjects seeking 
employment in the United Kingdom can be taken without legislation'. Such 
legislation, the report continued, 'would give power to restrict the entry to the 
66 CWP(53) Ist meeting, 30 Jan 53, C01028/22, para. 9. 
67 CWP(53) 2nd meeting, 21 Jul 53, C01028/22, para. 26. On the other hand, the Commonwealth 
Relations Office stated that 'In the case of India and Pakistan, the countries which would be most 
affected by the application of any controls, the considerations would be different' (CWP(5-3) 2nd 
meeting, 21 Jul 53, C01028/22, para. 26). 
68 CWP(53) 3rd meeting, 12 Nov 53, C01028/22, para. 18. 
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United Kingdom of British subjects not normally resident here and a power to 
deport those who take employment without the permission of the appropriate 
authority'. 69 On the other hand, concern about public and Parliamentary reactions 
was also pointed out as follows: 'Consideration of any form of restriction on the 
freedom of British subjects to enter or remain in the United Kingdom would raise 
major questions of policy, and legislation for the purpose would almost certainlý, be 
controversial'. 70 Despite these reservations from political considerations, the general 
position of civil servants took one step forward towards legislation from that in 
1951. 
Cabinet considerations on public support 
The conclusions of the official committee CWP were reported to the Cabinet 
meeting on 3 February 1954 (CC(54)7th). 71 The total number of coloured people 
was reported to be about 40,000, compared with 7,000 before the Second World 
War, and about 2,000 had entered the UK in 1953.72 
Unlike civil servants, the Home Secretary (David Maxwell-Fyfe) was not in 
favour of taking a power to entry or deport British subjects. 73 He felt that 'a case 
has not been made out for taking even a limited power of this nature [i. e. 
deportation]1.74 In the Cabinet meeting, the Home Secretary on the one hand raised 
public concern about immigration and told that 'at any time the occurrence of some 
69 CWP(53) report, 17 Dec 53, CO 1032/119, D03 5/5216, para. 5 1. 
70 CWP(53) report, 17 Dec 53, C01032/119, D035/5216, para. 51. 
71 This was partly because the Prime Minister (Winston Churchill) hoped to discuss the issue in 
the Cabinet rather than at a lower level (P. G. Oates, a Joint Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, 
to R. J, Guppy, Principal Private Secretary to the Home Secretary, 29 Jan 54, PREM 11/824). 
72 CC(54) 7th conclusions, minute 4,3 Feb 54, CAB 128/27/pt. 1. 
73 C(54)34,28 Jan 54, CAB 129/65, p. 3, para. 7. 
74 C(54)34,28 Jan 54, CAB 129/65, p. 3, para. 7. 
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shocking crime involving a coloured person might give rise to strong public feeling 
on the matter'. 75 However, on the other, he also claimed that 'the problem had [not] 
yet assumed sufficient proportions to justify legislation which would involve a 
reversal of our traditional practice and would antagonise liberal opinion' and that It 
had to be recognised that any action which the Government might take could be 
easily misrepresented as introducing a "colour bar" 1.76 The Home Secretary's N71ew 
was accepted by the Prime Minister (Winston Churchill). 77 The idea to legislate on 
entry was rejected. 
However ministers' views were different as regards deportation. It was 
claimed that'it was no longer incumbent on the United Kingdom to follow a policy 
more liberal than that in force in other Commonwealth countries and there might .. 
. be a case 
for assuming a power to deport from this country British subjects from 
overseas'. 78 Pushed strongly by this view, the Cabinet decide that the government 
should continue to seek for a way to legislate on deportation, and at first it should 
examine power of other Commonwealth and Colonial Government to deport British 
subjects. 79 
Ministers postponed legislation on entry in fear of politicising the issue in 
the same manner as the Labour government did in 195 1. Further discussions within 
the government were decided to be confined to deportation for the time being. 
75 CC(54) 7th conclusions, minute 4,3 Feb 54, CAB 128/27/pt. 1. 
76 CC(54) 7th conclusions, minute 4,3 Feb 54, CAB 128/27/pt. 1. 
77 CC(54) 7th conclusions, minute 4,3 Feb 54, CAB 128/27/pt. I. 
78 CC(54) 7th conclusions, minute 4,3 Feb 54, CAB 128/27/pt. 1. 
79 The Commonwealth Secretary and the Minister of State for the Colonial Affairs had already 
reported the measures of restriction imposed on British subjects by the Commonwealth and Colonial 
governments. These territories had legislative power to restrict entry and to deport British subjects. 
For this reason, both Ministers contended, power limited to deportation would not arouse much 
criticism from those territories (CC(54) 7th conclusions, minute 4,3 Feb 54, CAB 128'27/'pt. 1). 
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*** 
By this time, Commonwealth immigration had been defined within the government, 
especially within the civil servants, as an issue which could only be alleviated by the 
introduction of legislative control. Particularly important in this process was that the 
Cabinet decided to place the Home Office in the centre of the government's 
institutions which were to give considerations to the issue of Commonwealth 
immigration. This was evidently because the Home Office was the department in 
charge of immigration controls. However, this decision, in turn, was to limit the 
perspectives and measures the government may adopt in order to tackle the issue. 
The only formal remit held by the Home Office as regards immigration, therefore 
the only interest of the Home Office as regards Commonwealth immigration, was 
the control of immigration. Other perspectives such as prejudice and discrimination 
on the one hand, and housing, employment and welfare on the other, were not 
seriously taken within civil servants whose discussions were led by the Home 
Office. 
The hidden assumption that the issue of Commonwealth immigration was 
approached, not from the perspectives of anti-discrimination or those of social 
policy, but from regulative measures of immigration control, was established in this 
process of the formation of the policy community dominated by the Home Office. 
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Chapter 6 Formulation of Policy Contents 
The number of immigrants from the West Indies increased rapidly in the mid 1950s. 
The recorded figures were 2,000 in 1953,11,000 in 1954,27,500 in 1955, and 
29,800 in 1956. Fare-paying migrants rather than stowaways became government 
concern. The social consequences of immigration came to worry various quarters of 
the government more strongly than before. 
Public and Parliamentary anxiety over the issue increased in late 1953. 
Backed by the pressure from Parliament, political moves within the government 
became active. Intensive discussions emerged in various places - the Cabinet, inter- 
departmental official committees, and, later, the ministerial committee. Within the 
Cabinet, early legislation was demanded persistently by the Lord President, the 
Marquess of Salisbury. Strongly led by hardliners within the Cabinet who 
demanded restrictions on immigration, a Bill to introduce control on entry of British 
subjects was to be prepared and submitted to the Cabinet. 
In the meantime civil servants kept their own focus. Political considerations 
motivated ministerial discussions, while discussions by civil servants were 
relatively free from these. The stance of the major departments changed during three 
years from 1954 to 1956 with the change in circumstances from their own 
standpoint. Contrary to previous views, the general opinion of civil servants was to 
shift to rejecting early legislation. 
1. Increasing Public and Parliamentary Anxiety 
Pressurefrom Parliament and the Lord President 
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Public anxiety on immigration increased towards the end of 1953. More than a year 
had passed since the Prime Minister (Winston Churchill) first raised this issue in the 
Cabinet meeting of November 1952. In the meantime government discussions on 
Commonwealth immigration were gradually affected by political considerations. 
Concern within Parliament was increasing. On 10 December 195 3, Brigadier 
Medlicott, the Conservative Party MP for Norfolk Central, asked in the Commons 
about the number of coloured persons settled in the United Kingdom. ' Another 
question was raised also from Arthur Lewis, the Labour Party MP for Westhain 
North, in the Commons on 18 February 1954 about whether the Prime Minister 
would make a statement on the colour bar, 2 and again on 18 March he was to be 
asked by Thomas Reid, the Labour Party MP for Swindon, who was demanding that 
a committee of enquiry should be appointed 'to report on the problems arising from 
the increased immigration of coloured people into this country. 3 Parliamentary 
pressure on this issue was to increase further throughout 1954 and 1955.4 
On 10 March the Cabinet (CC(54)17th) discussed the Prime Minister's 
response to Thomas Reid's Question. The Home Secretary (David Maxwell-Fyfe) 
was of the opinion that the request for an enquiry should be rejected. He had in his 
mind the Cabinet consensus created a short while before that 'the situation was not 
yet so acute that these difficulties must be faced'. 5 He felt that the committee of 
I House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 'Coloured Persons (U. K. Settlement)', House of 
Commons Official Report, Session 1953-54, Vol. 521 (London, HMSO, 1953), 10 December 1953, 
col. 257w; cf. Zig Layton-Henry, Politics of Immigration: Immigration, 'Race'andRace'Relations in 
Post-war Britain (Oxford, Blackwell, 1992), p. 3 1. 
2 House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 'Colour Bar', House of Commons Official Report, 
Session 1953-54, Vol. 523 (London, HMSO, 1954), 18 February 1954, cols. 2154-5, col. 2154. 
3 CC(54) 17th conclusions, minute 6,10 Mar 54, CAB 128/27/pt. 1. 
4 Layton- Henry, Politics of Immigration, pp. 32 and 42n. 
ý CC(54) 17th conclusions, minute 6,10 Mar 54, CAB128/27/pt. l. The Home Secretary was 
thinking, that 'a Committee is unlikely to add materially to the information which has already been 
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enquiry would risk the politicisation of the issue because the appointment of the 
committee 'would arouse suspicion that the Government were contemplating action 
which would involve discrimination on grounds of colour and might disrupt the 
unity of the Commonwealth'. 6 The Cabinet endorsed his view and decided to reject 
Reid's request. 7 Accordingly, the Prime Minister replied in the Commons on 18 
March that 'the topic was under consideration, but that he did not think any useful 
purpose would be served by setting up a committee at that point'. 8 
However, more important at this Cabinet meeting on 10 March than this 
topic was that the Cabinet decision taken on 3 February that the scope of legislation 
should be limited to deportation was reversed. A stubborn Proponent of 
comprehensive legislation, i. e. both for entry and deportation, within the Cabinet 
was the Marquess of Salisbury, the Lord President of the Council and Leader of 
House of Lords. 9 At the Cabinet meeting he cast a doubt as to whether 'the 
possibility of deportation would in itself be enough to check the increasing tide of 
immigration'. 10 He claimed that the government should discuss the possibility of 
collected by the official inter-departmental Committee' and also that 'The issues involved are fairly 
clear and they involve the broadest policy considerations which are really inappropriate for any 
Committee' (C(54)94,9 Mar 54, CAB 129/66, p. 2, para. 4). 
6 CC(54) 17th conclusions, minute 6,10 Mar 54, CAB 128/27/pt. 1. 
7 Another consideration on this Cabinet decision was: 'When this answer had been given, it would 
be easier to judge the general state of feeling on this question in the House of Commons and to assess 
the prospect of passing legislation limiting the rights of British subjects from other parts of the 
Commonwealth to reside in the United Kingdom' (CC(54) 17th conclusions, minute 6,10 Mar 54, 
CAB 128/27/pt. 1). 
8 House of Con-imons, Parliamentary Debates, 'Overseas British Subjects (Immigration)', House 
of Commons Official Report, Session 1953-54, Vol. 525 (London, HMSO, 1954), 18 March 1954, 
col. 63w, col. 631t,. 
9 Viscount Swinton, Commonwealth Secretary, to David Maxwell-Fyfe, Home Secretary, 19 Mar 
54, D035/5216. 
10 CC(54) 17th conclusions, minute 6,10 Mar 54, CAB 128/27/pt. 1. 
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legislation on entry also. The Commonwealth Secretary (Viscount S%vinton) 
opposed his view and insisted that 'any initiative in this direction by the United 
Kingdom might have the result of bringing into force in India and Pakistan stricter 
immigration controls which would work to the disadvantage of the European 
business community in those countries'. II 
However, the view of the Lord President resulted in the Cabinet reversing its 
decision of 3 February. Accepting his opinion, the Cabinet decided that the Home, 
Commonwealth, and Colonial Secretaries should consider 'whether legislation 
restricting the right of British subjects from other parts of the Commonwealth to 
enter and remain in the United Kingdom should be confined to a power to deport 
individuals ... or whether powers should also be taken to control the entry of 
British subjects into this country'. 12 The hardliners led by the Lord President were 
beginning to dominate ministerial discussions. 
Discussions in the official committee CWT(2) 
It was the Commonwealth Relations Office that most strongly insisted to confine 
the government discussion to the issue of deportation. In order to keep good 
relations with independent Commonwealth countries, the Department strongly 
hoped to rule out the possibility of legislation on entry from those areas, and 
therefore to avoid any discussions about legislation on entry. Nine days later, on 19 
March, the Commonwealth Secretary (Viscount Swinton) sent a letter to the Home 
Secretary (David Maxwell-Fyfe) and proposed that the Home Secretary should set 
up a new inter-departmental committee of civil servants under the Home Office 
chairmanship and to discuss there only the question of deportation. 13 
II CC(54) 17th conclusions, minute 6,10 Mar 54, CAB 128/27/pt. 1. 
12 CC(54) 17th conclusions, minute 6,10 Mar 54, CAB 128/27/pt. 1. 
13 Viscount Swinton, Commonwealth Secretary, to David Maxwell-Fyfe, Home Secretary, 19 Mar 
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However, his claim to confine the option only to deportation was rejected b", 
the Lord President. Letters were exchanged between the Lord President and the 
Commonwealth Secretary, which proved fruitless to fill the gap between them. 14 
To solve the differences in views and then to set up agendas for the new official 
committee, a ministerial meeting of the Home Secretary, Lord President, 
Commonwealth Secretary, and Colonial Secretary was held on 12 April. It had 
already been clear that these Ministers and their Departments as well as the Minister 
of Labour and his Ministry were the most important actors in the government 
discussion on Commonwealth immigration. In the meeting the Lord President's 
view was finally adopted. The Ministers concluded that the enquiry of civil servants 
should consider both about deportation and restriction of entry. 15 
The new official committee was named "Working Party to Consider Certain 
Proposals to Restrict the Right of British Subjects from Overseas to Enter and 
Remain in the United Kingdom" (code CWP(2)). It consisted of civil servants of 
Assistant (Under-) Secretary ranks. The Chairman and the Departments represented 
were same as those in the previous official committee CWP, namely: Home Office 
(which provided the chairman, W. H. Cornish), Colonial Office, Commonwealth 
Relations Office, Ministry of Labour, Scottish Home Department, and Ministry of 
Transport. Over the period of five months, this committee held four meetings and 
produced two reports dated 10 July 1954 and 22 October 1954 respectively. 
In the discussion of the committee, civil servants confirmed their previous 
view that 'the only effective way of enforcing the desired control is to make it the 
law as regards British subjects in the categories to be controlled ... that they must 
54, D035/5216. 
14 Viscount Swinton, Commonwealth Secretary, to the Marquess of Salisbury, Lord President, 15 
Mar 54, D035/5216; the Marquess of Salisbury to Viscount Swinton, 20 Mar 54, D035/5216. 
15 Note of a meeting on 12 Apr 54, D035/5216, C01032/119. 
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obtain leave of an immigration officer to land in this country'. 16 The main points of 
their discussions were concerned therefore not with the question whether legislation 
should be adopted, but with the concrete measures and subjects of control. As 
regards the measures of control were concerned, requirement of a definite offer of 
employment from employers, which would be scrutinised by the Ministry of 
Labour, was proposed. This was basically on the same line with the Home Office 
proposal made in the previous official committee CWP. Civil servants thought that, 
'since individual employers in this country would be unlikely ... to apply 
for a 
coloured British subject by name, if this scheme were operated the stream of 
coloured labour from the West Indies would fairly quickly practically cease to 
flow'. 17 
As far as the subjects of control were concerned, two possibilities were 
raised as the categories of people subject to control. The first possibility was the 
Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC) not "belonging" to the 
United Kingdom, British subjects without citizenship, and British protected 
persons. 18 The other possibility was all Commonwealth citizens. In both cases, the 
control of Irish citizens was thought to be practically impossible. The Ministry of 
Labour, above all, opposed this for the reason that the Irish were essential to 
agriculture and certain other industries in Britain and strongly claimed that 'The 
16 CWP(2)(54) report, 10 Jul 54, D03 5/5216, CO 1032/119, p. 2, para. 5. 
17 CWP(2)(54) report, 10 Jul 54, D035/5216, C01032/119, p. 2, para. 6. 
18 Civil servants proposed a concept of 'a person "belonging" to the United Kingdom', who would 
be exempted from control. It was defined as one who: '(a) was born in the United Kingdom or was 
born of parents who at the time of his birth were ordinary resident here; or (b) has been ordinarily 
resident or domiciled in the United Kingdom continuously for a period of seven years or more and 
has not since the end of that period been resident continuously for a period of seven years or more 
in 
any other part of the Commonwealth; or (c) was naturalised in this country; or 
(d) is the wife or 
minor child of a person failing within the foregoing classes' (CWP(2)(54) report, 
10 Jul 54, 
D03 5/5216, CO 1032/119, p. 4, para. 12). 
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restoration of the control is not only costly and unnecessary but positivelý- 
undesirable from the employment point of view'. 19 
The first of these two possibility involved a couple of difficulties. 20 Firstly, 
it would make it obvious that the measure was targeted at coloured people, in 
particular those from the West Indies. Secondly, Citizens of the United Kingdom 
and Colonies not "belonging" to the United Kingdom would be placed at a 
disadvantage to citizens of other Commonwealth countries who were thought to 
have less claim on the United Kingdom. Thirdly, if a colonial territory became an 
independent state within the Commonwealth, the control would cease for its 
citizens. 
The second possibility, i. e. if control was extended to all Commonwealth 
citizens, these problems could be avoided. Moreover, this could cope with a future 
increase in immigration from India and Pakistan, which was a potential concern 
among civil servants. 21 However this option had problems of different kinds. 
Firstly, it might weaken the sentiment held by Commonwealth citizens which 
attached to the "mother country" and thus helped to bind together the nations of the 
Commonwealth. Secondly, India, Pakistan and Ceylon might take counter-action on 
immigration from the UK, which would be detrimental to British interests. And 
thirdly, exclusion of Irish citizens from the control would be more controversial 
than the first option as in this option Irish citizens were the only people exempted 
from control. 22 
In contrast to the control on entry, the measures about deportation were well 
detailed. Ministers had agreed in February (CC(54)7th, 3 February 1954) that 
19 CWP(2)(54) report, 10 Jul 54, D035/5216, C01032/119, p. 3, para. 8; p. 6, para. 18. 
20 CWP(2)(54) report, 10 Jul 54, D03 5/5216, CO 1032/119, pp. 4-5, para. 14. 
21 CWP(2)(54) report, 10 Jul 54, D035/5216, C01032/119, p. 5, para. 14. 
22 CWP(2)(54) report, 10 Jul 54, D035/5216, C01032/119, p. 5, para. 15. 
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deportation should be applied all British subjects from overseas. 23 Civil servants in 
the CWP(2) therefore confirmed that only those who "belong" to the United 
Kingdom should be exempted from deportation. 24 They also agreed on three 
conditions as the grounds for deportation - conviction of certain criminal offences, 
undesirability, and living on public ftinds. 25 The only difficult problem was the 
arrangements on Irish citizens. It was felt difficult to defend excluding Irish citizens 
from the scope of deportation. 26 Nevertheless, this point was unlikely to bring 
differences in positions among departments. Civil servants had already established 
the common lines as far as deportation was concerned. 
However, there were large differences in views on legislation on entry 
among civil servants. The Colonial Office supported the second option in which 
citizens of the whole Commonwealth including independent states should be made 
subject to control, while the Commonwealth Relations Office opposed this. In the 
situation that the Colonial Office favoured legislation on entry, the Cornmonwealth 
Relations Office was beginning to worry that the discussion would proceed at the 
pace of the Colonial Office and even to take the position to exclude the whole 
matters concerned with legislation on entry from government discussions. These 
differences in views as regards the subjects of entry control were to be reported to 
ministers. 
In order to examine the reports from the official committee CWP(2), the 
four ministers - Home Secretary (Gwilyrn Lloyd-George), Colonial Secretary 
(Alan 
Lennox-Boyd), Commonwealth Secretary (Viscount Swinton) and Lord President 
(the Marquess of Salisbury) - met again on I November. By this time, Oliver 
23 CWP(2)(54) report, 10 Jul 54, D035/5216, C01032/119, p. 6, para. 19. 
24 CWP(2)(54) 2nd report, 22 Oct 54, D035/5217, C01032/119, para. 5. 
25 CWP(2)(54) 2nd report, 22 Oct 54, D035/5217, C01032/119 para. 5. 
26 CWP(2)(54) 2nd report, 22 Oct 54, D035/5217, COI 032/119, para. 16. 
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Lyttelton and David Maxwell-Fyfe had been replaced by Alan Lennox-Boyd (28 
July 1954) and Gwilyrn Lloyd-George (18 October 1954) respectively. 27 The gap 
emerged again between the Commonwealth Secretary and the Lord President. This 
was further joined by the Colonial Secretary, who had a dissident view from the 
Commonwealth Secretary as to whether citizens of the independent Commonwealth 
countries should be made subject to legislation on entry. 
At the meeting the Commonwealth Secretary strongly opposed the inclusion 
of the citizens of the independent Commonwealth countries in the subject of 
legislative restriction. He claimed that'Any action which may weaken the ties which 
help to bind the Commonwealth together is a matter of direct interest to the United 
Kingdom, and it is important that this side of the question should be given full 
weight'. 28 Moreover, for him, "the fact" was that'the problem with which we are in 
fact concerned is that of coloured immigrants from Colonial territories' and 'we shall 
welcome the comparatively few good young Canadians or New Zealanders who 
wish to work here, while restricting an excessive number of West Indians or West 
Africans'. 29 The Lord President for his part was not satisfied with the analyses 
shown in the civil servant reports. When the first report was issued in August 1954 
he had revealed his discontent that 'There appears to be no recognition [in the 
report] of the dangers of the increasing immigration of coloured people into this 
30 country'. 
The differences in views among ministers as regards legislation on entry 
27 As a result of the Cabinet reshuffle on 18 October 1954, David Maxwell-Fyfe, who became a 
Lord, Viscount Kilmuir, was transferred to Lord Chancellor. For his successor as Home Secretary, 
Gwilym Lloyd-George transferred from Minister of Food. 
28 C(54)356,23) Nov 54, CAB] 29/72, p. 1, para. 4. 
29 C(54)356,23 Nov 54, CAB 129/72, p. 2, para. 5. 
30 Minute by the Marquess of Salisbury, Lord President, 8 Aug 54, on A. H. K. Slater, Private 
Secretary to Lord President, to the Marquess of Salisbury, Lord President, 5 Aug 54, CAB 1 241'l 19 1. 
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were unlikely to be solved. There was no way but the discussion about this point 
should be suspended for a while. Consequently the four ministers provisionall)ý 
agreed that further consideration of the problem should be confined to working out 
a practicable scheme for deportation for the time being. 31 
2. Dominance of Hardliners within the Cabinet 
Change in Home Office Is policy 
The position of the Home Office was changing in the meantime in 1954. A great 
change was appearing in the situation of immigration. As had shown at the 
beginning of this Chapter, the rate of immigration from the West Indies had greatly 
increased in 1954. It was to reach 11,000, as compared with a little over 2,000 in 
1953.32 
The change in administration brought a chance to the Home Office 
reviewing its policy. Under these circumstances, the new Home Secretary, Gwilym 
Lloyd-George, was more determined to take actions on the issue of Commonwealth 
immigration than his predecessor, David Maxwell-Fyfe. When Lloyd-George took 
office as Home Secretary, he showed the view to senior officials of his Department 
that 'a wider approach to this question will be expected from the Government' and 
that'it is not possible to continue to look with equanimity on a large, increasing and 
uncontrolled flow of immigrants into the United Kingdom of a kind which does not 
readily assimilate itself to the native population of this country'. 33 It became soon 
31 Frank Newsam, Pen-nanent U nder- Secretary, HO, to Thomas Lloyd, Pen-nanent Under- 
Secretary, CO, 8 Nov 54, CAB 124/119 1, CO 103 2/120. 
32 CC(54) 78th conclusions, minute 4,24 Nov 54, CAB 128/27/pt. 2. 
33 Frank Newsam, Permanent Under- Secretary, HO, to Thomas Lloyd, Permanent Under- 
Secretary, CO, 8 Nov 54, CAB 124/119 1, CO 1032/120. 
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evident that the Home Office was changing its policy on Commonwealth 
immigration under the new administration. The Department began to act on the 
belief that 'there is a general feeling that there is a problem which needs to be 
tackled'. 34 
The new Home Secretary did not preclude the possibility to legislate on 
entry, unlike Maxwell-Fyfe who was consistently opposed to any legislation as 
regards Commonwealth immigration. The new Home Secretary recognised the 
importance to gain public support for any government action. His initial strategy 
was therefore to mobilise public opinion in favour of legislation. On 8 November 
the Home Office approached the Colonial Office, Commonwealth Relations Office 
and Ministry of Labour, and proposed that a non-governmental committee of 
inquiry into the issue should be appointed. 35 The committee should be composed of 
ten or eleven persons and discuss, not about deportation, but about whether 
legislation to restrict entry is necessary or desirable. 36 
This proposal meant to abandon the agreement in the four Ministers' meeting 
of the previous week, on I November, in which the consideration should be for the 
time being confined to deportation, and infuriated other departments particularly the 
Commonwealth Relations Office. As pointed out above, the Commonwealth 
Relations Office was cautious about the initiative which might lead to legislation on 
34 Frank Newsam, Permanent Under- Secretary, HO, to Thomas Lloyd, Permanent Under- 
Secretary, CO, 8 Nov 54, CAB 124/119 1, CO 1032/120. 
35 Frank Newsam, Permanent Under-Secretary, HO, to Thomas Lloyd, Pen-nanent Under- 
Secretary, CO, 8 Nov 54, CAB 124/119 1, CO 1032/120. 
36 The proposed terms of reference was: 'To consider and report whether any, and if so, what 
changes in the law relating to the admission of British subjects to the United Kingdom are necessary 
or desirable in the national interest and in the interest of the immigrants themselves, and in particular 
to consider whether provision should be made for controlling the entry of those who wish to seek 
employment in this country. ' (Frank Newsam, Permanent Under- Secretary, HO, to Thomas Lloyd, 
Permanent Under- Secretary, CO, 8 Nov 54, CAB 124/119 1, CO 103 2/120) 
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entry from independent Commonwealth countries. The civil servant side of the 
Commonwealth Relations Office strongly opposed the proposal. It was thought that 
the admission of British subjects to the UK was unsuitable for a non-govemmental 
committee and also there was a risk that the appointment of the committee might be 
interpreted as a step to legislate 'in terms of coloured discrimination, with 
unfortunate reactions in the Asian Commonwealth countries'. 37 The 
Commonwealth Relations Office decided to take a stance basically to oppose the 
appointment of the committee. However, the Department also decided that, if the 
appointment of the committee were unavoidable, the Department should try to 
confine the scope of the enquiry strictly to 'only the particular class of immigrants 
which we have in mind. 38 This meant to be immigrants from the West Indies, at the 
narrowest, or from the Colonies, at the broadest. 
The Colonial Office was also surprised at the Home Office's proposal but its 
reaction was not so strong as that of the Commonwealth Relations Office because it 
did not necessarily opposed the control on entry. Rather what the Department was 
worrying was that the scope of enquiry might be limited to the immigration of the 
people from Colonies as the Commonwealth Relations Office claimed. 39 
Differences in views were therefore found between the Home Office, 
Commonwealth Relations Office and Colonial Office. Compromise was sought at 
ministerial level. At this time, the Commonwealth Secretary accepted the 
appointment of the committee, on the condition that the membership should include 
someone with special knowledge of the self-governing Commonwealth countries. 40 
37 A. F. Morley, Assistant Under- Secretary, CRO, to P. Liesching, Permanent Under- Secretary, 
and S. Garner, Deputy Under- Secretary, 9 Nov 54, D035/5217. 
38 Viscount Swinton, Colonial Secretary, to G. Lloyd-George, Home Secretary, 16 Nov 54, 
D035/5217. 
39 Minute by A. Lennox-Boyd, Colonial Secretary, 17 Nov 54, CAB 124/1191. 
40 C(54)356,23 Nov 54, CAB 129/72, p. 1, para. 4. 
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This compromise seemed to make the appointment of the committee possible. At 
the Cabinet meeting on 24 November (CC(54)78th), the Home Secretary proposed 
the idea. The possible composition of the committee was then announced two 
weeks later at another Cabinet meeting held on 6 December (CC(54)82nd). 41 
However, at this Cabinet meeting the agreement among ministers to set up a 
committee of enquiry was to be reversed. This was because 'serious doubts were 
expressed about the expediency of proceeding with the appointment of such a 
Committee'. 42 Doubts were raised from those in favour of early legislation. The 
pressure for early and comprehensive legislation from some Cabinet members was 
strong. They thought that the proposed committee 'was bound to include some 
members who would be opposed in principle to any action which might appear to be 
discriminatory in character' and therefore 'At the best ... the Government would be 
likely to find themselves obliged to act in disregard of a minority report, while at the 
worst the Committee's recommendations might make it impracticable for the 
Government to take any action in the matter'. 43 
The Cabinet discussion proceeded at the pace of these hardliners. They 
insisted that the government should choose legislation instead of a committee and 
that the Bill should be prepared. They had a firm belief that there was 'a surprisingly 
wide body of opinion in favour of immediate action'. 44 Consequently the Cabinet 
41 C(54)375,3 Dec 54, CAB129/72. The proposal was, as the Chairman, Lord Radcliffe or, 
failing him, the Earl of Crawford and Balcarres, or Mr John Sparrow (Warden of All Souls) or Sir 
David Lindsay Keir (Master of Ballior); One Conservative, one Labour and one Liberal MP; One 
representative of Employer Organisations; One representative of the Trade Union Congress; One 
person familiar with Commonwealth problems, to be nominated by the Commonwealth Secretary; 
One person experienced in Colonial administration, to be nominated by the Colonial Secretary; One 
person ('preferably a woman') well known as a social worker; One economic expert. 
42 CC(54) 82nd conclusions, minute 7,6 Dec 54, CAB 128/27/pt. 2. 
43 CC(54) 82nd conclusions, minute 7,6 Dec 54, CAB128/27/pt. 2. 
44 CC(54) 82nd conclusions, minute 7,6 Dec 54, CAB 128/27/pt. 2. 
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decided that a Bill for restricting on entry and stay should be arranged by the Home 
and Colonial Secretaries. " 
Increasing pressureftom backbenchers and theparty 
It was indeed true that the concern about increasing immigration was intensified 
within Parliament in 1954. However. this was felt to have an effect to increase 
immigration. 46 The Colonial Office in particular had powerful arguments to counter 
talk of legislation. Behind Cabinet discussions on legislation, the Colonial Office 
was eager to discourage emigration from the West Indies. Colonial Governors were 
warned that if they were unsuccessful in reducing the rate of emigration legislative 
control should be introduced in the UK. 47 
Despite the concerns of the Colonial Office, there emerged an Parliamentary 
initiative in January 1955 which was to affect the position of the govermnent. On 20 
January 1955 (CC(55)5th) the Cabinet was informed that a Conservative 
backbencher, Cyril Osborne, the Conservative Party MP for Louth, was seeking to 
introduce a Private Members' Bill designed to regulate the admission into the UK of 
persons not "belonging" to the British Isles. 48 He was seeking the Conservative 
45 This decision to draft a Bill had another political meaning. The next general election was due to 
be carried out within a year (by October 1955). Harold Macmillan later recalled in his memoir that 
Churchill hoped to raise the issue with the draft Bill at the general election (Harold Macmillan, At the 
End of the Day 1961-1963 (London, Macmillan, 1973), p. 73). 
46 D. W. Dean, 'Conservative governments and the restriction of Commonwealth immigration in 
the 1950s: the problem of constraint', Historical Journal, 35,1 (1992), 171-94, p. 179. 
47 The Colonial Office sent a despatch to the Governor of Barbados (R. A. Arundell), which read 
that 'The arrival of large numbers of immigrants, mainly though not entirely from the West Indies, is 
causing and widespread public and Parliamentary anxiety in this country and it is being considered 
whether it will not be necessary to introduce legislation to control immigration of British subjects 
from overseas' (Colonial Secretary to Governor of Barbados, 31 Dec 54, C01028/35; cf Dean, 
'Conservative governments', pp. ] 78-9). 
48 CC(55) 5th conclusions, minute 2,20 Jan 55, CAB 128/28. 
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backbench support for the Bill. 
Osborne's action put the Cabinet, as well as the Colonial Office, in 
confusion. They were suddenly under pressure to decide their position towards 
legislation on entry. The Cabinet worried about the situation that Osborne's Bill 
might prejudice the course of the goverm-nent's Bill in preparation. It was felt that 'If 
leave [to submit the Osbome's Bill to Parliament] were refused, it would be 
more difficult for the Government to introduce legislation of its own during the 
present session'. 49 
On the one hand, the Cabinet decided at its meeting on 24 January 
(CC(55)6th) that if Osborne's Bill were introduced to Parliament 'Ministers of 
Cabinet rank should abstain from voting and that other members of the Government 
should either abstain or vote in favour of the proposal'. 50 On the other hand, the 
efforts to discourage Osborne to proceed with its Bill was made behind the scene. 
The Osborne's Bill was discussed in the Parliamentary Conservative Party's 
Commonwealth Affairs Committee on 27 January. 51 The Whip claimed that debate 
on the Bill would degenerate into a colour bar wrangle, and 'an administrative 
solution giving the Home Secretary power to deport undesirables after conviction' 
would be much more effective than controversial legislation. The Whip further 
warned that an awkward situation might arise if leave to bring in Osbome's Bill was 
refused by the Commons, as it would tie the government's hands. 52 The pressure on 
Osborne from the Conservative Party leaders succeeded at last and his Bill was 
withdrawn at this time. 
Action outside the government continued, however. The Cabinet was again 
49 CC(55) 6th conclusions, minute 1,24 Jan 55, CAB 128/28. 
50 CC(55) 6th conclusions, minute 1,24 Jan 55, CAB128/28. 
51 Richard Lamb, The Failure of the Eden Government (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, 1987), 
pp. 18-9. 
52 Lamb, The Failure of the Eden Government, pp. 18-9. 
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informed on 16 March (CC(55)25th) that the issue of Commonwealth immigration 
would be raised at the Central Council of Conservative Associations on the 
following day. A resolution was to be adopted to call for legislation to deport 
undesirable persons belonging to other Commonwealth countries. 53 Unlike the 
Osborne's Bill, this was unlikely to have an direct impact on government policy. 
Legislation was not unlikely to be proposed due to division of opinions. The 
Cabinet decided that it should remain clam. 54 
The government's draft Bill and moves to gain public and Parliamentary support 
The government's Commonwealth Immigrants Bill was prepared by the Home 
Office in consultation with the Colonial Office. The Commonwealth Relations 
Office was not consulted at all. It was as late as May 1955 when the Commonwealth 
Relations Office was shown a draft of the Bill (2nd version) dated 3 February 1955 
from the Home Office for the first tiMe. 55 
The exclusion of the Commonwealth Relations Office from this process 
affected the contents of the draft Bill. The Commonwealth Immigrants Bill was 
drafted to apply to all immigrants from the Commonwealth who did not "belong" to 
the UK. They were also liable to deportation. Citizens of the Irish Republic 
ordinarily resident in the Republic were exempted from entry control; however they 
were liable to deportation unless they "belonged" to the UK. This was one of the 
two options that the CWP(2) had recommended in its report on 22 October 1954 
and the one the Colonial Office showed its preference. Though the provisions of the 
draft Bill applied in face to the whole Commonwealth, considering the resistance 
53 CC(55) 25th conclusions, minute 3,16 Mar 55, CAB 128/28. 
54 CC(55) 25th conclusions, minute 3,16 Mar 55, CAB 128/28. 
55 W. H. Cornish, Assistant Under- Secretary, HO, to A. F. Morley, Assistant Under-Secretary, 
CRO, 12 May 55, D035/5218. 
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from the Commonwealth Relations Office, subsequent Orders in Council enacted 
under the Bill could discriminate one territory or Commonwealth country from 
another. Against the background that a shortage of accommodation was the most 
serious concern, the housing certificate as well as the employment permit were 
proposed as measures of control. The basic provisions of this draft Bill, except for 
the housing certificate which was to be dropped later, were to be maintained in the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill of 1961. 
The outline of the Bill was reported in the Cabinet meeting on 13 January 
1955 (CC(55)3rd). The Commonwealth Relations Office had a worry about the 
provisions of the Bill. Commonwealth Secretary stated in the meeting that: 'its 
provisions should be kept as general as possible in order that means might be found 
in practice to allow the movement of British subjects between the United Kingdom 
and independent Commonwealth countries to continue without hindrance'. 56 
Moreover, in the Cabinet, there were still large differences in views. Opinions both 
in favour of and against the Bill were repeated. On the one hand, probable social 
effects of the high rate of immigration were raised and it was claimed that there was 
'general support for the view that the social consequences of the increasing flow of 
West Indian immigrants into this country were sufficiently serious to compel the 
Government to take such action'. 57 On the other hand, there were doubts on 
Parliamentary and public supports for legislation. It was claimed that 'the 
Government were most unlikely to be able to carry through the House of Commons 
a Bill suggested' as 'The Opposition Parties would not publicly support it, and some 
of the Government's supporters would not favour it'. 58 It was therefore suggested 
that 'The introduction of such a Bill would seriously dislocate the Parliamentary 
56 CC(55) 3rd conclusions, minute 6,13 Jan 55, CAB 128/28. 
57 CC(55) 3rd conclusions, minute 6,1 3)Jan 55, CAB 128/28. 
58 CC(55) 3rd conclusions, minute 6,13 Jan 55, CAB 128/28. 
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programme for the current session. 59 
As these arguments showed, the most important point was whether the Bill 
could gain as large public support as those who claim legislation believed. From 
this perspective, it was suggested that public opinion might be influenced in favour 
of legislation by giving more publicity on similar legislation of other 
Commonwealth governments. The Cabinet accepted this idea and decided to 
produce a White Paper. The content of publicity was agreed to be 'the restrictions 
already applicable to the entry of British subjects into all the other independent 
Commonwealth countries and into most Colonial territories'. 60 
Moves to influence public and Parliamentary opinions were accordingly 
expanded. The Defence Minister (Harold Macmillan), though not fully content with 
the Cabinet decision as he thought it insufficient, sent a letter on the following day, 
14 January, to the Deputy Prime Minister (Anthony Eden) and proposed that 
discussions on Commonwealth immigration should be started in the House of 
Lords, and then in the Commons and see 'the parliamentary and press attitude to the 
problem'. 61 
The draft of the White Paper about the existing restrictions on the entry of 
British subjects into other Commonwealth countries was submitted to the Cabinet 
meeting on 17 February (CC(55)15th). The draft White Paper revealed that 'in some 
Commonwealth countries, steps were taken to exclude British subjects who were 
not of European origin by administrative methods which lacked the support of any 
59 CC(55) 3)rd conclusions, minute 6,1) Jan 55, CAB128/28. 
60 CC(55) 3rd conclusions, minute 6,13 Jan 55, CAB 128/28. 
61 H. Macmillan, Defence Minister, to A. Eden, Deputy Prime Minister, 14 Jan 55, PREMI 1/824. 
Macmillan thought that 'legislation is hopeless unless it were agreed between all parties' and 
therefore that 'The problem ought to be "ventilated"' (H. Macmillan, Defence Minister, to A. Eden, 
Deputy Prime Minister, 14 Jan 55, PREMI 1/824). 
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statutory authority'. 62 The White Paper was intended to be published in order to 
justify UK legislation on entry. However, it was pointed out in the Cabinet that the 
other Commonwealth goverm-nents concerned might not welcome disclosure of this 
fact. The publication of the White Paper was decided later (CM(55)14th, 14 June 
1955) to be suspended because of this concem. 63 However., measures to influence 
Parliamentary and public opinions were continued to be sought. 
The Eden Cabinet and a plan of a public enquiry 
In April 1955 Churchill resigned as Prime Minister ahead of the coming general 
election. Anthony Eden, the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, 
succeeded to the post (6 April). Most of the Cabinet members concerned with 
Commonwealth immigration retained their posts namely: the Marquess of Salisbury 
(Lord President), Gwilym Lloyd-George (Home Secretary), Alan Lennox-Boyd 
(Colonial Secretary), Walter Monckton (Minister of Labour) and Norman Brook 
(Cabinet Secretary). The only significant change concerned was the appointment of 
the Earl of Home, who had been Minister of State of Scottish Office, as 
Commonwealth Secretary. He replaced the retiring Viscount Swinton. 
The Eden Cabinet inherited the problems of the Churchill Cabinet. As far as 
the matter about Commonwealth immigration was concerned, the final decision 
needed to be made as to whether the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill should be 
introduced to Parliament or not. A further increase of the rate of immigration had 
been recorded. By this time, it had been estimated that those coming from the West 
Indies in 1955 may well reach 20,000, as compared with some 10,000 in 1954, and 
some 2,000 in 1953. 
62 C(55)34,14 Feb 55, CAB 129/73; CC(55) 15th conclusions, minute 4,17 Feb 54, CAB 128/28. 
63 CM(55) 14th conclusions, minute 4,14 Jun 55, CAB128/29; CI(56)1,10 Feb 56, 
CAB 1.3 )4/12 10. 
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On 3 May the draft Commonwealth Immigrants Bill was at last submitted to 
the Cabinet meeting (CM(55)9th). Social aspects had come to be emphasised more 
than ever. As the number of immigrants increased, concern about social problems 
increased in the Home Office. The Home Secretary (Gwilym Lloyd-George) had 
confirmed the view that 'There is no means of controlling this influx without 
legislation'. 64 His memorandum which introduced the draft Bill to the Cabinet read 
that, though 'immigrants are still experiencing little difficulty in finding work', 'The 
main practical problems are in the field of housing and public health: they tend to 
congregate and live in overcrowded conditions which it is beyond the resources of 
the housing authorities concerned to alleviate'. 65 
At this time the general election due in three weeks time was the highest 
priority of the new government. The Conservative Party was expected to win the 
election. Under these circumstances the Home Secretary recommended the Cabinet 
to make decision quickly on two points. Firstly, a fact-finding committee should be 
appointed, instead of a committee representing public opinion, the appointment of 
which had been rejected in a past Cabinet meeting. Secondly, government's 
intention towards legislation should be clarified as the Conservative Party's position 
in the election campaign. 
Gaining more support from the public was still held to be essential for 
legislation. The Home Secretary for his part stuck to the idea to consult a non- 
governmental enquiry. He suggested that, 'before taking any decision about whether 
or not there should be legislation, it would be well to have the report of a committee 
of inquiry'. 66 He was thinking that the controversies which would be raised as 
64 CP(55)32,10 Jun 55, CAB 129/75, p. 1. 
65 CP(55)16,2May55, CABI29/75, p. l. 
66 CP(55)16,2 May 55, CAB129/75, p. l. The Home Secretary, however, also stated in the 
Cabinet meeting that, even if a committee was set up, 'the announcement would be most undesirable' 
as it is 'a sudden change' from the decision to turn down another committee and it might'alarm. those 
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regards the Bill 'would be reduced if it were possible to base the legislation on the 
recommendations of an impartial Committee' and that an independent body would 
merit to give the Cabinet the public authorisation to legislation. 67 The role of the 
non-governmental committee was, as the Cabinet Secretary (Norman Brook) 
minuted to the Prime Minister (Anthony Eden) a short while later on 14 June, not'to 
find a solution', but apparently 'to enlist a sufficient body of public support for the 
legislation'. 68 
However, as far as the announcement of the Conservative Party position 
towards legislation was concerned, the issue related to Commonwealth immigration 
was thought to be too controversial to be raised in its crude form during the election 
campaign. A senior Cabinet member, Viscount Kilmuir (David Maxwell-Fyfe), who 
had been involved in this issue since he was Home Secretary, was in particular 
cautious. He took the position in the background of the Cabinet that 'It should be 
suffice for members of the Government to say, during the election campaign, that 
this might be a suitable subject for some form of public enquiry'. 69 The Cabinet at 
last agreed that'the Government should avoid any definite commitment at this stage' 
and decided to shelve the issue until after the election. 70 The possibility of public 
enquiry was not, however, in any sense ruled out. Rather all Conservative 
candidates were instructed to answer during the election campaign that: 'The 
Government have been watching the situation most carefully. This is not a matter 
which should be allowed to become an issue of Party controversy. My own view is 
who are against restrictions' (CP(55)16,2 May 55, CAB 129/75, p. 3). 
67 CP(55)32,10 Jun 55, CAB 129/75, p. 2. 
68 N. Brook, Cabinet Secretary, to A. Eden, Prime Minister, 14 Jun 55, PREM 11/824. 
69 Viscount Kilmuir, Lord Chancellor, to A. Eden, Prime Minister, 6 May 55, PREM 11/824: 74; 
cf Lamb, The Failure of the Eden Government, pp. 15-6. 
70 CM(55) 9th conclusions, minute 5,3 May 55, CAB128/29. 
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that the best course might be to hold a full inquiry to bring out all the facts'. 71 
As was expected, the general election brought no change in administration. 
The Conservative Party gained a comfortable majority of 60. Soon after the 
election,, the Home Secretary sent a memorandum to the Cabinet and reminded them 
of the necessity of legislation. He proposed again to set up a committee consisting 
of non-governmental members. The terms of reference of the committee were 
proposed in his memorandum: 'To consider and report whether, having regard to the 
importance of maintaining the traditional ties between this country and other parts 
of the Commonwealth, any and, if so, what changes in the law relating to the 
admission to the United Kingdom of British subjects from overseas, or any class of 
them, and to their subsequent stay in the United Kingdom, are necessary or 
desirable in the national interest and in the interest of the immigrants themselveS'. 72 
This proposal, however, received a frosty welcome. At the Cabinet meeting 
on 14 June (CM(55)14th), it was attacked both from those in favour of and against 
legislation. As regards the proposed terms of reference, those who opposed 
legislation pointed out that it 'might give the impression that the need for restrictive 
legislation was taken for granted. It was further argued that 'The first purpose of an 
enquiry should be to ensure that the public throughout the country were made aware 
of the nature and extent of the problem: until this was more widely appreciated the 
need for restrictive legislation would not be recognised'. 73 Substantial objection 
was made from those in favour of legislation. They claimed that 'it could not be 
certain that the Committee's report would be such as to rally public opinion in 
support of restrictive legislation'. 74 It was proposed, instead, that 'an authoritative 
71 Viscount Kilmuir, Lord Chancellor, to A. Eden, Prime Minister, 6 May 55, PREM 11/824: 74; 
qf Lamb, The Failure of the Eden Government, pp. 15 -6. 
72 CP(55)32,10 Jun 55, CAB 129/75, p. 2 
73) CM(55) 14th conclusions, minute 4,14 Jun 55, CAB128/29. 
74 CM(55) 14th conclusions, minute 4,14 Jun 55, CAB 128/29. 
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statement of the increasing volume of immigration, and of the social and economic 
problems to which it was likely to give rise, might prove a better basis for action'. 75 
Pressed by the latter arguments, the Cabinet was to reject the idea to set up a 
committee of independent members. Instead it was decided to set up an inter- 
departmental committee of civil servants. The Home Secretary was instructed to 
arrange for a committee 'to prepare, in a form suitable for publication, a report on 
the growing influx into the United Kingdom of coloured workers from other 
Commonwealth countries and of the social and economic problems to which this 
was giving rise'. 76 
Civil servants'enquiry on social and economic problems 
This time the official committee was instructed to examine the social and economic 
consequences of immigration. The enquiry also had the purpose of publicising the 
necessity of legislation and thus justifying the change of government policy. 
However, against the expectations of some ministers, the enquiries were to discover 
few problems regarding immigration which would justify legislation on entry. 
Based on the Cabinet conclusion, the Home Office made an enquiry to other 
departments about reassembling the previous official committee under Home Office 
chairmanship. 77 The proposal suggested that the National Assistance Board, the 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government and the Ministry of Health should be 
added to the committee. With the acceptance by other departments of the terms of 
reference and the composition, the new official committee was announced. In 
addition to the departments present at the CWP(2) - Home Office, Colonial Office, 
75 CM(55) 14th conclusions, minute 4,14 Jun 55, CAB 128/29. 
76 CM(55) 14th conclusions, minute 4,14 Jun 55, CAB 128/29. 
77 qf Frank Newsam, Permanent Under- Secretary, HO, to Gilbert Laithwaite, Permanent Under- 
Secretary, CRO, 22 Jun 55, DO' )5/5218. 
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Commonwealth Relations Office, Ministry of Labour and National Service, 
Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation, Scottish Home Department, four social 
service departments - National Assistance Board, Ministry of Health, Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government, and Department of Health for Scotland - were 
invited. W. H. Cornish, an Assistant Under- Secretary, Home Office, was again 
decided to take chair. 78 Lasting until 1962 this official committee was to play a 
central role in introducing the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act. 
This official committee was named "Working Party to Report on the Social 
and Economic Problems Arising from the Growing Influx into the United Kingdom 
of Coloured Workers from Other Commonwealth Countries" (code CWP(. ) 3)). 
Unlike the previous two Home Office official committees, which discussed the 
measures to restrict employment in the UK (CWP, 1953) and the possibility of 
legislation on entry and deportation (CWP(2), 1954), the social and economic 
situation was the main issue to be considered in the CWP(3). The economic 
situation which had been little surveyed until then, was for the first time included in 
the agenda and, importantly, the Ministry of Labour, which had been placed at the 
periphery in government discussions of the early 1950s, was to return to the central 
place through the enquiry of this aspect. 
As far as social aspects were concerned, civil servants had a shared view 
namely that: 'housing was the most serious of the social consequences of 
78 CWP(3)(55)1,6 Jul 55, C01032/121, D0335/5218. The tenns of reference of the working party 
was: Whether any, and if so what, administrative or social problems arise from the immigration into 
the United Kingdom of persons from other parts of the Commonwealth and the Republic of Ireland; 
What administrative measures would be feasible if any control over the entry and settlement of such 
persons were thought necessary; What interference with the traditional ties between this country and 
other parts of the Commonwealth would be involved in any such measures. (CWP(3)(55)1,6 Jul 55, 
C01032/121, D035/5218) 
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immigration'. 79 Their observation was that 'those parts of the country where the 
need for labour was greatest and to which the immigrants tended to flow are those 
which already have housing problems, which are aggravated by the arrival of 
coloured people'. 80 Meanwhile as regards economic conditions, the Ministry of 
Labour's employment statistics showed that the number of unemployment was small 
and 'in the main the periods of unemployment were very short'. 81 Therefore the 
view of the Ministry was that: 'On economic grounds immigration, including 
Colonial immigration, was a welcome means of augmenting our labour resources. It 
was the condition of full employment here that was attracting these immigrants'. 82 
Encouraged by the good economic performance and employment situation, the 
Ministry of Labour, whose view on Colonial immigration had not been established, 
was shifting towards opposing legislation. This view was in fact shared by another 
economic departments, the Board of Trade, though it was not invited in the CWP. 
The Board of Trade took the view that the West Indian immigrants were a useful 
help to the British industry. 83 
In the discussions at the CWP(3), differences among the Departments 
concerned were again emphasised. As proposed in the draft Commonwealth 
Immigrants Bill, the Home Office had raised the possibility of adopting the 
79 CWP(3)(55) I st meeting, 15 Jul 55, CO 1032/12 1, D03 5/5218, para. 9. 
80 CWP(3)(55) Ist meeting, 15 Jul 55, C01032/121, D035/5218, para. 9. The Colonial Office 
claimed poor housing condition lay in a background of racial tension (CWP(3)(55) 2nd meeting, 27 
Jul 55, C01032/121, D035/5218, para. 8). The Ministry of Housing had a different view: 'the fact 
that the immigrants were coloured made it more difficult to overcome difficulties normally attendant 
on the immigration of persons accustomed to different standards of living' (CWP(3)(55) 2nd meeting, 
27 Jul 55, C01032/121, D035/5218, para. 8). 
81 CWP())(55) 2nd meeting, 27 Jul 55, C01032/121, D035/5218, para. 6. 
82 CM(55) 39th conclusions, minute 7,3 Nov 55, CAB 128/29. 
83 Lamb, The Failure of the Eden Government, p. 23. 
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employment permit and the housing certificate as measures of control. 84 The 
Ministry of Housing was sceptical of the housing certificate system. The Ministry 
contended that the proposed system could be abused and 'could lead to embarrassing 
demands from employers anxious to import labour', and, moreover, that local 
authorities would not undertake work on housing certificates. 85 As regards the 
desirability of legislation, the Commonwealth Relations Office kept the view that 
'the right of access, particularly for business and educational purposes, is most 
important for the maintenance of good Commonwealth relations'. 86 In contrast, the 
Home Office, which had consolidated a view based on social concerns by this 
enquiry, was of the opinion that 'uncontrolled immigration might lead to a situation 
which would exacerbate feelings between members of the Commonwealth in any 
event'. 87 The Colonial Office came to stand in-between and had toned down its 
intention to promote legislation. Its view expressed in the committee was that: 'the 
essential purpose of legislation would be to regulate entry rather than to prohibit it 
and that regulation was not necessarily inconsistent with free movement within the 
88 Commonwealth'. 
The CWP(3) produced two papers (dated 3 August 1955) for different 
purposes - the draft of a government statement and the report to the Cabinet. The 
views expressed in these papers were in general the summary of discussions which 
had been held for long within the government. The draft statement was produced so 
as to influence public opinion towards accepting legislation. It contended that 
employment, public order and relations with the public had resulted in few 
problems, but a shortage in accommodation was acute so that it might lead to 
84 CWP(3)(55)3,6 Jul 55, C01032/121, D035/5218, para. 11. 
85 CWP(3)(55) 2nd meeting, 27 Jul 55, C01032/121, D035/5218, para. 14. 
86 CWP(3)(55) 2nd meeting, 27 Jul 55, C01032/121, D035/5218, para. 12. 
87 CWP(3)(55) 2nd meeting, 27 Jul 55, C01032/121, D035/5218, para. 12. 
88 CWP(3)(55) 2nd meeting, 27 Jul 55, C01032/12 1, D035/5218, para. 12. 
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problems related to race. Based on these observations, civil servants recommended 
that control of immigration could be introduced based on accommodation and 
employment. 89 
The Cabinet discussed these papers in its meeting on 15 September 
(CM(55)31st). However, the general view of the Cabinet members on the draft 
statement was that the analysis of the situation in the draft statement was so neutral 
that it would be of no use for the original purpose, i. e. to influence public opinion. 
The Home Secretary (Gwilyrn Lloyd-George) expressed his impression on the 
statement that it'was an objective statement which ... would not lead to a demand 
for legislation to restrict immigration; nor on the other hand would it preclude the 
Government from introducing such legislation or taking other action if this were 
later decided to be necessary'. 90 This meant in other words that, as the Home 
Secretary admitted, 'Generally speaking, Colonial immigration was not an acute 
problem at the moment'. 91 In consequence the Cabinet concluded that 'the 
publication of the statement ... would not serve any useful purpose at the present 
time', and agreed'first to decide whether any action to restrict Colonial immigration 
was necessary, and if so what form it should take'. 92 
Nevertheless, the Cabinet discussion in general went again at the pace of 
hardliners. The Lord President (the Marquess of Salisbury) expressed 'a serious 
view of the dangers of uncontrolled Colonial immigration and was anxious that the 
Cabinet should consider practical proposals for dealing with this matter'. 93 He 
strongly demanded to circulate the draft Bill again in the Cabinet as a basis for 
further discussion. The Cabinet accepted his suggestion and decided to circulate the 
89 Draft Statement, attached to CP(55)102,18 Aug 55, CAB 129/77. 
90 CM(55) 31 st conclusions, minute 4,15 Sep 55, CAB 128/29. 
91 CM(55) 31 st conclusions, minute 4,15 Sep 55, CAB 128/29. 
92 CM(55) 31 st conclusions, minute 4,15 Sep 55, CAB 128/29. 
93 CM(55) 31 st conclusions, minute 4,15 Sep 55, CAB 128/29. 
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draft Bill. 
3. Change in the Positions of Civil Servants 
The positions of the Colonial Office and the Ministry of Labour 
The stance of the government on Commonwealth immigration was, however, 
changing. As the Home Secretary's comment in the Cabinet meeting showed, that 
the general view of the Cabinet was shifting towards rejecting legislation. The civil 
servants' enquiry in the CWP(3) had begun to bring a change in view at ministerial 
level. 
The department which was consistently and most strongly resisting 
legislation on entry was the Commonwealth Relations Office. At the above Cabinet 
meeting on 15 September, the Commonwealth Secretary (the Earl of Home) 
strongly tried to reverse the directions in Cabinet discussions which had been 
pressed by hardliners, though it resulted in failure as shown above. At the same time 
as the two papers from the CWP(3), the Commonwealth Relations Office for its part 
had sent a memorandum to the Cabinet (CP(55)113, dated 30 August 1955), which 
re-emphasised Department's opposition to legislation. Firstly, referring mainly to 
India and Pakistan, the memorandum claimed it politically impossible to 'legislate 
for a "colour bar"' and to 'take any action which would give the impression that 
citizens from India, Pakistan and Ceylon are less favourably treated than citizens 
from the older Commonwealth countries'. This might raise political reactions from 
these countries which would result in the introduction of 'retaliatory restrictions 
against the entry or residence of members of the British business community' in 
those countries. Therefore 'any legislation would have to be non-discriminatory in 
form'. Secondly, referring to the old Commonwealth countries, the memorandum 
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also claimed that 'we do not wish to keep out immigrants of good type from the 
"old" Dominions, and indeed "two-way immigration" is a policy to which we have 
always subscribed'. 94 
The Commonwealth Relations Office hoped to maintain the current polic), 
in which immigration was managed through voluntary restriction on emigration by 
the other Commonwealth goverm-nents rather than UK legislation. In the same 
memorandum it was revealed that the Indian government was 'genuinely ready to do 
what they can to stop immigration of this type [working-class Indians]' and the 
Pakistani government was likely to follow this. 95 
Opposition to legislation became in fact more apparent by the next Cabinet 
meeting on this issue, in which the draft Bill would be submitted. The stance of the 
Colonial Office was also shifting towards opposing legislation. Firstly, with strong 
resistance from the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Colonial Office began to 
worry about the possibility that the subject of immigration control might be limited 
only to the people from the Colonies. This would entail the risk of the legislation 
being taken as discrimination on colour, the legal balance with the status of the 
citizens of the independent Commonwealth countries and the sudden exemption 
from control on independence. The Colonial Office confirmed that legislation on 
entry was difficult with disregarding the firm opposition by the Commonwealth 
Relations Office. Secondly, a new, more important, factor against legislation was 
emerging. The plan of a West Indian Federation was looming large in the thinking 
of the Colonial Office. Territories of the West Indies were due to form a West 
Indian Federation in January 1958. The Federation would be composed of 
Barbados, Jamaica, the Leeward Islands (Antigua, Montserrat and St Christopher- 
Nevis-Anguilla), Trinidad and Tobago, and the Windward Islands (Grenada, 
"0 Aug 55, CAB 129/77. 94 CP(55)11'),. ) 
95 CP(55)113,30 Aug 55, CAB129/77. 
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Dominica, St Lucia and St Vincent). 96 This was supposed to be the first step for 
peaceful independence of this area in the future. In fear of adverse effects on this 
plan, the Colonial Office's opposition to legislation on entry was getting clearer. 
Similarly important was the position of the Ministry of Labour. As a result 
of the investigations of the CWP(3), economic factors had been added to oppose the 
introduction of legislation. Through this enquiry, the Ministry of Labour had 
resumed its position within the civil servant discussion. And as expressed in the 
discussion, the Ministry was opposed to legislation on entry. 
Therefore by the time the draft Commonwealth Immigrants Bill was 
circulated for the second time to the Cabinet in its meeting on 3 November 
(CM(55)39th), three of the four main departments concerned with the issue - 
Commonwealth Relations Office, Colonial Office and Ministry of Labour - had 
turned to feel legislation on entry difficult in its current form. It was true that in the 
Cabinet meeting the Lord President, and to a lesser extent the Home Office, were 
supporting legislation on entry; however it was no longer practical to push forward 
legislation against the objections of these three Departments. Accordingly, in the 
Cabinet meeting, the Prime Minister (Anthony Eden) rejected to introduce the Bill 
to Parliament. He commented that 'further thought must be given to this problem 
before the Cabinet could decide whether legislation should be introduced'. 97 
The official committee established by ministers in order to justify legislation 
on entry caused ironically the ministers to give up such legislation. The CWP(3), 
which was ordered to examine economic aspects as well as social ones, concluded 
that economically the employment of migrants resulted in few problems and 
actually was an asset to the economy. The Ministry of Labour resuming its place in 
96 J. D. B. Miller, The Commonwealth in the World (London, Gerald Duckworth, -')rd ed., 1965), 
p. 230. 
97 CM(55) 39th conclusions, minute 7,3) Nov 55, CAB128/29. 
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the civil servants' discussions opposed legislation. The Colonial Office reversed its 
position also to oppose legislation due to the difficulty of compromising with the 
Commonwealth Relations Office and also so as not to undermine the plan of the 
West Indian Federation. Political pressure at ministerial level was thus rejected so 
that the Cabinet hardliners became isolated. 
Set up of the ministerial committee CI 
Constitutionally, however, it was necessary to create a formal consensus among the 
ministers concerned. A forum of discussion by the ministers needed to be prepared. 
A week after the Cabinet meeting of 3 November, the Cabinet Secretary (Norman 
Brook) minuted and recommended to the Prime Minister to set up a ministerial 
committee. He stated that the Cabinet meeting on 3 November 'was the fifteenth 
time that the Cabinet have considered problem, without being able to reach 
conclusion'. The Cabinet Secretary proposed to avoid 'further discussion for a time' 
in the Cabinet and, instead, to appoint a ministerial committee 'to consider what 
form the legislation should take if it were decided to take powers to control this 
immigration' and 'how this legislative action could best be j ustified'. 98 
This proposal was duly accepted. The Prime Minister announced to the 
Cabinet the decision to set up a ministerial committee. 99 The committee was named 
the "Committee on Colonial Immigrants" (code CI). Its terms of reference were 
determined as follows: 'To consider what form legislation should take, if it were to 
be decided that legislation to control the entry into the United Kingdom of British 
subjects from overseas should be introduced; to consider also the intended effect of 
such legislation upon actual immigration, how any such control would be justified 
98 Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, to Anthony Eden, Prime Minister, 10 Nov 55, 
PREM 11/2920. 
99 CP(55)180,2ONov55, CABI29/78. 
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to Parliament and the public, and to the Commonwealth countries concerned, and to 
report to the Cabinet. "00 The four main departments were represented in the 
Committee - Home Secretary (Gwilyrn Lloyd-George), Commonwealth Secretary 
(the Earl of Home), Colonial Secretary (Alan Lennox-Boyd), Minister of Labour 
(lain Macleod, who was to replace Walter Monckton on 23 December 1955). The 
Lord President (the Marquess of Salisbury), the Lord Chancellor (Viscount Kilmuir) 
as chairman and Attorney-General (Reginald Manningham-Buller) were also 
present. 101 However, with three of the four main Departments had conformed a 
negative view on legislation, there remained little possibility that legislation was 
promoted even in a political manner. 
In this ministerial discussion, a draft report to the Cabinet was submitted 
from the Chairman at the second meeting (CI(56)2nd, 25 April 1956). Prepared by 
the Cabinet Office secretaries of the Committee, this draft report contained new 
proposals and, on the whole, maintained harder views on Commonwealth 
immigration than those of the official committee CWP(3). Firstly, as regards the 
social and economic situations, housing was, like the CWP(3), pointed out as the 
largest problem. 102 However the Cabinet Office draft report showed a different 
view on employment from that of the CWP(3). On the one hand it confirmed the 
view that 'coloured immigrants have recently been making a useful contribution to 
the labour force' and 'Indeed, during 1955 the arrival of drafts of immigrants to fill 
low-paid manual jobs helped to ease rather than to exacerbate the labour 
situation'. 103 On the other hand, it showed an anxiety namely: 'In view of a slight 
decline in the intensity of the demand for labour in recent months ... it is no 
longer 
I OOCI(55)1,7 Dec 55, CAB] 34/1210. 
101 Viscount Kilmuir, Lord Chancellor, formally came back to the discussion of the issue. He had 
been a Home Secretary in the Churchill Cabinet and opposed legislation at that time. 
102 C 1(5 6)2,19 Mar 5 6, CAB 1 -3 ) 
4/12 10, para. 8. 
103 CI(56)2,19 Mar 56, CAB 134/12 10, para. 8. 
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so easy to place West Indian immigrants in employment as it has been, and there is 
some reason to think that the proportion of unemployment among West Indians 
already in this country may be increasing'. 104 
Secondly, as regards measures for restriction, the Cabinet Office draft report 
proposed different sets of measures from those in the CWP(3)'s conclusion. These 
were the housing test and the quota system. Housing was recommended as it was 
considered to be more effective in controlling immigration than job. 105 It was 
considered that, in full employment, as it actually was at the time, the employment 
test would not be effective. 106 However, it was also claimed that, in the case of the 
housing test, 'the effective sanction would be in the hands of the local authorities. 
and its value in the broader national interest would consequently depend on the 
Government and the local authorities taking the same view of the problem at any 
given time'. 107 The introduction of a quota on the total number of immigrants was 
therefore suggested in order to compensate for these weaknesses of the housing 
test. 108 
Finally the Cabinet Office draft report clearly concluded that 'the control 
might be justified for the following grounds'. These were housing, population 
density, reference to the government's power of other countries, and the past history 
of sudden increase in immigration. 109 Deportation was also recommended as a 
corollary of entry restriction. I 10 
Despite the harsher views expressed in the Cabinet Office draft report, the 
104CI(56)2,19 Mar 56, CAB 134/1210, para. 8. 
105 CI(56)2,19 Mar 56, CAB 134/12 10, paras. 13-5. 
106 CI(56)2,19 Mar 5 6, CAB 13 4/12 10, para. 13. 
107 CI(56)2,19 Mar 56, CAB 134/12 10, para. 16. 
108 CI(56)2,19 Mar 56, CAB 134/12 10, para. 16. 
109 CI(56)2,19 Mar 56, CAB134/1210, para. 19. 
110 CI(56)2,19Mar56, CAB 134/1210, para. 15. 
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general view of the government had already shifted to opposing legislation. The 
draft report which disregarded the discussions of the four main departments were 
allowed little room to influence the discussion of the Ministerial Committee. At the 
meeting of the ministerial committee CI on 25 April 1956 (CI(56)2nd), the idea of 
the housing certificate was opposed from the Minister of Labour (lain Macleod). He 
claimed that 'the test might go much further than was intended in imposing an 
effective prohibition on immigration, instead of simply controlling it'. "' It was 
therefore argued that 'it might be better to rely from the start on a quota as the 
method of control'. ' 12 The quota system was also opposed from the Commonwealth 
Secretary (the Earl of Home): it 'would be an innovation which would not be 
welcomed by Commonwealth countries; it would be discriminatory as between one 
Commonwealth territory and another; it would have to be approved by Parliament 
by affirmative resolution which would be subject to critical debate, and the 
apportionment of the quota as between different Commonwealth countries would 
present embarrassing problems'. ' 13 The general view of the Committee on the 
measures of control was that 'Public opinion ... would 
be less critical of ... the 
housing test' than a quota system. 114 The Committee therefore concluded that, in 
their report to the Cabinet, they will 'give greater weight' to the arguments against 
using a quota system as the basis of control. ' 15 
On the point as to whether the time had come to introduce legislation, the 
Committee rejected early action. Legislation was opposed from the economic merit 
of immigration, the importance of traditional ties with the Commonwealth and the 
position of anti -discrimination. The economic perspective was in particular 
III CI(56) 2nd meeting, 25 Apr 56, CAB 134/12 10, p. 2. 
112 CI(56) 2nd meeting, 25 Apr 56, CAB 134/12 10, p. 2. 
113 CI(56) 2nd meeting, 25 Apr 56, CAB 134/12 10, p. 2. 
114 CI(56) 2nd meeting, 25 Apr 56, CAB134/1210, p. 2. 
115 CI(56) 2nd meeting, 25 Apr 56, CAB 134/12 10, p. 3. 
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emphasised: 'the immigrants would not come if there was no work' and 'From the 
economic point of view the nation had benefited up to the present from the arrival 
of coloured workers'. ' 16 Moreover, it was pointed out public support for legislation 
'would not be forthcoming at present and could not be expected'. "' There was no 
way to promote legislation any further. The Lord President was the only member in 
the Committee who remained in favour of legislation. He claimed that 'if no control 
were imposed now, we might be faced with the need for urgent action when it had 
already become too late'. ' 18 The Committee, however, duly concluded that 'steps to 
impose control would not be justified at present'. Ministerial discussion on the 
legislation on the Commonwealth immigration since November 1952 at last reached 
a conclusion, and it was that the the issue should be shelved for the time being. 
However, the view proclaimed by the Lord President was not rejected 
totally. In fact other ministers in the Committee also shared a fear about 
immigration in the future. This fear expressed in the meeting was that 'Clearly we 
could not absorb all the coloured immigrants who wish to come here, and 
eventually this immigration would give rise to problems which would be 
disproportionate to the difficulties and objections to be faced in enacting legislation 
to control it'. 119 Ministers, therefore, decided to report to the Cabinet that, as 'there 
seemed little doubt that some form of control would become necessary in the long 
run', 'The situation would ... need to 
be kept under regular review and should be 
120 These conclusion in the remitted for further examination in about a year's time'. 
ministerial committee C1 was approved in the Cabinet meeting on II July 
116 CI(56) 2nd meeting, 25 Apr 56, CAB 134/12 10, p. 4. 
117 CI(56) 2nd meeting, 25 Apr 56, CAB 134/12 10, p. 5. 
118 CI(56) 2nd meeting, 25 Apr 56, CAB 1 -3 )4/12 
10, p. 4. 
119 CI(56) 2nd meeting, 25 Apr 56, CAB 134/12 10, p. 4. 
120 CI(56) 2nd meeting, 25 Apr 56, CAB 134/12 10, p. 5. 
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(CM(56)48th). 121 
Control on immigration from the Irish Republic and the quota system 
Early legislation was thus rejected. However, two issues were left for discussion in 
view of future legislation. These were concerned respectively with the treatment of 
immigration from the Irish Republic and the quota system. The former was decided 
to be carried out in the ministerial committee Cl, while the latter at the civil servant 
level. 
In the same Cabinet meeting on II July, it was pointed out that, in case 
legislation became necessary, justification for making an exception for Irish citizens 
needed to be considered further. Application of control to Irish citizens had been 
discussed already on various occasions. The CWP(3) had reported in its report the 
previous year (dated 3 August 1955) that the control would be impractical. 
Therefore the Home Secretary's memorandum dated 18 September which was 
submitted to the ministerial committee CI (CI(56)5) basically followed the lines of 
previous discussions. A control over the land border between the Irish Republic and 
Northern Ireland would not to be a practical proposition 'since it would be virtually 
impossible to enforce it'. 122 Moreover Irish labour was 'a valuable source of 
manpower for industries and services in Great Britain'. 123 The inclusion of Irish 
citizens in any measure of immigration control would 'seriously impede the flow of 
labour and would necessitate the creation of an expansive administrative machine to 
handle the traffic'. 124 In the Cl meeting on 4 October (CI(56)3rd), ministers 
approved these views concerning the difficulty of controlling Irish immigration. 
121 CM(56) 48th conclusions, minute 10,11 Jul 56, CAB 128/30/pt. 2. 
122 CI(56)5,18 Sep 56, CAB 134/12 10, p. 1. 
123 CI(56)5,18 Sep 56, CAB 134/12 10, p. 2. 
124 CI(56)5,18 Sep 56, CAB 134/12 10, p. 2. 
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Still, in the Cabinet meeting on 20 November (CM(56)85th), some ministers 
claimed that 'it would be difficult to justify according exceptional treatment to 
citizens of the Irish Republic if the entry of British subjects had eventually to be 
controlled'. 125 Consequently the Cabinet shelved the decision on this issue once 
again. 
Regarding the quota system, the sceptical mood had further increased behind 
the scenes. The Home Secretary as well as the Colonial Secretary showed their 
reservation. 126 In their report to the Cabinet in June 1956, the Committee had 
recommended that a quota system should be considered in detail at the civil servant 
level. 127 The CWP(3) was reconvened after an interval of one year. By this time, K. 
B. Paice had replaced W. H. Cornish as Assistant Under-Secretary of the Home 
Office responsible for immigration (Aliens and Nationality Division) and thus the 
Chairman of the CWP(3). Civil servants were also doubtful about the quota system. 
The scheme was thought to have more disadvantages than advantages. It was 
considered to 'inevitably reveal discrimination against coloured people'. 128 The 
Commonwealth Relations Office was opposed to impose a quota on immigrants 
from India and Pakistan, while the Colonial Office worried that quotas, if 
introduced, would be discriminatingly small for the West Indies. 129 Practical 
difficulties were also expected, such as the measures for Irish citizens, the issue of 
consistency with the legislation on aliens, and administrative costs. For these 
reasons civil servants at the CWP(3) agreed that 'the quota system ... was 
125 CM(56) 85th conclusions, minute 8,20 Nov 56, CAB 128/30/pt. 2. 
126 G. Lloyd-George, Home Secretary, to Viscount Kilmuir, Lord Chancellor, 26 May 56, 
C01032/121, D035/5219; The Earl of Home, Commonwealth Secretary, to Viscount Kilmuir, Lord 
Chancellor, 6 Jun 56, C01032/121, D035/5219. 
127 CP(56)145,20 Jun 56, CAB 129/8 1, para. 16. 
128 CWP(3)(56) I st meeting, 18 Sep 55, CO 1032/12 1, D035/5219, para. 5. 
129 CWP(3)(56) I st meeting, 18 Sep 55, CO 1032/12 1, D03 5/5219, paras. 5-6. 
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misconceived and would be extremely difficult to administer'. 130 Moreover civil 
servants were sceptical even about the necessity of the scheme. They thought it , vas 
doubtful 'whether any undesirable social consequences of immigration ... would be 
sufficiently serious to justify the imposition of quotas on selected categories of 
immigrants' and that in the foreseeable future 'no situation was likely to arise which 
, 131 could not be effectively dealt with by the [labour] permit system. 
According to the lines of the discussion in the CWP(3), a draft report to 
ministers was produced by the Home Office, which was then added slight revisions 
on bilateral negotiation basis between departments concerned. This issue was not, 
however, to be discussed further until April 1956 under the new administration led 
by Harold Macmillan. 
*** 
From 1954 immigration from the West Indies accelerated. Strong political pressure 
was exerted on discussions within the government. In the course of these 
discussions the differences in discourses between the ministerial and civil servants' 
levels became evident. 
At ministerial level various measures were initiated in order to influence 
public opinion and thus to justify legislation. Two non-governmental committees of 
enquiry were proposed by the Home Secretary and, at last, civil servants were made 
to investigate the social and economic problem in the new official committee. 
However their enquiry proved useless for the intention of some ministers who 
wanted to justify the change of policy and facilitating legislation. The civil servants' 
enquiry showed that the problems were not so serious as to change policy. 
130 CWP(3)(56) Ist meeting, 18 Sep 55, C01032/121, D035/5219, para. 4. 
131 CWP(3)(56) I st meeting, 18 Sep 55, C01032/121, D035/5219, para. 3. 
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Meanwhile ministerial discussions had been repeated fruitlessly due to 
internal differences in views. To break the impasse, the Cabinet set up the 
ministerial committee of standing nature for the first time on this issue. It was 
unlikely that the decision would be made to introduce legislation in the ministerial 
committee. However, this committee was necessary in order to defuse the pressure 
from the Lord President. 
Political pressure, exerted by the Lord President in particular, did not find an 
echo at the civil servant level. There were intensive discussions at the civil servant 
level in this period. It is important to note that these discussions by civil servants 
were to set the framework for later discussions within the government at least two 
ways. Firstly, the enquiry of social and economic problems brought new 
perspectives into the assessment of the situation. Their investigation established the 
viewpoints for future discussions about the policy in this field. The enquiry resulted 
in directing and fixing policy makers' attention on the social situation of 
immigrants. The economic situation, which had drawn little attention by then, was 
also put on the formal government agenda on immigration policy for the first time. 
Secondly, concrete measures for future legislation were formulated. A Bill was 
drafted, which contained many provisions which would be enacted in the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962. Main among these were: application of 
the provisions to the whole Commonwealth, exemption of control of those who 
"belong" to the UK, and exemption of Irish citizens from entry control while 
subjection to deportation. 
In this period from 1954 to 1956, the stance of major departments changed 
for reasons of their own. Social consequences of the marked increase in 
immigration came to worry the Home Office more strongly than before. The 
Department under its new Secretary of State, Lloyd-George, changed its stance to 
supporting legislation. 
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There was a dramatic change in the stance of the Colonial Office in 1955 
from supporting legislation to opposing it. External relations worked as a brake for 
hasty legislation. The proposed West Indian Federation became particularly 
important for the Colonial Office after 1955. The Ministry of Labour also confirmed 
its position to oppose legislation. Attention to economic considerations also worked 
to deter the pressure of early legislation in view of the good economic situation and 
the shortage of labour. The Commonwealth Relations Office kept its objections to 
legislation. As three of the four major departments concerned with Commonwealth 
immigration were opposed to legislation on entry, the possibility of early legislation 
was ruled out. 
In this period, political pressure motivated the discussion within the 
government, however civil servants deterred early legislation. It was clearly 
apparent that there were two distinct areas of debate, one taking place among 
politicians and one among civil servants. However, both of these discourses were 
largely concealed from Parliament and the wider public. 
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Chapter 7 Politicisation of the Issue 
In January 1957, Anthony Eden resigned as Prime Minister on grounds of ill health 
but in reality for mismanaging the Suez Crisis the previous year. Harold Macmillan 
succeeded as Prime Minister. In the new Cabinet, Viscount Kilmuir (Lord 
Chancellor), the Earl of Home (Commonwealth Secretary), Alan Lennox-Boyd 
(Colonial Secretary), lain Macleod (Minister of Labour), the Marquess of Salisbury 
(Lord President) kept their posts. Non-nan Brook also remained as Cabinet 
Secretary. Lloyd-George was replaced by R. A. Butler as Home Secretary. 
Discussions within the government had been shelved for the period of one 
year since July 1956. Even after they were resumed from mid 1957, the government 
discussions on Commonwealth immigration remained on the whole calm for the 
time being. This situation changed greatly in August 1958. 
1. Impact of the Resignation of Lord Salisbury 
Increase in immigration from Pakistan and India 
Net immigration from the New Commonwealth reached 46,800 in 1956. Soon after 
forming the new Cabinet, Macmillan reconstituted the ministerial committee on 
Commonwealth immigration. He had received a Parliamentary Question from Cyril 
Osborne to which he was to reply on 24 January 1957.1 The new ministerial 
committee "Committee on Colonial Immigrants" (code CCI) was the same entity as 
its predecessor and the reconstitution was a matter of administration. It was chaired. 
I Paul Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics (Hannondsworth, Penguin Books, 1965), 
p. 130. 
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like the previous one, by the Lord Chancellor (Viscount Kilmuir) and attended by 
the Home, Commonwealth, and Colonial Secretaries, Minister of Labour and 
Attorney- General. The terms of reference of the committee were also the same as 
before. 2 
During the one-year period from July 1956 when discussions within the 
government were shelved, the membership of those involved in the policy process 
on Commonwealth immigration had undergone great changes. The new Home 
Secretary, R. A. Butler was, unlike Gwilyrn Lloyd-George, a heavyweight in the 
Conservative Party. He had been the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Churchill 
and Eden administration until December 1955 and, since then, the Leader of the 
House of Commons and Lord Privy Seal. He was a person who could exercise 
strong influence in the Cabinet, Parliament and the Party. 
More important in the course of the government discussions on 
Commonwealth immigration than Butler's appointment as Home Secretary was the 
resignation of the Marquess of Salisbury from the Cabinet in March 1957.3 This 
was due to the differences in views over the British retreat from Cyprus: for him, 
this looked another withdrawal from the Empire in the face of violence. 4 As seen in 
the previous chapter, the Marquess of Salisbury was the strongest voice in the 
Cabinet in support of legislation for controlling immigration. His resignation was to 
have a major impact on the discussions about legislation. 
2 The terms of reference were: 'To consider what form legislation should take, if it were to be 
decided that legislation to control the entry into the United Kingdom of British subjects from 
overseas should be introduced; to consider also the intended effect of such legislation upon actual 
immigration, how any such control would be justified to Parliament and the public, and to the 
Commonwealth countries concerned; and to report to the Cabinet. ' (CCI(57)1,24 Jan 57, 
CAB 134/1466) 
3 The Lord Presidentship was taken over first by the Earl of Home, Commonwealth Secretary, 
and from June 1957 by Viscount Hailsham. 
4 David Childs, Britain since 1945. - A Political History (London, Routledge, 3rd ed., 1992), p. 99. 
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The resignation of Lord Salisbury created a situation in which the views of 
civil servants had greater influence and were more likely to be adopted than before 
by ministers. The official committee CWP(3) continued to play an important part in 
the policy process of the Macmillan administration. Discussions within the 
government restarted in April 1957. There was the continued rise in net 
immigration. The net inflow from the New Commonwealth had reached 46,800 in 
1956. Among these, 29,800 came from the West Indies, which was an increase from 
I1 000 in 1954 and 27,500 in 1955. Moreover, in early 1957, immigration from 
India and Pakistan increased substantially. 5 
The first meeting of the CWP(3) under the Macmillan government was held 
on I April. 6 At this meeting, the same line of analysis of the situation was repeated. 
The major concern was social conditions, in particular, congregation of immigrants 
in the limited quarters of urban areas and resulting deterioration in race relationS. 7 
Meanwhile legislation was not politically supported as 'public opinion was not yet 
ready for legislation ... and its 
introduction ... might bring about serious political 
repercussions'. 8 Also, from the view of external relations, legislation would be 
'particularly untimely having regard to the constitutional developments in the West 
5 CCI(57)2,27May57, CABI34/1466. 
6 Lamb stressed the importance of the Prime Minister's letter to the Home Secretary dated 21 
June 1957, in which he asked for information on the situation of immigration from the 
Commonwealth (Richard Lamb, The Macmillan Years 1957-1963: The Emerging Truth (London, 
John Murray, 1995), p. 417; H. Macmillan, Prime Minister, to R. A. Butler, Home Secretary, 21 Jun 
57, PREM 11/2920). This was, however, by no means the initial suggestion of the govenunent 
discussions on Commonwealth immigration under the Macmillan administration. The government 
machinery had preceded this personal initiative by the Prime Minister. 
7 CWP(3)(57)5, I Apr 57, C01032/195, D035/5219; CCI(57) Ist meeting, 6 Jun 57, 
CAB 134/1466, pp. 1 -2. 
8 CC 1(5 7) 1 st meeting, 6 Jun 5 7, CAB 134/1466, p. 2. 
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Indies, Ghana and Nigeria'. 9 At the same time, the civil servants again confirmed 
that the proposed quota system should not be adopted. Imposing quotas was thought 
difficult on the grounds of. difficulty to conceal discrimination against coloured 
people; probable retaliation by some Commonwealth countries; further difficulties 
regarding Irish citizens; and the problems in deciding the overall and country 
quotas. 10 These views held by civil servants were to gain ministerial support at the 
CCI meeting on 6 June 1957 (CCI(57)lst), which was held after eight-month's 
interval, and then at the Cabinet meeting on 25 July (CC(57)57th). 
Negadve moodfor legisladon 
Meanwhile the patterns of immigration changed in 1957. Immigration from the 
West Indies, which had initially been the focus of policy makers' attention, showed 
a decrease. On the contrary, an increase in immigration from South Asia became 
apparent. In particular, Pakistani immigrants increased by 150% in 1957 to 5,200 
and Indian immigrants by 18% to 6,600.11 By the end of the year, civil servants had 
had more worry than before about 'the changing patterns of immigration' and 'its 
possible undesirable consequences'. 12 
At the CWP(3) meeting on 16 January 1958, the marked increase in the 
number of Pakistani immigrants drew the civil servants' attention and the following 
view was expressed: 'Coloured immigration was no longer a purely West Indian 
problem. The less noticeable but persistent increase in the number of Indians and 
Pakistanis was potentially much more serious; these people were a poor type and 
quite unassimilable. If the present rate of immigration were to increase in 
9 CCI(57) I st meeting, 6 Jun 57, CAB 134/1466, p. 2. 
10 Second Report of the Working Party, 2 May 57, attached to CCI(57)'), 27 May 57, 
CAB 134/1466. 
11 CWP(3)(58)2,16 Jan 58, CO 1032/195. 
12 CWP(3)(58)2,16 Jan 58, CO 1032/195. 
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momentum it would not be very long before we were faced with all the problems - 
social, economic, and perhaps political - of a multi-racial society'. 13 This worry that 
the influx from Pakistan might bring serious problems was shared by ministers. In 
the CCI meeting held on II March (CCI(5 8)1 st), the view was expressed that 'The 
large and increased influx of Pakistanis had introduced a new element into the 
situation which could not be allowed to continue unchecked indefinitely'. 14 
However, both civil servants and ministers were still cautious about 
immediate legislation at this time. It was true that at the CCI meeting on II March 
(CCI(58)lst) ministers decided that the draft Commonwealth Immigrants Bill 
should be re-examined 'to ensure its suitability for introduction at short notice if this 
should be necessary. However, for civil servants, it was important that there were 
no economic grounds for imposing a control, 16 while, for ministers, it was still 
uncertain whether legislation would gain public support. Therefore, at the same CCI 
meeting, the general view of ministers was that'it would be unwise to proceed with 
legislation unless there were clear indications that public opinion would support 
such a course'. 17 As this suggested, the approach of ministers to Commonwealth 
immigration had completely changed to be less assertive with the resignation of the 
Marquess of Salisbury the previous year. 
They decided to seek administrative measures for the time being while 
examining the Bill. The view of the Pakistani and Indian governments was sought 
on the possibility of action on their part to restrict the floW. 18 As a result, it became 
clear that both governments shared the view with the UK government that 'it is not 
13 CWP(3)(58)2,16 Jan 58, C01032/195, p. 3. 
14 CC 1(5 8) 1 st meeting, II Mar 5 8, CAB 13 4/1466, p. 1. 
15 CCI(5 8) 1 st meeting, II Mar 5 8, CAB 134/1466, p. 2. 
16 CWP(3)(58)2,16 Jan 58, C01032/195, p. 3. 
17 CC 1(5 8) 1 st meeting, II Mar 5 8, CAB 134/1466, p. 2. 
18 CCR58) Ist meeting, II Mar 58, CAB134/1466, p. 2. 
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in the interests of their citizens that they should come to this country [the UK] to 
swell the ranks of the unemployed and become a charge of public funds'. 19 Both 
goverrunents thus agreed to take measures to suppress emigration by restricting the 
issue of passports. 20 
Meanwhile, the draft Commonwealth Immigrants Bill was circulated at the 
CCI meeting on 19 May (CCI(58)2nd) for re-examination. By this time a small 
change was appearing in the thinking of the Commonwealth Relations Office. As 
had seen in the previous chapter the Department had persistently opposed legislation 
applied to independent Commonwealth countries. This was mainly because there 
was concern that such measures might harm good relations with Commonwealth 
countries. In the case of India and Pakistan, the main reason was because retaliatory 
action by their governments was expected when the UK introduced immigration 
control on the entry of their citizens to the UK. However, in the face of high 
immigration from India and Pakistan, the Commonwealth Relations Office had 
come to think that legislative restrictions might be supported from the Indian and 
Pakistani governments and also that 'Such support might provide an effective 
answer to criticisms in this country [UK] that the Bill was a measure of colour 
discrimination'. 21 Therefore in the CCI meeting the Commonwealth Secretary (the 
Earl of Home) suggested that the Department would allow the control being applied 
only to India and Pakistan. 22 
Nevertheless, there were great difficulties in promoting legislation, even on 
19 CWP(3)(58)7,4 Sep 58, C01032/196, para. 23. 
20 CCI(58)4,9 May 58, CAB 134/1466. 
21 CCI(58) 2nd meeting, 19 May 58, CAB134/1466, p. 2. 
22 The High Commissioners of India and Pakistan, however, showed a sceptical view for targeting 
only at India and Pakistan. They thought even if the governments might be ready to accept 
legislation, the press and public opinion will not be persuaded and might interpret legislation as 
discriminatory (CWP(-'))(58)7,4 Sep 58, C01032/196, para. 25). 
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this line. Many on the Committee were thinking that 'Parliamentary and public 
opinion would probably reject legislation which failed to deal with the larger and 
more publicised problem of the immigrants from the West Indies'. 23 Meanwhile, 
the opposition of the Colonial Office to legislation applied to the Colonies had 
become more evident since the Federation of the West Indies came into force in 
January 1958. Moreover, the general election had become an issue. By February or 
March of the year the Prime Minister (Harold Macmillan) had set his mind to hold 
the next general election in the autumn of 1959.24 Ministers in the CCI felt it 
politically unwise in these circumstances 'to undertake ... a controversial measure' 
on which 'Government supporters in Parliament were divided'. 25 Ministers thus 
confirmed that 'there was no need for immediate legislation', while they decided to 
see the effect of the administrative measures taken by India and Pakistan during 
three or four months. 26 
2. Political Responses to Disturbances 
Changing situation of employment 
Voluntary controls by the Indian and Pakistani governments were successful in 
reducing immigration. 27 At the middle of the year 1958, the statistics showed a 
decrease in immigration from India, Pakistan, and the West Indies. However, it was 
only for a short while that the situation calmed down. The downward trend of the 
West Indian immigration quickly reversed to record an increase. 
23 CCI(58) 2nd meeting, 19 May 58, CAB 134/1466, p. 3. 
24 Lamb, The Macmillan Years 1957-1963, p-52. 
25 CCI(58) 2nd meeting, 19 May 58, CAB 134/1466, p. 2. 
26 CCI(58) 2nd meeting, 19 May 58, CAB 134/1466, p. 4. 
27 CCI(58) 2nd meeting, 19 May 58, CAB 134/1466, p. 1. 
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In late August 1958, the situation changed radically in two additional. and 
more important, ways. The first was that the economic situation deteriorated and the 
employment situation changed. Unemployment among coloured people increased by 
2,000 from March to JUly. 28 Though this increase was 'not in itself unduly 
alarming', civil servants at the CWP(3) thought that 'it would probably have been 
much higher had the Governments of India and Pakistan not taken measures to 
prevent more of their citizens from coming here'. 29 
The Ministry of Labour, in fact, judged at the end of August that 'the effects 
of the economic recession were now becoming apparent'. 30 At the CWP(3) meeting 
on 21 August, the Ministry showed a severe view: 'the absorption of coloured 
workers had now reached saturation point and the employment prospects of any of 
the 17,000 already unemployed ... were very poor indeed' and 'New arrivals would 
probably fare worse'. 31 The Ministry was particularly concerned about the coming of 
winter, when seasonally unemployment would increase. 32 Its view was even so 
alarming that it stated in the meeting that 'the importance of prompt and effective 
action before the situation deteriorated further should not be underrated'. 33 
Legislation could not be passed in time to be effective the winter. The Ministry 
therefore proposed that the West Indies goverm-nents should be asked to take the 
same kind of administrative action as that of India and Pakistan. 34 
Urban disturbances and the Deportation Bill 
28 CWP(3)(58)7,4 Sep 58, C01032/196, para. 21. 
29 CWP(3)(58)7,4 Sep 58, C01032/196, para. 22. 
30 CWP(3)(58)6,21 Aug 58, C01032/196, para. 7. 
31 CWP('I)(58)6,21 Aug 58, C01032/196, para. 7. 
32 CWP(3)(58)7,4 Sep 58, C01032/196, para. 23. 
33 CWP(-'))(58)7,4 Sep 58, C01032/196, para. 9. 
34 CWP(3)(58)6,21 Aug 58, C01032/196, para. 9. 
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Secondly and, worse still, two days after the above CWP(3) meeting, on 23 August, 
the long predicted deterioration of race relations broke out. "Serious disturbances" 
erupted in Nottingham. 35 It was followed by another series of disturbances in 
Notting Hill, London. These had the issue of Commonwealth immigration develop 
from a local "problem" to a national one and politicise, which the government had 
been most concerned. 
Layton-Henry analyses the implication of these incidents in the whole 
debates on Commonwealth immigration as follows: 'It was the riots in Nottingham 
and Notting Hill in August and September 1958 that propelled the issue of black 
immigration on to the front pages of the newspapers and television, and made it a 
national rather than a series of independent local issues. Instead of the quiet though 
intense debates on the back benches and in civil service interdepartmental 
committees, the issue of immigration control became one of general public interest 
and debate. '36 
There was, on the one hand, widespread condemnation of the violence by 
party leaders, Church leaders, and editorials in the press. On the other, there was an 
interpretation at the local level that these incidents occurred as the response of local 
people who felt resentful against black immigration. This even included some 
Labour MPs in whose constituencies these incidents broke oUt. 37 In fact, public 
opinion seemed to be crystallising in favour of controlling immigration. For the first 
time the opinion polls on popular attitudes towards immigrants, race relations and 
immigration control were carried out. The result of a Gallup poll showed that 'a 
substantial majority of respondents favoured immigration controls, with only I in 5 
35 CCI(58)5,4 Sep 58, CAB134/1466, p. 5. 
36 Zig Layton-Henry, Politics of Immigration: Immigration, 'Race'and 'Race'Relations in Post- 
war Britain (Oxford, Blackwell, 1992), p. 38. 
37 Layton-Henry, Politics of Immigration, pp. 3 )8-41 and 73. 
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opposing'. 38 One of the strongest arguments that the government policy makers 
used to adopt to oppose legislation on entry was eroding. 
In view of the probable general election within a year, the government was 
forced to take urgent action to calm down the crisis and to prevent further 
politicisation of the issue. From a small number of staff around the Home Secretary, 
an idea emerged to separate provisions on deportation from the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Bill and to legislate on this independently. The Colonial and 
Commonwealth Relations Offices were not, though they were opposed to legislation 
on entry, necessarily opposed to legislation on deportation. For these Departments, 
deportation was a less bad, and realistic, option in order to avoid legislation on 
entry. The public opinion were thought to be less opposed to this course. 39 In the 
Cabinet meeting on 8 September (CC(58)69th), legislation on deportation, as well 
as strengthening voluntary restriction by the West Indies governments, were 
proposed by the Home Secretary. 40 The Cabinet agreed to this. 
On the request of the Colonial Office, the West Indian governments decided 
to refuse the issue of passports to persons known to have been convicted of serious 
offences. Jamaica also imposed restrictions on the issue of passports for 
unaccompanied juveniles and for the old and infirm. 41 Meanwhile on the UK side 
the Deportation Bill was hurriedly prepared at the civil servant level in the run-up to 
the next Parliamentary session due in November. The main points of the provisions 
of deportation had already been agreed in previous discussions about the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill. Civil servants confirmed at the CWP(3) meeting 
38 Layton-Henry, Politics of Immigration, p. 40. 
39 Colonial Immigrants: Brief for the Secretary of State for Cabinet on 8th September 1958, by I. 
B. Watt, Assistant Secretary, CO, n. d. [4 Sep 58], para. 12. 
40 CC(58) 69th conclusions, minute 3,8 Sep 58, CAB128/32/pt. 2. 
41 cf. Progress Report of Inter-Departmental Working Party, I Feb 61, attached to CCM(61)2,7 
Feb 6 1, CAB 134/1469, Annex 2, para. 5. 
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on 23 September that the following categories of people should be exempted from 
deportation: 1) those who were bom in the UK; 2) those who were bom of parents 
who at the time of his or her birth were ordinarily resident; 3) those who ývere 
ordinarily resident in the UK for seven years or more; or, 4) those who were 
naturalised in the UK. As regards Irish citizens, it was confirmed that there was 'no 
reason to exempt Irish citizens from applying deportation'. 42 These were the 
categories recommended by the CWP(2) in its report of 22 October 1954 and thus 
had been adopted in the draft Commonwealth Immigrants Bill. By the time the draft 
of the Deportation Bill was submitted to the ministerial committee CCI on 19 
January 1959, its outlines were also amended on the following points: to confine the 
power of the Home Secretary in ordering deportation to the case on which there was 
the recommendation of a court; to reduce the period of residence from seven to five 
years which would confer exemption from deportation; and to include as a category 
43 of exemption a person whose father was born in the United Kingdom. 
In the CCI meeting on 6 November (CCI(58)3rd), the majority of the 
ministers showed their approval in promoting legislation on deportation, though 
there was a minority opinion that it might have the effect of delaying the 
introduction of a comprehensive Bill at a later stage. At ministerial level, there was 
a shared view that 'considerable public disquiet on the subject' existed and that 
'Government inactivity would carry the risk of discouraging Colonial Governments 
from taking measures to restrict the numbers of emigrants setting out and might lead 
to the emergence of extremist groups in the United Kingdom'. 44 Ministers decided 
to prepared a Bill 'on the lines indicated' by civil servants. 45 
42 CCI(5 8)6,17 Oct 5 8, CAB 134/1466. 
43 CCI(58) 3rd meeting, 7 Nov 58, CAB 134/1466; CCI(58)7,19 Dec 58, CAB 134/1466. 
44 CCI(58) 3rd meeting, 7 Nov 58, CAB134/1466, p. 3. 
45 CCI(58) 3rd meeting, 7 Nov 58, CAB] 34/1466, p. 4. Zn 
170 
Concern aboutpoliticisation of the Bill 
After this CCI meeting, publication of the governments decision on the introduction 
of deportation provisions started. For example, at the annual Conservative Party 
Conference in October (I I October), the Home Secretary (R. A. Butler) implied, 
while resisting the idea to introduce control on entry, that provision for deportation 
of Commonwealth immigrants concerned in certain categories of crime might be 
desirable. In the speech he said, on the one hand, that 'we should maintain the long 
and respected tradition of allowing citizens of Commonwealth countries to come 
here' and, on the other, 'it is very likely that the Government in the new Session will 
seek a power of deportation'. 46 
It did not take long before the conditions which led to the hasty move by 
ministers towards the firm and apparent action began to settle down. The 
Deportation Bill was drafted by the Home Office on the lines proposed and 
circulated at the CCI meeting on 13 January 1959 (CCI(59)lst). After the 
disturbances, however, the flow of immigrants was showing a marked decline from 
autumn to winter and in the meantime the disturbances were not repeated. Under 
these circumstances, the possible bad effects which the Bill might cause were 
beginning to be taken into considerations of the government. Particularly important 
among them were the relations with the Commonwealth and the impact on 
comprehensive legislation in the future. There had even emerged a negative view on 
legislation within ministers at the CCI: 'it could be held that the problem was no 
longer sufficiently great to justify legislation of the kind proposed'. 47 
46 Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Campaign Guide 1959: The Unique Political 
Reference Book (London, Conservative and Unionist Central Office, 1959), p. 354; cf Nicholas 
Deakin, 'The politics of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill', Political Quarterly, 39,1 (1968), 24- 
45, p. 40. 
47 CCI(58) 3rd meeting, 7 Nov 58, CAB 134/1466, p. 3. 
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At the CCI meeting, the opinions of ministers divided. However it was the 
minority that opposed legislation. For them, to keep good relations with the 
Commonwealth was a major concern. Legislation was thought to 'constitute an 
important departure from the principle that British subjects from Commonwealth 
countries and Colonial territories had equal rights in this country with British 
subjects resident in the United Kingdom'. 48 The majority still favoured legislation. 
They claimed that, 'Though racial disturbances appeared to have subsided for the 
time being', 'failure to act might lead to a recurrence, to the formation of extremist 
groups, and to a demand for more stringent measures of control which could prove 
to be highly controversial and have serious implications in our relations with other 
Commonwealth countries'. 49Moreover, the introduction of the Deportation Bill had 
already been announced on various occasions. This made them to feel that 'the 
Government might be open to criticism if it failed to take step'. 50 
The most important factor at this point of time, however, was the fact that 
the next general election was expected to be held in autumn of the year. Political 
meanings might be attached to any judgement on legislation as this was expected to 
attract large public interest. Considering the nature of legislation aimed at the 
public, it was necessary to prevent the dealing of the issue itself from being 
politicised. Meanwhile conditions which would reject the need of legislation were in 
fact sufficient -a decrease in immigration, no repetition of disturbances, and 
maintaining good relations with the Commonwealth. There was no need to take a 
risk to politicise this issue in front of the general election. The issue was too 
sensitive to be handled too quickly. Under the circumstances the Chairman 
(Viscount Kilmuir, Lord Chancellor) deferred making a judgement in the 
48 CCI(58) 3rd meeting, 7 Nov 58, CAB 134/1466, p. 3. 
49 CCI(58) 3rd meeting, 7 Nov 58, CAB 134/1466, p. 3. 
50 CCI(58) 3rd meeting, 7 Nov 58, CAB134/1466, p. 3. 
172 
Committee and, instead, decided that the matter should be submitted to the Cabinet 
for decision. 51 
Accordingly the decision as to whether the Deportation Bill should be 
introduced in Parliament or not was to be made in the Cabinet. Ahead of the 
Cabinet meeting due on 19 February 1959, the Prime Minister (Harold Macmillan) 
asked his senior civil servant advisor the opinion about this issue. Burke Trend, 
Deputy Cabinet Secretary, who was respected as Macmillan's personal advisor on 
economical and colonial affairs, 52 minuted to Macmillan on 2 February. Trend 
stated that the introduction of the Deportation Bill in Parliament was 'essentially a 
matter of political judgement'. 53 The issue was'whether the Government would lose 
more by failing to take action ... than by introducing a Bill which involves a 
departure from our traditional policy of avoiding discrimination between subjects as 
regards entry to this country'. Considering that the next general election was 
expected to be held in autumn of the year, it was, Trend thought, 'unwise to stir up 
what would probably become a controversial matter at this stage'. He recommended 
therefore that the Prime Minister should 'defer action until the next Parliament, 
when the limited question of deportation could be tackled in the context of a 
comprehensive Bill'. 54 
It was decided in this way that the Deportation Bill should not be submitted 
to Parliament before the Cabinet meeting. At the Cabinet meeting on 19 February 
(CC(59)1 I th), the Home Secretary announced that, 'in view of the many other 
demands on the legislative programme, he would not wish to press for its 
51 CCI(58) 3rd meeting, 7 Nov 58, CAB 134/1466, p. 3. 
52 Lamb, The Macmillan Years 1957-1963, p. 1. 
53 B. Trend, Deputy Cabinet Secretary, to H. Macmillan, Prime Minister, 2 Feb 59, 
PREM 11/2920. 
54 B. Trend, Deputy Cabinet Secretary, to H. Macmillan, Prime Minister, 2 Feb 59, 
PREM 11/2920. 
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introduction during the current Session'. 55 The Deportation Bill was politically 
raised to influence the public and assuage public concern, and it was politically 
buried for electoral considerations. 
*** 
The urban disturbances in the summer of 1958 raised the issue of Commonwealth 
immigration to a matter of wide public concern. The issue was politicised. With a 
general election within a year, the government faced the need to subdue public 
interest on the issue. The Deportation Bill was prepared for this purpose on the 
demand of the Home Secretary. However, the strain caused by the disturbances 
were rapidly eased as well as the number of immigration decreased. The 
Deportation Bill was left only as a subject of ministerial discussion. Many ministers 
hoped to put forward legislation to show the firm attitude of the government, while 
the Prime Minister and his aides came to judge that the Bill would exacerbate 
divisions in the public and within the party so that the introduction of the Bill to 
Parliament itself would risk further politicisation of the issue. It was politics that 
mattered in this whole process. In view of electoral considerations, the idea of 
legislation on deportation was raised by ministers and was withdrawn by ministers. 
The same kind of consideration was working under the surface of the rise and fall of 
the Deportation Bill. 
In this process, the role civil servants played was not large. However there 
were a couple of remarkable changes in the role of civil servants in terms of 
institutions and views. Firstly, with the resignation of the Marquess of Salisbury 
from the Cabinet, there emerged a situation in which discussions at ministerial level 
and those at the civil servant level match better. Secondly the official committee, 
CC(59) I Ith conclusions, minute 8,19 Feb 59, CA13128/33). 
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which had had by and large an ad hoc nature, acquired a permanency nature from 
around 1957 at the latest. The institutional setting for the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Bill of 1961 gradually arranged in this fashion. 
The view and position of civil servants also changed in important respects 
during this period of time in the background to the political developments of the 
events after the disturbances of August and September 1958. The deterioration of 
race relations was concretely erupted in the disturbances. These made the Home 
Office even more cautious than before about social impact of immigration. Equally 
important was that employment, which, as well as the West Indian Federation, used 
to constitute a strong case to oppose early legislation, was getting worse from a little 
before the disturbances. The Ministry of Labour which used to oppose early 
legislation turned its position to restricting immigration. 
The position of civil servants as regards immigration was therefore entering 
a new phase. The future of the West Indian Federation and the position of the 
Colonial Office which had a large interest in this factor came to be illuminated as 
the key to legislation on both entry and deportation. 
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Chapter 8 Decision-making 
After the general election of 8 October 1959, a new ministerial committee in charge 
of Commonwealth immigration was not convened until January 1961. When Harold 
Macmillan formed a new Cabinet after the victory, a ministerial committee of this 
sort was not considered urgent. Many scholars of history have asserted that the 
disturbances in the autumn of 1958 had a considerable impact on, and led to, the 
introduction of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill of 1961.1 As this fact shows, 
however, the links between these two events are not so evident. It seems rather that 
the disturbances were, though one of the factors, not the decisive cause of the 
introduction of the Bill to Parliament in November 1961. In the meantime the 
government machinery on Commonwealth immigration and discussions ceased at 
the ministers' level. 
At the civil servant level, on the other hand, discussions and institutional 
arrangements were maintained. The official committee CWP(3) established since 
1955 continued and kept monitoring the situation of immigration. With abolition of 
the ministerial committee, the CWP(3) was to report directly to the Home 
Secretary. 2 In this respect the official committee consolidated its independent 
existence and was not of secondary importance to the ministerial committee. 
1. Beginning of Discussions towards the 1962 Act 
I qf D. W. Dean, 'Conservative governments and the restriction of Commonwealth immigration 
in the 1950s: the problem of constraint', Historical Journal, 3 5,1 (1992), 171-94, p. 188. 
CWP(59) 2nd meeting, 7 Dec 59, C010332/198, para. 3. 
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Civil servants I view on the situation in 1959 
True, the declining trend of net intake in Britain had reversed from August 1959. 
Net immigration in the four months between August and November 1959 was 
12,500, while it was 7,500 in the same months of the previous year. 3 Among the 
total intake of 12,500,9,000 were from the West Indies. 4 However, throughout the 
year of 1959 the situation relating to immigration was by and large calm. 
Civil servants at the CWP(3) showed the almost same view as before. In 
social aspects, housing remained 'one of the most intractable problems affecting 
coloured immigrants"5 and there were some cases in which coloured people were 
convicted of drug trafficking or prostitution. 6 However, as regards health, according 
to the Ministry of Health, the problem of tuberculosis among immigrants was 
small. 7 And in relations with neighbours, it was judged that there remained 'no 
evidence of any significant increase of racial tension'. 8 Economic aspects were not 
serious at all. The employment figures for 1959 improved and unemployment 
among New Commonwealth workers were at low level. Though newly arrived 
unskilled workers had difficulty in getting their first job, the strong performance of 
the economy meant that skilled workers were easily absorbed in the job market. 
Despite these assessments, however, the Ministry of Labour kept a cautious 
position about immigration. From the view of the Ministry, the employment outlook 
was 'the key to the whole situation', 9 and the future prospects of the job situation in 
Britain should be fully considered. These were not advantageous for immigration. 
3 CWP(60)1,26 Jan 60, D035/7991, para. 2. 
4 CWP(60)1,26 Jan 60, DO. 3) 5/799 1, para. 3. 
5 CWP(60)1,26 Jan 60, D035/7991, para. 25. 
6 CWP(60)1,26 Jan 60, D035/7991, paras. 23-4. 
7 CWP(60)1,26 Jan 60, DO35/7991, paras. 35-40. 
8 CWP(60)], 26 Jan 60, D03 5/799 1, para. 12. 
9 CWP(59) 2nd meeting, 7 Dec 59, CO 1032/198, para. 15. 
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Three points were raised. Firstly, the number of workforce in Britain was estimated 
to increase with the increase in school leavers and the end of the National Service. 10 
Secondly, migration from the UK, mainly to the Commonwealth and North 
America, was 'at a low level' so that in 1958-9 there was 'a small inward balance for 
the first time for many years'. II Thirdly, employment of migrants was thought 
uncertain once the economy moved into recession. These economic and social 
points were sufficient to support for civil servants, as expressed in the CWP(3) 
meeting on 7 December 1959, the necessity to maintain voluntary restrictions by the 
Commonwealth governments on emigration of unskilled people. 12 
Inidative of the Home Office 
In the early months of 1960, immigration from the West Indies further increased. 
The total intake in 1960 up to May reached 16,500, which was higher than any 
previous five years except in 1956. Among them the influx of West Indians reached 
a record high of 15,000.13 
At the civil servant level, the situation of immigration was felt to be 
changing. It was at this time of mid 1960, almost one year and half before the 
introduction of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill to Parliament, important change 
in views among civil servants occurred as regards Commonwealth immigration and 
this resulted in them accepting legislation at last. With the increase in immigration, 
the mood of the Home Office, in particular, turned to alarm. 14 The number of 
10 CWP(60)1,26 Jan 60, D035/7991, paras. 29-34. The Ministry of Labour estimated that the 
number of children of school leaving age would be about 50% higher in 1962 than in 1956 
(CWP(59) 2nd meeting, 7 Dec 59, CO 1032/198, para. 15). 
11 CWP(59) 2nd meeting, 7 Dec 59, C01032/198, para. 15. 
12 CWP(59) 2nd meeting, 7 Dec 59, C01032/198, para. 16. 
13 CWP(60)4,22 Jun 60, D03 5/799 1, paras. 2-3. 
14 M. Z. Terry, Temporary Principal, CO, to R. G. Pettitt, Principal, CO, 30 Jun 60, 
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people coming to the UK was felt to be 'so large as to create in effect a new 
situation'; in particular the figures of West Indian immigration looked 'striking to the 
point of being sensational'. 15 These concerns held by the Home Office were 
reported in the CWP(3) meeting on 10 June. 
Meanwhile, as far as employment was concerned, economic performance 
was still judged good. The Ministry of Labour showed the view in the same CWP(3) 
meeting that 'in present conditions of very full employment with the demand for 
labour still growing, ... it was ... possible ... to find employment even for 
coloured immigrants who were normally bad "placing" positions'. 16 However, at the 
same time, the Ministry of Labour kept the severe view about future prospects of 
employment and thus of immigration. 17 In fact, from the economical point of view, 
the situation of immigration from the West Indies exhibited a marked change at this 
point of time in mid 1960, though this was not yet recognised fully within the 
government. There had been significant correlation since 1956 between the arrival 
from the West Indies and the labour demand in the UK. The arrival decreased when 
labour demand declined from 1956 to 1958, and increased when the demand 
recovered from 1959 to the first half of 1960. After that, this correlation broke up. 
Despite a decline in labour demand from the second half of 1960, the arrival from 
the West Indies recorded a marked increase. 18 
The rapid increase in West Indian immigration from the beginning of 1960 
was reported in the Cabinet meeting on 26 July (CC(60)46th). The Home Secretary 
(R. A. Butler) raised concern about: the acute housing situation, a fear of the 
CO 103 1/ 93 2, para. 3. 
15 CWP(60) I st meeting, 10 Jun 60, D03 5/799 1, para. 2. 
16 CWP(60) Ist meeting, 10 Jun 60, D035/7991, para. 8. zD 
17 Minute by M. Z. Terry, Temporary Principal, CO, 29 May 60, C01031/3932. 
18 Ceri Peach, West Indian Migration to Britain: A Social Geography (London, Oxford University 
Press, 1968), pp. 36-50. 
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recurrence of racial tension and the prospect of increase in unemployment. 19 At this 
point of time, the Home Secretary was to suggest again the possibility of legislation. 
It was true that the Colonial Office, which was opposed to legislation, had already 
sent a despatch to the West Indies in March, and again to Jamaica in May, to inquire 
whether those governments would be willing to strengthen administrative measures 
to discourage their people from emigrating to the UK. 20 However, the Home Office 
was doubtful whether these efforts would be likely to reduce the level of 
immigration from those areas. The Home Secretary thus proposed to appoint a new 
ministerial committee in the autumn and to resume consideration about legislation, 
in case such administrative measures did not reduce the numbers. 21 
Decision to appoint a ministerial committee 
Towards the end of the year the increase in West Indian immigration accelerated as 
the Home Office had feared. The pace was so high that the annual net influx became 
certain to exceed the level of 1956, the year in which the largest net influx both 
from the West Indies (29,800) and from the "new" Commonwealth as a whole 
(46,800, including the West Indies) was recorded. Anxiety in the Home Office 
greatly increased throughout the summer. 
By November, the position of the West Indian governments towards 
emigration became apparent. In reply to an enquiry by the Colonial Office in 
September about measures to discourage, and the future prospects of, emigration, all 
the West Indian governments responded that they expected the high rate of 
migration to the UK to continue and possibly to increase. 22 In addition, many stated 
19 C(60)12 8,19 Jul 60, CAB 129/102/pt. 1, p. 1, para. 33. 
20 CWP(60)4,22 Jun 60, D035/7991, p. 2, para. 5. 
21 C(60)128,19 Jul 60, CAB129/102/pt. 1, p. 2, para. 6; CC(60) 46th conclusions, minute 2,26 Jul 
60, CAB 128/34. 
22 Memorandum by the Colonial Office, 4 Nov 60, attached to CCM(61)2,7 Feb 61, 
180 
explicitly that they cannot contemplate any more drastic measures to reduce 
emigration to the UK. Jamaica went further in saying that 'it considers "any form of 
positive or legal restrictions most dangerous"'. 23 Restricting the issue of passports 
by West Indian governments had apparently reached its JiMitS. 24 
This was an important step pushing the UK government toward legislation. 
It let them recognise that no measures were left other than legislation by the UK 
government itself Accordingly, at the Cabinet meeting on 25 November 
(CC(60)59th), the constitution of a new ministerial committee which was to discuss 
legislation was decided on the proposal by the Home Secretary. 25 
2. Discussions in the Ministerial Committee 
Social concerns as the casefor control 
The new ministerial committee "Commonwealth Migrants Committee" (code CCM) 
was established on 13 December 1960 with the following terms of reference: 'To 
consider and keep under review the problems caused by the uncontrolled entry into 
the United Kingdom of British subjects from overseas'. 26 The Committee was again 
chaired by the Lord Chancellor (Viscount Kilmuir) and composed of Home 
Secretary (R. A. Butler), Commonwealth Secretary (Duncan Sandys), Colonial 
Secretary (lain Macleod), Minister of Housing (Henry Brooke), Minister of Labour 
CAB 134/1469, para. 6. 
23 Memorandum by the Colonial Office, 4 Nov 60, attached to CCM(61)2,7 Feb 61, 
CAB 1) 4/1469, para. 10. 
24 R. G. Pettitt, Principal, CO, to A. R. Thomas, Assistant Under- Secretary, CO, 11 Oct 60, 
C01031/3932. 
25 CC(60) 59th conclusions, minute 8,25 Nov 60, CAB 128/34. 
26 CCM(60)1,13 Dec 60, CAB 134/1469. 
181 
(John Hare), Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Charles Hill), Minister of 
Health (J. Enoch Powell), and Attomey-General (Reginald Manningham-Buller). 
The annual net immigration from the New Commonwealth reached a record 
high in 1960 of 58,000, of which 49,000 were from the West IndieS. 27 As seen 
above, already before this ministerial committee came into force, civil servants had 
confirmed that restrictions on entry were inevitable. At the CWP(3) meeting on 19 
January 1961, the civil servants reconfirmed this view by agreeing that 'there is no 
possibility of the West Indies Governments taking any effective administrative 
action to stop emigration to the United Kingdom', and that 'so long as immigration 
of coloured people into the United Kingdom continues uncontrolled there can be no 
escape from serious social consequences'. 28 
It was evident that the case for control was not economic situations but 
social situations. The reasons for legislative actions were summarised by the 
CWP(3) in its later report dated July 1961 as follows: 'The case for control of 
immigration rests not on grounds of employment, crime, or health, but on the strain 
imposed by coloured immigrants on the housing resources of certain local 
authorities and the danger of social tension inherent in the existence of large 
unassimilated coloured communities'. 29 As was suggested here, the case for 
legislation was justified on social grounds in particular with regard to housing 
problems and resulting social tensions. Similar views dominated also among 
ministers at the new committee. The first meeting of the CCM was held on 16 
February (CCM(61)lst). In the meeting ministers confirmed that 'the present level 
of coloured immigration raised problems which could not be ignored' and 'as the 
various problems of housing, health and employment became more acute it would 
27 CCM(61)3,8 Feb 6 1, CAB 134/1469, para. 1. 
28 CWP(6 1) 1 st meeting, 19 Jan 6 1, DO 175/54, CO 1032/302, p. 2. 
29 CCM(61)10,26 Jul 61, CAB134/1469, para. 5, see also para. 57. 
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become more and more likely that a serious situation would eventually arise'. 30 
Relations with the Commonwealth remained another important 
consideration. This was even more important at this point of time since the 
Federation of the West Indies stood on the verge of collapse. The West Indian 
Federation was one of the weakest of its kind. Each area was separated by sea, with 
small populations and weak economies. Moreover, because of well-developed local 
political institutions, there was little federal consciousness, but there was much 
rivalry between leaders of the islands. In particular Jamaica and Trinidad, two of the 
largest and richest islands in the Federation, had deep mistrust of each other and of 
other less rich islands. 31 
For the Colonial Office, the West Indian Federation was the most important 
consideration in its policy towards the area, and certainly more than controlling 
immigration. Accordingly, at the first CCM meeting on 16 February, the Colonial 
Secretary (lain Macleod) demanded that 'no indication should be given that the 
Government were contemplating restrictive legislation', as 'Any such indication 
might have a disastrous effect' on the continuation of the West Indian Federation 
and its future relationship with the Commonwealth. 32 It was evident that in order to 
control immigration there was no other course than legislation by the UK 
goverm-nent. However clear conclusions had not been established yet about the 
balance of benefits between control of immigration and its likely impact on 
constitutional developments in the West Indies. 
The impact of legislation on new constitutional developments became the 
major issue also in the Cabinet meeting of the same day (CC(61)7th, 16 February 
30 CCM(61) Ist meeting, 19 Jan 61, D0175/54, C01032/302, p. 2. 
31 J. D. B. Miller, The Commonwealth in the World (London, Gerald Duckworth, 3rd ed., 1965), 
pp. 230-1. 
32 CCM(6 1) 1 st meeting, 19 Jan 6 1, DO 175/54, CO 1032/302, p. 3. 
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1961), where strong opposition to promoting legislation was raised. In fact there 
was still opposition at ministerial level to control of immigration. At least, Colonial 
Secretary (lain Macleod), Commonwealth Secretary (Duncan Sandys) and 
Education Minister (Edward Boyle) were opposed to legislation. 33 It was therefore 
difficult for the Cabinet to make a clear decision instantly. Ministers only confinned 
at this Cabinet meeting that'there was no need to decide at once whether legislation 
should be introduced'. 34 At the same time, however, they decided to consider in the 
meantime the content and form of such legislation 'in order that the Government 
might be in a position to reach a decision and, if necessary, to take action early in 
the following Session [from autumn 1961 ]1.35 
Committee Is decision and importance of the West Indian Federation 
Though there remained much difficulty in terms of relations with the 
Commonwealth, it did not take long before considerations on constitutional 
developments in Colonial territories were overwhelmed by the continuing rise in 
immigration and the breakdown of voluntary restrictions by the West Indies. The 
increase in immigration was continuing, apparently unabated. A new estimate of 
immigration was circulated within the government in May, which foresaw that 'if 
the present trend continued, the total [net immigration] for 1961 might reach 
200,000', which would mean that'by the end of the year there would be nearly half a 
million coloured people in the United Kingdom'. 36 Moreover it became evident in 
the same month that passport controls taken by the Indian and Pakistani 
33 Paul Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics (Han-nondsworth, Penguin Books, 1965), 
p. 134; Ira Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities: Race, Politics, and Migration in the United States, 
1900-30, and Britain, 1948-68 (London, Oxford University Press, 197' )), p. 134. 
34 CC(61) 7th conclusions, minute 2,16 Feb 61, CAB 128/35/pt. I. 
35 CC(61) 7th conclusions, minute 2,16 Feb 61, CAB128/35/pt. l. 
36 CC(61) 29th conclusions, minute 7,30 May 61, CAB 128/35/pt. 1. 
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governments to restrain immigration to Britain broke down. Immigrants had come 
to the UK by obtaining passports for the Middle East. 37 
The increase intensified fears of a repetition of the violence in Nottingham 
and Notting Hill in 1958, especially among ministers. In the CCM meeting on 17 
May (CCM(61)2nd) the following view was expressed: 'The large influx in recent 
months was causing concern amongst Members of Parliament, especially those 
whose constituencies included the areas where the immigrants had congregated. and 
it was now accepted by Government supporters generally that some form of control 
was unavoidable if we were not to have a colour problem in this country on a 
similar scale to that in the U. S. A. '. 38 It had been perceived that 'the influx and the 
social problems to which immigration on the present scale gave rise could no longer 
39 be ignored'. Consequently, ministers confirmed that 'the situation created by the 
recent high rate of coloured immigration obliged the Government to take some 
restrictive action'40 and agreed in this CCM meeting to recommend that the Cabinet 
should 'introduce legislation to enable immigration from the Commonwealth to be 
controlled'. 41 
Though losing its relative importance in the ministers' thinking, 
consideration of constitutional developments in the West Indies was still the 
important matter for the Colonial Office. Even after the Committee's decision to 
recommend legislation to the Cabinet, the Department's view was that 'it would be 
better to defer introducing any legislation until the West Indies became independent' 
in a few years'time, otherwise 'it might have an unfortunate effect'. 42 However this 
37 CCM(61) 2nd meeting, 17 May 6 1, CAB 134/1469, p. 1. 
38 CCM(61) 2nd meeting, 17 May 6 1, CAB 134/1469, p. 1. 
39 CCM(61) 2nd meeting, 17 May 6 1, CAB 134/1469, p. 2. 
40 CCM(61) 2nd meeting, 17 May 6 1, CAB 134/1469, p. 2. 
41 C(61)67,26 May 6 1, CAB 129/105, para. 4. 
42 CWP(61) 3rd meeting, 10 May 61, C01032/304, D0175/54, paras. 3-4. In fact as late as on 31 
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view on the West Indies had lost its importance within the government as a whole 
and, in this CCM meeting, it was replaced by another question about the timing of 
government announcement about legislation. The most important in this respect was 
that Jamaica was due to hold a referendum in September and it would decided 
whether to remain the Federation. Jamaica, as well as Trinidad, the largest colonies, 
believed they could attract more foreign investment, particularly from the US, on 
their own free from the other smaller colonies. 43 Jamaica's concerns to other 
smaller members of the Federation had been on the verge of its rejection to the 
Federation. From the UK government's view, Jamaica's membership to the 
Federation was essential for the existence of the Federation. In these circumstances, 
the Colonial Secretary (lain Macleod) warned at the CCM meeting that the UK 
government should not make any announcement about legislation before October. 
The Ministerial Committee's recommendation about promoting legislation 
was reported to the Cabinet at its meeting on 30 May (CC(61)29th). It was thought 
that in this Cabinet meeting the final decision to introduce the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Bill to Parliament in the next Session would be taken. Unexpectedly to 
most Cabinet members, however, the Colonial Secretary repeated his reservations 
about legislation again at this meeting. 44 Consequently the Prime Minister refrained 
July 1961, the Colonial Office Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Hugh Fraser) told at the CCM 
meeting (CCM(61)3rd) that 'it was most desirable that there should be no legislation to control 
immigration until the West Indies had become independent' (CCM(61) 3rd meeting, 31 Jul 61, 
CAB134/1469, p. 2). For the Department, this would also have a practical advantage in that an 
abnormality that the UK should impose restrictions on "Citizens of the United Kingdom and 
Colonies" (CUKC) could be avoided, as West Indians would lose this status after independence 
(CWP(61) 3rd meeting, 10 May 61, C01032/304, DO175/54, para. 4). This view was, however, 
strongly opposed by the Commonwealth Relations Office. 
43 Miller, The Commonwealth in the World, pp. 231-2. 
44 Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day 1961-1963 (London, Macmillan, 1973), p. 76; 
Richard Lamb, The Macmillan Years 1957-1963: The Emerging Truth (London, John Murray, 
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from taking a decision to introduce legislation. It was only decided that in the 
meantime'no [government] announcement on the subject should be made'. 45 
3. Discussions at the Civil Servant Level 
The subject of control and the Commonwealth 
Despite Cabinet's indecision, the focus of civil servants' discussions after the 
establishment of the ministerial committee CCM in February had moved to concrete 
measures of legislation. It was not the case for legislation but dealing with the West 
Indian dimension and the details of legislation that were crucial. As far as the details 
were concerned, the main points of discussion were two-fold, namely, the subject 
and concrete measure of control. The first point was who was to be exempted from 
control on entry and deportation. At the CCM meeting on 17 May (CCM(61)2nd), 
where ministers decided to recommend that the Cabinet should introduce 
legislation, ministers had shown their willingness to adopt the lines in the previous 
Bills and to basically employ birth in the UK or the possession of a UK passport as 
the criteria of exemption. 46 Civil servants at the CWP(3) meeting on 14 July re- 
examined these provisions and also confirmed that these would be practical in 
general. 47 However there were two major exceptions to this principle, which should 
1995), pp. 420-1. 
45 CC(61) 29th conclusions, minute 7,30 May 61, CAB 128/35/pt. 1. 
46 CCM(61) 2nd meeting, 17 May 6 1, CAB 134/1469, p. 4; p. 5. 
47 CWP(61) 5th meeting, 14 Jul 61, C01032/305, D0175/54, p. 6, paras. 15-16. There was one 
legal problem in this respect. Section 6(l) of the 1948 British Nationality Act determined the right of 
British subjects to obtain United Kingdom citizenship after twelve months' residence in the United 
Kingdom. In ma ority of cases such registration would lead to the automatic loss of the former Ii 
citizenship and therefore in practice confer immunity from deportation. To leave Section 6(l) 
untouched therefore could frustrate the provisions for control particularly conditional landing and 
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be discussed in detail - controls on people from the Irish Republic and of EEC 
citizens. These exceptions entailed a risk that British relations ýN-ith the 
Commonwealth might be damaged as some aliens were felt to receive better 
treatments than British subjects. 
The Irish issues was summarised into three questions: 1) whether or not 
control should be applied to Irish citizens; 2) whether the exemption of the Irish 
Republic should be contained in the Bill or the Order-in-Council or neither; and 3) 
if the Irish Republic were exempted from control, that is, if no border controls were 
introduced between Ireland and the UK, how evasion of the control by entering the 
UK via the Irish Republic should be defended. 48A common position held among 
policy makers within the goverm-nent, since the discussion leading to the draft 
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill of 1955, was that controlling Irish immigration was 
impossible and unrealistic. In particular the Ministry of Labour kept the view that 
the UK needed Irish labour and 'whatever legislative provisions were made in 
respect of the Irish, nothing must in practice be done to impede the flow of Irish 
labour to the United Kingdom'. 49 It was thought desirable that immigrants from the 
Irish Republic should be excluded from control. ýO 
The real question was therefore what form legislation should take in relation 
to the Irish Republic. The possibilities of exemption were by the Bill, by an Order- 
deportation (CWP(61) 7th meeting, 16 Aug 61, C01032/305, DO175/55, p. 6, para. 12). This 
problem had been raised in the discussions over the draft Deportation Bill of 1958. Revision of 
Section 6(l) of the British Nationality Act was endorsed by the CCM meeting on 29 September 1961 
(CCM(61)4th). The qualifying period of registration for British subjects was to be extended to five 
years, which was the same as the period after which they obtained exemption from deportation and 
also that the aliens got entitlement to apply for naturalisation (CCM(61) 4th meeting, CAB 134/1469, 
29 Sep 6 1, p. 4). 
48 CCM(61)10,25 Jul 6 1, CAB 134/1469, para. 46. 
49 CWP(61) 2nd meeting, 29 Mar 61, C01032/303, DOI 75/54, p. 4, para. 8. 
50 CCM(61) 2nd meeting, 17 May 6 1, CAB 134/1469, p. 4, p. 5. 
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in-Council or by administrative means. 51 It was expected that the Commonwealth 
countries would strongly object to a Bill which would exclude the Irish from the 
system of control which applied to them. However, it was believed, according to the 
Commonwealth Relations Office, that they would accept that 'the Irish must in 
practice be excluded from control'. 52Therefore civil servants decided to recommend 
to ministers that any restrictions applying to the whole Commonwealth ought to 
apply, at least in form, to the Irish Republic-, but that, whatever the form of 
legislation would be, no attempt should be made in practice to apply restrictions to 
the Republic, 'in view of the overwhelming practical difficulties of doing So'. 53The 
measures to prevent the evasion of control by people entering via the Irish Republic 
was also taken into account. The Home Office emphasised that, on the assumption 
that'the only possibility of dealing effectively with the problem lay in obtaining the 
co-operation of the Republican authorities"54 the UK government had close links 
with the Irish government and, if there were a possibility of large scale evasion, the 
UK government could expect to be alarmed in advance. " 
The problem regarding EEC citizens who would be granted free entry to the 
UK when it joined the EEC, was similar to that regarding Irish citizens in that EEC 
citizens might be considered to have been allowed more favourable status in 
entering and staying in the UK than British subjects in the Commonwealth. As far 
as the point concerned, civil servants at the CWP(3) took the view that the scheme 
proposed for control of Commonwealth immigration would 'certainly not be less 
liberal in its results than any development relating to foreign workers which is likely 
ý1 CWP(61) 2nd meeting, 29 Mar 61, C01032/303, DO175/54, p. 4, para. 9. 
52 CWP(61) 2nd meeting, 29 Mar 6 1, C01032/303, DOI 75/54, p. 4, para. 7. 
53 CCM(61)10,25 Jul 61, CAB134/1469, para. 46. 
54 C WP(61) 7th meeting, 16 Aug 6 1, CO 1032/5 5, DO 175/5 5, p. 6, para. 12. 
55 CWP(61)13,31 May 6 1, CO 1032/54, DO 175/54, pp. 3-4, para. 8. 
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to result from a decision to join the Common Market [i. e. EEC]1.56 This was based 
on the interpretation by the Ministry of Labour about EEC provisions. The citizens 
of EEC countries would not be receiving 'more favourable treatment than that 
proposed for British subjects', as under the Treaty of Rome they 'would not be free 
to come to the United Kingdom to look for work' but they 'would be free only to 
come and take specific jobs for which they had been engaged'. 57 
However, there was a doubt about this interpretation even among civil 
servants in fact. Despite the interpretation by the Ministry of Labour, the Home 
Office still feared that 'the result [of legislation] would be that aliens from the Rome 
Treaty countries ... would become entitled to more favourable treatment than 
British subjects from the Commonwealth'. 58 Accordingly the special position of 
Irish and EEC citizens were to remain as major areas of controversy for a 
considerable period of time. 
Concrete measures 
The second major point of civil servants' discussions after the appointment of the 
ministerial committee CCM was the concrete measure of control. Provisions in the 
1958 draft of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill would be a basis of discussion. 
The 1958 draft was to prohibit entry if the person did not have a labour permit and a 
housing certificate. The new draft Bill had already been submitted to the CCM for 
consideration at its first meeting on 16 February 1961 (CCM(61)lst). At this time, 
the Home Secretary (R. A. Butler) had raised three altematives as measures for 
control which had been discussed in the former ministerial committee, namely, 
housing certificate, labour permit, and quota system. He also had indicated that the 
56 CCM(61)10,25 Jul 6 ], CAB 134/1469, para. 40. 
57 CWP(61) 4th meeting, 9 Jul 6 1, C01032/304, DOI 75/54, p. 4, para. 7. 
58 CWP(61)13, C01032/304, D0175/54, p. 6, para. 12. 
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least unsatisfactory system of control might be a labour permit. 59 
Civil servants at the CWP(3) meeting on 29 March examined five options 
raised so far in the course of government discussions and decided to adopt a scheme 
solely on a employment control. The options raised were: 1) housing certificates, 2) 
labour permit, 3) quota system, 4) health checks, and 5) citizenship. Firstly, the civil 
servants had opposed a quota system already in 1956-57 as it would bound to be 
openly discriminatory against coloured immigrants. Secondly, the Ministry of 
Health opposed any scheme based on health checks. This option would be very 
expensive and might result in the exclusion of only a few immigrants. 60 Thirdly, as 
far as citizenship was concerned, two Possibilities had been raised as a criterion of 
exempting from control - either employing the existing "Citizenship of the United 
Kingdom and Colonies" (CUKC), or creating a new United Kingdom (or British 
Isles) Citizenship, which was to exclude the Colonies and to include the Irish 
RepubliC). 61 However, both were rejected as a criterion as they would entail 
difficulties with Commonwealth countries. The proposed new Citizenship in 
particular would entail two aspects which were hard to be accepted - inclusion of 
Irish citizens in British citizenship and separation of the Colonies from the United 
Kingdom. Civil servants thought that to include the Irish Republic in a citizenship 
established in Britain would be politically and constitutionally impossible. 
Meanwhile, as for separating the Colonies from the UK, they feared that it would 
have an adverse effect on the ties between the UK and its Colonies. 62 Lastly, a 
59 CCM(61)3,8Feb6l, CABI34/1469. 
60 Possibilities of Health Check for Commonwealth Immigrants, n. d., attached to CCM(61)5,11 
Apr 6 1, CAB 134/1469, 
61 The new United Kingdom citizenship had been proposed by J. Enoch Powell (Minister of 
Health) which would replace the existing "Citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies". This 
would cover peoples in British Islands including the Irish Republic. 
62 Citizenship in relation to the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, n. d., attached to CCM(61)5,11 
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housing certificate, which had been adopted in the 1955 and 1958 draft 
Commonwealth Immigrants Bills, was thought to be too effective in restricting 
immigration, more so than necessary. The Ministry of Housing assessed that, 
considering the high pressure for accommodation, the local authorities would issue 
few housing certificates in reality. 63 The Ministry of Labour also claimed in this 
respect that 'a system of housing certificates would have the effect of depriving 
industry of the immigrants it needed'. 64 
For all these reasons, civil servants at the CWP(3) decided to adopt a scheme 
65 solely on a employment control and to continue to examine its possibility. The 
labour permit system applied to aliens was thought so drastic that it might stop an 
inflow of even necessary labour. The Ministry of Labour had a view as follows: 'The 
work most of the immigrants do is of real importance to the country. A system 
which severely curtailed their numbers is not therefore desirable on economic 
grounds, apart from the political difficulties it would create. For this reason the 
simple imposition of a labour permit system such as applies to aliens is considered 
out of the question. It would cut numbers far too drastically'. 66 Instead, the Ministry 
of Labour proposed a three-fold labour permit system: skilled workers; persons 
coming to a specific job, skilled or unskilled, with a named employer-, and other 
unskilled workers. 67 At the CWP(3) meeting on 10 May, this system which was to 
be introduced later in the 1962 Act as the employment voucher system was agreed 
by civil servants to be adopted. 
Apr 61, CAB 134/1469. 
63 Housing Certificates for Intending Immigrants, n. d., attached to CCM(61)5,11 Apr 61, 
CAB 134/1469, para. 3. 
64 CWP(61) 2nd meeting, 29 Mar 61, C01032/303, D0175/54, p. 2, para. 5. 
65 CWP(61) 2nd meeting, 29 Mar 6 1, C01032/303, DOI 75/54, p. 2, para. 6. 
66 CWP(61)10,28 Apr 61, COI 032/304, DO175/54, p. 1, para. 1. 
67 CWP(61) 3rd meeting, 10 May 6 1, CO 1032/304, DO 175/54, p. 1, para. 2. I 
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Cases for deportation were an issue of discussions at a later stage. As well as 
the three conditions for deportation raised in the 1958 draft Deportation Bill - 
conviction of criminal offences liable to imprisonment, undesirability, and living on 
public funds, two further cases were considered at the request of ministers. 68 One 
was the conviction of minor offences by those who were found to have bad criminal 
records in their countries of origin. Civil servants agreed to oppose to include this 
condition as 'there were considerable difficulties of principle and practice in 
including in the Bill a provision of the kind' and as a court could 'recommend any 
offence carrying liability to imprisonment' for which it could recommend also 
deportation. 69 The other case was the deception of the immigration authorities or 
staying on after legitimately entitled to do so. It had also been suggested that it 
might be desirable to take power to attach to entry permits conditions the breach of 
which would involve liability to deportation (i. e. conditional landing). Civil servants 
agreed that these cases should be made to constitute an offence carrying liability to 
imprisonment, thus a court could recommend deportation, as it 'might have a 
deterrent effect for a false statement'. 70 However, they were uncertain about the 
idea of a conditional landing as it would need "internal controls", which would have 
a practical difficulty in terms of enforcement of controls and was thought to have an 
effect to 'discourage assimilation' as well. 71 
68 CWP(61) 7th meeting, 16 Aug 61, C01032/305, D0175/55, pp. 2-3), para. 5. 
69 CWP(61) 7th meeting, 16 Aug 61, C01032/305, D0175/55, p. 3, para. 6. 
70 CWP(61) 7th meeting, 16 Aug 61, C01032/305, D0175/55, p. 5, para. 10. 
71 CWP(61) 7th meeting, 16 Aug 61, C01032/305, DO175/55, p. 5, para. 10. The Ministry of 
Labour was firmly against control based on information about job-seekers. An idea of using the 
medium of the National Insurance scheme run by the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance 
was considered. It was however thought that 'it would be open to grave objections' for using 
information for the purpose other than stated (CWP(61) 7th meeting, 16 Aug 61, C01032/305, 
DOI 7 515 5, p. 6, para. 12). 
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Treasury Is opposition to restriction 
The details of control which were to be introduced in the 1961 Commonwealth 
Immigrants Bill were thus being discussed at the civil servant level even before the 
first recommendation of the ministerial committee CCM to the Cabinet introducing 
legislation to Parliament on 17 May. Meanwhile once turning to cases for control, 
the employment situation at this stage of mid 1961 remained stable. As the Ministry 
of Labour revealed, 'the great majority of immigrants find and keep work without 
undue difficulty' so that 'curtailment of immigration ostensibly on employment 
grounds would not be easy to jUStify'. 72 It was evident that the case for control of 
immigration rested on social grounds, not economic. It was because of this that the 
government had consider the effect on industry of controlling immigration. For civil 
servants at the CWP(3) therefore the question to be solved was 'how to slow down 
the rate of immigration without depriving important industries and services of much 
needed labour'. 73 The proposed three-fold labour permit system was a compromise 
between social and economic considerations. 
It was at this very final stage on the path to legislation, Treasury's views on 
impact of immigration control on the British economy were suddenly to stir up 
controversies in the government. The Treasury, another economic Department, had 
a different view from other Departments. The Treasury was not a member of the 
CWP(3) and thus not participated in discussions about Commonwealth immigration 
either at ministerial level (except at the Cabinet meeting) or at the civil servant 
level. The Treasury shared the view with the Ministry of Labour that immigrants 
made a useful contribution to the productive capacity of the British economy. The 
immigration of unskilled workers benefited the economy, and in this respect, 'there 
72 CWP(61)10,28 Apr 6 1, CO 1032/304, DOI 75/54, p. 1, para. 1. 
73 CCM(61)5, II Apr 6 1, CAB 134/1469, para. 3. 
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was no case for any control on any known economic grounds'. 74 However, there 
was a difference in importance of this view in the priority of the Department 
between the two economic departments. For the Treasury, which had been excluded 
from discussions on Commonwealth immigration, this was the most important 
aspect of Commonwealth immigration and far more important than the social 
consequences. In fact the Treasury's position on Commonwealth immigration was to 
be reflected in the Economic Survey next year (April 1962), which read that 'There 
was an unusually large number of immigrants and school leavers, who were, 
generally speaking rapidly absorbed into employment'. 75 
The Treasury was for the first time invited to the CWP(3) meeting on 14 
July. It was invited in order to discuss financial arrangements of the controls, but it 
resulted in criticising strongly the previous discussions in the CWP(3). 76 At the 
next meeting on 21 July, the Treasury emphasised further that it 'could not associate 
itself with the presentation of the arguments in favour of restriction'. 77 However, it 
was too late for the Treasury to have its view being shared by other Departments. 
The fact at this point of time was, according to the Chairman of the CWP(3) from 
the Home Office, that 'Ministers were already well aware of the social and political 
arguments for restriction' and 'what they wanted know was whether there was any 
74 CWP(61) 5th meeting, 14 Jul 61, C01032/305, DO175/54, para. 14. 
75 Economic Survey, Cmnd. 1678 (London, HMSO, 1962), April 1962, p. 20. The positions of the 
Colonial Office and the Treasury, both of which opposed legislation, were also little different from 
each other. The Colonial Office was opposing legislation, but not necessarily control of irrunigration, 
while what the Treasury was opposing was control of inu-nigration itself. 
76 The Department viewed 'with concern any proposal to increase the establishment of the Home 
Office and the Ministry of Labour in order to implement machinery for keeping out needed I 
manpower from the Commonwealth' (CWP(61)5th meeting, 14 Jul 61, C01032/305, DO175/54, 
para. 14). 
77 CWP(61) 6th meeting, 21 Jul 61, C01032/305, DO175/55, p. 2, para. 4. 
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practicable method of control'. 78 The objections of the Treasury was brought to 
ministerial level ten days later at the CCM meeting on 31 July (CCM(61)3rd). 79 
However, these were mostly dismissed. 
4. Politics of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill 
Jamaican referendum and Cabinet decision 
Conclusions in civil servants' discussions were reported to ministers one after 
another. Measures of control and the three-fold labour permit system were endorsed 
at the CCM meeting on 17 May (CCM(61)2nd). 80 Criteria based on birth or holding 
UK passport, treatments of Irish citizen and evasion from the Irish Republic were 
endorsed also at the CCM meeting on 31 July (CCM(61)3rd). 81 As regards the 
treatment of EEC citizens, the interpretation adopted by the civil servants was also 
adopted by ministers. This was that 'the freedom of citizens of other countries in the 
Community to come here would remain subject to administrative control which 
need be no more liberal than the proposed system of control for Commonwealth 
citizens'. 82 Ministers also endorsed at its meeting on 29 September (CCM(61)4th) 
that the exemption of control of Irish citizens should be made administratively. 83 
78 CWP(61) 6th meeting, 21 Jul 61, C01032/305, D0175/55, p. 2, para. 4. 
79 The Treasury's Financial Secretary (Edward Boyle) claimed that 'the time had not yet come 
when control should be imposed' and made a reservation to legislation: 'although he did not underrate 
the political pressure upon the Goverrunent to control immigration, he was not persuaded of the 
necessity for doing so on economic grounds, and thought that the economic advantage of the present 
level of immigration was overriding' (CCM(61) 3rd meeting, 31 Jul 61, CAB134/1469, p. 2). 
80 CCM(61) 2nd meeting, 17 May 6 1, CAB 134/1469, pp. 4-5. 
81 CCM(61) 3rd meeting, 31 Jul 6 1, CAB 134/1469, p. 3. 4") 
82 CCM(61) 3rd meeting, 31 Jul 61, CAB134/1469, p. 4. 
83 CCM(61) 4th meeting, 29 Sep 6 1, CAB 134/1469, p. 4. 
196 
In September 1961, Jamaica decided in its referendum to withdraw from the 
West Indian Federation. A separate independence for Jamaica distinct from other 
West Indian territories became established. 84 This was a great blow to the UK 
government policy on the West Indies. Ironically, however, in the light of legislation 
on Commonwealth immigration under work, this incident acted to remove the 
largest barrier to proceed legislation. Accordingly, ministers decided at the CCM 
meeting (CCM(61)4th) on 29 September to recommend to the Cabinet for the 
second time that legislation to control Commonwealth immigration should be 
introduced at the beginning of the next Session which was due in one month. 85 The 
revised draft Bill was thus submitted to the Cabinet at its meeting on 10 October 
(CC(61)55th). The Cabinet at last decided in this meeting that 'legislation should be 
introduced in the forthcoming session of Parliament ... to control immigration into 
the United Kingdom from other parts of the Commonwealth' (CC(61)55th). 
It was also raised in the Cabinet meeting the need to give all Commonwealth 
governments advance notice that control was likely to be introduced. The 
Conservative Party Conference was scheduled to discuss Commonwealth 
immigration on the following day, where resolutions on this subject were to be 
submitted. The Cabinet decided that the Home Secretary would not admit, that the 
government had already made a decision to introduce legislation. On the next day at 
the Conference (I I October 1961), delegates voted overwhelmingly in favour of the 
84 Consequently Jamaica became an independent state within the Commonwealth on 6 August 
1962. Other territories with the exception of Trinidad and Tobago agreed to form a new West Indian 
Federation in May 1962 with Federal capital in Barbados. Trinidad and Tobago also decided not to 
remain in the Federation and became independent on 31 August 1962. The new Federation lasted 
until 1966 when Barbados became independent on 30 November 1966. Other members except 
Montserrat and St. Vincent, which remained a dependant territory, attained the internal self- 
government and assumed the status of an associated state with Britain in early 1967. 
85 CCM(61) 4th meeting, 29 Sep 61, CAB 134/1469, p. 2. 
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motion. Meanwhile the Home Secretary (R. A. Butler) in his speech said as follo, %vs: 
'This [to impose some restriction on free entry to the UK] is obviously a matter in 
which we have to have the fullest consultations with overseas Governments and 
Commonwealth Goverm-nents. This must be carried thorough. Also the Conference 
will know that the final decision must be that of Her Majesty's Government and 
must be taken at the time of year when decisions are taken about the forward 
legislative programme. That is the constitutional position, and we cannot go behind 
it'. 86 As Foot commented, these were'clearly, not the words of a man in a hurry'and 
Ino one could have assumed from his speech that he would be moving the Second 
Reading of a control Bill only four week later'. 87 All the Commonwealth 
governments were informed by a telegram from the Colonial Office dated 13 
October that the UK government had decided to introduce legislation to control 
immigration from the Commonwealth. 88 
Preparation of the Bill at ministerial level 
It was expected that the Bill would arouse great controversies once introduced in 
Parliament. A large part of such criticisms of the Bill would be cast in terms of 
relations with the Commonwealth. It was important for the government to keep such 
controversies as low as possible. For this purpose there added a few revisions on the 
Bill at this final moment to avoid criticism in the Parliamentary debates. 
This work involved high political sensitiveness. Special meetings of small 
86 National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, Official Report of the Eighteenth 
Annual Conference (London, National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, 1961). 
p. 33. 
87 Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics, p. 138. 
88 Telegram: Secretary of State for the Colonies to all Governors and Administrators, Acting IM ZD 
Governor-General the West Indies, acting U. K. High Commissioner Singapore: Commonwealth 
immigration into Britain, 13 Oct 6 1, PREM 11/3 93 8. 
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numbers of ministers were set up outside the CCM and further revisions of the Bill 
were discussed there. Two such informal meetings of ministers were held in the 
Cabinet Office on 19 and 26 October. They were attended by the Home Secretary 
(R. A. Butler), the Lord Chancellor (Viscount Kilmuir), the Lord President 
(Viscount Hailsham), the Commonwealth Secretary (Duncan Sandys), the Colonial 
Secretary (Reginald Maudling), the Minister of Labour (John Hare) as well as the 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (lain Macleod, who moved to this post on 9 
October) as the Chairman of the Conservative Party Organisation, and the Treasury 
Parliamentary Secretary (Martin Redmayne) as the Chief Whip. 
Firstly, it was pointed out that there was 'no defensible principle of 
allocation' between the Bill and the Order-in-Council. There was a risk of 
'considerable criticism in Parliament, and possibly from Commonwealth 
Governments' that the Bill was thought to leave too much to discretion. 89 In fact, 
the Cabinet Legislation Committee had recommended to the CCM that the draft Bill 
was revised to 'include all the necessary provisions which were likely to be 
permanent'. 90 Based on this instruction, the Bill was revised, before being 
submitted to the Cabinet meeting on 10 October, to include all those provisions 
whose variation is not expected to be required from time to time. 91 
The second point of revision was the timing of announcement on the 
position of the Irish Republic. As seen above, the government had already decided 
that it would not control the entry of Irish citizens for employment nor impose a 
passport check at the relevant port. The issue on this point was whether or not a 
clear statement should be made at the Second Reading in the Commons. The 
government of the Irish Republic had conveyed to the UK government their 
89 CCM(61) 4th meeting, 29 Sep 61, CAB134/1469, p. 3. 
90 CCM(61) 4th meeting, 29 Sep 61, CAB134/1469, p. 4. 
91 C(61)153,6 Oct 61, CAB 129/107/pt. 1, p. 4, para. 12. 
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willingness to co-operate with the UK to deter evasion of British immigration 
controls via Ireland of British subjects under such controls. It would introduce 
legislation to control British subjects not belonging to the United Kingdom. 
However the Irish government had informed the UK government that it could 
recommend to its ministers the introduction of such legislation only after a clear 
statement by the UK government being made that Irish citizens would be exempted 
from UK controls. 92 
However, for ministers in the UK, a clear indication in the Parliamentary 
debate about the exemption of Irish citizens was politically difficult. They thought it 
unwise 'to give any indication on the Second Reading of the Bill that the 
government intended to strike a bargain whereby the Irish would be excluded from 
the control provided that they operated a similar restriction at their ports on 
Commonwealth immigration'. 93 Accordingly the Home Secretary (R. A. Butler) at 
this point of time decided not to make 'any detailed explanation of the position of 
the Irish on the Second Reading, beyond saying that the Bill applied to them as it 
applied to Commonwealth citizens'. 94 However this decision was to be reversed 
later. 
The third point to be cleared to avoid controversies related to the balance 
with control of aliens. This was particularly important as Britain had decided shortly 
before, in August 1961, to apply for EEC membership. Free movement provisions 
of the EEC Treaty which would allow workers of the member states to enter and 
reside for work in other member states had further attracted public and 
Parliamentary attention than before. It was highly likely that the balance between 
this favourable treatment of EEC workers and the restrictive treatment of 
92 Minutes of a meeting, 26 Oct 61, CO1032/307, p. 2. 
93 Minutes of a meeting, 26 Oct 61, CO1032/307, p. 3. 
94 Minutes of a meeting, 26 Oct 61, CO1032/307, p. 3. 
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Commonwealth immigrants might be contrasted politically. It was important at least 
'to show that Commonwealth immigrants would be treated at least as liberally and if 
possible more so than would European immigrants'. 95 Moreover, it had been 
realised that the existing legislation for the control of aliens was temporary in form, 
i. e. subject to annual renewal. Some ministers hoped, on the one hand, that the 
probable legislation for British subjects needed to be, at least, subject to annual 
renewal, or alien legislation needed to be transformed permanent. The 
Commonwealth Relations Office for its part opposed the idea of adopting annual 
renewal and hoped the duration of the Bill to remain five years as it was drafted. 
The Department was concerned about annual renewal causing 'each year the row ... 
with the Commonwealth countries affected'. 96At this stage ministers adopted the 
latter opinion and decided 'to amend the proposed Bill so as to provide that the 
legislation would continue for five years, with the possibility of an extension at the 
end of that period by Order in Council subject to Affirmative Resolution in 
Parliament'. 97 However, this decision would also be reversed later. 
Introduction of the Bill to Parliament 
On 31 October, the Queen's Speech announced that 'legislation will be introduced to 
control the immigration to the United Kingdom of British subjects from other parts 
of the Commonwealth, and to give powers for the expulsion of immigrants 
convicted of criminal offences'. 98 The Commonwealth Immigrants Bill was 
published on the following day, I November. 99 According to Harold Macmillan, 
95 Minutes of a meeting, 19 Oct 6 1, CO 1032/307, p. 1. 
96 GEN756 2nd meeting, 28 Nov 6 1, CAB 130/180, p. 2. 
97 Minutes of a meeting, 19 Oct 61, C01032/307, p. 2. 
98 House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 'Queen's Speech', House of Commons Official 
Report, Session 1961-62, Vol. 648 (London, HMSO, 1961), 31 October 196 1, cols. 4-7, col. 6. 
99 House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 'Bills Presented', House of Commons Official 
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Prime Minister, 'the storm broke' in Parliament. 100 His memoir read that J have 
never seen the House of Commons in so hysterical a mood since the days of 
Suez'. 101 R. A. Butler, Home Secretary, also wrote later. this was 'by far the most 
controversial of the measures for which I took responsibility as Home Secretary'. 102 
It was clear 'from Press and Parliamentary reaction to the publication of the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill'that the position of the Irish Republic would be the 
major point of controversy. 103 It was 'in this exception [that] lay the heart of 
attack'. 104 Not only the opposition parties, but government supporters also disliked 
the measure, 'especially those who were the greatest enthusiasts for the Empire and 
Commonwealth'. 105 
Reactions to this point were more than expected so that amendment on the 
tactics to carry Parliamentary debates was in a way possible and in the other 
necessary. It was no longer important whether the position of the Irish Republic 
would be concealed in the Second Reading or not. A clear statement about the 
intentions of the UK government that Irish citizens would be exempted from the 
subject of immigration controls was the condition upon which the Irish government 
would amend their own legislation. However, reactions from Parliament and the 
public after the introduction of the Bill to Parliament was much beyond the initial 
expectation of the government. Rather than concealing the details concerning Irish 
citizens, it was felt necessary to emphasise the government's claim that it was for 
Report, Session 1961-62, Vol. 648 (London, HMSO, 196 1), 1 November 196 1, cols. 160-3, col. 16 1. 
100 Macmillan, At the End of the Day 1961-1963, p. 77. 
101 Macmillan, At the End of the Day 1961-1963, p. 79. 
102 Richard A. Butler, The Art of the Possible: The Memoirs of Lord Butler, E. G., C. H. (London, 
Hamilton, 1971), p. 205. 
103 C(61)180,8 Nov 6 1, CAB 129/107/pt. 1, p. 1. 
104 Macmillan, At the End of the Day 1961-1963, p. 80. 
105 Macmillan,. 4t the End of the Day 1961-1963, p. 8 1. 
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practical reasons, not for racial discrimination against coloured people, that the 
controls would not apply to the Irish Republic. 106 
Ministers accordingly changed their strategy on the management of the Bill. 
It was agreed that the Home Secretary should refer to the position of the Irish 
Republic in his statement on the Second Reading. This was accepted by the Cabinet 
meetings on the following day (CC(61)61 st, 9 November 196 1) and reconfirmed on 
the day of the Second Reading (CC(61)63rd, 16 November 1961). It was decided'to 
emphasise that under the terms of the Bill it would be open to the Government to 
impose this control and that they must reserve the right to doSo'. 107 
Appointment of an ad hoc ministerial committee 
Opposition to the exclusion of Irish citizens from control was, however, strong. 
Even among the Departments, the Commonwealth Relations Office fought to apply 
the three-fold voucher system - as amended from labour permit system in 
nomination - also to Irish citizens. 108 For the Commonwealth Relations Office, it 
would be 'less difficult to defend the Bill in the Commonwealth if the ... distinction 
between Irish and Commonwealth citizens were reduced as far as possible'. 109 More 
important for ministers was that there was opposition even among government 
supporters. After the Second Reading Conservative backbenchers indicated to the 
Conservative Party Chairman and Leader of the House (lain Macleod) that they 
would vote against the Bill on the Third Reading unless the Irish were included in 
control provisions. 110 It was evident for ministers that some concessions had to be 
made in place of giving Irish citizens the favourable position to British subjects in 
106 C(61)180,8 Nov 6 1, CAB I 29/107/pt. 1, p. 2. 
107 CC(61) 63rd conclusions, minute 2,16 Nov 6 1, CAB 128/35/pt. 2. 
108 GEN756 2nd meeting, 28 Nov 6 1, CAB 130/180, p. 2. 
109 GEN756 I st meeting, 24 Nov 6 1, CAB 13 0/180, p. 1. 
I 10 Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics, p. 140. 
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the Commonwealth. To give considerations on this subject, an ad hoc ministerial 
committee was hurriedly appointed on the request of the Conservative Party 
Chairman. "' The Committee on Commonwealth Immigrants Bill (GEN756) ýNus 
chaired by the Prime Minister himself and had three meetings (24.28 and 30 
November 1961). The Irish question was, as the Prime Minister (Harold Macmillan) 
perceived, 'essentially a domestic political one for the Government in relation to 
their own supporters'. ' 12 
In preparation for GEN756 civil servants were ordered to examine possible 
measures to be applied to Irish citizens in order to ease domestic oppositions. 
Ministers felt that'The right course would be to adhere to the Government's original 
decision to include Southern Irish [citizens of the Irish Republic] within the scope 
of the Bill but exclude them from its operation'. ' 13 Civil servants thus confirmed 
the existing position of the government, namely: the Bill should be applied to the 
Irish Republic in form, while control was impracticable. 1140n this condition, civil 
servants proposed three possibilities of devising systems of supervision over Irish 
citizens. Possibility A was to require Irish citizens to register with the local Ministry 
of Labour office. This scheme was considered to be practicable. However, unlike in 
the case of Commonwealth citizens, this would mean that 'information could be 
obtained only about those in or seeking employment'. Therefore it might be difficult 
to claim that 'this was ... a control over 
immigration'. 115 Possibility B was to 
require Irish citizens to obtain a Ministry of Labour voucher before coming to the 
II11. Macleod, Leader of the House of Commons, to H. Macmillan, Prime Minister, 17 Nov 6 1, 
PREM 11/3938; P. J. Woodfield, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, to H. Macmillam, Prime 
Minister, 17 Nov 61, PREMI 1/3938. 
112 GEN756 2nd meeting, 28 Nov 61, CAB13)0/180, p. l. 
113 GEN756 2nd meeting, 28 Nov 6 1, CAB 130/180, p. 1. 
114 Report by Officials, n. d., attached to GEN756/3,27 Nov 6 1, CAB 130/180, paras. 1-2. 
115 Report by Officials, n. d., attached to GEN756/3,27 Nov 6 1, CAB 130/180, para. 7. 
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UK on the same basis as Commonwealth citizens, though exempted from control at 
the ports. And Possibility C was to make it an offence for both Commonwealth and 
Irish citizens to enter the UK for the first time without having been examined by an 
Immigration Officer or to accept employment within a specified period without 
permission by the Ministry of Labour. However, these two types of control, 
allowing people in from the Irish Republic but then impeding them from taking 
work, was difficult to justify. This was, like Possibility A, to prevent people 
working in the UK but not to prevent them coming to the UK 'in excessive 
numbers" 16; and, secondly, it was impossible to allow those who legally entered the 
UK but then were refused permission to work, to stay indefinitely on national 
assistance. 117 The Home Secretary felt that possibility A was the least complicated 
and the only practical solution. 118 At the GEN756 meeting on 28 November 
(GEN756 2nd), Possibilities B and C were thus rejected. ' 19 Possibility A, namely, 
that Irish citizens should register with the local office of the Ministry of Labour, was 
agreed to modify so as to cover not only workers but also all Irish citizens coming to 
the UK. 120 They would all be required to fill in a certain form which would be 
issued on ship or aircraft, and be collected by immigration officers on arrival. 
Meanwhile, further revision on the duration of the Bill was also raised as a 
possibility to accommodate opposing voices. There had been indications that some 
sections of the Labour Party would find the proposed legislation to limit 
Commonwealth immigration less objectionable if it could be drafted in such a form 
as to require Parliamentary approval for its renewal annually. 121 At the ministerial 
116 Report by Officials, n. d., attached to GEN756/3,27 Nov 61, CAB130/180, para. 9. 
117 Report by Officials, n. d., attached to GEN756/3,27 Nov 6 1, CAB 130/180, para. 10. 
118 GEN756/3,27 Nov 6 1, CAB 130/180, para. 7. 
119 GEN756 2nd meeting, 28 Nov 6 1, CAB 130/180, p. 3. 
120 GEN756 2nd meeting, 28 Nov 6 1, CAB 130/180, p. 3. 
121 Minutes of a meeting, 19 Oct 6 1, CO 1032/307, p. 1. 
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committee GEN756, it was again suggested that the Bill would be made subject to 
annual renewal similar to the alien legislation and that an assurance should be given 
that the government would be prepared to reconsider its position to the control at the 
end of the first year. 122 Though the Commonwealth Relations Office showed some 
reservation about this idea, ministers at GEN756 finally agreed that legislation 
should run in the first instance for eighteen months and thereafter to be subject to 
annual renewal. 123 
These concessions raised in GEN756 - combination of the registration of 
Irish citizens and the annual renewal of legislation - were approved by the Cabinet 
meeting on 5 December (CC(61)67th). 
Amendments at the Committee stage and thepassing of the Bill 
Two further amendments were added to the Bill at the Commons' Committee stage 
(5 December 1961 - 13 February 1962). An "immigration certificate" system was 
proposed by the Labour Party. This was 'to ensure that an intending traveller from 
the Commonwealth who qualifies for admission to this country [United Kingdom] 
shall be given the opportunity, before making arrangements for his journey, of 
obtaining a document which ensures his admission' to the UK. 124 Civil servants 
agreed in the CWP(3) meeting on 15 December to adopt this proposal. 125 It was 
thought that an introduction of some kind of visa system was desirable both for 
travellers and for carriers as a traveller could in advance 'know before leaving home 
whether or not he would be admitted' 126 and 'the carrying company can tell whether 
122 GEN756 I st meeting, 24 Nov 6 1, CAB 13 0/180, p. 2. 
123 GEN756 2nd meeting, 28 Nov 6 1, CAB 130/180, p. 4. 
124 CWP(62) 1,10 Jan 62, CO 1032/309, DO 175/55, para. 2. 
12S CWP(61) 9th meeting, 15 Dec 61, CO1032/309, DO175/55, pp. 1-2. 
126 CWP(62) 1,10 Jan 62, CO 1032/309, DO 175/55, para. 5. 
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a potential passenger is likely to be refused admission'. 127 
Conservative backbenchers proposed the establishment of a Commonwealth 
Immigration Advisory Council to give advice and assistance on questions of 
immigration policy and the welfare and well-being of immigrants. Regarding this 
proposal civil servants concluded that it was practical to establish a body advising 
on matters connected with welfare; however, such a body should not have any 
responsibility for advising on immigration poliCy. 128 Civil servants thought that 
'immigration policy has to be determined by the Government in the light of many 
and complex considerations, both practical and political'. 129 They feared that 'An 
Advisory Council on immigration policy would almost certainly wish to concern 
itself with the total number of immigrants to be admitted'. 130 Accordingly the Home 
Secretary (R. A. Butler) announced his intention to set up an Advisory Committee 
for welfare in the Commons' Committee on 13 February 1962.131 The 
Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council, as amended from the proposed 
designation, was at last to be 'appointed by the Home Secretary to advise him on any 
matters which he might refer to it from time to time affecting the welfare of 
Commonwealth immigrants in this country and their integration into the 
community'. 132 
127 CWP(62)1,10 Jan 62, C01032/309, D0175/55, para. 6. 
128 CWP(62)1,10 Jan 62, C01032/309, D0175/55, para. 21. 
129 CWP(62)1,10 Jan 62, C01032/309, D0175/55, para. 21. 
130 CWP(62)1,10 Jan 62, C01032/309, D0175/55, para. 21. 
131 CWP(62)10,3 Apr 62, C01032/3 10, D0175/55. 
132 Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council, Report, Cmnd. 2119 (London, HMSO, 1963), 
July 1963, p. 2. The Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council was charged: (i) to examine the 
arran-, ements made by local authorities in whose areas substantial numbers of Commonwealth z: 1 
immigrants have settled to assist immigrants to adapt themselves to British habits and customs, and 
report on the adequacy of the efforts made; (ii) to examine whether the powers of local authorities to 
deal with matters affecting the welfare of immigrants are sufficient, and whether any further action 
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With these amendments, the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill passed the 
Commons on 27 February and then the Lords on 5 April. With the Bill being sent to 
the Lords on 27 February, the date of implementation of provisions in the Bill 
became 'a matter of urgency' to be decided. 133 This issue was discussed at the 
CWP(3) meeting on 6 March. The Home Office hoped Part I of the Bill, namely. 
"Control of Immigration", should be brought into operation 'as soon as practicable, 
and it was most unlikely that any date later than Ist July would be acceptable to 
Ministers', while the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office 
'would find it extremely difficult to do So'. 134 As for Parts II, "Deportation", and 111, 
"Miscellaneous and General", of the Bill, the Home Office hoped that they 'should 
come into force on the same day as the South African Bill - i. e. 31st May'. 135 
Despite differences in opinion at the civil servant level, the Home Secretary finally 
decided the date on 31 May for Parts 11 and 111, and on I st July for Part 1.136 
The Bill received the Royal Assent on 18 April. Accordingly, the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 took in effect on 31 May 1962 for Part 11 
(Deportation) and III (Miscellaneous and General) and on I July 1962 for Part I 
(Control of Immigration). 
*** 
can usefully be taken by the Government to stimulate action by local authorities; and (iii) to examine 
the relationship between action by local offices of Government. Departments and local authorities on 
the one hand, and the efforts of voluntary bodies on the other, in furthering the welfare of 
immigrants. (Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council, Report) 
133 CWP(62) Ist meeting, 6 Mar 62, C01032/3 10, DO175/55, para. 2. 
134 CWP(62) Ist meeting, 6 Mar 62, C01032/3 10, DO175/55, para. 3. 
135 CWP(62) Ist meeting, 6 Mar 62, C01032/310, DO175/55, para. 4. 
136 CWP(62)9,29 Mar 62, CO 1032/3 10, DO 175/55. 
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In the period between 1959 to 1961, civil servants played consistent roles on the 
basis of the official committee CWP(3). This committee regularly monitored the 
situation of immigration and, after the ministerial committee CCM was appointed in 
December 1960, it was to feed ideas to the CCM. The introduction of the Bill had 
virtually become assured by the time of the establishment of the CCM. The critical 
period of the government decision on legislation had been passed between June to 
November 1960 when the Home Office judged the immigration situation had 
changed significantly and voluntary restrictions of the West Indian administrations 
collapsed. In this process during 1959 and 1960, the situation supported the claim of 
the Home Office, and the Department in turn strongly led the discussions among 
civil servants. In this respect, the case for control rested on the strain on the housing 
market and the consequent fear of social tension. 
Relations with Commonwealth governments were, however, significant 
during this period of 1959 to 1961 in two respects, namely, the future of the West 
Indies, and Commonwealth sentiments in general. Jamaican referendum in 
September 1961 had a major influence on the timing of legislation. The West Indian 
Federation was the major concern of the Colonial Office. The Department opposed 
legislation as this might adversely affect the Federation. But it was not necessarily 
opposed to controlling immigration in principle. To avoid legislation it tried to seek 
voluntary restrictions from the West Indies by restricting the issue of passports, 
which however turned out to be a failure by November 1960. Even after that, the 
Colonial Office hoped to postpone legislation until the independence of the West 
Indies. Commonwealth sentiments were put into focus in particular after the 
introduction of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill to Parliament was approved by 
the Cabinet in October 1961. The position of Irish citizens and the duration of 
legislation, in particular as compared with alien legislation, were both thought to be 
damaging to relations with the Commonwealth. Important was that Commonwealth 
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sentiments were at stake in the context of British domestic and Parliamentary 
politics and not necessarily in the context of concrete relations with the 
Commonwealth. The nature of discussion of Commonwealth immigration thus 
changed after the Cabinet approval of legislation in October 1961 and, after that, the 
role of civil servants in the policy process diminished and the sole initiative of 
discussions within the government was taken by ministers and discussions were 
made mainly in the contexts of domestic politics. It was in these circumstances that 
general sentiments about the Commonwealth appeared as the major focus of 
controversies over the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill. 
In contrast to social factors and factors concerned with the Commonwealth, 
economic factors had surprisingly little impact in the government discussions in this 
period. The overall employment situation from 1960 to 1961 was not so bad as to 
require control of immigration purely in this respect. Both the Treasury and Ministry 
of Labour confirmed the need of overseas labour for British industry. This was a 
factor which resulted in the invention of the three-fold employment voucher system; 
however this did not in any sense stand as a determinant of legislation unlike other 
factors. 
Economic factors could have gained more importance as was suggested in 
the Treasury's strong opposition to legislation which appeared in May to July 1961. 
There were two institutional reasons why economic factors were not influential in 
the policy process. Firstly, the Treasury was excluded from the government 
discussion about Commonwealth immigration until mid 1961, when the agreement 
about the introduction of legislation to Parliament had largely been made. As the 
Department in charge of macroeconomics management in general, the Treasury, in 
terms of its rank in the Whitehall and its responsibility for government economic 
policy, could have been an important counterweight to the Home Office, which 
emphasised social factors in government discussions. However, the Treasury failed 
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to secure an institutional basis in, and thus was largely excluded from, the policy 
process of this area. Secondly, and partly due to this, the economic perspective was 
represented only by the Ministry of Labour in the government. As a result, the 
economic dimensions of immigration, especially its valuable contribution to 
alleviating the long-term labour shortage, reducing inflation and contributing to 
economic growth, were neglected in the discussions. The economic contribution of 
immigration was limited to that relating to employment - the real employment 
situation and its short or medium-term prospects. The Ministry of Labour's position 
on immigration was far from considered and was too sensitive to short term changes 
in the employment statistics. For these reasons, the substantial contribution of 
immigration to the economy as a whole was neglected and overwhelmed by social 
and political factors. 
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Chapter 9 Implementation of the New Policy 
The Commonwealth Immigrants Act gave the UK government measures to control 
immigration from the Commonwealth. The importance of Commonwealth 
immigration as a political issue decreased. However this was not the end of the 
government discussions about controlling immigration. There appeared differences 
in views within the government how to implement the employment voucher scheme 
introduced by the Act. This was exacerbated by the rise in applications for vouchers 
from India and Pakistan. Various new measures were invented under the voucher 
scheme in order to cope with this rise in applications. The phase of the policy 
process on Commonwealth immigration shifted to the implementation of new 
policy. 
The passing of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act brought changes in 
government institutions for administering Commonwealth immigration. The Act 
resulted in the Ministry of Labour gaining its importance in the policy process. The 
control by employment using the voucher system assured the Ministry of a major 
place in the government discussions. The initiative by the Home Office was thus 
challenged by the Ministry of Labour. The former hoped that voucher scheme 
should be administered restrictively, while the latter hoped that it should be 
administered liberally. The Ministry of Labour and the Home Office were the two 
most influential Departments in the policy community during this period of 1962 to 
1964. However, the balance of government discussions and thus of policy would 
gradually move again in favour of the Home Office. 
1. Rivalry of the Ministry of Labour and the Home Office 
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The new institutional arrangements 
During the days when the passing of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill in 
Parliament became virtually certain after it passed the Commons' Committee stage 
on 13 February 1962, a plan to renew the ministerial committee and, accordingly, to 
establish a new official committee was being discussed in the Ministry of Labour. 
The principal question after the introduction of the Act was the rate at which 
employment vouchers would be issued. Civil servants of the Ministry of Labour 
were cautious about the Home Office taking initiatives on this issue, which was 
considered to be a job of its own. I To claim its right to initiate policy in this area, 
the Ministry of Labour thought it would be best to renew the institutional 
arrangements. 2 The Ministry of Labour proposed to the Home Office that a new 
official committee chaired by a Ministry of Labour civil servant should be 
established. 3 This proposal was legitimate so that the Home Office had no choice 
but to accept this. However, the Home Office, reluctant to give up initiatives in 
policy, noted that the existing official committee CWP(3) would be kept in 
operation to discuss matters other than the voucher scheme. 4 
I H. F. Rossetti, Deputy Secretary, ML, to Laurence Helsby, Permanent Secretary, ML, 13 Feb 
62, LAB8/2726. 
2A senior civil servant of the Ministry of Labour (H. F. Rossetti, Deputy Secretary) confessed 
this in a minute to his Permanent Secretary, which read as follows: 'Our experience ... 
does not 
encourage me to think that it would be desirable for the voucher scheme, for which our Minister is 
directly responsible, to be considered by a Committee under their [Home Office] Chairmanship. I 
think it is, in principle, appropriate that we should have the Chair. ' (H. F. Rossetti, Deputy Secretary, 
ML, to Laurence Helsby, Permanent Secretary, ML, 13 Feb 62, LA138/2726) 
3 Laurence Helsby, Permanent Secretary, ML, to Charles C. Cunningham, Permanent Under- 
Secretary, HO, 15 Feb 62, LA138/2726- 
4 Charles C. Cunningham, Pen-nanent Under- Secretary, HO, to Laurence Helsby, Permanent 
Secretary, ML, 20 Feb 62, LAB8/2726. 
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The new inter-depar-tmental official committee "Voucher Working Party" 
(code VWP) was decided to be chaired by an Under Secretary of the Ministry of 
Labour (C. J. Maston, Employment Department). The voucher scheme under the 
new Act was supposed to be administered in the light of factors such as 
employment, housing, health, education, opinion in the Commonwealth, and 
assimilation into the community. 5 Accordingly the VWP was represented by eight 
departments - four major departments, i. e. Home Office, Colonial Office, 
Commonwealth Relations Office, Ministry of Labour, and four departments 
concerned with social policy, i. e. Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Ministry of Pensions and National 
Insurance. The Treasury, which had strongly opposed the introduction of the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act, did not have a seat at this civil servant forum also 
at this time. 
At the beginning of the first meeting held on 15 March 1962, the Chairman 
of the new committee clearly delineated the objectives of the committee from that of 
the CWP(3), emphasising that 'the working party [VWP] was not intended to take 
the place of the Home Office working party [CWP(3)], but would limit itself to 
consideration of problems arising from the Voucher Scheme, including the numbers 
of vouchers to be issued'. 6 Many of the members, however, overlapped with that of 
the CWP(3) and it soon proved to be difficult for two official committees to co-exist 
within the same policy community, which led to the virtual winding up of the Home 
Office CWP(3) within a year. 7 
Recommendation hy the VWP 
Minutes of VWP meeting, 15 Mar 62, LAB8/2715, DOI 75/56, LAB8/2726. Z=l 
Minutes of VWP meeting, 15 Mar 62, LAB8/2715, DO 175/56, LAB8/2726, para. I. 
The last confirmed meeting of the CWP(3) was held on 6 April 1962. 
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The initial job of the VWP was to recommend to ministers the rate at which 
vouchers should be issued. At its first meeting the VWP considered the factors 
bearing on the permissible volume of immigration and on the rate of issue of 
vouchers. As above, the main factors that should be taken into consideration, \\ere 
employment, housing, health, education, opinion in the Commonwealth, and 
assimilation into the community. 
The view of departments could not agree on a particular target on the 
number of immigration. Not all departments considered a decrease in immigration 
to be necessary. The Ministries of Labour and Housing supported a slight reduction. 
The Ministry of Labour considered that 'Ministers would insist on some cut in the 
1961 net intake, especially if large numbers continued to come in during the first six 
months of 1962'. 8 While the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations 
Office, both of which hoped to secure sufficient share for Colonies and the 
Commonwealth respectively, were reluctant to cut down severely or at least did not 
wish to press for a reduction. Meanwhile, the Home Office did not show its position 
clearly at the beginning of the new scheme. Reflecting the difference in views. the 
proposed figures of the net annual intake were so wide as to range from 40,000, the 
level of the three years 1955-57, when the question of legislation had been 
considered at the Cabinet, to 120,000, the level at which 'the employment situation 
justified'. 9 
The rate of voucher issue was initially set, when a report to ministers was 
drafted by the Ministry of Labour, on the basis of the annual intake of 70,000 new 
Commonwealth immigrants, the simple average of the net annual intake of the three 
years 1959-61. This figure was, however, reduced to 60,000 at the second meeting 
of the VWP on 10 April. This was the level of the year 1960, 'which in some 
8 Minutes of VWP meeting, 15 Mar 62, LAB8/2715, DO175/56, LAB8/2726, p. 3, para. 10. 
9 Minutes of VWP meeting, 15 Mar 62, LAB8/2715, DO 175/56, LAB8/2726, p. 4, para. 12. Z! ) 
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respects might be considered the last "normal" year for immigration'. 10 This meant 
a rate of issue of almost 6,000 vouchers a month. This figure was finally reported to 
the Minister of Labour. 
As regards the way in which vouchers would be issued, the Ministry of 
Labour preferred the "first come, first served" principle as this was considered to be 
'the simplest and fairest alternative'. " This point had been already discussed at a 
meeting of civil servants held at the Home Office on 10 November 1961 shortly 
before the Commons' Second Reading of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill. The 
meeting was represented by the Home Office, Ministry of Labour, Commonwealth 
Relations Office and Colonial Office. On category C vouchers, the Home Office 
showed reluctance to apply the "first come first served" basis on issuing this 
category of vouchers. The Department thought that 'Ministers might be very 
reluctant to accept a situation in which large numbers of immigrants from Asia were 
admitted ... with the result more acceptable immigrants from the West Indies, and 
still more from the "White Dominions", could not obtain vouchers'. 12 However, 
Commonwealth countries had been told that there would be no "country quotas", 
and in fact 'the Government of Pakistan had expressly asked that applications from 
Pakistanis should in no way be prejudiced'. 13 Therefore civil servants had 
tentatively agreed that 'while applications from each country would have to be taken 
in chronological order, some system of allocation between countries within category 
"C" would have to be devised'. 14 Based on this agreement in October 1961, civil 
servants at the VWP decided to issue vouchers in Category C to persons in each 
country in accordance with the proportion of applications received from that 
10 Minutes of VWP meeting, 10 Apr 62, LAB8/2715, DO 175/56, p. 1, para. 2. 
II Minutes of VWP meeting, 15 Mar 62, LAB8/2715, DO 175/56, LAB8/2726, p. 4, para. 13. 
12 Operation of voucher system: minutes of a meeting, 10 Nov 61, CO1032/308, p. 3. 
13 Operation of voucher system: minutes of a meeting, 10 Nov 61, CO1032/308, p. -3). 
14 operation of voucher system: minutes of a meeting, 10 Nov 61, CO1032/308, p. 3. 
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country. 15 
The view of the Home Office 
As had made at the civil servant level, the renewal of the ministerial committee 
followed. On I May, the existing ministerial committee CCM, which last met on 29 
September 1961, was formally wound up and in its place a new ministerial 
committee, "Commonwealth Immigration Committee" (code CIC), was established 
in order 'To consider problems relating to Commonwealth immigration into the 
United Kingdom'. 16 The CIC was composed of the Lord Chancellor (Viscount 
Kilmuir) as Chairman, ministers of the four major departments - Home Secretary 
(R. A. Butler), Commonwealth Secretary (Duncan Sandys), Colonial Secretary 
(Reginald Maudling) and the Minister of Labour (John Hare), three ministers of 
social service departments - Minister of Housing (Charles Hill), Minister of 
Pensions (John Boyd-Carpenter), and Minister of Health (Enoch Powell), one 
minister from the regional department - Scottish Secretary (John Maclay), one law 
minister - Attorney- General (Reginald Manningham-Buller), and, importantly, one 
minister from the economic department - Treasury Financial Secretary (Edward 
Boyle). In line with the four main departments, the Treasury, which had not been 
given a place in the formation process of the 1962 Act, at last had an institutional 
place in the government discussions. However, the Department still did not have a 
permanent place in civil servant discussions, which were dominated by the above 
mentioned four departments. 
Regardless of the civil servants' agreement in the VWP, ministers were 
divided as to the rate of voucher issue at the first meeting of the ministerial 
committee CIC held on 3 May (CIC(62)lst). The VWP had recommended the rate 
15 Minutes of VWP meeting, 15 Mar 62, LAB8/2715, DO] 75,, '56, LAB8/2726, p. 4, para. 13. 
16 CCM(62) 1,1 May 62, CAB 134/1469; CIC(62) 1,1 May 62, CAB 134/1507. 
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of issue of vouchers 6,000 a month, which would produce the net annual coloured 
immigration of 60,000, approximately the level recorded in 1960. This figure XN-as 
supported by the Commonwealth and Colonial Secretaries and the Treasury 
Financial Secretary on the grounds that 'Assurance had been given that the Act 
would be implemented liberally' and that 'A net annual intake of 60,000 might be 
very helpful as the economy expanded'. 17 
However, there was a view among ministers that the net annual intake of 
60,000 would be excessive. 18 In fact, even at the civil servant level the Home 
Office was doubtful about the figure agreed in the VWP. The Department had a 
'considerable doubt' 'about the degree of social assimilation which had been 
achieved'. 19 It wanted to set a figure as low as possible. The view of the Department 
was that the year 1960 should not be regarded 'as a year of "normal" immigration', 
as the year 1960 was the year whose intake 'led Ministers to conclude that 
legislation must be introduced'. 20 The Department thought, considering that the 
average inflow for the five years 1956-1960 was less than 40,000 a year, 'if we now 
went beyond that figure, the public would wonder why we introduced the Bill'. 21 
Therefore at the CIC meeting on 3 May, the Home Office minister (David 
Renton, Minister of State), proposed, instead of the figure proposed from civil 
servants, the smallest figure ever arguing. He claimed that 'A better view might be 
to regard 1961 as a wholly abnormal year and to aim at a net annual intake which 
corresponded with the average for the previous five years - say 36,000'. 22 
According to the calculations by the Ministry of Labour, the net annual intake of 
17 CIC(62) I st meeting, -3) 
May 62, CAB 134/1507, p. 2. 
18 CIC(62) I st meeting, 3 May 62, CAB 134/1507, p. 1. 
19 CIC(62) I st meeting, 3 May 62, CAB 134/1507, p. 1. 
20 CIC(62)4, II May 62, CAB 134/1507, para. 2. 
21 CIC(62)4, II May 62, CAB 134/1507, para. 2. 
CIC(62) I st meeting, -3) 
May 62, CAB 134/1507, p. 1. 
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60,000 and 36,000 coloured immigrants, meant the monthly rate of voucher issue of 
respectively 6,000 and 4,000.23 
With these differences in views, ministers could not achieve a conclusion. 
The difference between the Home Office and other Departments was unlikely to be 
resolved soon. The Ministry of Labour had already been receiving applications for 
vouchers. Therefore, in the next CIC meeting held on 15 May (CIC(62)2nd), the 
Minister of Labour (John Hare) sought the Committee's approval for temporary 
authority to issue vouchers to applicants only for A and B vouchers namely, 
vouchers for those with specified skills and vouchers for those who obtained the 
offer of a concrete job. This was approved by ministers of the Committee. They 
decided that the Minister of Labour ought 'to consult them again about the issue of 
vouchers under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act when the total of the A and B 
vouchers issued and the pending applications for C vouchers was in the region of 
3,0001.24 
However, this number was not enough even to process applications at the 
initial stage. Civil servants in the Ministry of Labour had pointed out there would be 
a serious delay from the start and they worried that this delay might cause a bad 
impression among Commonwealth goverm-nents. 25 Therefore only two days after 
the above CIC meeting, on 17 May, the Minister of Labour was to obtain a new 
authority from the Committee Chairman (Viscount Kilmuir) to issue up to the total 
of 1,000 vouchers. 26 This was further followed by another authority from 
Committee members that vouchers should be issued at a rate of not more than 500 a 
23 CIC(62)3,11 May 62, CAB 134/1507. 
24 CIC(62) 2nd meeting, 15 May 62, CAB 134/1507, p. 2. 
25 John Hare, Ministry of Labour, to Viscount Kilmuir, Lord Chancellor, 17 May 62, LAB8/2729. 
26 John Hare, Ministry of Labour, to Viscount Kilmuir, Lord Chancellor, 17 May 62, LAB8/2729; 
Viscount Kilmuir, Lord Chancellor, to John Hare, Minister of Labour, 21 May 62, LAB8/2729. 
219 
week (approximately 2,000 a month). 27 
True, this rate 'enabled practically all the applications which had been 
received to be granted'. 28 However, after Ist July, when the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act became operative, a substantial increase in applications was 
expected. According to the calculations by the Ministry of Labour, the rate needed 
to be increased to 4,000 a month (approximately 1,000 a week) 'if a substantial 
backlog of applications was thereafter to be avoided'. 29 This number corresponded 
to the net annual intake of 36,000, which was the lower of the two figures 
considered in the Committee's previous discussions and previously supported by the 
Home Office. 
The Minister of Labour therefore proposed, at the CIC meeting on 28 June 
(CIC(62)3rd), to double the limit to 4,000 a month. However, the Home Office 
opposed this raise of the rate of issue. Though at last a compromising figure of 750 
a week proposed by the Chairman was accepted by ministers on the condition that 
this rate would be effective only until the end of JUly, 30 the differences in positions 
between the Home Office and other Departments towards the rate of issue of 
vouchers was too substantial to be easily resolved. 
In fact the Home Office was regarding the voucher system as the measure to 
restrict immigration so that the Department thought that it should be unnecessary to 
process all the application. Its view expressed in the CIC meeting was that: 'There 
were ... advantages in fixing a rate which would not enable all applications to be 
granted as soon as the formalities had been completed, since otherwise it might be 
27 John Hare, Minister of Labour, to Viscount Kilmuir, Lord Chancellor, 5 Jun 62, LAB8/2729; 
Viscount Kilmuir, Lord Chancellor, to John Hare, Minister of Labour, 6 Jun 62, LAB8/2729; 
CIC(62)5,25 Jun 62, CAB 134/1507, p. 1, para. 1. 
28 CIC(62) 3rd meeting, 29 Jun 62, CAB 134/1507, p. 1. 
29 CIC(62) 
-3 )rd meeting, 
29 Jun 62, CAB 134/1507, p. 1. 
30 CIC(62) 3rd meeting, 29 Jun 62, CAB134/1507, p. 2. 
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suggested that there had been no need to introduce the recent legislation; and if 
there were no effective limitation of immigration at the beginning of the control, it 
might be more difficult to start to refuse or defer applications later'. 31 Meanwhile 
the position of the Ministry of Labour, which was supported by the Commonwealth 
Relations Office in particular, was that: 'Assurances had been given that it [the 
voucher scheme] would be administered liberally, and if this could be demonstrated 
in the figures for vouchers applied for and granted during the first few months, other 
Commonwealth Governments might be less disposed to criticise the way in which 
the Act was operating if later it was necessary to deter a large proportion of 
applications'. 32 The difference in view as to the rate of voucher issue was concerned 
with the purpose of the voucher system - whether it was for rejecting immigration or 
for managing immigration. 
It was between the Home Office and other Departments that the ma*or 
difference in views existed. However this was transformed by the Home Office into 
the one between ministers and civil servants. In this period the Home Office had 
lost the central position among civil servants of the Department concerned. The 
Ministry of Labour took initiatives in the discussion at the official committee VWP. 
The Home Office found it difficult to have its opinion dominate at the civil servant 
level. It therefore tried to avoid the discussion in the VWP and directly brought its 
view into the ministerial committee where the equal institutional status was 
guaranteed to the Home Office and the Ministry of Labour under the chairmanship 
of the Lord Chancellor. As a result, the views and proposals produced at the official 
committee VWP were often dismissed or reversed at the ministerial committee. 
31 CIC(62) 3rd meeting, 29 Jun 62, CAB 134/1507, p. 1. 
32 CIC(62) 3rd meeting, '19 Jun 62, CAB 134/1507, pp. 2-3. It) - 
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2. Resumption of the Initiative by the Home Office 
Impact of the Cabinet reshuffle of July 1962 
This situation was finally to be resolved in favour of the Home Office. Despite this 
Department losing its initiative at the civil servant level, it obtained an institutional 
backing at ministerial level and thus regained initiatives in the whole government 
discussion. In this course the event occurred in July 1962 was especially important. 
This month, following the successive poor records in by-elections, Prime Minister 
(Harold Macmillan) carried out 'the biggest Cabinet reshuffle of the post-war 
period'. 33 In "the night of long knives" on 12/13 July, he sacked seven Cabinet 
members and four junior ministers. 34 
The reshuffle brought radical changes to the circle of those managing 
Commonwealth immigration. Firstly, the ministerial responsibility for the Colonial 
Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office was amalgamated. Duncan Sandys 
was appointed Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and for the Colonies. 
The importance of these two Departments in Whitehall had decreased by this time 
reflecting gradual changes in policy priorities regarding external relations. 35 These 
two Departments were gradually losing status also in the policy community on 
Commonwealth immigration, in which the Ministry of Labour and the Home Office 
were the two major actors after the introduction of the Commonwealth Immigrants 
33 David Childs, Britain since 1945: A Political History (London, Routledge, 3rd ed., 1992), 
p. 140. 
34 Richard Lamb, The Macmillan Years 1957-1963: The Emerging Truth (London, John Murray, 
1995), p. 523; Keith Alderman, 'Harold Macmillan's "Night of the Long Knives" ', Contemporary 
Record, 6,2 (1992), 243-65. 
35 Until October 1963 separate junior ministers were placed in each Department. Both Department 
were mer ed as a single Commonwealth Office in July 1965 (Joe Garner, The Commonwealth Office, 9 :: > 
192j-68 (London, Heinemann, 1978), pAl 1. 
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Act. 
Secondly, there was a large change in membership of the ministerial 
committee CIC, which in fact was the largest change in the history of standing 
ministerial committees on Commonwealth immigration from 1955. Five of the 
eleven members left the committee, including two of the most influential figures. 
Viscount Kilmuir, Lord Chancellor was sacked, and R. A. Butler, Home Secretary, 
was promoted to First Secretary of State. 36 With the exclusion of Lord Chancellor 
from the Committee and the abolition of the Colonial Secretary post, the number of 
the Committee members decreased to nine. 37 Three new members joined the 
Committee. Henry Brooke became Home Secretary from being Chief Secretary to 
the Treasury and Paymaster-General. Michael Noble and Keith Joseph were 
respectively appointed as Scottish Secretary and Minister of Housing. Earl Jellicoe 
became Minister of State at the Home Office. 
The most substantial change in terms of the impact on the policy process 
was the appointment of the Home Secretary as chairman of the Committee. This 
meant that the Home Office resumed its institutional basis for leading the 
government discussion. The initiative in the policy community was thereafter to 
shift towards the Home Office and this led the government policy towards 
restrictiveness. 
Towards greater restrictiveness 
Despite the failed attempt on 28 June to raise the weekly limit of vouchers to 1,000, 
36 The other changes in the Ministerial Conu-nittee was: Reginald Maudling, Colonial Secretary, b 
whose post was abolished, became Chancellor of the Exchequer; John Maclay, Scottish Secretary, 
and Charles Hill, Housing Minister, were both sacked. David Renton, Minister of State of the Home 
Office, an informal member, but important permanent attendant, of the Committee and this policy 
area was also sacked. 
37 CIC(62)7,26 Jul 62, CA13134/1507. 
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the Ministry of Labour was still thinking that 'In order to avoid an embarrassing 
backlog of applications' '38 a weekly issue of 1,000 was necessary. In fact, the 
Ministry of Labour managed to obtain some success in late July when the Minister 
of Labour (John Hare) again sought to raise the rate of voucher issue to 4,000 a 
month or, 1,000 a week, at the first CIC meeting after the large change in 
membership, on 23 July 1962 (CIC(62)4th). The rate was raised to 900 a week from 
750. However, this was the last remarkable success for the Ministry of Labour. 
Two months later in September 1962, the Ministry failed to obtain a iiew 
relaxation. At the CIC meeting on 21 September (CIC(62)5th), the Minister of 
Labour for the third time asked to raise the rate of issue to 1,000 a week. 39 
Applications for vouchers were rising to an average of over 2,000 a week. This 
meant that, if the rate of voucher issue remained at 900 a week, 'the delaý, before an 
applicant could be granted a Category C voucher would be six months or more by 
the end of the year'. 40 
The Home Office minister (Earl Jellicoe) strongly objected another rise. 
Social concerns were raised as had been so in the discussion leading to the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act. It was claimed in the meeting that 'It would be 
very difficult to reduce the rate if it were found that it led to a much larger increase 
in the net coloured intake than had been assumed'. 41 Though the figures for 
unemployment among coloured Commonwealth immigrants showed a slight 
decrease, the number was perceived to be 'still substantially higher than the number 
unemployed a year previously'. 42 Public anxiety about immigration was also raised. 
It was claimed that 'In areas where coloured immigrants had congregated there was 
38 CIC(62) 4th meeting, 23 Jul 62, CAB 134/1507. 
39 CIC(62) 5th meeting, 21 Sep 62, CAB 134/1507, p. 1. 
40 CIC(62) 5th meeting, 21 Sep 62, CAB 134/1507, p. I. 
41 CIC(62) 5th meeting, 21 Sep 62, CAB 134/1507, p. 33. 
42 CIC(62) 5th meeting, 21 Sep 62, CAB 134/1507, p. 3. 4M, 
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a good deal of public resentment about the large numbers "ho were in receipt of 
National Assistance, and the situation contained a political threat to public order'. 43 
The institutional situation had become advantageous for the Home Office. 
The Home Secretary (Henry Brooke), as the Chairman of the CIC, decided to 
maintain the rate at 900 a week. This rate was to be kept for three months until the 
CIC meeting on 10 December 1962, when the CIC decided to change the concept of 
a maximum limit. 
Introduction of "disregarded" vouchers 
At the end of October 1962, the delay in the issue of vouchers had increased to six 
months and, according to calculations by the Ministry of Labour, it was expected to 
reach twelve months in early 1963.44 It had become evident that a revision of the 
process of voucher issue was essential if the limit of voucher issue were to be 
strictly set as it was. Within only four months from its start, the voucher scheme was 
in a serious difficulty and needed its first modification. It had also become evident 
that only a small number (18 per cent) of voucher-holders had arrived in the UK. 45 
As far as India and Pakistan were concerned, this figure was as low as 4 and 3 per 
cent respectively due to the rigid conditions imposed by their governments on the 
issue of passports. 46 The Ministry of Labour had judged that the failure of category 
C applicants to make use of the vouchers issued to them created an unnecessary log- 
jam. 
In these circumstances the Ministry produced a couple of solutions, which 
were brought to the inter-departmental discussion. They were: that vouchers should 
43 CIC(62) 5th meeting, 21 Sep 62, CAB 134/1507, p. 3. 
44 CIC(62) 6th meeting, 30 Oct 62, CAB 134/1507, p. I. 
45 CIC(62) 6th meeting, 30 Oct 62, CAB 134/1507, p. 2. 
46 CIC(62-1) 6th meeting, 30 Oct 62, CAB 134/1507, p. 2. 
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not be issued unless the applicants could prove he/she possessed the travel 
documents necessary to enable the person to come to the UK; that the period for 
which a voucher was valid should be reduced from six months to, for example, 
three months; and that vouchers should show clearly when they were due to expire 
so that the holders should realise how much time they had. 47 The VWP had two 
successive meetings on 15 and 23 November and accepted the Ministry of Labour's 
proposal to exempt the vouchers issued to Indians and Pakistanis who did not 
provide passport details from counting in the limit until they were collected, with a 
valid passport being shown. 48 The Commonwealth Relations Office for its part had 
a worry about this proposal as it 'would entail special administrative arrangements 
discriminating against India and Pakistan which could cause us great embarrassment 
if they became known publicly'. 49 Nevertheless, the Ministry of Labour decided to 
propose to the ministerial committee CIC to set the limit of 600 a week for this new 
categories of exempted applications, as well as to keep the current limit of ordinary 
issue at 900 a week. 
The proposal of the new measures was supported by ministers at the CIC 
meeting on 10 December (CIC(62)7th), though there was some reservation from the 
Commonwealth Relations Office, that 'a practical way of dealing with a problem 
which caused injustice to Commonwealth countries other than India and Pakistan'. 50 
Ministers endorsed the Ministry of Labour proposal that a maximum of 600 a week 
47 CIC(62) 6th meeting, 30 Oct 62, CAB 134/1507, p. 2. 
48 Main Conclusions of Informal VWP Meetings, 15 and 23 Nov 62, LA138/2715, DOI 75/56, p. 2. 
Meanwhile, the reduction of period of validity of vouchers was rejected on the ground that 'This 
would not necessarily have the effect of clearing the back-log more quickly and was almost certain to 
increase the volume of work on renewals, and the inconvenience caused to applicants' (Main 
Conclusions of Informal VWP Meetings, 15 and 23 Nov 62, LA138/2715, DOI 75/56, p. 1). 
49 CIC(62) 7th meeting, 10 Dec 62, CAB 134/1507, p. 33. 
50 CIC(62) 7th meeting, 10 Dec 62, CAB 134/1507, p. 4. 
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vouchers would be issued for applications from Indian and Pakistanis without 
showing valid passports. At the same time, however, they decided to reduce the 
weekly rate of the issue of other vouchers from 900 to 750. This was because the 
Home Secretary (Henry Brooke) strongly demanded that restrictive measures should 
be taken. He was of the opinion that, given the high and rising rate of 
unemployment, 'the Government ought not to do anything likely to increase the 
number of Commonwealth immigrants actually arriving'in the UK. 51 Therefore. he 
claimed that 'at the very least, if the proposals by the Minister of Labour were 
adopted, the weekly rate of issue of vouchers should be reduced' and this opinion at 
last became the ground on which the rate of voucher issue was reduced. 52 
Introduction of the "one-quarter rule" 
The new scheme of "disregarded" vouchers worked well for the time being. Delays 
in the issue of vouchers were reduced to below six months in January 1963.53 
Ministers confirmed at the CIC meeting on 23 January 1963 (CIC(63)lst) that the 
new scheme 'appeared to have worked satisfactorily'. 54 The arrangements were to 
be continued until July 1963 by decisions at three meetings of January, March and 
May 1963 (CIC(63)lst, 2nd, 3rd). 
However, from the end of 1962, a change in situations had occurred. Due to 
a relaxation of passport control by the government of Pakistan, there had been a 
marked increase in applications for C vouchers from Pakistan. 55 According to a 
Ministry of Labour memorandum sent to the VWP in late February 1963, the 
situation was as follows: 'When the scheme started, India took an early lead over all 
ýl CIC(62) 7th meeting, 10 Dec 62, CAB 134/1507, pp. 3-4. 
52 CIC(62) 7th meeting, 10 Dec 62, CAB 134/1507, p. 4. 
53 CIC(63) I st meeting, 23 Jan 63, CAB 134/1508. 
54 CIC(63 )) I st meeting, 2-33 Jan 63, CAB 134/1508, p. 2. I 
C IC(63 )) 2nd meeting, 20 Mar 63, CAB 134/1508, p. 1. 
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other countries within category "C", and by the end of November, 1962, had put in 
17,257 applications (50% of the category "C" total), compared with Pakistan's 9,281 
(27%). From December onwards Indian applications dropped away and Pakistani 
ones increased very rapidly, until by 15th February, 1963, Pakistan had put in 
24,241 applications (44% of the total), compared with India's 20,307 (37%). Thus at 
this date the two countries between them accounted for 81% of all category "C" 
applications'. 56 The Ministry came to worry more than ever about the impact of the 
log-jam of applications to countries other than India and Pakistan. 57 A raise in the 
rate of "disregarded" vouchers was not effective considering the relaxation of the 
issue of passports in Pakistan. 
The problem was felt to be concerned with the "first come, first served" 
principle of issuing vouchers. The Ministry of Labour had in mind a couple of 
alternative measures to the "first come, first served" principle. At first, the idea to 
limit applications from Pakistan feeding into the examination queue was proposed 
to the other Departments in April. This was to set up a limit within which the 
number of category C applications from Pakistan to feed each month into the main 
queue. In the VWP meeting on 19 April this proposal was accepted. 58 In the 
negotiation between the Ministry of Labour and the Commonwealth Relations 
Office, the limit was tentatively set at 2,500 a month. 59 However, this arrangement 
would need an agreement by the Government of Pakistan and the negotiation was 
rejected by the UK High Commissioner in Pakistan. When asked about this by the 
Commonwealth Relations Office, he expressed 'considerable doubts about its 
56 Category 'C' applications from India and Pakistan: Effect on 'first come, first served', n. d. [25 
Feb 62], LA138/2715, LAB8/2860. 
57 CIC(63)4,9 May 63, CA13134/1508. 
58 Conclusions of informal VWP meeting, 19 Apr 63, LA138/2715, D0175/56. 
59 CIC(6-3)4,9May63, CABI34/l508. 
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acceptability to the authorities' of Pakistan. 60 The proposal to limit applications 
from Pakistan feeding into the examination queue was thus failed. 
Secondly, the Ministry of Labour proposed in mid June to set up a limit of 
1,100 a month for each country on the number of Category C applications feeding 
into the examination queue. 61 This plan would be, the Ministry of Labour thought, 
preferable to the previous one aimed only at Pakistan. However, this plan was 
opposed by the Home Office. The Home Office thought that the plan was too 
complicated, and moreover, it would in fact result in guaranteeing a quota of 1,100 a 
week to India and Pakistan even if the total number of voucher issue was reduced. 62 
A quota system was an idea which had been consistently opposed within the 
government. 
Both plans proposed by the Ministry of Labour were consequently rejected. 
The Home Office, instead, proposed to the Ministry of Labour in late June an idea 
to set up a limit on the issue of vouchers for each country to one quarter or one third 
of the total number of voucher issue in a specific period. 63 This idea was supported 
by the Colonial Office which disliked a quota system. 64 
In the meantime, the high rate of applications from Pakistan continued and 
applications from India also increased. 65 Some measures, probably more radical 
60 CIC(63)5,3 Jul 63, CAB134/1508, p. 3, para. 10. 
61 A. M. Morgan, Assistant Secretary, ML, to R. F. Wood, Assistant Secretary, HO, 19 Jun 63, 
LAB8/2860. 
62 R. F. Wood, Assistant Secretary, HO, to A. M. Morgan, Assistant Secretary, ML, 20 Jun 63), 
LA138/2860. 
63 R. F. Wood, Assistant Secretary, HO, to A. M. Morgan, Assistant Secretary, ML, 20 Jun 63, 
LAB8/2860. 
64 T. C. Jerrom, Assistant Secretary, CO, to A. M. Morgan, Assistant Secretary, ML, 25 Jun 63, 
LA138/2860. 
65 By early July, the waiting period for the issue of aC voucher had swollen to three years. 90,000 
applications for C vouchers were outstanding from India and Pakistan, and 6,000 new applications 
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ones were needed to deal with the log-jam of applications. In these circumstances 
the Ministry of Labour decided to make concessions. Accepting the suggestion by 
the Home Office, the Ministry of Labour proposed three measures to the ministerial 
committee CIC. They were: to stop all further issue of "disregarded" vouchers; 
instead to raise the weekly rate of issue from 750 to 900 vouchers, and, to arrange 
no Commonwealth country receiving more than one quarter of the total number of 
category C vouchers issued in any one week. 66 With these measures, the waiting 
period for applications from countries other than India and Pakistan should 'be kept 
within reasonable JiMitS'. 67 
Ministers in the CIC meeting of 8 July (CIC(63)4th) accepted to introduce 
the proposed "one-quarter rule" and to stop the issuing of "disregarded" vouchers. 
However, with regard to raising the voucher issue from 750 to 900, the Home 
Secretary as the Chairman of the Committee concluded to continue the weekly rate 
of 750.68 The Home Office was strongly opposed to any relaxation. The view of the 
Department was that: 'Since the number of vouchers taken up had been rising and it 
was difficult to be sure that even on the present quotas the net coloured immigration 
in the coming year would not go markedly above the total for the past twelve 
months'. 69 
3. Change in the View of the Ministry of Labour 
were being received each week from these two countries (CIC(63) 4th meeting, 8 Jul 63, 
CAB134/1508). 
66 CIC(63)5,3 Jul 63, CAB134/1508, p. 3, para. 12. 
67 CIC(633) 4th meeting, 8 Jul 63, CAB134/1508, p. 2. 
68 CIC(63) 4th meeting, 8 Jul 63, CAB134/1508, p. 3. 
69 CIC(63) 4th meeting, 8 Jul 63, CAB1314/1508, p. 3. 
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Endorsement of reduction in voucher issue 
In October 1963, with the sudden resignation of Harold Macmillan due to illness, 
Alec Douglas-Home (the Earl of Home) succeeded him as Prime Minister. Henrv 
Brooke (Home Secretary) and Duncan Sandys (Commonwealth Secretary) remained 
in office. Replacing John Hare, Joseph Godber was promoted from Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs to Minister of Labour. Meanwhile, Norman Brook had already 
been succeeded by Burke Trend as Cabinet Secretary in January 1963. The new 
ministerial committee CCI was appointed shortly afterwards. Composition and 
terms of reference of the CCI were exactly the same as its predecessorCIC. 70 
While the voucher scheme was successively modified by the introduction of 
"disregarded" vouchers and the "one-quarter rule", the net entry to the UK had 
shown a gradual increase towards the autumn of 1963. The net immigration to the 
UK during the two months of July and August in 1963 reached 10,000. In particular 
the arrival of voucher holders was increasing. From May to August, the monthly 
figure of their arrival changed from 1,944,2,589,3,103, then 3,248. Of the figures 
of July and August, more than 3,000 in each month comprised India and Pakistan. 
These indicated that the net annual immigration of coloured immigrants would be 
some 50,000 to 60,000, which was as large as in 1960, the year when the Home 
Office finally decided to put forward legislation. 71 In the meantime applications for 
vouchers had further increased, in particular those from India. By the end of 
September 1963 there were 207,000 applicants in the queue for C vouchers, of 
whom 9,000 were from countries other than India and Pakistan. 72 
The large increase in the arrival of voucher holders alarmed both civil 
servants and ministers. A completely new principle for the issuing of vouchers was 
70 CCI(63)], 25 Oct 63, CAB134/1468. 
71 CIC(633) 5th meeting, 2 Oct 63, CAB] 34/1508, p. l. tý 
72 CCI(6-3 )) I st meeting, 6 Nov 63, CAB 134/1468, p. 1. 
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inevitable. Under these circumstances the position of the Ministry of Labour 
towards the voucher scheme was to change. Giving up its previous idea, the 
Ministry decided in September 1963 to propose urgently two measures aiming at 
restricting immigration. They were a drastic reduction of the rate of voucher issue 
and a moratorium on applications of C vouchers from India and Pakistan. 73 The 
unexpected increase in immigration was largely due to the taking up of 
"disregarded" vouchers as a result of the relaxation of passport controls in India and 
Pakistan. 74 The last "disregarded" vouchers, which was issued at the end of July, 
would not expire until the end of January 1964. "Disregarded" vouchers issued to 
these two countries were being taken up in considerable numbers. Claimed 
"disregarded" vouchers, together with vouchers issued to "applicants with priority" 
(C vouchers for which priorities was given to persons who had served in the British 
armed forces), had exceeded the numbers available for India and Pakistan under the 
flone-quarter rule". 75 In fact the number of claimed "disregarded" vouchers were not 
counted against the quota for India and Pakistan. This arrangement might not only 
'appear unfair to other Commonwealth countries"76 but also was felt to be 
undesirable in the light of the anxiety about the increasing influx. 
However, it was difficult to put the claimed "disregarded" vouchers subject 
to the "one-quarter rule". If "disregarded" vouchers were to be counted against the 
quota, it was highly likely that these countries would 'complain that they were not in 
fact receiving the 25 per cent which they had been told they would be allowed under 
the new arrangements'. 77 The current arrangements were therefore left in place until 
73 CIC(63) 5th meeting, 2 Oct 63, CAB134/1508, p. 1; CIC(63) 6th meeting, 7 Oct 63, 
CAB 1-3 )4/1508, p. 1. 
74 CIC(63)9,25 Sep 63, CAB134/1508. 
75 CIC(63) 5th meeting, 2 Oct 63, CAB 134/1508, p. 1. 
76 CIC(63) 5th meeting, 2 Oct 63, CAB 134/1508, p. 2. 
77 CIC(63) 5th meeting, 2 Oct 63, CAB 134/1508, p. 2. I 
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the last "disregarded" voucher expired in January 1964. In the meantime, the claim 
for "disregarded" vouchers was to remain a factor outside of the UK government's 
control. It was impossible for the British government to control immigrants coming 
with valid vouchers. 
On this condition, a restriction of the fresh issue of vouchers appeared as a 
major subject of discussion. According to the calculations by the Ministry of 
Labour, the effect of the reduction in the rate of voucher issue was that: the figure of 
600 vouchers a week would'allow a small flow of C vouchers to all Commonwealth 
countries'; the figure of 500 a week would 'make it possible to deal with Forces 
priority C vouchers'; and the figure of 400 a week would 'provide only for A and B 
vouchers'. 78 Accordingly, ministers had two successive CIC meeting on 2 and 7 
October (CIC(63)5th, 6th). At the meeting of 7 October ministers decided to reduce 
the issue of vouchers from 750 a week to 500, as well as that the new issue of C 
vouchers to India and Pakistan should be suspended for the time being 
(CIC(63)6th). 79 
With this reduction, the revision of the criteria of issuing A and B vouchers 
became essential to keep C vouchers. Both the Commonwealth Relations Office and 
the Colonial Office opposed the elimination of C vouchers and wanted to keep a 
small number of C vouchers for areas such as the West Indies, St Helena and the 
Falkland Isles. 80 At an informal meeting of the VWP on 24 October attended by the 
Ministry of Labour, Home Office, Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations 
Office, a package of plans to shape up the criteria for A and B vouchers was 
proposed by the Ministry of Labour and was accepted. 81 These were: for A 
78 CIC(63) 6th meeting, 7 Oct 63, CAB 134/1508, p. 1. 
79 CIC(63) 6th meeting, 7 Oct 63, CAB 134/1508, p. 1. 
80 Minute by A. M. Morgan, Assistant Secretary, ML, n. d. [17 Dec 63], LAB8/2860; Background 
note on the attitude of other Departments, n. d. [Nov 64], LAB8/2715. 
81 Note for meeting, 24 Oct 63, DOI 75/58. 
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vouchers, (i) the current working rules of the Ministry of Labour should in respect 
of a genuine vacancy of job be endorsed; (ii) more evidence should be required from 
an employer for the applicant; (iii) the requirement of attachment of photograph in 
the application form should be extended to A voucher applications from India and 
Pakistan; (iv) vouchers should be transmitted through official channels, not through 
employers; (v) available and suitable local labour should always be brought to the 
notice of the prospective employers. For B vouchers, (i) male shorthand typists 
should be excluded from the list of category; (ii) the teacher's vouchers should only 
be issued to applicants whose qualifications are acceptable in the UK; (iii) graduates 
should be accepted only if they had at least two years employment in suitable work 
in the home territory following graduation. 82 This modification of the working rules 
for the A and B voucher issue was basically endorsed by ministers at the first 
meeting of the new ministerial committee CCI under the Douglas-Home 
government, held on 6 November (CCI(63) I st). 
Despite the agreements among civil servants and endorsement by ministers, 
the Home Office for its part wanted the smallest possible number of voucher issue, 
i. e. 400 vouchers a week. 83 At the CCI meeting on 6 November (CCI(63) I st), the 
Department proposed a further reduction to 400 vouchers a week. 84 This not only 
meant the total elimination of C vouchers but also contained a risk 'to make it 
impossible to issue A and B vouchers to all those who qualified for them' as 'More 
than 400 applications for A and B vouchers were coming in each week and the 
figure was likely to increase'. 85 The Ministry of Labour hoped to maintain the level 
of 500 a week. The Commonwealth Relations Office also opposed a further 
82 CCI(63)4, I Nov 6' ), CAB 134/1468, Appendix 111, p. 4, paras. 12-3. 
83 Note for meeting, 24 Oct 633, D0175/58. 
84 CCI(63) I st meeting, 6 Nov 63, CAB 134/1468, p. 1. 
8s CCI(63) I st meeting, 6 Nov 63, CAB 134/1468, p. 1. 
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reduction on the ground that it would eliminate C vouchers, which 'would bear 
particularly hard on the West Indies' and this would 'give added prominence to the 
disregarded vouchers taken up in India and Pakistan'. 86 
However, the increase in the arrival of voucher-holders was expected to 
continue. According to the Home Office. 'the upward trend of immigration in the 
third quarter of 1963, together with the substantial number of vouchers outstanding 
and the many more Indian and Pakistani dependants arriving, suggested that net 
immigration in the second year of control might reach 60,000'. 87 Ministers at last 
decided on a reduction in voucher issues to 400 a week. 
Moratorium of C voucher applicationsfrom India and Pakistan 
As well as conceding on the point of the reduction in voucher issue, the Ministry of 
Labour was also considering from no later than June a moratorium on applications 
for non-priority C voucher from India and Pakistan. 88 The rate of issue of all 
vouchers was set at 400 a week, that is, approximately 20,000 a year. Meanwhile, 
there were more than 200,000 applicants outstanding for C vouchers at the end of 
September 1963, of whom only 9,000 were from countries other than India and 
Pakistan. 89 Moreover, as had explained above, the issue of C vouchers for 
applications from India and Pakistan had already been suspended since October. It 
was unrealistic to continue to take the stance to allow vouchers to all applicants in 
India and Pakistan. 
However, a moratorium of applications was felt to involve political 
difficulties as this would be a large change in policy. In particular a moratorium 
86 CCI(63) I st meeting, 6 Nov 63, CAB 134/1468, p. 1. 
87 CCI(63) I st meeting, 6 Nov 63, CAB 134/1468, p. 1. 
88 A. M. Morgan, Assistant Secrýtary, ML, to R. F. Wood, Assistant Secretary, HO, 19 Jun 6' 3, 
LAB8/2860. 
89 CC 1(63) 1 st meeting, 6 Nov 63, CAB 134/1468, p. 1. 
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limited only to India and Pakistan might be interpreted as discrimination to these 
two countries. Though a Commonwealth-wide moratorium was suggested as an 
alternative and at last the Ministry of Labour decided to propose to ministers a 
Commonwealth-wide moratorium on new non-priority C applications, this was still 
a large change in policy and thus contained political difficulties. " 
This issue was brought to the CCI meeting on 25 February 1964 
(CCI(64)1 st). It was explained that the measure 'could most conveniently be applied 
to India and Pakistan alone, but for political reasons it might have to be applied to 
the Commonwealth as a whole'. 91 Ministers at this meeting postponed a decision, 
and instead they instructed the Commonwealth Relations Office representative 
(John Tilney, Parliamentary Under- Secretary) to consider ftirther before making a 
decision. 92 This was thought to bring difficulties both in terms of relations with the 
Commonwealth and of British domestic politics. 
However, for civil servants it was felt that there was no way but to introduce 
a moratorium to avoid unexpected confusions which might be caused by the delay. 
In late February 1964, outstanding applications increased to nearly 300,000 
applications, 150,000 from India and 120,000 from Pakistan. This meant 'New 
applicants from these countries would not receive a voucher for about fifty years'. 93 
Civil servants at the VWP meeting on II May confirmed again that 'a moratorium 
on non-priority applications from India and Pakistan was inevitable'. 94 
90 This was also opposed by the Commonwealth Relations Office which hoped for a small number 
of vouchers for other areas such as the West Indies and poorer Colonial territories (Note of 
decisions, 10 Dec 63, LAB8/2715, D0175/58, paras. 7; Proposed alternative to moratorium on non- 
priority applications, Apr 64, LAB8/2715, para. 2; Back ground note on the attitude of other 
Departments, n. d. [Nov 64], LAB8/2715). 
91 CCI(64) I st meeting, 25 Feb 64, CAB 134/1468, p. 1. 
92 CCI(64) I st meeting, 25 Feb 64, CAB 134/1468, p. 2. 
93 CCI(64) I st meeting, 25 Feb 64, CAB 134/1468, p. 1. 
94 Note of meeting (draft), II May 64, LAB8/2715, para. 8. 
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The timing of the announcement was a particularly sensitive issue at this 
time in the political timetable. Two important events were near at hand. The 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference was due in JUly. 95 In the past two 
meetings in 1961 and 1962, there had been fierce controversies over the apartheid 
policies of South Africa and its membership, and also over the British application to 
the European Economic Community (EEC). 96 A general election was also due 
within five months. With these political agendas in mind, the Commonwealth 
Relations Office preferred the announcement of a moratorium to precede the Prime 
Ministers' Conference. 97 Accordingly, on 5 June, the Minister of Labour (Joseph 
Godber) announced in the written answers to the Commons that no non-priority 
Category C Indian and Pakistan application would be accepted for the time being. 98 
4. Plans for a Change in Policy 
Suspension offurther Cabinet decisions 
With the high rate of inflow from mid 1963, the social impact of immigration had 
been much concerned about by the Home Office. 99 By mid April 1964, the 
Department had confirmed its position to further reduce the rate of voucher issue 
95 The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conferences were held almost every year in the early 
1960s. The number of the countries attending the conference had been increased with the rapid 
expansion in membership due to independence of African countries. Accordingly, pressure from 
Commonwealth countries in the conference had been increased. 
96 Gamer, The Commonwealth Office, 1925-68, pp. 349-50. 
97 Note of meeting (draft), II May 64, LA138/2715, para. 9. 
98 House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 'Commonwealth Immigrants (Vouchers)', House of 
Commons Official Report, Session 1963-64, Vol. 695 (London, HMSO, 1964), 5 June 1964, 
col. 216w. 
99 CM(64) 25th conclusions, minute 7,30 Apr 64, CAB 128/38/pt. 2. 
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from 400 a week. True, alteration of the scheme for A and B vouchers had created 
some 'room, in a total of 400 a week, for the issue both of B vouchers and of a 
limited number of C vouchers'. 100 However, a further reduction meant the total 
elimination of C vouchers. At this stage where a moratorium of application for C 
vouchers from India and Pakistan almost being definitive though not yet formally 
being announced by the govenu-nent, the Commonwealth Relations Office came to 
accept a further gradual reduction of the rate of issue of vouchers and even the 
'elimination in category C. 101 
Elimination of C vouchers was an important political decision. This would 
be an important departure from the current government policy and therefore should 
be notified in advance to Parliament. Elimination of C vouchers 'would be 
inconsistent with the Government's statements in Parliament during the debates on 
the Bill'. 102 Accordingly, the government discussion on Commonwealth 
immigration was again raised to Cabinet level, for the first time since the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act came into force in July 1962. 
At the Cabinet meeting on 30 April (CM(64)25th), the issue was raised by 
the Home Secretary (Henry Brooke). He explained that the possibility of the 
elimination of C vouchers had become an issue, which, however, needed to be 
announced in Parliament well in advance. 103 At the same time it was explained that 
a radical change in policy would be very controversial because a general election 
was due by October, and a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference was 
scheduled in July. These political factors worked strongly in ministers' decision. The 
Cabinet finally decided to shelve the issue for the time being and would not take any 
100 CCI(6-')') 2nd meeting, 19 Dec 63, CAB 134/1468, p. 1. 
101 CM(64) 25th conclusions, minute 7,30 Apr 64, CAB128/38/pt. 2. 
102 CM(64) 25th conclusions, minute 7,30 Apr 64, CAB 128/38/pt. 2. 
103 cf CP(64)89,17 Apr 64, CAB 129/117/pt. 2, p, 3, para. 12. 
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decisions before the general election about a major change in policy on 
Commonwealth immigration. 104 
However, at the same time, the Cabinet decided that in the meantime the 
government should give a comprehensive review on the voucher scheme for the 
new administration after the election in case the abolition of non-priority C 
vouchers became necessary. It was therefore decided that the Home Secretan 
should consider 'whether, on the assumption that the present policy as regards 
Commonwealth immigrants would be maintained, there would nevertheless be 
advantages in some gradual reduction in the rate of issue of category C vouchers'. 105 
The impact of the economy 
As the number of the issuing of vouchers was reduced so the economic perspectn,! e 
gradually gained in importance. A further reduction might lead to a reduction in 
essential labour for British industry. In fact, it was pointed out in the above Cabinet 
meeting on 30 April, that 'Any marked change of policy at the present time would 
be undesirable on broad political grounds, particularly since the social implications 
of the present rate of immigration had to be weighed against the advantages of an 
additional supply of labour'. 106 
Since the summer of 1963, the economic dimension had been occasionally 
raised in government discussion. Two reports about economic surveys of 
immigration were produced by civil servants for ministers. At the CIC meeting on 2 
October (CIC(63)5th), a report on the existing survey of the social and economic 
effects of coloured immigration was submitted. This was Prepared by the Home 
Office in collaboration with the Treasury, the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry 
104 CM(64) 25th conclusions, minute 7,30 Apr 64, CAB 128/38/pt. 2. 
105 CM(64) 25th conclusions, minute 7,30 Apr 64, CAB 128/38/pt. 2. 
106CM(64) 25th conclusions, minute 7,30 Apr 64, CAB] 28ý38/pt. 2. 
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of Health. 107 The origin for this report was the statement of the Minister of Health 
(Enoch Powell) at the CIC meeting on 8 July 1963 (CIC(63)4th) that in some urban 
areas nearly half the maternity beds were occupied by coloured immigrants. 
Ministers at the CIC had then instructed the Home Secretary to 'arrange for officials 
to collate for the information of the Committee particulars of current research into, 
and information about, the social effects and the economic advantages and 
disadvantages of coloured immigration'. 108 
The report by civil servants submitted at the CIC meeting on 2 October 
showed, according to the Home Secretary, 'a considerable amount of work on the 
social effect of coloured immigration but a comparatively dearth of information 
about economic factors'. 109 Ministers therefore decided that the Treasury and the 
Ministry of Labour should 'consider in more detail and in consultation with other 
Departments as necessary what particular lines of research into economic aspects of 
coloured immigration could be most usefully pursued and by what means'. I 10 
The second examination on the surveys of economic aspects was carried out 
by the Treasury, the Ministry of Labour, the Home Office and the General Register 
Office. "' Their report was submitted to the CIC from the Treasury eight months 
after, at its meeting on 6 July 1964 (CCI(64)2nd). The report concluded that an 
107 R. F. Wood, Assistant Secretary, HO, to 0. L. Williams, Assistant Secretary, Treasury, II Sep 
63, LAB8/2867; H. N. Roffey, Assistant Secretary, MH, to R. F. Wood, Assistant Secretary, HO, 26 
Sep 63, LAB8/2867. 
108 CIC(63 )) 4th meeting, 8 Jul 63, CAB 134/1508, p. 4. 
109 CIC(63) 5th meeting, 2 Oct 63, CAB 134/1508, p. -3. 
I 10 CIC(63) 5th meeting, 2 Oct 63, CAB 134/1508, p. 3. 
IIIR. F. Wood, Assistant Secretary, HO, to John Boreham, Chief Statistician, GRO, I Nov 63, 
LAB8/2873; A. M. Morgan, Assistant Secretary, ML, to John Boreham, Chief Statistician, GRO, 15 
Nov 63, LAB8/2873; 0. L. Williams, Assistant Secretary, Treasury, to John Boreham, Chief 
Statistician, GRO, 27 Nov 63, LAB8/2873; Meeting in the Treasury, 19 Dec 63, LAB8/2873; 
Meeting in the Treasury, 7 Feb 64, LAB8/2873. 
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independent survey would be 'difficult and costly, and the information obtained 
might not be in all respects satisfactory'. ' 12 Therefore it recommended that'a survey 
based on information specially extracted from the 1966 Sample Census' should be 
conducted. 113 
Among ministers, there was a common recognition that'important decisions 
on Commonwealth immigration might be required before 1966 [,, N-hen the Sample 
Census would be carried out] 1.114 A large revision of the voucher scheme, in 
particular the abolition of C vouchers, would be an important task immediately after 
the general election. The view of ministers was divided on the need to conduct a 
survey before the 1966 Sample Census. This was mainly due to the difference in 
emphasis on the importance of economic factors concerning Commonwealth 
immigration. On the one hand, the Treasury's Economic Secretary (Maurice 
Macmillan) claimed that, as 'the Survey results could not be obtained quickly, it 
might then be important for the Governinent to show that they were taking steps to 
obtain more information about the role of immigrants in the econorny'. "5 On the 
other hand, the Home Office minister (Lord Derwent) claimed that, though 
'Immigrant workers were generally known to be making a useful contribution to the 
labour force and it was equally well known that their tendency to congregate, with 
their families, in certain areas brought social problems', 'It was the latter aspect of 
immigration, rather than the former, which attracted public interest and concern'. 116 
There were doubts on whether the detailed information on economic aspects 'could 
have a significant bearing on major decisions'. ' 17 
112 CCI(64) 2nd meeting, 6 Jul 64, CAB 134/1468, p. 3. 
113 CCI(64) 2nd meeting, 6 Jul 64, CAB 134/1468, p. 3. 
114 CCI(64) 2nd meeting, 6 Jul 64, CAB134/1468, p. 3. 
I 15 CCI(64) 2nd meeting, 6 Jul 64, CAB 134/1468, p. 3. 
116 CCI(64) 2nd meeting, 6 Jul 64, CAB 134/1468, p. 3. 
117 CCI(64) 2nd meeting, 6 Jul 64, CAB 134/1468, p. -33. 
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At this time, the latter voice dominated the meeting. The Home Secretary as 
Chairman (Henry Brooke) in particular was sceptical about the importance of 
economic aspects. Consequently, an early survey on economic aspects of 
immigrants was rejected. 118 However, it was evident that economic concern was 
gaining ground as the rate of voucher issue further reduced. 
Proposals to secure C vouchers 
A major point of probable new measures was a further reduction of the rate of 
voucher issue from 400 a week. This would 'lead beyond the elimination of category 
C and prevent demands in categories A and B from being met in fulF. ' 19 Therefore 
whether C voucher should be secured or not under a special measure was a matter of 
concern. There were differences in views also on this point between the Home 
Office and other Departments. 
Civil servants in general preferred to secure C vouchers. There was a view in 
the government that 'those coming with category C vouchers tended to take 
unskilled jobs which would otherwise not be filled in times of full employment but 
which might nevertheless be essential to maintain skilled employment'. 120 The 
Ministry of Labour showed in mid May three alternatives to the VWP, on which C 
vouchers should be issued: up to 50, subject to a total ceiling of 400; up to a total 
ceiling of 350 only when A and B combined fell short of 350; or, up to half of the 
extent that A and B fell short of 400.121 At the VWP meeting on 11 May, the first 
option, which was least complicated, was adopted. This meant that 'The majority of 
Category C vouchers issued would, for the foreseeable future, be for applicants with 
118 CCI(64) 2nd meeting, 6 Jul 64, CAB 134/1468, p. 4. 
119 Note of meeting (draft), II May 64, LAB8/2715, para. 6. 
120 CCI(64) 2nd meeting, 7 Jul 64, CAB 134/1468, p. 1. 1 
121 Note of meeting (draft), II May 64, LAB8/2715, paras. 3 and 5. 
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Forces Service preference'. 122 Civil servants decided that the Home Office should 
recommend the Cabinet that, 'while the authorised rate of issue should remain 400 a 
week, it should be subject to a maximum issue of 50 Category C vouchers a 
week'. 123 
A Home Officeplan to abolish C vouchers 
This principle was adopted by the CCI meeting on 6 July (CCI(64)2nd). The Home 
Office, however, despite these agreements at the VWP and the CCI, was not fully 
convinced of the importance of the economic aspects and the need of C vouchers. In 
fact the Home Office was thinking, as the Home Secretary had admitted in the 
Cabinet meeting on 30 April, that 'The rate of admission ... could not be 
substantially reduced still further unless C vouchers were virtually eliminated'. 124 
For the Department, the truth was: V voucher holders tended to go to areas where 
immigrants were already concentrated, and so not only providing some pool of 
unemployed labour but also creating social problems'. 125 Therefore once new 
statistical figures became available, its incentive to make the new plan more 
restrictive was accelerated. 
Mainly due to the issue of "disregarded" vouchers, the net intake of coloured 
immigrants for the twelve months up to 30 June 1964 had reached 68,000.126 The 
current rate of issue of vouchers was still estimated to produce a net intake of 
50,000 to 60,000 a year. 127 The Home Secretary (Henry Brooke), above all, was 
thinking that immigration could not be 'allowed to continue indefinitely at this 
122 CCI(64)6,18 Jun 64, CAB 134/1468, p. 4, para. 12. 
123 CCI(64)6,18 Jun 64, CAB 134/1468, p. 4, para. 12. 
124 CM(64) 25th conclusions, minute 7,30 Apr 64, CAB 128/38/pt. 2. 
I CC 1(64) 2nd meeting, 7 Jul 64, CAB 134/1468, p. 1. 
126 CCI(64) 3rd meeting, 28 Jul 64, CAB 134/1468, p. 1. 
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level'. 128 In these circumstances the, Home Office, which was formally responsible 
to producing the new plan, decided to disregard discussions and recommendations 
in the VWP and to form the outline of the new plan by itself which would abolish C 
vouchers and reduce immigration drastically. 
The Department had doubts not only about C v*ouchers but also the 
continuation of A vouchers, i. e. vouchers issued to those who have specified 
qualifications. The Home Office thought it possible to restrict the issue of vouchers 
to only 'those coming to jobs which it is of national importance to fill and which 
cannot be filled by people already in this country'. 129 This would bring the 
admission for employment of Commonwealth citizens 'broadly into line with the 
admission of aliens', and this 'might reduce the inflow by 7,000 or 8,000 a year, plus 
dependants'. 130 This would mean reducing the annual voucher issue to 8,000 a year, 
or 15 0a week. 131 
The new plan would be concerned with the main body of the 1962 Act rather 
than particular details of the voucher scheme and therefore involve large 
modifications in the categories of control. The main concern of the Home Office 
was to reduce immigration so that its scope of revision of the scheme were not 
confined to the workers who would be allowed vouchers. The Home Office hoped 
to change conditions of entry by dependants of voucher holders and students. 132 
The outline of new measures was presented to the CCI meeting on 28 July 
(CCI(64)3rd). To take the form of reviewing the 1962 Act, the measures were 
arranged in terms of legislation, namely, those changes that require legislation and 
those that did not. However, the Home Office evidently preferred the option which 
128 CCI(64) 3rd meeting, 28 Jul 64, CAB 134/1468, p. I. 
129 CCI(64)8,21 Jul 64, CAB 134/1468, p. 3, para. 13. 
130 CCI(64)8,21 Jul 64, CAB 134/1468, p. 3, para. 13 3. 
131 CCI(64)11,31 Aug 64, CAB 134/1468. 
132 CCI(64) 3rd meeting, 28 Jul 64, CAB 134/1468, p. 2. 
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would not require legislation and this option was duly approved. 
Insertion of economic considerations 
Pressure from the Home Office toward further reduction of vouchers was based on 
social concern. Economic considerations were, hmvever, also gaining ground in the 
government discussions. Ministers confirmed at the same CCI meeting on 28 July 
that 'decisions on further measures to restrict Commonwealth immigration would .. 
. have to balance economic and social considerations'. 
133 The British economy at 
this time in July 1964 was in so good condition that 'Labour is already short in the 
Midlands and the South and is likely to become more So'. 134 Even the Home 
Secretary had admitted that 'In present circumstances we can certainly absorb this 
number [ 15,000 a year, which are estimated to arrive as a voucher-holder in 1964] 
into employment'. 135 
Soon after this CCI meeting the outline produced by the Home Office was 
thus strongly opposed from other departments in particular from economic 
departments. The Ministry of Labour had assessed the impact of the issue of 
vouchers of 250,150 and 50 a week (13,000,8,000,2,600 a year respectively). The 
figure of 50 would allow only people who had firm offers of employment in the 
public sector. The figure of 150, which the Home Office had in mind, would allow, 
in addition to the previous category, people who did not have an offered work but 
who had specific qualifications such as teachers, doctors, nurses and a few other 
professional people. The figure of 250 would allow, in addition to the first category, 
all those qualifications for B vouchers and technicians and engineering craftsmen. 136 
133 CCI(64) 3rd meeting, 28 Jul 64, CAB 134/1468, p. I. b 
134 CCI(64)8,21 Jul 64, CAB 134/1468, p. 3, para. 11. 
135 CCI(64)8,21 Jul 64, CAB 134/1468, p. 3, para. 11. 
136 CCI(64)1 1,33 1 Aug 64, CAB 134/1468. 
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Not only the Ministry of Labour but also the Treasury, which had a seat in 
the ministerial committees from 1962, were concerned about the economic impact 
of further reductions. For the Treasury, which had gained interest on this matter 
since late 1963 through the civil servant discussions on the survey of economic 
aspects, the most important point was the balance between 'importance on social 
grounds of limiting immigration to the numbers that could be absorbed' and 'the 
necessity on economic grounds of securing an adequate supply of labour'. 137 
Moreover, the drastic reduction of vouchers might also raise a concern about 
relations with the Maltese government. There were special arrangements in which 
the UK encouraged the Maltese government to make for obtaining jobs in the UK 
for Maltese who wish to emigrate. 138 There was another plan for the recruitment of 
temporary government staff from Malta. 139 These issue had already been raised by 
the Commonwealth Relations Office at the CCI meeting in November 1963 
(CCI(63)lst). With the labour shortages in some areas in the UK, this diplomatic 
consideration was also linked to the economic arguments opposing further 
restrictions. In the Cabinet meeting on 30 July, it was therefore suggested that 
'There might be some advantage in encouraging immigration from Europe, 
particularly from Malta, where the budgetary support which we were obliged to 
provide might be reduced if we were able to make a larger contribution to the relief 
of unemployment in the Island by accepting an increased number of Maltese 
immigrants'. 140 
Under these circumstances, it was difficult even for the Home Office to take 
a restrictive course. As seen above, the outline of new measures presented at the 
137 CM(64) 44th conclusions, minute 2,30 Jul 64, CAB 128/38/pt. 2. 
13 8 CCl(6' ))4,1 Nov 6' ), CAB 134/1468, para. 13. 
139 CC 1(63)4,1 Nov 63, CAB 134/1468, para. 13. 
140 CM(64) 44th conclusions, minute 2,30 Jul 64, CAB 128/3 8/pt. 2. 
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CCI meeting on 28 July was supposed to limit the voucher issue to 150 a week 
(8,000 a year). However, the Home Secretary finally decided to propose to the 
Cabinet the figure of 250 a week (13,000 a year), the least restrictive line the 
Department had in mind. 141 The plan of new measures which were revised 
accordingly was presented in the Cabinet meeting on 10 September (CM(64)47th). 
The Cabinet decided that it would give further consideration to this matter based on 
the proposed plan after the general election. 142 
*** 
On 15 October 1964, the Conservative Party was defeated in the general election 
and the Labour Party took office. Thirteen years of the Tory governments thus 
ended. The planned new arrangements were not implemented under a Tory 
administration. Nevertheless, this change in governments brought few change in the 
direction of the voucher scheme, or, more broadly, policy on Commonwealth 
immigration. Plans proposed from civil servants, and the circle of civil servants 
involved in the policy process and their discussion, survived the change in 
administration. 
On the contrary, what did not survive was the opposition of the Labour Party 
to the Commonwealth Immigrants Act. 143 The Wilson administration had a 
ministerial committee concerned with Commonwealth immigration from the 
beginning. After ten-month examination, the Labour goverm-nent published a White 
Paper in August 1965 and announced that it would reduce the rate of issue of 
vouchers to 8,500 a year, of which 1,000 were reserved for Malta. It also announced 
141 CP(64)165,2 Sep 64, CAB 129/116. 
142 CM(64) 47th conclusions, minute 3), 10 Sep 64, CAB128/38/pt. 2. 
143 cf John Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2nd ed., 199-33), p. 64. 
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the complete abolition of the C voucher category. 144 
During the period of 1962-1964, the Ministry of Labour became. as the 
Department formally in charge of the issue of vouchers, one of the tý, ý, -o important 
actors in the policy community on Commonwealth immigration. The Ministry tried 
to take major initiatives in the policy process. However, the Home Office was 
reluctant to give up its leading role. The battle between the Home Office and the 
Ministry of Labour was important in that two Departments had differences in %, ie\\-s 
on implementing the voucher scheme. The former took it as a measure for 
restricting immigration, while the latter as a measure for managing immigration. 
The battle between these two Departments resulted in the win by the Home 
Office. There were three major reasons for this. Firstly, the MiniStFy of Labour 
failed to take initiatives at ministerial level. The change brought to the membership 
in the ministerial committee by the Cabinet reshuffle of June 1962 made this 
definitive. The reshuffle assured the Home Office of a place as an important actor, 
by appointing the Home Secretary chairman of the ministerial committee concerned 
with Commonwealth immigration (CIC). As a result, the Home Office led 
discussions among ministers, while the Ministry of Labour led only discussions 
among civil servants. Discussions of two levels conflicted more often than in the 
past. Recommendation from the official committee VWP was often rejected by 
ministers. 
Secondly, the position of the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth 
Relations Office, which used to be two of the four most important departments in 
the process of introducing the 1962 Act, declined in this period. The position of the 
Ministry of Labour was basically supported by these two departments. However. 
both were rapidly losing importance within the whole Whitehall community as 
decolonisation of Britain's Empire proceeded further. 
144 Immigrationftom the Commonwealth, Crnnd 2739 (London, HMSO. 1965), August 1965. 
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Thirdly. the increase in influx from India and Pakistan due to the 
"disregarded" voucher arrangements aroused much concern within the government 
from the social perspective. In fact, as the Home Office's insistence towards 
restriction became harsher, the need to examine the economic aspects were raised at 
the ministerial level from mid-1963. The Treasury had a permanent seat in the 
ministerial committees from 1962. This made easier than before the economic 
consideration being raised within the goverment discussions. Nevertheless, it 
would be fair to say that the economic factors were not so much taken until the last 
moment when the reduction of voucher issue might hinder the entry of essential 
labour for the UK economy. The persisting strong pressure of immigration from 
India and Pakistan was enough for the Home Office to legitimise its claim that 
Commonwealth immigration should be restricted for social grounds. Consequently, 
after the 1962 Act, as well as before that, the dominant concern in the government 
was the impact of immigration on domestic society. 
The Home Office dominance at the ministerial level, the decline in influence 
of the Colonial and Commonwealth Offices, and moreover, the increase in influx 
from India and Pakistan due to the "disregarded" voucher arrangements, all worked 
in favour of the line proposed by the Home Office, that is, restriction. Though the 
Ministry of Labour remained the other important actor throughout this three-year 
period, the rapid increase in immigration in particular forced the Ministry to accept 
restricting immigration. 
The policy community on Commonwealth immigrants which was 
established in the process leading to the introduction of the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act was so firm that it was not easily to be modified by a single 
department. The policy community was supported in terms of institution and 
discourse. The Home Office held the central place in the policy community and its 
position was legitimised by the powerful discourse within the government which 
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emphasised the fear of social tensions. 
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Part III 
Conclusion 
Chapter 10 The Role of Civil Servants in the Policy Process 
This thesis has examined the role of policy makers within the government in the 
formulation and development of policy on Commonwealth immigration. In doing 
so, it has given answers to two related questions namely, how and to what extent 
have civil servants exerted influence in the policy process ? and how does one 
particular set of issues, rather than another, capture policy makers' attention in the 
course of discussion ? In this concluding chapter these points are re-examined in the 
light of the structure in the policy process on Commonwealth immigration and to 
show how this is related to the existing theories of British government and policy. 
1. The Thesis Reanalysed 
British immigration policy in the postwar period has been well researched from the 
perspective as to what impact parties, Parliament and public opinion has had on the 
formulation of policy. Alternatively, when research has focussed on the role of 
elites within the government, it is senior politicians that are the subjects of research. 
Pressures from outside of the government and the role of senior politicians have 
thus been the main areas of analysis. 
Political science studies of immigration policy 
A survey of major works shows how political science studies of immigration to 
postwar Britain has been dominated by works that have emphasised the role of 
elected elites and public opinion. E. J. Rose and Nicholas Deakin, for example, have 
analysed in great detail the history of Commonwealth immigration and in particular 
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the role of Roy Jenkins as Home Secretary in introducing the first Race Relations 
Act and preparing the ground for the second Race Relations Act., Their 
considerable research had the intention of providing liberal race relations legislation 
and of encouraging politicians to take a firm lead in managing public opinion to 
support anti- di scriminati on legislation in housing, employment and other areas. 
Paul Foot's pioneering work also emphasised the role of politicians in 
influencing public opinion in a racist or anti-racist direction. 2His work sought to 
show how the lack of a strong anti-racist lead by Gordon-Walker in Smethwick 
allowed anti-immigrant campaign of Peter Griffith to be successful in 1964. Donley 
Studlar's work, while wide ranging and extensive, is mainly concerned to explain 
the impact of the immigration issue on electoral behaviour and agenda setting. 3 
Anthony Messina's work on party competition is narrowly focussed on parties and 
electoral behaviour and is particularly valuable for its analysis of party competition 
in the London Borough of Ealing. 4 
Even more general and wide ranging works have surprisingly little to say 
about the role of the civil servants in the policy making process. Zig Layton-Henry 
mentions the establish and work of the inter-departmental committees in his history 
I Eliot J. B. Rose, Nicholas Deakin, Mark Abrams, Valerie Jackson, Maurice Peston, A. H. 
Vanags, Brian Cohen, Julia Gaitskell and Paul Ward, Colour and Citizenship: A Report on British 
Race Relations (London, Institute for Race Relations/ Oxford University Press, 1969). 
2 Paul Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1965). 
3 See, for example, Donley T. Studlar, 'Policy voting in Britain: the coloured immigration issue 
in 
the 1964,1966, and 1970 general elections', American Political Science Review, 72,1 (1978), 46-64; 
'Elite responsiveness or elite autonomy: British immigration policy reconsidered', Ethnic and 
Racial 
Studies, 3,2 (1980), 207-23); 'Non-white policy preferences, political participation and the political 
a-enda in Britain', in Zig Layton-Henry and Paul B. Rich (eds), Race, Government and Politics in 
Britain (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1986), 159-86; and, Donley T. Studlar and Zig Layton-Henry, Z-) 
'Nonwhite minority access to the political agenda in Britain', Policy Studies Review 9,2 (1990), 27_33- 
93. 
4 Anthony M. Messina, Race and Party Competition in Britain (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989). 
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of the politics of postwar immigration but his analysis are again focuses on 
politician, parties, electoral behaviour and legislative institutionS. 5 Gary Freeman's 
valuable comparative analysis of postwar immigration to France and Britain focuses 
on the roles of parties and the electorate. In particular he argues that the lack of a 
manifest ideology in the British case made the Labour Party less well equipped to 
counter anti-immigrant pressure from the Conservative and public opinion. 6 
The successful management of the issue by the exclusion of political 
pressures is the major characteristics of the policy process examined in this thesis. 
This confirms Jim Bulpitt's centre-periphery model which draws attention to the 
success of policy makers in managing the issue. His model has, however, little to 
say in detail about the policy making process. 7 In contrast, this thesis 
complemented and deepened his analysis by presenting the detailed mechanism of 
the management of the issue by focusing on the structure in the policy process. 
This thesis therefore has illuminated an underresearched and neglected area 
of the policy process. It is complementary to the existing studies of immigration 
policy making rather than contradictory or reevaluating them. It showed through an 
analysis of government documents how extensive and serious was the work being 
carried out on immigration policy behind the scene. 
Non-elective actors in the policy process 
5 Zig Layton-Henry The Politics of Race in Britain (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1984); 
and Politics of Immigration: Immigration, 'Race'and 'Race'Relations in Post-war Britain (Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1992). 
6 Gary Freeman, Immigrant Labour and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and 
British Experience 1945-1975 (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1979). 
7 Jim Bulpitt, 'Continuity, autonomy and peripheralisation: the anatomy of the centre's race 
statecraft in England, ' in Zig Layton-Henry and Paul B. Rich (eds), Race, Government and Politics in 
Britain (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1986), 17-44. 
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The previous interpretations of immigration policy have weaknesses in their 
interpretation of the development of the issue in this policy area. For example, these 
works are unable to explain the lack of govenunent action in the period from the 
outbreak of the urban disturbances in September 1958 to the introduction of the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill in Parliament in October 1961. This weakness is 
mainly because explanations employed in previous works have underestimated the 
variety of actors within the government. In particular previous works have ignored 
the role of non-elective actors in the policy process. 
With focussing on the public opinion, Parliament, parties and politicians, it 
is politics that has been emphasised so far. Separating non-political aspects from 
politics is therefore important for research on the policy process. There is no doubt 
that politics plays a significant role in the formulation of policy, but it is a limited 
aspect of the whole policy process. In the policy process, there are political and non- 
political aspects and both play an important part. Policy can be formulated also 
behind politics, and often without relation to it, in the hands of non-elective actors. 
The non-political aspects of the policy process have so far failed to be given proper 
attention. 
The dismissal of the role of non-elective actors is not peculiar to this area, 
but it is widely seen in the analysis of policy making in Britain. The non-political 
aspects of the policy process have attracted little academic interest in general. This 
has roots in normative views about the British political system. The emphasis in 
political studies on power distribution has so far worked to limit the scope of 
empirical research. It is on the recognition that non-political aspects of the policy 
process are as important as political aspects that this thesis has been based. 
Originality of the thesis 
This research has tried to make an original contribution to the existing research 
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from three directions. Firstly, it has tried to identify the role of civil servants in the 
policy process. Civil servants have been less researched than other actors in studies 
of British politics and their role in the policy process has been little surveyed. 
Emphasis was on links between the core executive and departments, which major 
debates on the postwar government and policy such as the consensus/advocacy 
politics thesis has neglected. 
Secondly, this thesis has tried to make their role clear by placing it in a 
broad structure within the governinent. In particular it has focussed on informal 
networks linking various actors in contrast to formal constitutional rules. The role 
of government actors is explained with reference to these informal networks. These 
are important for a particular actor to play roles in the policy process as the network 
is a major determinant of its influence. 
Therefore, thirdly, the development and institutionalisation of these 
networks are highlighted in relations to the development of government policy. 
Policy as the output of the government are conditioned by this structure within the 
policy process in terms of contexts and options. 
Structure in the policy process 
The internal structure of the government policy process, in which policy makers 
formulated policy, has been examined, employing the ideas developed in the 
bureaucratic politics and policy network models. Three perspectives have been 
introduced, which are concerned respectively with factors determining the stance of 
policy makers, factors determining the influence of policy makers, and the set of 
rules which govern relations between policy makers. 
The first perspective is that the stance of a policy maker is determined more 
by his/her organisational and personal interests than by other factors. Each policý' 
maker has his/her own stance towards the policy issue and thus has different views 
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and approach to a particular point and policy. The focus has therefore been put on 
the relationship between policy makers' bureaucratic positions and their policy 
preferences. 
The second perspective is that the influence of an actor in the policy 
community depends on his/her position in the policy network. Actors assured of a 
central place in policy discussions within the goverm-nent find it easier to have their 
views listened to within policy circles, while those with marginal status or who are 
not assured of institutional places find it difficult or impossible to make their voices 
heard. The focus has been put on the structure of policy makiiig within the 
government. 
The last perspective is that formal or constitutional arrangements impose 
limitations on policy makers' actions, and these, therefore, affect patterns of the 
policy process. Interactions between major policy makers in the policy process are 
not made in a condition of anarchy. There are rules which bind actors and govern 
their interactions. Among various, formal or informal rules, constitutional 
arrangements have a strong impact on the policy process. 
The process analysis in Chapters 4 to 9 have examined these three points. 
They are summarised and reviewed in the following section. 
2. The Policy Process 
This thesis has examined historically the development of policy on Commonwealth 
immigration between 1948 and 1964 and the roles civil servants have played. This 
is because dealing with policy formulation as a process of negotiation over time is 
an effective way of identifying the role of non-elective actors in the policy process, 
which is separate from that of elective actors. The whole period from 1948 to 1964 
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was divided into six stages (Figure 10.1). 
Problem recognition (1948 - 1950) 
Between 1948 and 1950 immigration from the West Indies began to be perceived 
within the government as a problem that should be tackled by the government. The 
growth of immigration from the West Indies caused anxiety among civil servants. 
The problems the government should deal with as well as the directions of the 
government policy on Commonwealth immigration were identified by civil servants 
in this period. 
The increasing immigration from the West Indies was recognised as a 
problem because civil servants feared a potential rise in social tensions. Already in 
these early days when neither public nor senior politicians' interest in 
Commonwealth immigration was high, discussions by civil servants went beyond 
the boundaries of departments. They agreed at a meeting held in February 1949 that 
the problem should be approached from two directions, from the perspective of 
controlling immigration to the UK and from the view of accommodation, 
employment and welfare of those already settled in the UK. These two perspectives, 
as well as the issue of deportation of "undesirables", which would be added later, 
became the assumptions of British government policy on Commonwealth 
immigration. 
Institutionalformadon (1950 - 1954) 
Before 1950, the interest in immigration from the Commonwealth as a policy matter 
was confined to the civil servant level and this issue was not discussed much at 
ministerial level. Unlike later inter-departmental official committees, inter- 
departmental discussions of civil servants before 1950 were organised around the 
Colonial Office, and were in general ad hoc. They did not serve or report to higher 
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civil servants' review 
Figure 10.1 The policy process on Commonwealth immigration 1948-1964 
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levels of government such as ministerial committees or the Cabinet. 
However, in the period between 1950 and 1954, attention on the issue rose 
to ministerial level. There was a change in recognition as regards the issue within 
the government, and accordingly the institutional framework for future government 
actions was established. Particularly important in this process ýý*as that the Home 
Office was placed at the centre of government's institutions that were to give 
considerations to the issue of Commonwealth immigration. This was because the 
Home Office was the department in charge of immigration controls. Important in 
the policy process was that this was to limit in the long run the perspectives and 
measures the government might adopt in order to deal with the issue. Reflecting the 
departmental interest of the Home Office, social concern was emphasised as the 
perspective on Commonwealth immigration, and the control of immigration as the 
measure to be taken. 
The position of the Home Office in the institutional framework concerned 
with Commonwealth immigration was gradually reinforced despite the change in 
government in 1951. Commonwealth immigration was accordingly firmly defined 
within the government as an issue which could only be alleviated by the 
introduction of controls. The hidden assumption that the issue of Commonwealth 
immigration should be approached, not from the perspective of social policy, but 
from regulative measures of immigration control, was established in the process of 
the formation of institutional frameworks which were led by the Home Office. 
Policy contentformulation (1954 - 1956) 
The number of immigrants from the West Indies increased rapidly after 1953. The 
social consequences of immigration came to worry various quarters of the 
government more strongly than before. In the period between 1954 and 1956 public 
and Parliamentary interests in the issue greatly increased. This caused ministerial 
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pressure calling for restriction, as well as the views and considerations of each 
policy maker on the issue were crystallised. The emphasis in the government 
discourse both on the negative social consequences of immigration and on the need 
for control of immigration were further strengthened. 
Backed by public and Parliamentary anxiety over the issue, political action 
was reinforced within the government. Political pressure was exerted on 
government discussions. Lord Salisbury in particular persistently demanded early 
legislation in the Cabinet. Led by hardliners within the Cabinet, a draft 
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, which aimed at introducing control on entry of 
British subjects, was submitted to the Cabinet in May 1955. In parallel, various 
measures were initiated by ministers in order to influence public opinion and thus to 
justify legislation. 
With political pressure being gradually strengthened, the impact of 
immigration was intensively surveyed by civil servants. Their discussions resulted 
in setting the framework for later government discussions in at least two ways. 
Firstly their investigations established the viewpoint for future discussions about 
policy in this field. Under the strong influence of the Home Office, which worried 
about the social consequences of immigration, their enquiries resulted in directing 
and fixing policy makers' major attention on the social situation of immigrants. In 
this process, the views of each department were also established. In addition to 
social concern being emphasised, the importance of relations with Commonwealth 
governments, in particular in terms of the future of the West Indian Federation, 
were reconfirmed and the economic situation of immigration was put in the 
government agenda on Commonwealth immigration policy. 
Secondly, concrete measures for future legislation were formulated in the 
preparation of the draft Commonwealth Immigrants Bill of 1955. This draft 
contained many provisions which were to be enacted by the Commonwealth 
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Immigrants Act in 1962. The basic outlines of legislation such as application of the 
provisions to the whole Commonwealth, exemption from control of those who 
"belong" to the UK, and exemption of Irish citizens from entry control were 
established in this period. 
In the meantime the ministerial discussions motivated by political 
considerations were repeated fruitlessly due to internal differences of vieN\, s and 
civil servants' negative position towards legislation. In fact, there was a wide gap 
between political considerations and other factors. At the civil servant level three of 
the four major departments concerned with Commonwealth immigration were 
opposed to legislation on entry. As a result early legislation was ruled out. 
Polificisadon (195 7- 1959) 
The issue became politicised with the outbreak of the urban disturbances in 1958. 
These disturbances raised the issue of Commonwealth immigration to a matter of 
wide public concern and caused it to develop from a limited local concern to a 
national political issue. The governirnent, in particular ministers, worried about this 
development partly because a general election was expected within a year. For fear 
of losing its control of the issue, the goverment faced the need to subdue public 
interest and to prevent the issue from further politicisation. The draft Deportation 
Bill was prepared for this purpose on the initiative of the Home Secretary. 
In this process the gap between political considerations and other factors re- 
emerged. The strain caused by the disturbances were rapidly eased and the level of 
immigration decreased. The Deportation Bill remained only as a subject for 
ministerial discussion. Many ministers hoped to put forward legislation to show 
government's manageability of, and firm attitude towards, the issue. Meanwhile the 
Prime Minister and his aides decided to turn down the introduction of the Bill to 
Parliament. They feared that it would exacerbate divisions in the public and within 
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the Conservative Party, and therefore that the introduction of the Bill to Parliament 
itself would risk further politicisation of the issue. In view of electoral 
considerations, the Deportation Bill was raised by ministers and then withdrawn by 
ministers. It was politics that dominated the policy process in this period. 
In the meantime the views and positions of civil servants changed in 
important aspects behind these political developments. The deterioration of race 
relations which was concretely revealed by the eruption of the disturbances in 1958 
undoubtedly made the Home Office even more cautious than before about the social 
impacts of immigration. Equally important was that the employment situation, 
which had constituted a strong case against early legislation, took a turn for the 
worse from a little before the disturbances. Accordingly, the Ministry of Labour 
which had opposed early legislation turned its position to favouring restriction of 
immigration. 
Decision taking (1960 - 1961) 
A further increase in immigration from the summer of 1959 brought a change in the 
Home Office view, which led to the government's decision to legislate on 
immigration control. In the period from spring to autumn of 1960, the increase in 
immigration and the breakdown of administrative measures taken by 
Commonwealth governments both supported Home Office's arguments in favour of 
restriction. The Home Office influenced discussions at the civil servant level 
strongly. 
The critical period in the move towards legislation was passed between June 
and November 1960. In this period the Home Office judged that the situation of 
immigration changed significantly and that voluntary restrictions by the West Indian 
administrations collapsed. This judgement made legislation within a short period of 
time inevitable. The remaining issue was the concrete timing of the introduction of 
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the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill in Parliament. In fact, this was not approved by 
the Cabinet until October 1961 because the future of the West Indian Federation 
was seen as the crucial key to the timing of legislation. The introduction of the Bill 
was finally determined after Jamaican referendum held in September 196 1. 
The nature of discussion changed after the Cabinet approval of legislation 
in October 1961. In the legislative process the role of Parliament increased 
temporarily. Commonwealth sentiments were reemphasised in this context of 
Parliamentary politics. Some provisions in the Bill, in particular the position of Irish 
citizens and the duration of the Act, were contrasted with those in the alien 
legislation, and were thought to be damaging to relations with the Commonwealth. 
It was not only in the context of actual relations with the Commonwealth but also 
in the context of British domestic and Parliamentary politics that Commonwealth 
sentiments were important. 
Implementation (1962 - 1964) 
With the passing of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill in Parliament, the phase of 
the policy process on Commonwealth immigration shifted to the implementation of 
the new policy. The importance of Commonwealth immigration as a political issue 
declined. In the period between 1962 and 1964 the initial differences in views 
among government policy makers in implementing the provisions of the 1962 Act 
gradually converged into the Home Office's line of restriction. 
The Commonwealth Immigrants Act gave the British government powers to 
control immigration from the Commonwealth. However there appeared differences 
of views within the government on how to implement the employment voucher 
scheme introduced by the Act. On the one hand there was a view that the scheme 
was a measure for restricting immigration to the UK and therefore should be 
administered restrictively, while on the other hand there was a view that the scheme 
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was a measure for managing immigration according to skills and job vacancies and 
therefore should be administered in accordance with labour market demands. The 
former view was promoted by the Home Office, while the latter view mainly by the 
Ministry of Labour. 
These differences in views were exacerbated with the rise in applications for 
vouchers from India and Pakistan. Various new measures were invented under the 
voucher scheme in order to cope with this situation. However, in general, the 
balance of government discussion, and thus government policy, moved gradually in 
favour of restriction. 
Characteristics of the policy process 
There were two major characteristics of the policy process on Commonwealth 
immigration. Firstly, political pressures were, to a considerable extent, excluded 
from the mainstream of the policy process. This was typically shown in the 
development of discussions between 1954 and 1956 when the issue had not 
expanded yet as one that commanded public attention at the national level. In the 
meantime political pressures were exerted on government discussions with the 
increase in immigration. However, this did not affect much on civil servants' 
investigations in this period regarding the necessity of legislation and the impact of 
immigration. Practical considerations were firmly maintained, which resulted in 
rejecting early legislation. Similarly, political considerations had impacts on the 
management of the issue in the period following the urban disturbances of 1958 and 
on the legislative process of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill in Parliament, but 
these did not affect the mainstream of the policy process. 
Secondly, the social consequences of immigration were the dominant 
perspective in the government discussion so that the government perspective on the 
issue and the option of policy measures were consistently taken from the position of 
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social concerns. Housing shortages and the resulting social tensions were repeatedly 
raised from the very beginning. Relations with the Commonwealth, in particular 
those with "old" Commonwealth countries, with India and Pakistan until the 
increase in immigration from these countries in 1958, and with the West Indies after 
1956, acted to some extent as a brake on early legislation, as did economic factors 
such as the need for labour in British industry. These factors. however, did not 
reverse the direction of government discussions towards restricting immigration. 
Discussions within the government were consistently motivated by social concerns. 
These two major characteristics in the policy process on Commonwealth 
immigration relate closely to the structure in the policy process, in particular the 
existence of the closed policy community within the government. The next two 
sections analyse this point. 
3. Structure in the Policy Process 
Three points concerned with the structure in the policy process have been 
emphasised in this analysis of the policy process on Commonwealth immigration: 
firstly, the stance of each policy maker and its determinants; secondly, the influence 
of the policy maker in the policy process and its determinants; and thirdly, the role 
of the policy maker and its determinants. These have been examined particularly in 
the light of the policy community developing in this policy area. 
During the seventeen-year period from 1948 to 1964, there emerged a stable 
and exclusionary policy community within the government. Initially developed out 
of a loose network centred on the Colonial Office, it was dominated by the Home 
Office, and later reformed into the one led jointly by the Home Office and the 
Ministry of Labour though the former was the dominant partner. The existence of 
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this policy community was important in the policy process of this area as it played a 
major part in determining the characteristics of the policy process shokNn above. 
Factors determining the stance of actors in the policy process 
It was raised as a perspective that the stance of a policy maker is conditioned b\- 
his/her organisational or personal interests. This thesis has shown that the major 
determinant of the stance of a policy maker in this policy area was his/her position 
in the government, or departmental responsibilities. Unlike Heclo and Widavsky's 
claim of the universal departmental culture in the whole of Whitehall, 8 this thesis 
identified significant differences in the way each government department behaved. 
In the policy process on Commonwealth immigration from 1948 to 1964, 
senior civil servants in the four critical departments, as well as ministers, played 
major roles. These departments were Home Office, Ministry of Labour, Colonial 
Office, and Commonwealth Relations Office. Civil servants of these departments 
had great interest in maintaining the influence, and fulfilling the mission, of their 
department. They were relatively unconcerned with political implications of policy, 
which were a major concern for politicians. 
The responsibilities of a particular government department and its stance are 
linked with the assistance of department's concrete priorities and its interest in a 
particular issue, in this case, the one concerned with Commonwealth immigration. 
These are influenced by factors both internal and external to the government (Figure 
10.2). The external factors concern conditions imposed on the British government 
raised in Chapter 1. They were translated in the light of departmental priorities and 
thus constitute departmental interest. Departmental priorities are affected mainly by 
internal factors to the government such as the influence of ministers, but also by 
8 Hugh Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky, The Private Government of Public Money. - Community and 
Policy inside British Politics (London, Macmillan, 1974). 
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Figure 10.2 The responsiblity-stance link and the factors influencing the stance 
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great changes in external conditions though not often. This internal factor will be 
examined in detail in the latter half of this section that deals with the structure in the 
policy process. The stance of the four departments and ministers are examined 
below in terms of their responsibilities. 
r r- hume Office 
With formally responsible for immigration control, the Home Office was bound to 
become an important actor once control of immigration became an issue. Its link 
with responsibilities and stance is as follows: 
Responsibility: keeping law and order in British society-, 
Priority: prevention of social tensions; 
Interest: the potential to disturb law and order; 
Stance: restriction or not. 
The Home Office was in charge of social matters that were not dealt with by other 
departments. With most of the social affairs departments being concerned with 
social welfare, the Home Office's responsibilities were to do with social regulation, 
i. e., maintaining public order such as the police, criminal justice, and prisons. As 
one of the formal responsibilities of the Department, the immigration control was 
linked with other areas of social regulation. Approaching the issue from the likely 
impact of immigration on law and order, the Home Office put its priority on 
avoiding social tensions. From this perspective immigration was viewed as having 
the potential to disturb law and order, in particular tensions with neighbourhoods 
which might be generated by poor housing conditions. The stance of the Home 
Office concerned whether to restrict immigration or not. Once the issue was raised 
as a priority the departmental stance towards Commonwealth immigration was kept 
at restriction. 
The departmental interest in this issue was not strong until 1954. At the 
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early stages of Commonwealth immigration the departmental interest in this issue 
was small as it defined the issue as a Colonial matter. When ministerial decision 
forced the Department to take initiatives at inter-departmental meetings in 1950 in 
support of ministerial committee GEN325, it was reluctant to support legislation, 
even if the scope of legislation was limited to deportation. Though it thought that 
administrative measures would have little effect in deterring immigration from the 
West Indies, the departmental interest was not so strong as to reverse the traditional 
stance of the Home Office. It kept the stance on the ground that legislation that 
would remove the traditional right of British subjects to enter and stay freely in the 
UK could hardly be justified in the light of public feelings both in the UK and the 
Commonwealth. There was an indifference to the issue so that it did not overwhelm 
the traditional belief. 
The remarkable increase in immigration from 1953 increased departmental 
interest in this issue. The new situation was interpreted in the light of departmental 
responsibility of keeping law and order. The Home Office worried about the strains 
with neighbourhoods due to the deterioration of housing conditions of immigrants. 
In the light of departmental priorities to avoid domestic conflicts the issue was 
understood as the one concerning housing chaos and resulting racial conflicts 
though these were only potential concerns until the urban disturbances of 1958. The 
Home Office's stance shifted towards legislative restriction by 1954. 
The beginning of 1960 saw an increase in the interest of the Home Office in 
the issue. The Home Office's interest in the issue and stance to restrict immigration 
in a restrictive way was reinforced with the sharp increase in immigration from late 
1959. There appeared a recognition within the Department that the nature of 
immigration changed. Over the summer of 1960 its interest in the issue further 
increased, which led the government to the introduction of the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Bill in Parliament the following year. 
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The Departmental responsibilities and broad external factors that affect 
Departmental interest remained unchanged after the implementation of the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1962, so did Departmental stance towards 
restriction. The Home Office continued to take the restrictive line. It regarded the 
voucher scheme as the measure for restricting immigration, in contrast to other 
departments that regarded it as that for merely managing immigration. In the name 
of preventing social tensions, the Home Office tried to suppress the number of 
immigrants to as low a figure as possible by severely curtailing the rate of the 
voucher issue. Thus as the voucher scheme allowed a large influx from India and 
Pakistan, the Home Office's mistrust in the scheme was intensified. The 
Department's stance to reduce the issue of vouchers was strengthened as far as to 
demand the abolition of not only C vouchers, but also A vouchers. 
Ministry ofLabour 
Except in the early 1950s, when the economic factors of immigration did not feature 
highly in government discussions, the Ministry of Labour retained a certain amount 
of influence in the policy process throughout the period from 1948 to 1964. To 
understand the stance of the Ministry of Labour, it is important to see the new 
element added in its responsibilities. Departmental priorities changed with the 
introduction of the employment voucher scheme in 1962. 
Its initial links between responsibility and stance is as follows: 
Responsibility: monitoring the domestic labour market; 
Priority: keeping order in the labour market; 
Interest: unemployment; 
Stance: restriction or not. 
It had responsibilities to monitor the domestic labour market and put its priority in 
maintaining the order in labour markets. The external conditions mainly concerned 
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with labour markets based on the economic cycle were translated by this prioritýý 
and formed the departmental interest in the issue. The dominant interest in the pre- 
1962 period was in avoiding unemployment. Therefore, in general, the interest in 
this issue increased when the employment situation deteriorated, but decreased 
when the situation recovered. 
Initially the Ministry had a sceptical view on immigration from the West 
Indies. In terms of skills of the prospective immigrants and jobs available in the UK 
the immigration from the West Indies were regarded as unnecessary for British 
industry. Therefore in 1948 - 1949 the Ministry opposed official recruitment of 
labour from the West Indies as proposed by the Colonial Office on the one hand and 
kept a cautious position regarding the spontaneous influx from the West Indies on 
the other hand. After 1955 with a relatively good economic performance, 
departmental interest in immigration receded. The Ministry believed that there was 
few reasons to restrict immigration from the employment perspective. This stance 
was exhibited particularly well when the influx greatly increased in 1956 and 1957. 
Despite the large influx, the Ministry kept the stance not to intervene the flow of 
immigration. On the contrary, since the summer of 1958, a declining employment 
situation as well as a dismal future prospect about the employment due to the end of 
military conscription and a prospective increase in the number of school leavers 
caused the Ministry to emphasise the precariousness in labour markets and thus to 
increase its interest in immigration. Accordingly it turned its stance to restriction of 
Commonwealth immigration. From then to the Cabinet decision to introduce the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill in Parliament in October 1961, the Ministry kept 
this stance. 
The old link between responsibility and stance was replaced by a new one as 
a result of a change in Ministry's responsibilities when the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act came into effect. The new link was as follows: 
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Responsibility: management of the employment voucher scheme; 
Priority: smooth working of the scheme; 
Interest: the log-jam of application; 
Stance: increase in issue or not 
The smooth working of the employment voucher scheme itself emerged as its 
priority. It tried to secure a large enough number of voucher issues to avoid a log- 
jam of applications. The Ministry regarded the voucher scheme as a tool for 
managing, rather than restricting, immigration. In contrast to the Home Office, 
which set its focus on the actual number entering the UK, the Ministry of Labour 
stuck to the rate of voucher issue. Therefore, in the face of a large number of 
applications from India and Pakistan, it opted to take the course to revise the 
voucher system in order to avoid the disruption of the scheme. 
Colonial Office 
Management of Colonial matters was the responsibility of the Colonial Office. 
Subject to external conditions concerned with relations with the Colonies, the 
departmental priority changed from managing Colonial society to steering the 
Colonies to independence without chaos. For most of the period covered in this 
thesis, the departmental interest in this issue was concerned with the impact of 
legislation on British relations with the Colonies rather than the amount of 
immigration itself. Its stance was therefore concerned with whether to legislate or 
not. It is remarkable that the Colonial Office was not necessarily opposed to 
controlling immigration. 
The initial link between responsibility and stance was as follows: 
Responsibility: management of Colonial matters; 
Priority: managing Colonial society; 
Interest: impact of legislation; 
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Stance: legislation or not. 
With the repeated arrivals of West Indians and an increase in stowaways, the 
Colonial Office began to consider the possibility of legislative control as early as in 
the late 1940s. It believed that legislative measures would be more clearcut and, 
therefore, less offensive for the feelings in the Colonies than administrative 
measures, which were thought to be devious and insincere. For the same reason, the 
Colonial Office was opposed to legislation targeted at the Colonies only, though 
Commonwealth immigration came mainly from the Colonies, in particular from the 
West Indies, until the late 1950s. The view of the Department was that any 
legislation should be applied to the whole Commonwealth, which, however, the 
Commonwealth Relations Office strongly opposed. 
In the mid 1950s the stance of the Colonial Office changed to oppose 
legislation. A large change in British government's general external relations 
brought a change in departmental priorities from managing Colonial society to 
peaceful independence. This brought the change in the interest of the Department in 
legislation on Commonwealth immigration: 
Priority: steering the Colonies to independence without chaos; 
Interest: impact of legislation; 
Stance: legislation or not. 
As far as the West Indies was concerned, the independence of the West Indies 
within the framework of the proposed West Indian Federation became the primary 
concern of the Department by 1956. In this light legislation was seen with interest to 
affect badly the West Indian Federation so that the Colonial Office turned its stance 
to clearly opposing legislation. With the change in departmental priorities, not 
legislative restrictions but voluntary ones on the side of the Colonies were sought as 
the appropriate policy measure despite occasional increases in immigration from the 
West Indies in the late 1950s. To avoid legislation it tried to seek voluntar-y 
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restrictions from the West Indies by passport controls. In fact the Colonial Office 
gradually realised that voluntary restrictions by the West Indian governments would 
not be workable as immigration accelerated in 1960. Nevertheless, the departmental 
interest was in the impact on legislation. Even after that, it hoped to postpone 
legislation until the independence of the West Indies. In fact the West Indian 
Federation was on the verge of collapse and a referendum was due to be held in 
Jamaica in the autumn of 1961 to decide whether she would stay in the West Indian 
Federation. The Colonial Office, being forced into dilemma, kept the stance to 
oppose legislation and insisted that the West Indian factors should be fully taken 
into account in government discussions. 
Two events in 1962 had a major impact on the stance of the Colonial Office. 
The entry into force of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act and the independence of 
Jamaica resulted in the main concern of the Colonial Office shifting to securing a 
certain proportion of employment vouchers for the remaining small Colonial 
territories. Departmental interest in the issue went declined in general. By the mid 
1960s, the external factors which caused the Department to change its priority in the 
mid 1950s also worked to reduce the importance of the Department itself. The 
general competence of the Colonial Office as a government department decreased as 
more Colonies achieved independence. The standing of the Colonial Office in the 
government discussion on Commonwealth immigration accordingly diminished 
rapidly thereafter. 
Commonwealth Relations Office 
The Commonwealth Relations Office held concerns of the same nature as the 
Colonial Office with respect to external relations. 
Responsibility: management of Commonwealth matters; 
Priority: keeping good relations with "old" Commonwealth, 
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then to a lesser degree with India and Pakistan; 
Interest: the right of the British subject; 
Stance: restriction or not. 
The responsibility of the Commonwealth Relations Office was the management of 
Commonwealth matters. However, unlike the Colonial Office, its partners were the 
governments of independent states so that the respect for their status as well as their 
importance in the UK status in the postwar world order reflected strongly in its 
stance. Its departmental priorities were in particular on keeping good relations with 
the "old" Commonwealth and, to a lesser extent, with India and Pakistan. Public 
opinion and British business interests in these countries were major concerns of the 
Department. In order to maintain a strong British relationship with these countries, 
the Department had much interest in securing the substantial right of British 
subjects in these countries from being restricted, unlike the Colonial Office, whose 
interest lay in the measures of restriction. The Commonwealth Relations Office was 
concerned about whether restriction of immigration would be introduced for the 
people in independent Commonwealth countries, and was opposed consistently and 
most strongly to restriction which would be applied, even in form, to these people. 
From the beginning, the Commonwealth Relations Office showed its 
opposition to legislative restrictions on immigration. It hoped to exclude matters 
relating to Commonwealth countries from the agenda of government discussion, 
which however met strong resistance from the Colonial Office. The Commonwealth 
Relations Office also hoped that, if entry from Commonwealth countries were made 
subject to control, entry from the Irish Republic should also be controlled. The 
opposition of the Commonwealth Relations Office to the exemption of Irish citizens 
from control continued even after the introduction of the 1961 Bill to Parliament 
was virtually decided. 
The stance of the Department was not, however, consistent towards every 
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country in the Commonwealth. Its major priority was given to the "old" dominion 
while India and Pakistan were given a lesser priority and the departmental stance 
was more ambiguous towards them. At first, the Commonwealth Relations Office 
was anxious about special discriminatory measures against India and Pakistan, 
which were the two largest potential senders. Such measures, it was thought, would 
endanger relations with these countries when these became known to their publics. 
However, this position did not last long. The departmental opposition to restriction 
was not maintained with the increase in immigration from these two countries, 
which was much in evidence by early 1958. The Department swiftly changed its 
stance and endorsed the idea to take restrictive measures that would be applied only 
to these two countries. This selective posture taken by the Department continued 
after the 1962 Act when India and Pakistan came to the forefront of the government 
discussion in place of the West Indies. On the one hand, the Department was 
prepared to allow special measures for India and Pakistan, while on the other hand, 
it, like the Colonial Office, hoped to secure a certain number of vouchers for 
territories other than Pakistan and India. 
Responsibility and stance 
This thesis has shown that stance of a particular governmental department is based 
on departmental responsibilities, which determine their priorities and interest. When 
a change occurs in departmental stance this is brought either by a change in 
departmental responsibilities or priorities or interest. Once responsibilities and 
priorities are given, external factors are interpreted in the light of departmental 
priorities to Produce departmental stance. Such external factors were the level and 
pace of increase in immigration from the Commonwealth, the phase in the 
economic cycle, and relations with the Commonwealth. This shows that 
departmental stance is determined by departmental responsibilities and more 
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concrete priorities, which are to interpret the concrete external conditions. 
Even though departmental responsibility and priorities are relatively stable 
and constant, as the cases of the Home Office and the Commonwealth Relations 
Office showed, priorities are subject to change due to the effect of external factors. 
A great change in external factors may cause the departmental priorities to change. 
The departmental priority of the Colonial Office changed from managing Colonial 
society to a peaceful transition to independence. This not only produced a change in 
stance but also resulted in the loss of independence from the Commonwealth 
Relations Office and then the disbandment of the department itself. Moreover 
responsibilities are also subject to change due to changes brought about by factors 
internal to the government. The departmental responsibilities also suffer a change as 
is seen in the case of the Ministry of Labour. The composition of its responsibilities 
changed with the addition of the overall responsibility for managing voucher 
scheme to the list along with monitoring the employment situation. 
Ministers'stance and its difference with that of civil servants 
This thesis has shown that the stance of ministers basically corresponded to those of 
their departments. However, ministers occasionally brought views into the policy 
process, which were distinct from those of civil servants. Such a view usually 
corresponded to, or was claimed to correspond to, public and Parliamentary opinion. 
This shows that ministers' priorities were determined by the department which the 
minister supervised and/or by his/her interpretation of public or Parliamentary 
opinion. Ministers have their place at the crossroads of two main lines of the policy 
process within the government, that is, the executive-political party line and the 
executive-departmental line. Ministers' stances can thus be determined both by their 
positions as the head of a department and their positions as a senior member of the 
governing party. 
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Their position as a senior member of the governing party was remarkable as 
the view of this kind was distinct from that of the civil servants of the department 
and unique to ministers. It derived from their position as politicians. that is, elected 
representatives. Politicians were sensitive to public opinion for electoral 
considerations and their main criteria of adopting a particular policy measure were 
liable to be whether or not the public would support it. 
In the policy process on Commonwealth immigration this was evident, 
firstly, in the period after 1954. As Parliamentary and public interest on the issue of 
Commonwealth immigration increased, the ministerial priority was on public 
opinion. Gwilym Lloyd-George, while being Home Secretary, proposed repeatedly 
that the Cabinet should establish a non-governmental. committee of inquiry in order 
to gain public support. Secondly, after the 1958 disturbances, the draft Deportation 
Bill was proposed and discussed at the ministerial level, which was promoted 
largely for political considerations. While confirming the effectiveness of voluntary 
restrictions by sending countries, ministers put forward legislation simply to gain 
public support for the government. The election was an important consideration for 
politicians in this context. Controversial issues were shelved as the general elections 
approached both in 1955 and 1964. Electoral considerations also worked to drop the 
Deportation Bill in 1959. 
The stance of Cabinet ministers without specific departmental 
responsibilities was particularly important in this respect. They had a seat in the 
Cabinet to represent the political party and Parliament, which made them 
particularly sensitive to public and Parliamentary opinions. Their priorities were not 
necessarily constrained by departmental considerations. The most outstanding 
example was the Marquess of Salisbury, the Lord President and Leader of the 
Lords, who was to insist persistently on early legislation from 1954 till his 
resignation from the Cabinet in 1957. 
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However, the stances of ministers were in most cases determined by the 
departmental considerations for some structural reasons, which will be examined 
later, so that few differences appear within the department between its minister and 
civil servants. The difference in views between departments, including both 
ministers and civil servants, was generally larger than that between ministers and 
civil servants in a single department 
Structure in the policy process 
The second perspective was that the structure which emerged in the policy process 
had important implications in allowing particular actors to play significant roles in 
the policy process. This thesis has illustrated that the influence of a particular actor 
in the policy process was determined by his/her position in the policy network. In 
particular the existence of the policy community and its nature were important. The 
major determinant of his/her influence in policy making of this area was the 
position of each actor in the policy community. Once a policy community was 
established, it was difficult for peripheral- and non-actors, to take initiatives in 
framing policy or influencing the details. 
The whole structure 
The overview of the structure in the policy process on Commonwealth immigration 
is exhibited in Figure 10.3. In this policy area there was a stable and exclusionary 
policy community within the goverm-nent. It included senior civil servants from the 
four main departments in this issue, i. e., Home Office, Ministry of Labour, Colonial 
Office and Commonwealth Relations Office, the ministers of these departments as 
well as the Prime Minister and his advisers. They have their own resources for 
participating in the policy process. 
The central positions in the policy community were dominated by civil 
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----------- comparatively established links 
Figure 10.3 The structure in the policy process on Conu-nonwealth immigration 
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servants, in particular by those at the Home Office. Their positions ývere backed bN. 
two conditions, or resources, namely, their specialist knowledge of the issue and 
their inter-departmental network which was independent from that of ministers. 
Civil servants established their position in the policy process as experts in this issue 
through repeated and detailed discussions and thus constituted the indispensable 
part of the policy community on Commonwealth immigration. These positions of 
civil servants were also supported institutionally in particular by the existence of 
inter- departmental negotiations at the civil servants' own level. These provided civil 
servants with the "horizontal" network of co-ordination of their own beyond 
departmental boundaries. 
This thesis has therefore in common with Jordan and Richardson's 
'bureaucratic accommodation' in that both emphasised the importance of co- 
ordination at the level of civil servants. On the other hand, these findings are rather 
different from their thesis as to relations between the position of civil servants and 
their expert knowledge. They claim, like this thesis, that in Britain civil servants are 
liable to sit at the centre of the network in policy making. 9 For them this is because 
civil servants lack knowledge as experts in the issue. Because civil servants are not 
experts on issues compared with interest group staff, they try to assess the feasibility 
of policy through consultation with outside experts and thus establish close links 
with relevant interest groups. 10 However, as this thesis has shown, civil servants are 
not always keen to establish links with outside groups. Rather, as far as the policy 
area in this thesis is concerned, their central co-ordinating position was assured by 
their domination of expert knowledge. 
In this policy area ministers also had their places in the policy community. 
9 A. Grant Jordan and J. J. Richardson, British Politics and the Policy Process: An Arena 
Approach (London, Allen and Unwin, 1987), pp. 178-9. 
10 Jordan and Richardson, British Politics and the Policy Porcess, p. 171. 
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They had their places not in the capacity of being politicians but mainly in the 
capacity of being the heads of departments. Their positions in the policy process 
were assured constitutionally to represent departments at ministerial levels. 
However, unlike civil servants, they did not have special resources by which they 
could contribute in the policy process strongly in their own right, except for 
constitutional position. Ministers therefore participated in government discussions 
mainly as a representative of the department. This is the main reason why the 
difference in views between the minister and his/her officials were small in general 
as far as departmental ministers were concerned. 
In contrast, other actors were largely excluded from the policy community 
on Commonwealth immigration. They had only a limited, temporary, access to the 
community. In the case of Parliament, parties and the public, their access was 
possible only with assistance of ministers acting as politicians independent of 
departments. However, room for ministers acting as such intermediators was very 
limited in this policy area. 
In summary, the policy community on Commonwealth immigration had the 
following characteristics: 
1. it was dominated by civil servants of the four major departments in this policy 
area and, to a lesser extent, by ministers who acted as representatives of their 
departments; 
2. other actors such as Parliament, parties, interest groups and the public, were 
largely excluded or only marginally involved; 
3. it was not only relatively closed and exclusionary in this respect, but also 
comparatively stable over time; and, 
4. it was based on informal networks mainly at the level of civil servants and 
their knowledge, which were gradually institutionalised. 
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Relations between departments 
Though constitutional positions assigned to ministers cannot be dismissed, in 
general civil servants of the four departments had the central place in the policN' 
process in this area. It was very significant that, among the four departments, the 
Home Office had the central place for most of the period, the Home Office by and 
large kept the leading position in the policy community. 
The policy community in this area emerged in the early 1950s. Before then 
discussions on Commonwealth immigration had taken place solely among civil 
servants. The Colonial Office was the main actor at this time but inter- departmental 
communications did not have firm institutional bases and their discussions were 
largely sporadic. By 1950, there had occurred a redefinition of the issue at the 
ministerial level. This followed a shift in responsibility within Whitehall. The 
gradual increase in immigration from the Commonwealth resulted in ministerial 
recognition of the issue shifting from a Colonial matter to domestic one. In these 
circumstances the policy community emerged in order to discuss the impact of 
immigration inter-departmentally. The Home Office, which was formally 
responsible for immigration control, was situated by ministers at the centre of co- 
ordination. Since then the Home Office was to enjoy the leading position among the 
four main departments until the passing of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants 
Act. 
In the meantime the Ministry of Labour was given a place particularly after 
1955 when the employment situation was raised on the agenda by ministers. Its 
assessment of the employment situation had a certain amount of influence on 
government policy. In contrast, the Commonwealth Relations Office did not have 
strong foothold in the policy community of this policy area before 1956 as the issue 
was mainly about immigration from the West Indies, of which the Colonial Office 
was formally in charge. The draft Commonwealth Immigrants Bill of 1955 was 
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prepared without involvement of the Commonwealth Relations Office. As a result, 
people from the whole Commonwealth were made subject to control in the 1955 
draft Bill while Irish citizens were not. Unfortunately for the Commonwealth 
Relations Office, this became the basic principle of later discussions about 
legislation. 
The dominance of the Home Office suffered a change in the period after 
1962. The Ministry of Labour and the Home Office were the two most influential 
departments in the policy community from 1962 to 1964. The Ministry of Labour, 
which was formally responsible for the employment voucher scheme, gained the 
initiative at the civil servant level. Though the Home Office lost the leading role at 
this level, it still retained dominance at the ministerial level, where pressures within 
the government to reform the institution were not so large as those at the civil 
servant level. The major status of the Home Office in the policy community was 
reconfirmed after the Cabinet reshuffle of June 1962, as a result of which the Home 
Secretary was appointed Chairman of the ministerial committee on Commonwealth 
immigration. Between 1962 and 1964, these two departments took joint initiatives 
at the early stage, but the balance gradually shifted in favour of the Home Office due 
to its dominance at the ministerial level. 
As has shown previously, the stance of the four main departments did not 
always point in the same direction. Rather there were conflicting views at civil 
servant level. The view of the Home Office is likely to dominate in the discussion, 
but the views of other departments were also taken into account through 
interdepartmental co-ordination by civil servants. 
Two areas of discussion 
In this policy area, ministers, as head of departments, and civil servants were 
interdependent within the policy community for constituting the dominant line of 
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the government approaching this issue. At the same time, ministers and civil 
servants work, to some extent, independently of and enjoyed autonomy from each 
other. Accordingly, there were two distinct areas of discussion within the 
government, one taking place among politicians and one among civil servants. 
The discussion at the civil servant level started long before ministers had a 
major interest in this subject. In the period between 1954 and 1956, civil servants 
had apparently different emphasis on the issue from ministers and this resulted in 
deterring early legislation. In the meantime ministers also had autonomy to a certain 
extent from departments in the policy process. 
In institutional terms, the official inter- departmental committees, which had 
had by and large an ad hoc nature, were gradually institutional i sed and acquired a 
permanent nature from around 1957 at the latest. The official committee 
consolidated its independent existence and was not of secondary importance to the 
ministerial committee. This provided civil servants with the institutional base for 
their participation in the policy process. In the period between 1959 and 1961, civil 
servants played consistent roles on the basis of the official committee. Even when 
ministerial discussions on the subject were suspended, discussions were maintained 
at the civil servant level. From October 1959 in particular, discussions in the official 
committee were reported directly to the Home Secretary until a new ministerial 
committee was set up. Civil servants exchanged information in the official 
committee regularly and, after ministers had their own interdepartmental forum by 
the appointment of the new ministerial committee in December 1960, civil servants 
fed ideas to the ministerial committee through the official committee. 
These two interdependent, but distinct, areas of discussion were skilfully 
used by the Home Office after it lost its initiative at the civil servant level by the 
introduction of the employment voucher scheme and the resulting establishment of 
the new official committee with the initiative of the Ministry of Labour. In the 
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period from 1962 to 1964, ministerial discussions of ministers and those of civil 
servants often contradicted each other and the conclusions of the latter were often 
reversed by the former. This occurred mainly because there were disagreements 
between the Home Office and the Ministry of Labour rather than because there was 
a difference in views between ministers and civil servants. The former took the 
initiative at the ministerial level but not at the civil servant level, and the latter at the 
civil servant level but not at the ministerial level. The Home Office was to use this 
two-layer structure in the policy process in order to ensure its voice being 
successfully listened to within the policy community. 
Role of actors in the policy process and constitutional rules 
The third perspective is concerned with the rules which govern the division of 
labour among policy makers. As was seen above, informal networks were created to 
link the main departments at the civil servant level. These were gradually 
institutional i sed within the government and contributed greatly to secure the 
independence of civil servants from ministers in the policy process. This thesis has 
also shown that constitutional role expectations bound strongly the role of actors in 
the policy process, and make differences between the role of ministers and that of 
civil servants. The constitutional division of labour in the policy process explains a 
lot about the role of each actor. 
Civil servants 
The role of civil servants in the policy process is summarised in three ways, namely, 
producing the direction and details of policy, keeping consistency of ideas and 
policy, and analysing problems quickly. 
Firstly, civil servants produced the direction and details of policy in this 
policy area. Substantial discussions about policy contents were carried out by them. 
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As the government discussion on the issue lasted over a long period, senior civil 
servants of the departments concerned emerged as a group of policý' experts within 
the government and monopolised knowledge on the issue. They examined various 
aspects of immigration and formed government views on policy. The initial 
framework of British government's policy on Commonwealth immigration was thus 
established in the civil servants' meeting of February 1949. Contents of legislation 
which was to be introduced by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 as Ný-ell 
as the viewpoint against which the judgement as to whether legislation would be 
carried out had been largely formulated in the discussions of civil servants by 1956. 
Secondly, civil servants maintained the consistency of policy. In this policy 
area discussions by civil servants on the issue preceded ministerial discussions. By 
the time ministers began to demand legislation in 1954 with the increasing anxiety 
in Parliament and the public, civil servants had had repeated discussions concerning 
Commonwealth immigration for more than five years. They kept the initial policy 
agreed in February 1949 despite changes in government. The contents of, and 
viewpoints for adopting, policy were maintained by them. They produced the 
"standard operating procedures" of the government machine regarding this issue, 
which were composed of long-held customs, traditions, work-ethics and paradigms, 
and these were accumulated and institutionalised as knowledge, so did the informal 
networks in this area. These values of the government machinery neutralised 
pressures by other actors in the policy process. Civil servants as the holders of the 
"standard operating procedures" worked to secure the continuity and stability in 
policy. 
Thirdly, civil servants acted to deal with problems that needed quick 
solutions. This role was important in particular when the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Bill of 1961 was introduced in Parliament. Strong opposition in 
Parliament caused the government to seek measures to appease the opposition. New 
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arrangements for immigration from the Irish Republic were swiftly invented by civil 
servants, as well as the practicability of measures proposed from Parliament such as 
the Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council and immigration certificates were 
quickly discussed. 
The policy of the British government in this area was thus largely 
maintained by civil servants. Their initiative in the policy process was guaranteed 
by their autonomy from ministers, which in turn was assured by the existence of the 
relatively closed and stable policy community. The policy community was worked 
to exclude the pressures, and support to ministers, from outside. In this policy area, 
civil servants were more than a mere conduit through which ministers can exercise 
top-down influence on policy. They acted as highly organised and expertly trained 
professional personnel powerfully influencing the shape of policy by using their 
knowledge and skills as well as the inter-departmental network as their resources. 
Ministers and Prime Minister 
In contrast to civil servants, ministers did not have a large impact on policy itself In 
this policy area ministers did not influence content and contexts of policy. This was 
partly because they did not have much interest in these subjects, but also because 
the structure was gradually established in which ministers found it hard to exert 
influence due to their less favourable position in the policy community compared 
with that of civil servants. 
It was true that ministers brought a distinct view from civil servants into the 
policy process. Ministers as politicians injected politics in the policy process, which 
often originated in the public, party and Parliament, and conversely they initiated 
measures to influence public opinion and thus to justify legislation at ministerial 
level. Ministers in fact facilitated discussions within the government after 1954 
when the rapid increase in immigration was followed by a rise in Parliamentary 
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concern. Some Cabinet ministers began to claim that legislation was necessary both 
on entry and deportation. 
However, the roles ministers played in the policy process were limited in 
general. As seen in the discussion of ministerial committees and official 
committees, ministers' discussions were largely a repetition of those of civil 
servants, and the opinion of ministers did not depart much from the departmental 
opinion. This was because, as had been explained, in this policy area ministers had 
fewer resources in terms of knowledge and institutions for examining the details of 
policy than civil servants. The chances where ministers were able to affect 
discussions on policy in their own right were limited to the cases where the issue 
had great importance in domestic politics. 
This does not mean that ministers did not play any role in the policy process. 
Rather they played important roles in other respects. Firstly, the final decisions were 
made by Cabinet ministers and this norm was maintained at least formally. 
Ministerial committees basically acted within Cabinet directions, and official 
committees acted within Cabinet and ministerial committees' directions. Official 
committees submitted papers, which were produced based on their discussions, to 
the relevant ministerial committee, which in turn reported to the Cabinet. There 
were few examples in which civil servants made final decisions about whether to 
introduce concrete policy measures or not. In this sense the Prime Minister, who has 
the constitutional supremacy as the final tie braker within the government are 
particularly important. As far as relations between civil servants and ministers were 
concerned, they both acted according to the division of labour based on the 
constitutional allocation of their competencies. 
Secondly, more substantially for the policy process, ministers transformed 
the framework of policy discussion within the government. At the emerging stage of 
the policy community in particular, ministers played a decisive role in directing later 
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discussions. The involvement of the Home Office in the policy process was forced 
by ministerial decisions. It was the Cabinet that situated the Home Office at the 
centre of discussion by appointing the Home Secretary as chairman of the 
ministerial committee in 1950 and further institutionalised this by setting up an 
inter-departmental official committee also chaired by the Home Office in 1952. 
Similarly the Home Office's acquisition of the chairmanship in the ministerial 
committee was brought by the Cabinet reshuffle in June 1962. 
Thirdly, it is also important to note that ministers changed the agenda of 
policy discussions. The initial discussion under the Conservative government on 
Commonwealth immigration was raised by Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister, 
in 1952. His personal interests in this issue stimulated the beginning of nine years of 
discussions which resulted in the introduction of the Commonwealth Immigrants 
Act in 1962. Similarly, the Cabinet ordered the official committee to include 
economic factors, in addition to social factors, on its the agenda at the end of 1955. 
This caused the issue of domestic labour demands to function as a deterrent to 
control of immigration in the economic boom until 1958. 
Ministers did not greatly engage in the discussion about details of policy, but 
they affected the framework for discussion in terms of institution and agenda, which 
was to initiate the govermnent approach to the issue. II Such top-down influence on 
institutions and agenda was not exerted by civil servants. This aspect of switching 
the circuit of government discussions was the area where Cabinet ministers had 
distinct roles in the policy process from civil servants. This is especially the case 
with the Prime Minister. As the final tie braker within the government these roles of 
II Such a change in "venues" of discussion is the point which recent studies on agenda setting 
such as those by Frank Baumgartner have focussed on. See, for example, Frank R. Baumgartner and 
Bryan D. Jones, 'Agenda dynamics and policy subsystems', Journal of Politics, 5-33,4 (1991), 1044- 
74. 
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ministers were to be played most typically by the Prime Minister. 
This shows that ministers were assured of their places in the policy process 
using the constitutional positions as their resource. The constitutional division of 
labour played a major role in determining ministers'part in the policy process. 
Other actors 
In contrast to civil servants and ministers, the public and Parliament had , er\- 
limited roles in this policy area. Their role in the policy process of this area was 
dependent on ministers. Public and Parliamentary anxiety over the issue increased 
remarkably in late 1953. This was supported by some ministers and thus political 
moves within the government were activated. Consequently intensive discussions 
emerged at various levels within the government and finally the draft 
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill of 1955 was prepared and submitted to the 
Cabinet. Similarly wide public concern was raised by the urban disturbances in the 
summer of 1958. With a general election being held within a year, the government 
faced the need to subdue public interest on the issue. Accordingly the draft 
Deportation Bill was prepared in order to alleviate public anxiety. 
Pressures from the public, Parliament and party were exerted on the 
government discussion via ministers. However, these did not have large impact on 
the discussion as the moves to legislation in both examples cited above failed. The 
only exception in this respect was the amendment on the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Bill in the legislation process in Parliament. Amendments were 
proposed in relations to Commonwealth sentiments by Conservative backbenchers 
and the opposition Labour Party. These were adopted by the government. However. 
this was possible only because it was in the legislative process where Parliament 
had the supreme constitutional role. The lack in the impact of these actors was 
because, at the initial stage of the government discussion, interest groups outside the 
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govemments were poorly organised and weak, so that public as lvell as 
backbenchers could not establish strong links with the government concerning this 
issue. 
4. Impact of the Policy Community on the Policy Process 
The presence of the closed policy community and the structure produced around it 
had significant impact on the policy process in this area. As was shown in Section 2 
of this Chapter, two points were particularly important characteristics in this policy 
process. These are explained with respect to the implication in the policy process of 
the policy community. Firstly, the policy community prevented, for a considerable 
extent, the politicisation of the issue by mitigating the influence of political 
pressure, and thus kept the issue from escaping out of government control. 
Secondly, the policy community delineated government perspectives on the issue 
and the option of policy measures taken. 
Exclusion ofpolitical considerations 
The policy community composed mainly of the four most involved departments 
provided the basis on which civil servants enjoyed considerable autonomy from 
ministers in the policy process. Such a policy making style, in which a small group 
of bureaucratic policy experts dominated the central areas of policy making, worked 
to prevent the politicisation of the issue of Commonwealth immigration, which 
might otherwise have occurred due to the involvement of specific interests. 
As explained above, there were two areas of discussion within the 
government. Ministerial discussions were often motivated by political g 
considerations, while discussions by civil servants were, to a considerable extent, 
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free from these. Impetus for policy change could originate in changes in recognition 
within the government, as well as from outside pressures. As far as the policV 
change in this area was concerned, the change in recognition of the issue among 
civil servants was more important than pressures from outside. This was well 
illustrated in the developments of the issue in the two periods - between 1954 and 
1956 and between 1959 and 1960 - when a rapid increase in immigration was 
recorded. In the period from 1954 to 1956, Parliamentary pressure caused some 
Cabinet members to raise the issue within the government and discussions 
continued for several years at various levels of the government. Discussions by civil 
servants, however, resulted in converging on the whole to oppose legislation. In the 
period from 1959 to 1960, anxiety increased among civil servants particularly in the 
Home Office, and this paved the way to legislation. 
The policy community in this area provided the basis on which civil servants 
enjoyed considerable autonomy from ministers in the policy process and could exert 
strong influence on it. The mainstream of discussion was kept at the civil servant 
level so that policy change required changes in the recognition of civil servants. 
It was particularly important that discussions by civil servants were mostly 
free from political considerations. Civil servants kept their own focus on practical 
aspects of policy. Consequently, even when political pressures motivated the 
discussion within the government, political considerations were strictly confined 
within ministerial discussions. Involvement of civil servants in the policy process 
which was assured by the policy community functioned as a buffer to minimise 
disturbances in policy which might be caused by political factors, and enabled 
smooth co-ordination between actors with different interests in the background of 
politics. 
Limitation ofperspecdves andpolicy option 
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The structure of the policy community is important in order for particular actors to 
play key roles and for particular issues to be raised or, on the contrary. set aside or 
neglected at the discussion table. It works to limit the scope of discussion about 
policy also in terms of context and measures. This is the second implication of the 
presence in the policy community of senior civil servants of the four departments. 
In the formation process of the policy community, the basis on vhich the 
future policy was discussed was established. The growing influence of the Home 
Office in the policy community worked to limit the agenda and measures the 
government might adopt in order to tackle the issue, and thus characterised the 
direction of the government discussion. As regards the view on immigration, 
reflecting the nature of the Home Office as the Department in charge of public 
order, social aspects were taken more highly in the discussions than other factors 
such as colonial relations or the employment situation. Potential negative social 
impacts of immigration dominated the government discussion consistently rather 
than the positive benefits to the labour market and the economy in general. Colonial 
immigration was considered as a burden rather than as an asset. 
Meanwhile, for the same reasons, policy as an output of the government was 
managed from the perspective of regulation. The only formal remit held by the 
Home Office as regards immigration, therefore the only interest of the Home Office 
as regards Commonwealth immigration, was to control immigration. Policy options 
which were not normally dealt with by the Home Office, for example, policy against 
racial discrimination and prejudice, and social policy such as service provision in 
the field of housing, employment and welfare, were not expected to be raised in the 
discussion. Such perspectives were not seriously taken within discussions of civil 
servants which were led by the Home Office. These needs of the new minorities 
were easily overwhelmed by the need to deter influx or raised only to justify control. 
The central theme of policy discussions was thus fixed on the single point "how to 
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reduce immigration", though ministerial committees established after 1955 Nvere 
named simply "Committee on Colonial Immigrants" or "Commonwealth Migrants 
Committee". 12 
It was therefore very important that, throughout most of the period, the 
Home Office kept the leading position in the policy community. With the gradual 
consolidation of the policy community, in which discourse and composition 
matched, the issue became confined to a possibility of restricting a further increase 
in influx. The centrality of the Home Office worked to strengthen the recognition of 
the issue from social concern and to limit the possible policy measure to 
regulation. 13 
There were other perspectives which were raised temporarily in the 
government discussion. The main among these were external relations and the 
economic situation, which were respectively the main concerns of the Colonial 
12 The issue about the welfare of immigrants did not have an independent policy community. This 
aspect of immigration was left for the remit of the Colonial Office. The Department's interest in this 
aspect appeared in the official committee CPUK from 1950 and another official committee in the late 
1950s. These inter-departmental committees were not the shadow of a ministerial committee, and 
their discussions seldom came up to ministerial level. The only exception in this respect was a plan 
for a West Indian Housing Association which emerged soon after the 1958 disturbances. This was to 
improve housing situations of those from the West Indies by encouraging the supply of 
accommodation for them. This plan, however, resulted in failure because major sponsors for the 
Association were not found. The plan was brought to the ministerial level. It was, however, through 
the channel of the policy community led by the Home Office. See, for example, Note of a meeting in 
the Home Office, 13 Nov 58, C01032/197; J. M. Ross, Assistant Secretary, HO, to 1. B. Watt, 
Assistant Secretary, CO, 14 May 59, C01032/197; CCI(59)1,10 Jul 59, CA13134/1467. 
13 For this reason, it has often been claimed that social policies related to the integration of ethnic 
minorities and measures for anti-discrimination should be separated from the remit of the Home 
Office. The Home Office has actually formal responsibilities on significant parts of these two policy 
areas. See, for example, Nicholas Deakin, 'Racial integration and Whitehall: a plea for 
reorganisation', Political Quarterly 39,4 (1968), 415-26; Jaqi Nixon, 'The Home Office and race 
relations policy: coordinator and initiator', Journal of Public Policy 2,4 (1982), 365-78. 
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Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Ministry of Labour. External 
relations actually acted to mitigate the impact of social concern and to slow down 
the straight-forward move to restriction. The Colonial Office and the 
Commonwealth Relations Office, which represented these interests, were fulk, 
incorporated in the policy community and important actors in this policy area. 
However, these factors could not be so decisive as to reject social perspectives in 
the policy community. Moreover, in the 1960s, these two Departments gradually 
lost their influence in the Whitehall as the importance of relations with the 
Commonwealth in British politics decreased. 
Nevertheless, external relations, especially relations with Commonwealth 
governments, were significant in the policy process in two respects. Firstly. 
relations with the "old" Commonwealth countries and the future of the West Indian 
Federation were important enough to postpone legislation until 1961. The Colonial 
Office strongly opposed legislation as this might adversely affect the Federation, 
and in fact the Jamaican referendum in September 1961 was decisive for the timing 
of legislation. Secondly, Commonwealth sentiments in British domestic politics 
were also important in the legislative process of the Commonwealth Immigrants 
Act. The position of Irish citizens and the duration of legislation, in particular as 
compared with alien legislation, were both thought to be damaging to relations with 
the Commonwealth. Commonwealth sentiments had importance in the policy 
process in the context of British domestic and Parliamentary politics and not 
necessarily in the context of concrete relations with the Commonwealth. 
Meanwhile, the economic perspective, which was the major concerns of the 
neighbouring West European governments in this period, was the least respected of 
the three main contexts of policy, though it was injected as the point of examination 
in the official committee CWP(3) at the end of 1955 and, since then, acted as a 
deterrent to immigration control until 1958. The economic implications of 
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immigration were little considered except for the employment situation, which the 
Ministry of Labour was monitoring. Still the focus of monitor was on levels of 
unemployment rather than the positive contribution in terms of skills and economic 
growth. In fact, the Ministry of Labour was not a department which had much 
interest in economic aspects of immigration 'in general'. After the 1962 Act, when 
the Ministry of Labour took initiatives at the civil servant level, its management of 
the voucher scheme was not linked to the situation of employment but simplý, to the 
number of application for vouchers. 
This abnormality appeared typically when the Treasury attended the official 
committee meeting for the first time in the summer of 196 1. At this stage the 
introduction of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill in Parliament was already 
imminent. Nevertheless the Treasury showed strong objection to restriction from the 
economic perspectives. The Treasury was the most important department which 
could have represented economic perspectives in government discussions as the 
department in charge of macro economic management. It was persistently 
concerned about the shortages of labour in the national economy and had less 
negative view of Commonwealth immigration than other departments. However, it 
was not much involved, and thus its view was not reflected, in government 
discussions. It is true that after 1962 the Treasury gained a permanent seat at 
ministerial committees in this policy area. Its fear about the loss of the essential 
labour by the drastic reduction in voucher issue was to some extent respected 
thereafter, particularly in modifying the voucher scheme. However its voice in the 
government discussion was not still very strong since it did not have a 
corresponding seat at, more important, civil servant levels. Moreover the 
involvement of the Treasury in the policy process of this area was too late for the 
Department to influence the critical formulation of policy. As a result, ecollomic 
factors had surprisingly little impact in the government discussion. 
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As has been argued here, the context and options of policy on 
Commonwealth immigration was largely constrained by the structure of the policy 
community made up of the four major departments. The policy community on 
Commonwealth immigration which was established in the process leading to the 
introduction of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act was so closed and stable that it 
was not much responsive to pressure from outside. It was firmly supported in terms 
of composition and discourse. The Home Office had been given the central place in 
the policy community and this position was in turn legitimised by powerful 
discourses within the goverment which emphasised the fear of social tensions. 
There were interdependent relations between the involvement of the Home Office in 
the policy process and the direction of discussion. 
5. Implication of the Thesis 
Contribution of the thesis 
This thesis has exhibited the role of civil servants in the policy process, which has 
been underrated and disregarded in the previous studies of British policy making. It 
showed the detailed mechanism in the policy process of the executive-departmental 
area, which the "Whitehall models" have not shown. This thesis therefore largely 
complements the major existing works over British government such as those on the 
consensus/adversary politics thesis and on the Prime Minister's 'presidential power' 
thesis, which have emphasised the role of political parties, Cabinet members and the 
Prime Minister. 
In this thesis the role of civil servants was illuminated in terms of the 
structure in the policy process, which appeared along with the development of 
policy. Informal networks between actors were examined and it was found that civil 
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servants were as important actors as politicians in the policy process. In particular, 
this thesis has made clear the existence of civil servant's co-ordination in the 
executive- departmental relations, which has been pointed out in the case of relations 
between departments and interest groups by Jordan and Richardson's bureaucratic 
accommodation model but not specifically pointed out in other areas. It has also 
made clear the mechanism where this co-ordinative role worked to limit the context 
and option of government policies and to exclude external political pressures from 
the policy process to a significant extent. 
This thesis has also found that knowledge and skills concerning the 
particular policy area are accumulated in the department and thus constitute an 
important resource of civil servants, along with inter-departmental institutions, 
when they play roles in the policy process. This refutes the amateurism of civil 
servants which is claimed to be important for civil servants to establish consultative 
relations with outside groups. Furthermore, the thesis confirmed the existence of the 
division of labour between ministers and civil servants and made clear the details of 
their interdependence. This was to sharply contrast to the view of bureaucratic 
domination over ministers raised in Chapter 2. 
Th e structure in th e policy process an d th e division of labo ur with min isters 
These new findings are explained more in detail. Although they are all interlinked 
with each other, the resources of civil servants in the policy process and the division 
of labour are concerned with the nature of the structure in the policy process. Two 
points has been raised in this thesis as the ones that are important in the structure in 
the policy process. Firstly, this thesis has made clear the impact of informal 
networks within the government in the policy process. In particular it has shown 
that in some policy areas there is a closed policy community in its policy process. 
which is important in the policy process at least from the following perspectives: 
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1. the policy community functions to accumulate knowledge, and this resulted in 
producing values and views unique to the actors deeply involved in the policy 
area; 
2. the policy community provides civil servants with the basis on which they play 
a major role in the policy process as experts on a particular policy; and, 
3. the policy community works to limit the scope of policy, that is, contexts and 
option being adopted. 
This thesis has shown the importance of informal networks in the policy process. 
However, this by no means denies the importance of constitutional rules. Despite 
the importance of informal networks in the policy process, formal arrangements and 
rules in a particular polity are also important as has been seen in the role of 
ministers. The structure in the policy process consists of both informal networks and 
constitutional rules. 
This point is therefore made more explicit by referring again to the relations 
between civil servants and the core executive. The findings in this thesis as regards 
the role of civil servants shows the existence of co-ordination by civil servants. 
Bureaucratic mechanisms in Whitehall provide the essential integration, especially 
the official committee system, regular meetings of senior civil staffs, and multiple 
Whitehall information networks. 
This does not mean that no core executive, however structured, is able to 
fully control a modem government machinery. The core executive also plays an 
important, not secondary, role in managing the machine. Ministers, above all the 
Prime Minister, have constitutional supremacy over civil servants so that they can 
play distinct roles in the policy process on final decision making and 
both 
institutional and agenda setting. These points in particular the latter two indicate 
that the structure in the policy process may be changed by ministers. There 
is a 
division of labour between ministers and civil servants. The bureaucratic co- 
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ordination found in this thesis never denies the role of the Prime Minister and the 
core executive, rather it is complementary to the recent discoveries in these areas 
from the policy process perspectives. The role of the Prime Minister and the core 
executive in the policy process is still important and distinct from that of civil 
servants. 
Consensual style of the British government and the limitation of this thesis 
Meanwhile, as far as the co-ordinative role of civil servants and its dynamism in the 
policy process are concerned, they can be understood in terms of the impact of the 
structure in the policy process. This thesis has shown two points in particular as 
regards implications in the policy process of the existence of the relatively closed 
policy community within the government, namely: the policy community prevented 
the influence of political pressure and thus kept the issue from escaping out of 
government control; and, the policy community delineated government perspectives 
on the issue and the option of policy measures to be taken. 
The consensual/adversarial thesis regarding party politics as well as 
bureaucratic thesis show that the British policy process tends to incorporate main 
actors within certain boundaries, where a particular policy issue is discussed in 
consensual manners. This thesis has added a concrete example of such consensual 
style in the British policy process to these previous theses from the new perspective, 
namely, the executive-departmental side within the government. The basis of 
consensual politics has been examined in detail by revealing structural conditions 
on which each government actor played their interdependent, but unique role within 
the policy process. The considerable involvement of civil servants in the policy 
process and the significant division of labour between ministers and civil servants, 
which has shown in this thesis, worked to minimise the conflicts within the 
government by providing co-ordination at a lower level which limits the context and 
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option of policy and excludes political pressures. 
The findings in this thesis, however, are not necessarily generalisable to all 
parts of the British policy process. The conditions these characteristics appears in a 
particular policy area are: 1) ministers have little interest in or little will to intervene 
the issue; 2) the policy process has a relatively long time-span which enables 
informal networks and expert knowledge to be institutionalised and to be available 
as the resources of civil servants; and, 3) organised interests outside the government 
are non-existent or weak so that the public and backbenchers fail to establish links 
with the core executive to influence its opinion strongly. 
Among these conditions, more important as determinants of civil servants' 
influence in the policy process than the last are the former two: ministers' interest in 
a particular issue and the degree of institutionalisation of informal networks for the 
issue. The extent of the latter overwhelming the former is the likelihood in which 
the policy process shown in this thesis appears. This means in other words that 
repeated policy making in which the relative importance of constitutional roles is 
not strong as compared with informal rules in governing the policy process is the 
condition. 
This thesis has illuminated and analysed the role of civil servants as policy 
experts at the centre of the policy process. In this policy area the influence of such a 
small group of bureaucratic experts expanded as government discussions on the 
issue developed. This might reveal, from a constitutional Point of view, the 
undemocratic side of the policy process in that non-elective civil servants can exert 
great influence in formulating policy. 
However from the view of the discipline of political science, which has the 
aim of illuminating political realities, the very recognition that the influence of civil 
servants in the policy process may not be small in some policy areas should be 
invaluable. The significance of the role of policy experts in democratic political 
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systems should not necessarily lie, as is often raised as a matter of anxiety, in their 
ability to manipulate elected representatives and gain unaccountable control over 
the goverm-nent, but should lie in their ability to provide the intellectual means for 
formulating public policies. 
As Birch remarks when he writes about his Whitehall model, a model that 
focuses on the bureaucratic side of the goverm-nent sees government as a way of 
providing public services and promoting the public interest, and tends to regard 
party conflict as a distraction which may be necessary but which is somewhat 
irrelevant to the main business in hand. This contrasts sharply with the view based 
on the values of the democratic theorist, who thinks that the essential criteria of 
good government are that all shades of opinion should be reflected in public 
discussion and that in the end the will of the majority should prevail. 14 Informality 
within the government is to develop to promote efficiency in the policy process and 
formality based on constitutional principles is to develop to secure and promote 
public representation. 
14 Anthony H. Birch, The British System of Government (London, George Allen and Unwin, 3rd 
ed., 1973), p-38. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 Chronology 
1945 July The Labour Party wins the general election; Clement R. Attlee takes 
office as Prime Minister 
1947 Feb The Treasury's Economic Survey shows a positive view to the 
introduction of foreign workers 
1948 Mar The Colonial Office proposes the Ministry of Labour the introduction 
of workers from the West Indies 
Jun 492 Jamaicans arrive at Tilbury by the Empire Windrush 
Sep 108 Jamaicans arrive at Liverpool by the Orbita 
Oct The official committee CLWP (chairman: J. M. Martin, Assistant 
Under- Secretary, Colonial Office) is set up in order to consider the 
possibility of introducing workers from the West Indies 
1949 Feb The possibility of introducing legislative control on the entry of 
colonial subjects is referred to at an interdepartmental meeting of 
officials held at the Home Office 
Jun The Royal Commission on Population publishes its report in which 
the Commission shows a negative view on large scale 
immigration 
Jul The CLWP in its final report shows the view that there are no overall 
labour shortages in the UK 
1950 Feb The Labour Party wins the general election 
Mar The Cabinet discusses about colonial immigration and establishes the 
ministerial committee GEN325 with the Home Secretary (J. 
Chuter Ede) being chairman in order to examine the means to 
prevent increase in immigration from the Colonies and the 
possibility of legislation for this purpose 
1951 Jan The ministerial committee GEN325 concludes that it is difficult to 
legislate on immigration 
Oct The Conservative Party wins the general election; Winston S. 
Churchill takes office as Prime Minister 
1952 Nov The Cabinet discusses about colonial immigration; the official 
committee CWP is set up with the Home Office chairman (W. H. 
Cornish, Assistant Under- Secretary) in order to consider measures 
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to prevent colonial people from obtaining jobs in the UK 
1953 Dec The CWP produces its report and shows the view that legislation on 
entry and deportation is the only effective measure to prevent 
colonial people from obtaining jobs in the UK 
1954 Mar A question is raised in the Commons as to whether the government 
sets up a committee of enquiry; the Cabinet rejects the idea 
May The official committee CWP(2) is set up (chairman: W. H. Cornish, 
Assistant Under- Secretary, Home Office) in order to consider 
about the details of legislation on entry and deportation 
Oct The CWP(2) produces its second and final report in which it shows 
the view that legislation should in face cover the whole 
Commonwealth and that Irish citizens should be exempted from 
control 
Dec The Cabinet decides to draft a Bill for entry and deportation 
1955 Jan A Private Member's Bill to restrict immigration is prepared by Cyril 
Osborne 
Apr Anthony Eden replaces Winston Churchill as Prime Minister 
May The goverm-nent's draft Commonwealth Immigrants Bill is submitted 
to the Cabinet 
May The Conservative Party wins the general election 
Jun The draft Commonwealth Immigrants Bill is reintroduced to the 
Cabinet; however, the Cabinet defers decision on the Bill 
Jul The official committee CWP(3) is established (chairman: W. H. 
Cornish, Assistant Under- Secretary, Home Office) in order to 
consider about the social and economic problems of immigrants 
Aug The CWP(3) produces a report in which the committee shows the 
view that legislation could not be justified 
Nov The Cabinet decides to postpone the introduction of the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill in Parliament; instead, it sets up 
a ministerial committee Cl with the Lord Chancellor (Viscount 
Kilmuir) being chairman in order to consider as to whether 
legislation could be justified 
1956 Jun The ministerial committee Cl produces its report in which it 
concludes legislation could not be justified 
Jul The Cabinet decides to shelve the discussion about Commonwealth 
immigration for one year 
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195 7 Jan Harold Macmillan replaces Anthony Eden as Prime Minister; the 
ministerial committee CCI (chairman: Viscount Kilmuir, Lord 
Chancellor) is established 
1958 Jan The West Indian Federation comes into existence 
Jan The rapid increase in immigration from India and Pakistan is 
reported to the CWP(3) 
Aug The deterioration in employment is reported to the CWP(3) 
Aug Urban disturbances brake out in London, which were followed by 
disturbances in Nottingham in September 
Sep The Cabinet decides to draft a Deportation Bill 
1959 Jan The draft Deportation Bill is presented to the ministerial committee 
Ccl 
Feb The Cabinet decides that it does not introduce the Deportation Bill to 
Parliament 
Oct The Conservative Party wins the general election 
1960 Jun The increase in immigration from the West Indies is reported to the 
Cabinet 
Nov The Colonial Office produces a report which shows voluntary 
restrictions by the West Indian governments have collapsed 
Nov The Cabinet decides to reconstitute a ministerial committee on 
Commonwealth immigration 
Dec The ministerial committee CCM (chairman: Viscount Kilmuir, Lord 
Chancellor) is established 
1961 Feb The Cabinet decided to prepare legislation on immigration control 
and deportation, which could be published, if necessary, in the 
Parliamentary session from the autumn 
May The ministerial committee CCM recommends the Cabinet to 
introduce the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill to Parliament; the 
Cabinet defers decision 
Sep Jamaica rejects in its referendum to stay in the West Indian 
Federation 
Oct The Cabinet decides to introduce the Commonwealth Immigrants 
Bill to Parliament 
Nov The Commonwealth Immigrants Bill is published 
1962 Feb The Commonwealth Immigrants Bill passes the Commons 
Mar The official committee VWP is established (chairman: C. J. Maston 
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Under Secretary, Ministry of Labour) on the initiative of the 
Ministry of Labour 
, 14pr 
The Commonwealth Immigrants Bill receives Royal Assent ýp 
May The ministerial committee CCM is reconstituted as CIC (chairman: 
Viscount Kilmuir, Lord Chancellor) 
Jul Part I of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act (immigration control) 
comes into effect; the rate of the issue of vouchers is initially set 
at 750 a week 
Jul The Cabinet reshuffle results in the Home Secretary (Henry Brook) 
taking the chair in the ministerial committee CIC 
Jul The rate of the issue of vouchers is raised to 900 a week 
Dec "Disregarded" vouchers for applications from India and Pakistan 
were introduced; the rate of the issue of vouchers is set at 750 a 
week plus "disregarded" vouchers at 600 a week 
1963 Jul The "disregarded" voucher is abandoned after a rapid increase in 
immigration from India and Pakistan from the spring; the "one- 
quarter rule" is introduced, instead 
Oct The ministerial committee CIC expresses concerns about the high 
level of immigration of the year up to the month and decides to 
suspend the new issue of C vouchers for applications from India 
and Pakistan as well as to curtail the rate of the issue of vouchers 
to 500 a week 
Oct The report by civil servants on previous surveys of social and 
economic aspects is presented to the ministerial committee CIC 
Oct Alec Douglas-Home replaces Harold Macmillan as Prime Minister; 
The ministerial committee CCI (chairman: Henry Brooke, Home 
Secretary) replaces the CIC 
Nov The rate of the issue of vouchers is reduced to 400 a week; the 
criteria of the issue of A and B vouchers are reviewed and 
restricted 
1964 Apr The Home Secretary (Henry Brooke) reports to the Cabinet the 
possibility of abolishing C vouchers; the Cabinet decides to shelve 
decisions on Commonwealth immigration until after the general 
election; the Cabinet also decides to review its policy under the 
1962 Act and formulate a new plan for future discussion 
Jun Applications for C vouchers from India and Pakistan are suspended 
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Jul The second report by civil servants on the survey of economic 
impacts of immigration is submitted to the ministerial committee 
CO 
Jul The Home Secretary (Henry Brooke) submits to the Cabinet the 
outlines of a plan to reform policy on admission of entry for 
Commonwealth immigrants 
Sep The Home Secretary (Henry Brooke) submits to the Cabinet the plan 
to reform policy on admission of entry for Commonwealth 
immigrants, in which the proposed rate of the issue of vouchers is 
amended to be 250 a week 
Oct The Labour Party wins the general election; Harold Wilson takes 
office as Prime Minister 
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Appendix 2 The Cabinet, Main Committees and Meetings 
1. Cabinet and main ministers concerned 
Clement R. Attlee (Jul 45 - Feb 50) 
Home Secretary: 
Minister of Labour 
Colonial Secretary: 
J. Chuter Ede 
George A. Isaacs 
George H. Hall (until Oct 46), 
A. Creech Jones (from Oct 46) 
Commonwealth Secretary *: Viscount Addison (until Oct 47), 
Philip J. Noel-Baker (from Oct 47) 
Cabinet meetings on this issue: 0 
* Until July 194 7, Dominion Secretary. 
Clement R. Attlee (Feb 50 - Oct 5 1) 
Home Secretary: 
Minister of Labour 
Colonial Secretary: 
Commonwealth Secretary: 
J. Chuter Ede 
George A. Isaacs (until Jan 5 1); 
Aneurin Bevan (Jan 51 - Apr 5 1); 
A. Robens (from Apr 5 1) 
James Griffiths 
Patrick C. Gordon-Walker 
Cabinet meetings on this issue: 3 (1950: 2,195 1: 1) 
Winston Churchill (Oct 51 - Apr 55) 
Home Secretary: David Maxwell-Fyfe (until Oct 54); 
Gwilyrn Lloyd-George (from Oct 54) 
Minister of Labour: Walter Monckton 
Colonial Secretary: Oliver Lyttleton (until Jul 54); 
Alan Lennox-Boyd (from Jul 54) 
Commonwealth Secretary: Lord Ismay (until Mar 52); 
The Marquess of Salisbury (Mar 52 - 
Dec 52); 
Viscount Swinton (from Dec 52) 
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Lord President: The Marquess of Salisbury (from 
Dec 52) 
Cabinet meetings on this issue: 13 (1952: 2,1954: 5,1955: 6) 
Anthony Eden (Apr 55 - Jan 57) 
Home Secretary: Gwilyrn Lloyd-George 
Minister of Labour: Walter Monckton (until Dec 55); 
Colonial Secretary: 
Commonwealth Secretary: 
lain Macleod (from Dec 55) 
Alan Lennox-Boyd 
The Earl of Home 
Lord President: The Marquess of Salisbury 
Lord Chancellor: Viscount Kilmuir 
Cabinet meetings on this issue: 8 (1955: 5,1956: 3) 
Harold Macmillan (Jan 57- Oct 5 9) 
Home Secretary: 
Minister of Labour: 
Colonial Secretary: 
Commonwealth Secretary: 
Lord Chancellor: 
R. A. Butler 
lain Macleod 
Alan Lennox-boyd 
The Earl of Home 
Viscount Kilmuir 
Cabinet meetings on this issue: 6 (1957: 1,1958: 4,1959: 1) 
rT- 
hurold Macmillan (Oct 59 - Feb 63) 
Home Secretary: 
Minister of Labour: 
R. A. Butler 
John Hare 
Colonial Secretary *: lain Macleod (until Oct 6 1); 
Reginald Maudling (Oct 61 - Jul 62) 
Commonwealth Secretary*: Duncan Sandys 
Lord Chancellor: Viscount Kilmuir (until Jul 62) 
Cabinet meetings on this issue: 8 (1960: 2,1961: 6) 
* On July 1962, the posts of Colonial and Commonwealth Secretary were merged into one. 
Alec Douglas-Home (Oct 63 - Oct 64) 
Home Secretary: Henry Brooke 
Minister of Labour: Joseph Godber 
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Commonwealth and Colonial Secretary: 
Duncan Sandys 
Cabinet meetings on this issue: 3 (1964: 3) 
2. Ministerial committees and other main ministerial meetings 
Immigration ofBritish Subjects into the United Kingdom (code GEN325) 
Established: 22 June 1950 
Final meeting: 10 January 1951 
Number of meetings: 2 
Chairman: J. Chuter Ede (Home Secretary) 
Other Members: 
Minister of Labour (G. A. Isaacs) 
Minister of Health (Aneurin Bevan) 
Colonial Secretary (James Griffiths) 
Scottish Secretary (Hector McNeil) 
Commonwealth Secretary (Patrick C. Gordon Walker) 
Attorney-General (Hartley Shawcross) 
Terms of reference: 
'To consider and report to the Cabinet what further means might be 
adopted to control the immigration into this country of coloured people 
from British Colonial territories, if amending legislation were passed 
limiting the right of British subjects, or if any class of British subjects, 
to enter and reside in the United Kingdom, and what issues of policy 
would be involved in making such a change in the existing law' 
Committee on Colonial Immigrants (code Cl) 
Established: 7 December 1955 
Final meeting: 4 October 1956* 
Number of meetings: 3* 
Chairman: Viscount Kilmuir (Lord Chancellor) 
Other members: 
Home Secretary (Gwilyrn Lloyd-George) 
Commonwealth Secretary (The Earl of Home) 
Colonial Secretary (Alan Lennox-Boyd) 
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Minister of Labour (Walter Monckton; from 23 Dec 55, lain 
Macleod) 
Lord President (The Marquess of Salisbury) 
Attomey-General (Reginald Manningham-Buller) 
Terms of reference: 
'To consider what form legislation should take, if it were to be decided 
that legislation to control the entry into the United Kingdom of British 
subjects from overseas should be introduced; to consider also the 
intended effect of such legislation upon actual immigration, how anN, 
such control would be justified to Parliament and the public, and to the 
Commonwealth countries concerned; and to report to the Cabinet' 
* Confirmedfinal meeting and number of meetings. It is highly likely that the fourth meeting 
was held on 22 October 1956; however, documents concerned with this meeting have not 
been published 
Committee on Colonial Immigrants (code CCI) 
Established: 24 January 1957 
Final meeting: 22 July 1959 
Number of meetings: 6 
Chairman: Viscount Kilmuir (Lord Chancellor) 
Other members: 
Home Secretary (R. A. Butler) 
Commonwealth Secretary (The Earl of Home) 
Colonial Secretary (Alan Lennox-Boyd) 
Minister of Labour (lain Macleod) 
Lord President (The Marquess of Salisbury; from Mar 57, 
The Earl of Home; from Jun 57, Viscount Hailsham) 
Attomey-General (Reginald Manningham-Buller) 
Terms of reference: 
'To consider what form legislation should take, if it were to be decided 
that legislation to control the entry into the United Kingdom of British 
subjects from overseas should be introduced; to consider also the 
intended effect of such legislation upon actual immigration, how any 
such control would be justified to Parliament and the public, and to the 
Commonwealth countries concerned; and to report to the Cabinet' 
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Commonwealth Migrants Committee (code CCM) 
Established: 13 December 1960 
Final meeting: 29 September 1961 
Number of meetings: 4 
Chairman: Viscount Kilmuir (Lord Chancellor) 
Other members: 
Home Secretary (R. A. Butler) 
Commonwealth Secretary (Duncan Sandys) 
Colonial Secretary (lain Macleod; from Oct 60, Reginald 
Maudling) 
Minister of Housing (Henry Brooke) 
Minister of Labour (John Hare) 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Charles Hill; from Oct 
60, lain Macleod) 
Minister of Health (Enoch Powell) 
Attorney-General (Reginald Manningham-Buller). 
Terms of reference: 
'To consider and keep under review the problems caused by the 
uncontrolled entry into the United Kingdom of British subjects from 
overseas' 
Informal ministerial meetings held in the Cabinet Office on 19 and 26 October 1961 
Attended by: Home Secretary (R. A. Butler) 
Lord Chancellor (Viscount Kilmuir) 
Lord President (Viscount Hailsham) 
Commonwealth Secretary (Duncan Sandys) 
Colonial Secretary (Reginald Maudling) 
Minister of Labour (John Hare) 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (lain Macleod) 
Treasury Parliamentary Secretary (Martin Redmayne) 
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill (code GEN756) 
Established: 23 November 1961 
Final meeting: 30 November 1961 
Number of meetings: 4 
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Chairman: Harold Macmillan (Prime Minister) 
Other members: 
Lord Chancellor (Viscount Kilmuir) 
Lord President (Viscount Hailsham) 
Home Secretary (R. A. Butler) 
Commonwealth Secretary (Duncan Sandys) 
Colonial Secretary (Reginald Maudling) 
Minister of Labour (John Hare) 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (lain Macleod) 
Minister of Pensions (John Boyd-Carpenter) 
Minister of Transport (Ernest Maples) 
Scottish Secretary (John Maclay) 
Attorney-General (Reginald Manningham-Buller) 
Treasury Financial Secretary (Edward Boyle) 
Treasury Parliamentary Secretary (Martin Redmayne) 
Commonwealth Immigration Committee (code CIQ 
Established: I May 1962 
Final meeting: 7 October 1963 
Number of meetings: 13 
Chairman: Viscount Kilmuir (Lord Chancellor); 
from Jul 62, Henry Brook (Home Secretary) 
Other members: 
Home Secretary (R. A. Butler; from Jul 62, Henry Brooke) 
Commonwealth Secretary (Duncan Sandys) 
Colonial Secretary (Reginald Maudling; from Jul 62, Duncan 
Sandys) 
Minister of Labour (John Hare) 
Minister of Housing (Charles Hill; from Jul 62, Keith Joseph) 
Minister of Pensions (John Boyd-Carpenter) 
Minister of Health (Enoch Powell) 
Scottish Secretary (John Maclay; from Jul 62, Michael 
Noble) 
Attorney-General (Reginald Manningham-Buller) 
Treasury Financial Secretary (Edward Boyle) 
Terms of reference: 
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'To consider problems relating to Commonwealth immigration into the 
United Kingdom' 
Commonwealth Immigration Committee (code M) 
Established: 25 October 1963 
Final meeting: 28 July 1964 
Number of meetings: 5 
Chairman: Henry Brook (Home Secretary) 
Other members: 
Commonwealth and Colonial Secretary (Duncan Sandys) 
Minister of Labour (Joseph Godber) 
Minister of Housing (Keith Joseph) 
Minister of Pensions (Richard Wood) 
Minister of Health (Anthony Barber) 
Scottish Secretary (Michael Noble) 
Attorney-General (John Robson) 
Treasury Financial Secretary (Alan Green) 
Terms of reference: 
'To consider problems relating to Commonwealth immigration into the 
United Kingdom' 
3. Official committees and other main inter-departmental meetings by civil 
servants 
Working Party on the Employment in the United Kingdom ofSurplus Colonial 
Labour (code CLWP) 
Period: October 1948 - July 1949 
Chairman: J. M. Martin (Assistant Under-Secretary, Colonial Office) 
Member: Ministry of Agriculture 
Colonial Office 
Foreign Office 
Ministry of Fuel and Power 
Ministry of Health 
Home Office 
Ministry of Labour 
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Ministry of National Insurance 
Treasury 
Terms of reference: 
'To enquire into the possibilities of employing in the United Kingdom 
surplus manpower of certain Colonial territories in order to assist the 
manpower situation in this country and to relieve unemployment in 
those Colonial territories' 
Home Office meeting of 18 February 1949 
Chairman: William S. Murrie (Deputy Under- Secretary, Home Office) 
Attended by: Home Office 
Treasury 
Colonial Office 
Commonwealth Relations Office 
National Assistance Board 
Ministry of Transport 
Ministry of Labour and National Service 
Ministry of Civil Aviation 
Ministry of Health 
Inter-Departmental Committee on Colonial People in the United Kingdom (code 
CPUK) 
Period: May 1949 - (1952 ?) 
Chairman: J. B. Williams (Assistant Under- Secretary, Colonial Office) 
Member: Colonial Office 
Ministry of Health 
Home Office 
Ministry of Labour 
National Assistance Board 
Ministry of Transport 
Treasury 
Cabinet Office meeting of 22 March 1950 
Chairman: Norman Brook (Cabinet Secretary) 
Attended by: Home Office 
Ministry of Labour 
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Ministry of Health 
Colonial Office 
Commonwealth Relations Office 
Meetings of civil servants in support of GEN325 
Period: June 1950 - January or February 1951 
Chairman: (William S. Murrie, Deputy Under- Secretary, Home Office'? ) 
Attended by: Colonial Office 
Home Office 
Ministry of Labour 
Commonwealth Relations Office 
Cabinet Office 
Working Party on Coloured People Seeking Employment in the United Kingdom 
(code CWP) 
Period: December 1952 - December 1953 
Chairman: W. H. Cornish (Assistant Under- Secretary, Home Office) 
Member: Home Office 
Colonial Office 
Commonwealth Relations Office 
Ministry of Labour 
Scottish Home Department 
Ministry of Transport 
Terms of reference: 
'to examine the possibilities of preventing any further increase in the 
number of coloured people seeking employment in the United Kingdom' 
Working Party to Consider Certain proposals to restrict the right of British 
Subjectsftom overseas to Enter and Remain in the United Kingdom (code 
CWP(2)) 
Period: May 1954 - October 1954 
Chairman: W. H. Cornish (Assistant Under- Secretary, Home Office) 
Member: Home Office 
Colonial Office 
Commonwealth Relations Office 
Ministry of Labour 
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Scottish Home Department 
Ministry of Transport 
Terms of reference: 
'To consider proposals: 
(1) to take power to restrict entry to the United Kingdom of 
Commonwealth citizens not resident in the United Kingdom, and in 
particular the question 
(a) whether the proposals should apply only to citizens of the United 
Kingdom and Colonies resident overseas: 
(b) whether requiring citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies 
from overseas entering this country other than on a temporary basis to 
deposit a sum of E25 would be a sufficient deterrent to persons coming 
to the United Kingdom without resources or firm prospects of 
employment: 
(2) to take power to deport from the United Kingdom any 
Commonwealth citizen convicted of certain offences and persons 
considered undesirable or who become a charge on public funds' 
Working Party to Report on the Social and Economic Problems Arisingftom the 
Growing Influx into the United Kingdom of Coloured Workersftom Other 
Commonwealth Countries (code CWP(3)) 
Period: July 1955 - (April 1962 ?)* 
Chairman: W. H. Cornish (Assistant Under- Secretary, Home Office); 
from September 1956, K. B. Paice (Assistant Under- 
Secretary, Home Office) 
Member: Home Office 
Colonial Office 
Commonwealth Relations Office 
Ministry of Labour and National Service 
Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation 
Scottish Home Department 
National Assistance Board 
Ministry of Health 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government 
Department of Health for Scotland 
Terms of reference: 
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'Whether any, and if so what, administrative or social problems arise 
from the immigration into the United Kingdom of persons from other 
parts of the Commonwealth and the Republic of Ireland; 
What administrative measures would be feasible if any control over the 
entry and settlement of such persons were thought necessary; 
What interference with the traditional ties between this country and 
other parts of the Commonwealth would be involved in any such 
measurest 
* One meeting was held under the name of this committee on 14 February 1964. 
Voucher Working Party (code VWP) 
Period: March 1962 - (at least 1965) 
Chairman: C. J. Maston (Under Secretary, Ministry of Labour) 
Members: Home Office 
Colonial Office 
Commonwealth Relations Office 
Ministry of Labour 
Ministry of Education 
Ministry of Health 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government 
Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance 
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